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STUDIES IN HONOR OF

BASIL L. GILDERSLEEVE

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

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Basil L. Gildersleeve

Studies in Honor

of

Basil L. Gildersleeve



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TO

Basil Lanneau Gildersleeve

IN COMMEMORATION OF

THE SEVENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF HIS BIRTH

THESE STUDIES ARE DEDICATED

AS A TOKEN OF AFFECTION, GRATITUDE, AND ESTEEM

BY HIS PUPILS

θεὸς εὔφρων εἴη λοιπαῖς εὐχαῖς

OCTOBER 23, 1831

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THE APOSTOLIC COMMISSION.

Critical investigation of the four Gospels and the Book of Acts in recent years has thrown a flood of light upon the origin of Christianity. I propose in this article to use this light in a study of the Apostolic Commission.

Early in his ministry Jesus called Simon to leave all and follow him (Mk. i. 16–20). He named him Peter, the rock, as the foremost of the disciples, their chief and spokesman. The Gospels differ as to the time of this naming: Mk. iii. 16; Mt. x. 2, xvi. 17–19; Lk. vi. 14; John i. 40–42; but a critical study of these passages makes it probable that it did not take place until late in Jesus' ministry, when his Messiahship was recognized by the Twelve.[1]

Jesus also called James and John, who with Simon constituted the innermost circle of the Twelve, to whom Jesus entrusted the highest privileges. Next to these was Andrew. Levi (Matthew) also had a special call.

Seven others with these five were selected from the body of the disciples (Mk. iii. 14–19) to constitute the Twelve, who were constantly with Jesus as his companions in his ministry. There can be little doubt that St. Peter was the chief of the Twelve and that there was a primary group of four—Peter and Andrew, James and John. Philip was first of the second group, composed of Philip, Bartholomew, Matthew and Thomas. The third group was James, son of Alphaeus, Thaddaeus, Simon the Zealot, and Judas Iscariot. These three groups constituted the Twelve, who were sent forth in pairs, with authority from Jesus to preach, and teach, and heal during his ministry (Mk. vi. 7–13 = Mtth. x. 1 seq. = Lk. ix. 1 seq.). The four lists vary somewhat in the order of the names within the groups; but in no case in the four lists of Mk., Mtth., Lk. and Acts is there any change of the names out of the three groups.

[1] See Briggs, Study of Holy Scripture, pp. 514–516.

The order of names in Acts (i. 13) differs somewhat from the order of Luke (vi. 13–16) as well as from those of Matthew (x. 2–4) and Mark (iii. 14–19).

In the first group John's name comes second in Acts, whereas in Mtth. and Lk. it is last, the name of Andrew having taken its place in these lists. It seems that the order of names comes from the Jerusalem source,[1] and that John is coupled with Peter in the list as he is in the history. Philip comes first in all the lists of the second group. But the other three names appear in an entirely different order in Acts from that of any of the Gospels: Thomas, Bartholomew, Matthew. There is no reason for this that appears in the history. In the third group James, son of Alphaeus, is always first and Judas Iscariot last. The order of Simon and Thaddaeus differs. In Luke and Acts, Simon is first; in Mark and Matthew, Thaddaeus is first. The reason for this change lies below the surface of the history. We may think of a change in their relative historical importance.

The original term used by Jesus for these Twelve was simply *the Twelve*. The term *apostle* seems to be peculiar to the usage of St. Paul, in his epistles, and of St. Luke, in the Gospel and the Acts.[2] We may say with confidence that the word *apostle*, as applied to the Twelve, was not in any of the primitive sources, whether the Logia of Matthew, the original Gospel of Mark, the original John, or the Hebraistic source of the history of the Church at Jerusalem. In all cases in the Book of Acts, it came from the final author and not from the source. The few uses[3] in the Gospels other than Luke's are redactional. The term *apostle* was a generic term, including in Pauline usage the Twelve and also Paul, Barnabas, and many others; an indefinite number of apostles. The number twelve was a limited number selected by Jesus as his companions during his earthly life. It could never be exceeded. Paul and Barnabas were *Apostles*, but they could never enter into the group of the *Twelve*. The treachery and death of Judas removed him from the number of the Twelve. The first thing they had to do was to fill his place and make their number complete. It seems at first strange that Jesus him-

[1] There was probably a Hebraistic Jerusalem source used by Luke as the basis of the first part of the Book of Acts.

[2] McGiffert, Christianity in the Apostolic Age, pp. 647 seq.

[3] Mt. x. 2; Mk. iii. 14, vi. 30.

self did not select the substitute for Judas during the forty days; and some have inconsiderately argued that the Twelve acted without the authority of Jesus and the influence of the Divine Spirit in the selection of the substitute for Judas, and have even gone so far as to represent that the Lord had really in mind to substitute St. Paul for Judas. But this is certainly a mistake. St. Paul maintains his rights as an Apostle, immediately commissioned by the Lord himself, and his equality in this respect with St. Peter, St. John and St. James (Gal. i. 11 seq.). But nowhere does he, or any one else for him, claim that he was one of the Twelve. Indeed, he had not the qualifications to be one of the Twelve.

Acts i. 15–26 gives an account of the assembly of the brethren for the selection of a substitute for Judas. This narrative in the main comes from the source, although it is probable that vers. 16*b*–19 contain additional material from the author of Acts. This explanatory gloss gives the more specific application of the Psalm to Judas, and gives an account of the death of Judas in the Field of Blood. The words *apostles* and *apostleship* are also glosses. But the story itself is original to the source. The qualification to be one of the Twelve was:

"Who have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and went out among us (Luke adds: 'beginning from the baptism of John, unto the day that he was received up from us'): of these must one become a witness with us of his resurrection" (ver. 21–22).

Two were proposed: 1) Joseph Barsabbas-Justus; 2) Matthias. The choice did not depend on the Eleven, or on the 120 brethren assembled, but upon the Lord himself. Only Jesus, the Messiah, could make the choice. As the Divine Spirit had not been imparted, they were forced to use the sacred lot, the determination of which, according to the Old Testament usage, was with God the searcher of minds; but which, according to their new conception that Jesus was Lord and also searcher of minds, could only come from him. The lot decided for Matthias, and the number of the Twelve was complete. It should be said at this point that the choice of a substitute for Judas was made, not because he had died, but because he had betrayed his trust and had by his own wicked act departed from his high office. No one thought of selecting a substitute for St. James when he

died, or for any other of the Twelve. The Twelve continued to be the Twelve when they departed to the higher life. They became the foundations of the New Jerusalem (Rev. xxi. 14). The Twelve could not possibly have successors as the *Twelve*, any more than their number could be increased. They might, however, have successors as *apostles*, an office which they shared with St. Paul, St. Barnabas, and others. It is improper, therefore, to speak of the Twelve Apostles as a class by themselves. The Twelve were set apart as those favored with the especial intimacy of Jesus during his earthly life; chosen to be with him during that life, to bear witness of that life and of his resurrection; and St. Peter was their chief. But in addition to this they subsequently became *apostles*, and as such shared the apostolate with many others. St. Paul, St. Barnabas, and others were their equals as apostles. Whether the Apostles as apostles had successors is a question which is debatable. Whether the Twelve had successors or could have successors is not debatable. It was impossible from the very nature of the case.

The same question emerges with reference to St. Peter, as with reference to the Twelve—namely, whether he could have successors. If the Twelve could have no successors, then St. Peter as the chief of the Twelve could have no successor. We have seen, however, that the Twelve were also apostles, and as such had a ministry to the Church other than the witness which was their peculiar privilege as the Twelve; and that this apostolate they shared with St. Paul, St. Barnabas, and others; and that the apostolate therefore might have successors, as it had additions made to it during the lifetime of the Apostles. If now St. Peter was not only primate of the Twelve, but also primate of the Apostolate and so of the Church in other relations than in those peculiar to the Twelve, then it is quite possible that St. Peter might have successors in the primacy and the headship over the Church.

The narrative represents that 120 of the ἀδελφοί were present when the selection of Matthias was made. We may assume that Joseph Barsabbas and Matthias, Mary the mother of Jesus, and his brothers, James and Jude, were present; and that those unnamed were women as well as men (Acts i. 14, 15, 23). These statements probably come from the source and not from the final author. St. Paul, in I. Cor. xv. 6, states that Jesus appeared to

above 500 brethren at once. Even this number can hardly represent the sum total of the brotherhood that Jesus had gathered about himself during his brief earthly ministry.

In addition to the Twelve, St. Luke reports a group of disciples named *the Seventy* (Lk. x. 1). It is doubtless a later statement than those derived from the Logia and St. Mark, which know nothing of such a body; but there is no sufficient reason to doubt its genuineness.

The story of Luke is: On leaving Galilee for his Perean ministry Jesus set apart *70*, those whom he had called to follow him, who should go before him in pairs and prepare the way for his ministry, by heralding the advent of the kingdom of God and working miracles in his name. The reason why Luke mentions *the Seventy* is that he alone reports the Perean ministry. The Logia, Mark, Matthew and John know but little of any work in Perea, and therefore had no occasion to speak of the ministry of the 70.

It is clear, however, from the Logia and Mark, that other men than the Twelve were called by Jesus to follow him in special ministry, abandoning property and family and all things for his sake and the proclamation of the gospel of the kingdom. There is no evidence that the group of 70 disciples was continued. They probably were a special selection for this service. But that which the 70 represented—a larger group of ministerial followers of Christ than the Twelve—was certainly continued. In all probability the number 70 had increased very greatly. It is quite possible that the most of the 120 brethren were followers in this special and stricter sense; and it is not beyond reason to suppose that even the 500 witnesses of the resurrection were mostly representatives of the disciples of Christ, and not the whole body of them, and so made up of men and women of this class.

We may safely conclude, therefore, that the whole brotherhood of Jesus, in the week before Pentecost, in Galilee, Perea, Samaria and Jerusalem, where Jesus and the Twelve and the Seventy had preached and wrought miracles, consisted of several thousand men and women; that upwards of 100 of these were disciples who had received the special call to follow him in a ministry which required the renunciation of property and family ties, and exclusive attention to the preaching of the gospel; that the Twelve were the recognized chiefs of this new religious community, and that St. Peter was the recognized head of them all.

There is no report in the Gospel of Mark (apart from the appendix), or in the Logia, of a commissioning of the disciples by Jesus, subsequent to his resurrection. But there can be little doubt that such a commission is mingled in the extracts from the Logia given in connection with the sending forth of the Twelve and the Seventy; for many of these utterances of Jesus had reference to a wider and a larger ministry than any reported in the Gospels during the lifetime of Jesus. From these statements of the Logia we may gather the following summary statement: Jesus commissioned the disciples to preach the kingdom of God. He identified himself with them; so that the treatment of them would be regarded as the treatment of him. These disciples were required to love him supremely, to forsake relatives, property, and all other duties, and to follow him supremely in poverty, self-denial, crossbearing, and obedience to his word.[1]

The Apocalypse of Jesus has inserted in it (Mk. xiii. 9–13 = Lk. xxi. 12–19) a logion, which appears also in the commission of the Twelve (Mtth. x. 17–22). A comparison of the three texts gives the following three strophes, each of 6 trimeter lines:

I.

"But take heed to yourselves.
They will deliver you up to Sanhedrim,
And in synagogues will ye be beaten,
And before governors will ye stand,
And it will turn out unto you for a testimony,
And unto the nations must the gospel be preached.

II.

"And when they lead you to deliver you up,
Be not anxious how ye shall speak;
For it will be given in that hour,
That which ye shall speak;
For it is not ye who speak,
But it is the Spirit that speaketh.

[1] Mtth. viii. 21–22 = Lk. ix. 59–60.
" x. 7–16 = " x. 2–11.
" x. 40 = " x. 16.
" x. 37–38 = " xiv. 26–27.
" xvi. 24 = " ix. 23, xiv. 27.
See Briggs, Messiah of the Gospels, p. 238 seq.

III.

"And brother will deliver up his brother,
And father will deliver up his child,
And children will rise up against their parents,
And they will put them to death,
And ye will be hated by all;
But he that endureth to the End will be saved."

The Hebrew Logion would be (following in the main the usage of Delitzsch, N. T. in Hebrew, but keeping in view the rhythm of Hebrew Wisdom):

ואתם השמרו לנפשתיכם
ימסרו אתכם לסנהדריות
ותכו בבתי כנסיות
ותובאו לפני משלים
ותהיה לכם לעדות
והבשורה להקרא בגוים

אם־יוליכו וימסרו אתכם
אל־תדאגו איך תדברו
כי־ינתן בשעה ההיא
את־אשר תדברו אתם
כי־לא אתם המדברים
כי־אם הרוח המדבר

וימסר אח את־אחיו
וימסר אב את־בנו
ויתקוממו בנים על־אבותם
והמה ימיתו אתם
ותהיו שנואים לכל־אדם
והמחכה עד־הקץ יושע

I. 1. Mt. has *προσέχετε δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων*, which does not seem to be so original or natural as Mk., *βλέπετε δὲ ὑμεῖς ἑαυτούς*. Lk. omits this line.

2. This line is omitted by Lk. but given by Mt.

3. Mt. is more specific, using *μαστιγώσουσιν*, *scourge*, for Mk., *δαρήσεσθε*, which may be original. Lk. generalizes: "But before all these things they will lay their hands on you and will persecute you, delivering you up to the synagogues and *prisons*."

4. All have *kings* as well as *governors*. But it makes the line too long, and is a natural insertion from the history. The order of the two is

inverted in Lk. Mk. has *σταθήσεσθε*; Lk., *ἀπαγομένους*; Mt., *ἀχθήσεσθε*, all going back on the original ותובאו. *ἕνεκεν ἐμοῦ* is explanatory addition.

5. Lk., "It shall turn unto you for a testimony," ותהיה לכם לעדות, seems to preserve the original line which is interpreted in Mt. and Mk. as "for a testimony unto them."

6. This line is omitted by Lk., is condensed by Mt. into *καὶ τοῖς ἔθνεσιν*, and enlarged by Mk. into *εἰς πάντα τὰ ἔθνη πρῶτον δεῖ κηρυχθῆναι τὸ εὐαγγέλιον*, which may be regarded as an explanatory addition, making the line too long. Cf. Mt. xxiv. 14.

II. 1. Condensed by Mt. into *παραδῶσιν ὑμᾶς*; omitted by Lk.

2. Mtth. has *πῶς ἢ τί*, *how or what*, which is enlargement. It is paraphrased by Lk.: "Settle it therefore in your minds not to meditate beforehand how to answer." *How* of Mtth. and Lk. is more probable intrinsically than *what* of Mk.

3 and 4. These two lines must be restored by conjecture. They are condensed in Mk. into: "Whatsoever shall be given to you in that hour, that speak"; which is prose. Mtth. has the first line correctly; but only *τί λαλήσητε* of the second line. Combining this with the first words of Mark's sentence, we get the second line. Lk. paraphrases, and combines these two lines with the remaining two, thus: "For I will give you a mouth and wisdom, which all your adversaries will not be able to withstand or to gainsay."

5. This line is the same in Mk. and Mtth.

6. This line varies. In Mk. it is *ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον*. But Jesus never used *holy* with *Spirit*—that is Lukan, and redactional in other gospels. Mtth. has *τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν τὸ λαλοῦν ἐν ὑμῖν*. This, without the qualifying *τοῦ πατρὸς ὑμῶν* and the explanatory *ἐν ὑμῖν*, gives us the original line. It was the usage of Jesus to speak of "*the Spirit*." Lk. explains this as the personal direction of Jesus himself, which is a later conception and interpretation.

III. 1. *εἰς θάνατον* is explanatory addition from line 4; otherwise the same in Mtth. and Mk.

2. The Hebrew would repeat vb., as Delitzsch, Heb. N. T.; Mt. x. 21.

3. This is the same in Mtth. and Mk.

4. The line is defective in both texts; *καὶ θανατώσουσιν αὐτούς*, Mk., Mt. We might conjecture subject; this should then sum up the three previous lines in a demonstrative הֻמָּה. But Mtth. xxiv. 9, condensed in Lk. xxi. 16, is doubtless based on the same original as Mk. xiii. 12, and it suggests a change of subject here rather than first in line 5. Mt., *καὶ ἀποκτενοῦσιν ὑμᾶς*. Lk., *καὶ θανατώσουσιν ἐξ ὑμῶν*. But on the whole it seems best to read והמה ימיתו אתם.

5. *διὰ τὸ ὄνομά μου* is an explanatory addition, making the line too long.

6. The *οὗτος* makes the line too long, and is an emphatic addition.

We may not be able to determine when this commission was given, and whether it was given to the Twelve or to the larger ministry. But this much is plain: we may know without doubt essentially what Jesus said to them. Their ministry was to be before the Sanhedrim, in synagogues, and before Roman governors; just as Jesus' ministry was. They would give their testimony in these places and suffer for Christ's sake. They were not only to preach the gospel in the land of Palestine, but also unto the nations. It is not evident whether this ministry was conceived as to the Jews and the proselytes scattered among the nations, or as an effort to proselytize the nations beyond the scope of the proselyting of the Pharisees. It is not likely that it was, as given by Jesus, in the specific Pauline sense of later date. It was not inconsistent with it, but it did not compel that interpretation. It did, however, conceive of a world-wide ministry.

There was a specific promise of the presence and guidance of the Divine Spirit in this world-wide ministry; and not only a general guidance, but a specific, one may say an ecstatic, guidance; for the Spirit is conceived as so taking possession of them, that they speak not their own words but the words of the Divine Spirit. It is also distinctly taught that they will suffer persecution, and that patient endurance until the End of the Age, the Second Advent of the Lord, is necessary for their full and final salvation.

One finds in the four Gospels a large amount of material relating to the work that the Twelve and the larger ministry had to do, in the world, in following the Master. It is impracticable for us to take all this into consideration. But it is necessary to consider whether Jesus gave a final commission to his ministry after his resurrection, and if so, what was the extent of that commission. The reports are so different in the Gospels, that we must use all the resources of literary and historical criticism to get at the real facts of the case. There is, as we have seen, no report of a final commission in the Logia or in Mark. The report in the Appendix to Mark is a general statement coming from a late date. Mtth. xxviii. 18–20, however, gives us a commission in connection with the appearance of Jesus to the Eleven on a mountain in Galilee. A careful study of this commission shows us that in all probability a logion or original sentence of Jesus underlies it; but that it has been enlarged and explained after the method of the Gospel of Matthew in other similar cases.

The Logion was probably as follows:

"All authority hath been given unto me.
Go ye therefore into all the earth,
And make disciples of all nations.
Baptize them into my name,
And teach them to keep my commands:
And I am with you unto the End."

The Hebrew Logion may be constructed essentially as follows:

כל־השלטון נתן לי
בכל־הארץ לכו אתם
והעמידו לתלמידים כל־הגוים
טבלו אותם בשמי
ולמדו לשמר מצותי
ואנכי אתכם עד־הקץ

If this be the original form of the Logion, it is precisely the same in structure as the three-strophed Logion already considered; and it is quite possible that it was originally an integral part of the same commission, for it harmonizes quite well with it and might indeed be its initial strophe.

"In heaven and on earth" is a quite natural and true interpretation of "*all* authority."

"Go ye therefore" seems to require a statement whither. The context suggests "all the earth."

The baptismal formula is evidently a late addition. Jesus could not have used it. He probably commanded his disciples to baptize in *his name* as well as to keep his commands. The practice of the disciples, as we see it in the Pauline epistles and in the Book of Acts, was to baptize in the name of Jesus, or the name of the Lord,[1] which is one and the same thing.[2] The Trinitarian formula was eventually substituted by apostolic authority, and so came into Mtth.'s text.

The *End* is the technical term for the End of the Age. Sometimes the more precise term is given—*αἰών* = עולם, but I doubt whether, in any of the words of Jesus, he said more than "*the End*."[3]

[1] Acts ii. 38, viii. 16, x. 48; cf. I. Cor. i. 13, so *εἰς Χριστόν*; Rom. vi. 3; Gal. iii. 27.

[2] McGiffert, Christianity in the Apostolic Age, pp. 60 seq.

[3] Briggs, Messiah of the Gospels, pp. 138, 231.

This Logion imparts the authority from the Lord to enter upon a world-wide ministry. This ministry was to consist—

(1) In making disciples of all nations—that is, making them disciples of Christ. It does not open up the question what their relation to Judaism would be. It does not in itself imply any more than that the disciples should do as the Pharisees did, proselyte the nations—only those commissioned by Jesus were organized and energized by Jesus and were sent forth as a band of missionaries to do it. They were certainly to make the nations disciples of Jesus.

(2) They were to baptize them into the name of Jesus. As John baptized his disciples, so the disciples of Jesus were to be baptized. The baptism of John had been a baptism unto repentance; the baptism of Jesus was a baptism into his name as the Messiah. It involved a recognition of Jesus as the Messiah, the Lord and King of the kingdom of God.

(3) They were to teach the commands of Jesus, and see to it that these commands were observed by the disciples. This conceives of a discipleship of obedience to commands or laws, only these commands are specifically those of the Messiah. There is involved no antithesis to the Law of Moses, but there is implied a new law, that of the Messiah. This conception is in entire keeping with the Logia and especially with the statement of Jesus: "I came not to destroy the Law, but to fulfil it" (Mtth. v. 17). The fulfilment of the Law that Jesus taught was in the Law of Love. It is noteworthy that there is no promise of the Divine Spirit here; but instead of the Spirit, Jesus promises his own presence with his ministers in all their ministry, even until the End of the Age of the world.

This commission, even if given to the Eleven alone, yet comprehends the entire ministry for all time. There is nothing in this commission which ever was peculiar to the Twelve. The entire ministry in the Apostolic Age did all these things. They made disciples; they baptized; they taught Jesus' commands; Jesus himself was present with them.

The same commission also covers all their successors in the ministry throughout all time: for the Master's presence was promised until the End of the Age, until the Second Advent.

There is a report in Lk. xxiv. 46–49 of a commission given to the Eleven in Jerusalem. This is in general terms and does not

give the contents of the commission itself. It states that Jesus said unto them: "Thus it is written, that the Messiah should suffer, and rise again from the dead the third day; and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in his name unto all nations, beginning from Jerusalem. Ye are witnesses of these things. And behold, I send forth the promise of my Father upon you; but tarry ye in the city, until ye be clothed with power from on high."

This report gives three essential things: (1) An explanation by Jesus to the Eleven of the real meaning of his death and resurrection, and of the relation of the prophecies of the Old Testament thereto. We have not the contents of this teaching of Jesus; but it was the most natural thing in the world that the risen Lord should explain just these things to the Eleven; and there is every reason for us to believe that he did it. This teaching of Jesus is doubtless represented in the interpretation of the Old Testament by the Apostles; but it is impracticable to distinguish between the teaching of the Apostles and the teaching of Jesus in this particular.

(2) He commissions the Eleven to preach in his name unto all nations, beginning from Jerusalem. This is simply a reiteration of what we have found in the Logia, except the phrase "beginning from Jerusalem," which was quite a natural thing for Jesus to say. But it matters little if we should suppose that clause to be an addition of the Evangelist. The words "Ye are witnesses of these things" are only a paraphrase of the *witness* of the Logion. What they are to preach: "repentance and remission of sins," is what Jesus himself preached, after the example of John the Baptist. It is what the Twelve actually did preach, according to Acts. It is altogether probable that Jesus taught them just this. It is true the Logion commands that they should teach to keep all the commands of Jesus. But if Jesus had specified later or on the same occasion what those commands were, he would have certainly said first of all, *repentance*, and he would have attached to repentance, as a condition, *the remission of sins*. All this is entirely in accord with the primitive tradition, and is not in accordance with Paulinism, which makes little of either of these things.

(3) The promise of the Spirit is given in the Logion. The only thing special in this passage is the definite attachment of the

fulfilment of that promise to a specific day, and the command to postpone entrance upon their ministry until they were endowed with the special gift of the power (*δύναμις*) from on high.

The statement in Acts i. 2–8 is in entire accord with this. It is chiefly from the final author of Acts; but there seem to be underlying it statements from the earlier document, as follows:

> "John indeed baptized with water;
> But ye shall be baptized with the Spirit."
> —(Ver. 5.)

This is a logion, an antithetical couplet. It is verified as a logion of the Lord by St. Peter in Acts xi. 16. But St. Peter omits "not many days hence," which is therefore an explanatory addition of the author from his context, charging the Eleven not to depart from Jerusalem, but to wait for the fulfilment of the promise. So also the original document gives us the inquiry of the Eleven: "Lord, dost thou at this time restore the kingdom to Israel?" (ver. 6). They naturally inquired about the kingdom, and they naturally supposed that the resurrection of the Lord had something to do with the restoration of the kingdom. They were certainly looking forward to the setting up of a kingdom of Israel in the land of Palestine. Jesus' reply is also original to the source for the most part:

> "No one can know times or seasons,
> Which the Father hath set within his own authority.
> Ye shall receive power, when the Spirit is come upon you,
> And ye shall be my witnesses in Jerusalem and unto the uttermost part of the earth."

The Hebrew Logion was essentially as follows:

איש לא־יכל לדעת העתים והזמנים
אשר שמם לו האב ביכלהו
תקבלו גבורה כבוא עליכם הרוח
והייתם עדי בירושלים ועד־קצה הארץ

This is a logion of four pentameters, and it is doubtless an original logion of Jesus. Luke has modified it only slightly by the insertion of "in all Judaea and Samaria," in order to make it correspond with his subsequent history; and, as usual, "Holy" is appended to "Spirit" in Luke. We follow in the first line

the Western text, which seems intrinsically more probable than the usual text—"It is not for you to know"—and it is more in accord with Jesus' words in his apocalypse, "But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father" (Mk. xiii. 32).[1] It is much more probable that Jesus here, as there, included himself among the "No one can know," than that he should assume to know and decline to tell it to the Eleven who asked him. A later scribe would not change the "It is not for you to know" into "*No one* can know." A scribe would be more likely to reverse the process.

The promise of the Spirit here is what we have had elsewhere with sufficient frequency. The commission to be witnesses is also now familiar. "The uttermost parts of the earth" is in accordance with the other logion as truly as is "Jerusalem."

In addition to the story from the original document, the author of Acts gives the general statement:

"After that he had given commandment through the Holy Spirit unto the apostles, whom he had chosen; to whom he also showed himself alive after his passion by many proofs, appearing unto them by the space of forty days, and speaking the things concerning the kingdom of God; and being assembled together with them, he charged them not to depart from Jerusalem, but to wait for the promise of the Father" (vers. 2–4).

The Appendix, Mk. xvi. 15–18, gives a commission in connection with an appearance to the Eleven in Jerusalem, which is evidently a compilation from several sources.

a) "Go ye into all the world
b) and preach the gospel to the whole creation.
c) He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved;
d) but he that disbelieveth shall be condemned."

This part may be regarded as parallel with the commission given by Matthew; but lines 2, 3 and 4 of Matthew are here condensed, and the language changed in *a*, *b*; and *c*, *d* really substitute Pauline faith for the obedience of Matthew, which latter is the conception of Christ and the Twelve. The second part is more manifestly compiled from the point of view of the experience of the Apostolic Age:

[1] Briggs, Messiah of the Gospels, p. 161.

"And these signs shall follow them that believe: in my name shall they cast out demons; they shall speak with (new) tongues; they shall take up serpents, and if they drink any deadly thing, it shall in no wise hurt them; they shall lay their hands on the sick, and they shall recover."

The use of *signs*, σημεῖα, agrees with the final author of John and Luke against the other Synoptists. The earlier term was δυνάμεις. The use of *tongues* reflects the tongues of the epistle to the Corinthians (I. Cor. xii. 28, xiv. 13 seq.), if not the gifts of the story of Acts (Acts ii. 4 seq.). The references to *demons* and the *laying hands on the sick* may have been taken from the earlier commission, as they resemble those of the Synoptic tradition. The reference to *serpents* seems to reflect the story of Paul, Acts xxviii. 1–6, and the reference to the *poisonous drink* has nothing to correspond with it. On the whole this composite commission reflects a late conception, and is little help to construct the original commission of Jesus. It combines the historic results of the commission with the commission itself.

When, now, we turn to John's Gospel, we find in Jo. xx. 21–23 a report of a commission given to ten of the Twelve in Jerusalem in the absence of Thomas:

"As the Father hath sent me, even so send I you. And when he had said this, he breathed on them, and said unto them: Receive ye the Holy Spirit. Whosesoever sins ye forgive, they are forgiven unto them; whosesoever sins ye retain, they are retained."

A critical examination of this passage shows that verse 23 is a variation of Matthew xviii. 18, and that it does not belong here. It is in the midst of an ancient canon of Church discipline, Mtth. xviii. 15–20[1]:

"What things soever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven:
And what things soever ye shall loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven."

But it is also contained in the naming of St. Peter, Mtth. xvi. 17–19:

"I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of God;
And whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth shall be bound in heaven:
And whatsoever thou shalt loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven."

[1] See Briggs, Messiah of the Gospels, p. 193.

The connection here is much more appropriate, and is doubtless original. If these words be eliminated from the narrative of John, we have simply the sending of the disciples, and the symbolic action with the words: "Receive ye the Holy Spirit." The adjective "*holy*" we may regard as redactional, in other respects the phrase is doubtless original. The symbolic action of Jesus, "breathing" on these ten, is entirely Hebraistic in conception, and probably comes from the original John. The words of Jesus, "I send you as the Father hath sent me" and "Receive ye the Spirit," are entirely in accord with the other narratives. The only difficulty lies with the interpretation of the act. If Jesus actually imparted the Divine Spirit to ten of the Twelve at this time, there is an inconsistency with the narrative of the Book of Acts, that the Spirit was first given at Pentecost. We notice also the absence of Thomas, and also of the substitute for Judas. Did the writer think that Jesus communicated the Divine Spirit officially only to ten of the Twelve? This conception of an impartation of the Divine Spirit by Jesus during his presence with the disciples[1] is inconsistent with the conception of the previous discourses, that it was necessary for Jesus to go away to the Father before he could send the Divine Spirit as another Paraclete (xvi. 7). Jesus' final departure to the Father, at his Ascension, was necessary prior to the advent of the Spirit. We must take the passage as a symbolical prophecy on the part of Jesus, and regard the words "Receive the Spirit" as prophetic. This interpretation harmonizes the Gospel of John with itself and also with the narratives of the other Gospels and of Acts, and is in accordance with prophetic analogies. It seems probable that a considerable amount of the material in the discourses of the Gospel of John, especially vi. 51*b*–58 and portions of chapters xv.–xvii., are post-resurrection discourses, delivered in that same upper room where the last Passover was celebrated, and where the disciples were accustomed to meet after the resurrection of Jesus, which was probably the same as the house of Mary, the mother of John Mark (Acts xii. 12). It was not unnatural, therefore, that the post-resurrection discourses and the pre-resurrection discourses given in the same place to the same disciples should appear together in consecutive discourses in the Gospel of John, chrono-

[1] McGiffert, Christianity in the Apostolic Age, pp. 49 seq.

logical order having been abandoned for a topical one, just as in the Sermon on the Mount (Mtth. chap. v.–vii.). At all events, the discourses, chap. xv.–xvii., delivered after the words: "Arise, let us go hence" (xiv. 31), centre about a promise of the Divine Spirit and an exhortation, warning and commission of the Eleven after the departure of Jesus to the Father:

"Herein is my Father glorified, that ye bear much fruit; and *so* shall ye be my disciples" (xv. 8).

"If ye keep my commandments, ye shall abide in my love" (xv. 10).

"Ye did not choose me, but I chose you, and appointed you, that ye should go and bear fruit, and that your fruit should abide" (xv. 16).

"A servant is not greater than his lord. If they persecuted me, they will also persecute you; if they kept my word, they will keep yours also" (xv. 20).

"But when the Paraclete is come, whom I will send unto you from the Father (*even* the Spirit of Truth, which proceedeth from the Father), he shall bear witness of me: and bear ye also witness, because ye have been with me from the beginning" (xv. 26–27).

"They shall put you out of the synagogues: yea, the hour cometh, that whosoever killeth you shall think that he offereth service unto God" (xvi. 2).

"It is expedient for you that I go away: for if I go not away, the Paraclete will not come unto you; but if I go, I will send him unto you" (xvi. 7).

"When he, the Spirit of Truth, is come, he will guide you into all the truth" (xvi. 13).

"While I was with them, I kept them in thy name which thou hast given me; and I guarded them, and not one of them perished, but the son of perdition" (xvii. 12).

"As thou didst send me into the world, even so sent I them into the world" (xvii. 18).

"Neither for these only do I pray, but for them also that believe on me through their word" (xvii. 20).

It is plain that the advent of the Spirit to guide, the commandment of love, the sending forth to bear witness of Christ, the persecutions that they will undergo—all this is entirely in accord with the commission as given in the Logia. That which is

especially emphasized here is the *Personal* Spirit, the *New Command of Love* (xv. 12, 17), and the *indwelling of the Spirit* in the witnesses (xiv. 7).

The commissions are attached to the Twelve in all cases where we have any information as to those who were present. But they are all of such a character as apply to the ministry as a whole and throughout all time. Is it involved in this commission that all other ministers derive their commission mediately through the Twelve, while the Twelve derived their ministry immediately from the Lord himself? In a sense this must be true, because only the Twelve received authority from the Lord before he left the earth to go to the Father. If all the authority for the ministry were derived from the original commission, this would be the inevitable result. But the commission did not complete the authority for the ministry. According to all the reports, the coming upon them of the Divine Spirit was to endow them with the authority and the power to undertake their ministry. The commission of the Twelve was, as it were, the instruction and the call of the primary ministers by the Lord before he ascended to his throne. It was necessary that he should actually ascend his throne and enter upon his reign, ere he could impart to even the chosen Twelve the royal authority to organize and to advance the kingdom on earth.

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HOMERIC ECHOES IN MATTHEW ARNOLD'S 'BALDER DEAD.'

The poem 'Balder Dead,' published in 1855, may be regarded as illustrating the 'classical' theory of Arnold's famous Preface of 1853. The subject—Romantic or Gothic as could well be chosen—is taken from the Younger Edda[1]; the treatment is consciously and purposely Homeric. In particular, the account of the funeral of Balder is to be compared with the account of the funeral of Patroklos, and the description of Hermod's visit to Hela's realm with the description of Odysseus' visit to the abode of Hades. In these passages there is a more or less consecutive imitation of particular books of the Iliad and Odyssey, but throughout the narrative one may notice many lines and phrases which seem to have been borrowed here and there in Homer, as the growth of the poem recalled them at random to the author's mind.

The poem begins with the wailing of the gods and heroes over the dead Balder's body:

> "And now would night have fall'n, and found them yet
> Wailing; but otherwise was Odin's will."

Compare the wailing of the Greeks over the body of Patroklos, Il. XXIII 154[2]: "And so would the light of the sun have gone down on their lamentation, had not Achilles said," etc.; or the wailing of the Trojan women over the body of Hector, Il. XXIV 713. Odin checks their wailing, and reminds them that Balder has but met the doom which the Nornies spun for him at his birth, just as Thetis checks the wailing of Achilles, Il. XIX 9: "for by the will of gods from the beginning was he brought low." And even as Achilles directs, Il. XXIII 49, that in the morning

[1] "Mallet, and his version of the Edda, is all the poem is based upon," Letters of Matthew Arnold, vol. I, p. 55 (Dec. 1855).

[2] The Homeric passages in this paper are quoted from the standard prose versions by Messrs. Butcher, Lang, Leaf and Myers.

the folk shall bring wood, and furnish forth a funeral-pile, so Odin gives command:

> "to-morrow, when the morning dawns,
> Bring wood to the seashore to Balder's ship,
> And on the deck build high a funeral-pile."

The funeral-feast of Il. XXIII 55, a feast which lasts until night-fall, has its counterpart in the funeral-feast of the gods and heroes

> "While twilight fell, and sacred night came on."

In this line Arnold borrows the Homeric epithet *κνέφας ἱερόν*, Il. XI 194; XVII 455, and in another line of the same passage:

> "And the Valkyries crown'd their horns with mead,"

he adapts the Homeric expression "and the young men crowned the bowls with wine" (*κρητῆρας ἐπεστέψαντο ποτοῖο*), Il. I 470, etc. When the grief-stricken Hoder leaves the feasting gods, and wanders out through the city gates:

> "Down to the margin of the roaring sea
> He came, and sadly went along the sand,"

we are reminded of the sorrowing Achilles, Il. XXIII 59, who, at the end of the funeral-feast, went apart from the rest, and "upon the beach of the sounding sea lay groaning heavily . . . in an open place, where waves were breaking on the shore." Compare, also, the famous line, Il. I 34, which tells how Chryses the aged priest "went in silence along the beach of the loud-sounding sea":

βῆ δ' ἀκέων παρὰ θῖνα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης.

In the wailing of Nanna and "the Goddesses who wrought her will," as they stand by Balder's bier:

> "And at his head and feet she station'd Scalds
> Who in their lives were famous for their song;
> These o'er the corpse intoned a plaintive strain,
> A dirge—and Nanna and her train replied,"

we seem to hear the wailing of Andromache and the Trojan women over the body of Hector, Il. XXIV 720: "And they . . . laid him on a fretted bed, and set beside him minstrels leaders of the dirge, who wailed a mournful lay, while the women made moan with them." And when their wailing is done:

> "and Nanna went
> Into an upper chamber, and lay down;
> And Frea seal'd her tired lids with sleep,"

we think of the recurrent grief of Penelope, Od. I 362, etc.: "She ascended to her upper chamber with the women her handmaids, and then was bewailing Odysseus, her dear lord, till grey-eyed Athene cast sweet sleep upon her eyelids."

The vision which comes to Nanna:

> "Then Balder's spirit through the gloom drew near,
> In garb, in form, in feature as he was,
> Alive; . . . . . he stood
> Over against the curtain of the bed,
> And gazed on Nanna as she slept, and spake:—
> 'Poor lamb, thou sleepest, and forgett'st thy woe!'"

is very like the vision which came to Achilles, as he slept, Il. XXIII 65: "then came there unto him the spirit of hapless Patroklos, in all things like his living self, in stature, and fair eyes, and voice, and the raiment of his body was the same; and he stood above Achilles' head and spake to him: 'Thou sleepest, and hast forgotten me, O Achilles.'" And just as Achilles tries to embrace the shade of Patroklos, Il. XXIII 99, "but clasped him not; for like a vapour (ἠΰτε καπνός) the spirit was gone beneath the earth," so Nanna tries to embrace the shade of Balder; but he fades away into the night, like a smoke which is seen to "hang in the air afield and disappear." Compare, also, Virgil, Geor. IV 499:

> "dixit, et ex oculis subito, ceu fumus in auras
> commixtus tenues, fugit diversa."

Odin's command:

> "Go quickly, Gods, bring wood to the seashore,
> With all, which it beseems the dead to have,
> And make a funeral-pile on Balder's ship,"

is an echo of the words of Achilles, Il. XXIII 49: "rouse the folk to bring wood and furnish all that it beseemeth a dead man to have when he goeth beneath the misty gloom." And the description of the gods bringing down wood for the funeral-pile is distinctly Homeric. They "took axes and ropes," and, with Thor at their head,

> "Forth wended they, and drave their steeds before.
> And up the dewy mountain-tracks they fared
> To the dark forests, in the early dawn;
> And up and down, and side and slant they roam'd."

There they lopped and clove the pine trees,

> "And bound the logs behind their steeds to draw,
> And drave them homeward; and the snorting steeds
> Went straining through the crackling brushwood down,
> And by the darkling forest-paths the Gods
> Follow'd, and on their shoulders carried boughs.
> And they came out upon the plain, and pass'd
> Asgard, and led their horses to the beach,
> And loosed them of their loads on the seashore,
> And ranged the wood in stacks by Balder's ship."

In the closing lines of this passage Asgard seems to be visualized as a sort of Ilios—with a Mount Ida on one side of it, and on the other the sea. But the whole passage is closely modelled on the description of the Greeks bringing down wood for the pyre of Patroklos, Il. XXIII 110 ff. In the Homeric passage, men are sent from all the huts to fetch wood, with Meriones to watch over them. "And they went forth with wood-cutting axes in their hands and well-woven ropes, and before them went the mules, and uphill and downhill and sideways and across they went. But when they came to the spurs of many-fountained Ida, straightway they set them lustily to hew high-foliaged oaks with the long-edged bronze, and with loud noise fell the trees. Then splitting them asunder the Achaeans bound them behind the mules, and they tore up the earth with their feet as they made for the plain through the thick underwood. And all the woodcutters bare logs; . . . And on the shore they threw them down in line, where Achilles purposed a mighty tomb for Patroklos and for himself."

Another of Odin's commands:

> "But now, put on your arms, and mount your steeds,
> And in procession all come near, and weep
> Balder; for that is what the dead desire.
> When ye enough have wept, then build a pile
> Of the heap'd wood, and burn his corpse with fire
> Out of our sight; that we may turn from grief,
> And lead, as erst, our daily life in Heaven,"

combines two commands of Achilles: Il. XXIII 8, "with horses and chariots let us go near and mourn Patroklos, for such is the honour of the dead"; and Il. XXIII 52, "rouse the folk to bring wood . . . to the end that untiring fire may burn him quickly

from sight, and the host betake them to their work." And the military honors paid to Balder:

> "And thrice in arms around the dead they rode,
> Weeping; the sands were wetted, and their arms,
> With their thick-falling tears—so good a friend
> They mourn'd that day, so bright, so loved a God,"

are borrowed bodily from Il. XXIII 13[1]: "So thrice around the dead they drave their well-maned steeds, moaning . . . Bedewed were the sands with tears, bedewed the warriors' arms; so great a lord of fear they sorrowed for." Virgil has imitated the same passage, Aen. XI 188–91; compare, in particular, the line:

> "spargitur et tellus lacrimis, sparguntur et arma."

The wailing of Odin:

> "And Odin came, and laid his kingly hands
> On Balder's breast, and thus began the wail,"

is like the wailing of Achilles, Il. XXIII 17, or XVIII 317: "And Peleus' son led their loud wail, laying his man-slaying hands on his comrade's breast." When Freya, "the loveliest Goddess she in Heaven," takes Balder's head in her hands, and recalls his kindness:

> "Thou only, Balder, wast for ever kind,
> To take my hand, and wipe my tears, and say:
> 'Weep not, O Freya, weep no golden tears!
> One day the wandering Oder will return.'
> . . . . . and Balder now is gone,
> And I am left uncomforted in Heaven,"

one thinks of the lament of Briseis, "that was like unto golden Aphrodite," over the body of Patroklos, Il. XIX 295: "But thou, when swift Achilles slew my husband . . . wouldst ever that I should not even weep . . . Therefore with all my soul I mourn thy death,[2] for thou wert ever kind." Compare, also, the wailing

[1] Similar military honors are recorded as paid by various ancient peoples to their heroes: by the Greeks to Achilles, Od. XXIV 68; by Germanicus and his legions to Drusus, Tacitus, Ann. II 7, 4; by the Carthaginians to Gracchus, Livy, XXV 17, 5; by the Huns to Attila, Jordanes, Get. XLIX; by the Jutes to Beowulf, Beow. 3170.

[2] τῷ σ' ἄμοτον κλαίω τεθνηότα, μείλιχον αἰεί. Compare the lament of the hero Regner: "Therefore with grateful heart I mourn thee dead."

of Andromache, Il. XXIV 724, "while in her hands she held the head of Hector, slayer of men"; and the lament of Helen, Il. XXIV 774: "for no more is any left in wide Troy-land to be my friend and kind to me, but all men shudder at me." And the line at the end of Freya's lament:

> "She spake, and all the Goddesses bewail'd,"

may be compared with such lines as Il. XXIV 746: "Thus spake she wailing, and the women joined their moan."

After the burning of Balder's funeral-pyre, the gods went and

> "sate down in Odin's hall
> At table, and the funeral-feast began."

So in the closing lines of the Iliad, after Hector's funeral-pile is burned: "when they had heaped the barrow they went back, and gathered them together and feasted them right well in noble feast at the palace of Priam, Zeus-fostered king."

When Frea explains that the messenger who is to go to Hela's realm must ride on until he hears "the roaring of the streams of Hell," and sees the "feeble shadowy tribes" and

> "the wailful ghosts
> Who all will flit, like eddying leaves, around,"

we are reminded of Circe's instructions to Odysseus when he is about to go to the abode of Hades, Od. X 504 ff. The Greek hero is to journey on until he comes to "a meeting of the two roaring waters," and when he has entreated "the strengthless heads of the dead," then will many spirits come to him "of the dead that be departed." The 'flitting' ghosts of the English poem recall Homer's ἀίσσουσιν, Od. X 495, and Virgil's 'volitare,' Aen. VI 293, 329. Moreover, Arnold's messenger, as he journeys through the darkness,

> "must ever watch the northern Bear,
> Who from her frozen height with jealous eye
> Confronts the Dog and Hunter in the south,
> And is alone not dipt in Ocean's stream,"

much as Odysseus, Od. V 270, steers his course by "the Bear, which they likewise call the Wain, which turneth ever in one place, and keepeth watch upon Orion, and alone hath no part in the baths of Ocean." And the promise made to Hermod when he is bidden to set forth to Hela's realm:

> "And they shall be thy guides, who have the power,"

recalls the comforting words of Od. IV 827: "For lo, such a friend goes to guide him, as all men pray to stand by them, for that she hath the power (*δύναται γάρ*), even Pallas Athene."

In Arnold's version of the manner of Nanna's death—by a "painless stroke" from Frea—we have the Homeric fancy which ascribes the sudden death of women to the "gentle shafts" of Artemis; compare Od. XI 173. And Hela's amazement when the living Hermod appears before her:

> "Unhappy, how hast thou endured to leave
> The light, and journey to the cheerless land . . .
> Being alive?"

repeats the amazement of the spirit of Anticleia, Od. XI 156: "how didst thou come beneath the darkness and the shadow, thou that art a living man?"[1]

When Hermod first addresses Balder in Hela's realm:

> "Even in the abode of death, O Balder, hail!"

we hear once more the cry of Achilles, Il. XXIII 20, 180: "All hail, Patroklos, even in the house of Hades." And a part of the dialogue between them is a very clear echo of the dialogue between Odysseus and the shade of Achilles. Hermod is speaking:

> "'And sure of all the happiest far art thou
> Who ever have been known in earth or Heaven;
> Alive, thou wast of Gods the most beloved,
> And now thou sittest crown'd by Hela's side,
> Here, and hast honour among all the dead.'
> He spake; and Balder utter'd him reply . . .
> 'Hermod the nimble, gild me not my death!
> Better to live a serf, a captured man,
> Who scatters rushes in a master's hall,
> Than be a crown'd king here, and rule the dead.'"

Compare Od. XI 483 ff., where Odysseus is speaking: "'while as for thee, Achilles, none other than thou wast heretofore the most blessed of men, nor shall any be hereafter. For of old, in the days of thy life, we Argives gave thee one honour with the

[1] Messrs. Butcher and Lang (The Odyssey of Homer, p. 416) quote the passage of the Kalevala, in which the Daughters of Death find a similar difficulty when the living Wainamoinen tries to enter Tuonela, the Finnish Hades.

gods, and now thou art a great prince here among the dead. Wherefore let not thy death be any grief to thee, Achilles.'

"Even so I spake, and he straightway answered me, and said: 'Nay, speak not comfortably to me of death, O great Odysseus. Rather would I live on ground as the hireling of another, with a landless man who had no great livelihood, than bear sway among all the dead that be departed.'"

When Odin proposes to go to Hela's realm and bring back Balder by force:

> "He spake, and his fierce sons applauded loud,"

we think of Il. VIII 542:

> Ὣς Ἕκτωρ ἀγόρευ', ἐπὶ δὲ Τρῶες κελάδησαν,

"So Hector spake: the Trojans roar'd applause," as it runs in Tennyson's specimen translation. The same line recurs in Il. XVIII 310. And the words in which Balder is made to foretell the downfall of heaven:

> "The day will come, when fall shall Asgard's towers,
> And Odin, and his sons, the seed of Heaven,"

are modelled on the words of Hector, Il. VI 450, or of Agamemnon, Il. IV 164: "the day shall come for holy Ilios to be laid low, and Priam and the folk of Priam of the good ashen spear."

The ship-burial of the Old Norse story is retained in the English poem, but many of the details are either omitted or modified. For example, in the original account[1] the gods are unable to launch Balder's ship, and so send to Jotunheim for the giantess Hyrrokin. She comes riding upon a wolf, with twisted serpents for reins; and while four Berserkers contrive to hold her plunging steed, she goes to the prow, and launches the ship "with one single push; but the motion was so violent that fire sprang from the underlaid rollers and all the earth shook." In Arnold's poem this grim giantess is not mentioned at all, and the might of Thor is made equal to the task:

> "and Thor
> Set his stout shoulder hard against the stern
> To push the ship through the thick sand;—sparks flew
> From the deep trench she plough'd."

[1] R. B. Anderson, The Younger Edda, p. 133; Karl Simrock, Die Edda, p. 287.

The ship, it will be noticed, becomes a classical ship—beached as ships in Homer are beached, with the prow pointing toward the sea.[1] Again, in the Norse story Nanna dies of grief before Balder's funeral-ship; in Arnold's version she dies in Homeric fashion, in her bed:

> "Frea, the mother of the Gods, with stroke
> Painless and swift, set free her airy soul."

The grotesque incident of the dwarf whom the angry Thor kicked into the blazing pyre is omitted altogether. Moreover, in the Edda "this funeral-pile was attended by many kinds of folk"—Odin and his ravens, Frea, and the Valkyries; Frey drawn in his chariot by the boar Gullinburste, Heimdal riding his steed Gulltop, and Freya driving her cats; there came also a great company of frost-giants and mountain-giants. In Arnold's version most of these details are omitted—whether as unclassical or as unessential—and the gods who remain become somehow nobler personages. For the treatment is Homeric, and Homer is 'always noble.'

In one of his letters[2] Arnold has something to say of Tennyson: "The fault I find with Tennyson in his Idylls of the King is that the peculiar charm and aroma of the Middle Age he does not give in them." In the Preface of 1853 he had argued for the Greek theory of poetic art: "All depends upon the subject; choose a fitting action, penetrate yourself with the feeling of its situations; this done, everything else will follow." Just how far the atmosphere or tone of the Norse mythology is reproduced in 'Balder Dead,' how thoroughly the author had penetrated himself with the feeling of its situations, I must leave it to others to say. It is somewhat bewildering to hear Odin and Hermod and Balder speaking in the very words of Achilles or Odysseus, and then to see such very Homeric gods eating of the boar Serimner's flesh, and drinking from "horns and gold-rimm'd skulls." One is reminded of the Irish critic's protest against Conington's verse translation of the Aeneid—"setting Virgil a-chorusing with Sir Walter Scott and Clan-Alpine's boatmen."[3] When

[1] Compare Il. XIII 333; XV 704; XVI 124.

[2] Vol. I, p. 147 (Dec. 1860).

[3] J. Henry, Aeneidea, vol. I, p. 53.

Arnold wrote his 'Sohrab and Rustum,' he took especial pains to 'orientalize' the similes, because he thought they "looked strange, and jarred, if Western."[1] His sensitive ear could detect "one continual falsetto" in the "pinchbeck Roman Ballads of Lord Macaulay"[2]; but he seems to have found no incongruity of details in his own deft mosaic of Norse and Homeric story.

WILFRED P. MUSTARD.

HAVERFORD COLLEGE, February 1, 1901.

[1] Letters, vol. I, p. 37.

[2] On Translating Homer, pp. 187, 295.

AD CATULL. XXX 4–5.

Nec facta impia fallacum hominum caelicolis placent.
Que tu neglegis et me miserum deseris in malis.

Cum ita scriptum sit in O et G codicibus, necesse fuit ut pro eo, quod ferri non posset, *que* aliquod vocabulum e coniectura inferretur. Primum igitur codices recentiores et editiones veteres *quos* exhibent, quam coniecturam Avantio Sillig, Guarino Baehrens tribuit; receperunt eam ex editoribus recentioribus Riese et Postgate, probavit Richter in Catullianis (progr. Lips. 1881), p. 5. Facilior et fortasse etiam prior emendatio *quae* cui debeatur, nescio; sed iam pridem vulgata erat lectio, cum eam complures huius saeculi editores receperunt, ut Lachmann, Rossbach, Vahlen (in editione Hauptiana quarta, et, nisi fallor, iam ipse Haupt), Ellis, Merrill, Palmer. Maluit L. Mueller *quod* scribere, cum *d* finalem "sine dubio sequentis verbi litera initiali" haustam esse affirmaret; quem secutus Owen corruptelam tamen e compendio scripturae ortam esse putat, quoniam e *qd* nota facile *q:* effici potuerit. Priora aspernatus Baehrens *quem* coniecit, quae et ipsa facilis erat emendatio; sed cum ad *amiculi* vocabulum pronomen relativum spectare deberet, etiam ordo versuum necessario commutabatur, ut v. 5 post v. 3 poneretur. Sed ipse Baehrens in commentario post decennium emisso suam sententiam reliquit, Munronis probavit, qui (Crit. and Elucid., p. 114) commate post *placent* interpungi et *quom* scribi iussit. Denique *queis*, i. e. *quibus*, dubitanter coniecit H. Richards, Cl. Rev. XI, p. 304, coll. L. Muell. ad Catull. LXIV 31.

Certe, si *quae* scribas, a lectione codicum vix disceditur; sed de sensu dubitatum est. Nam qui primus id scripsit, voluit fortasse (nihil enim de ea re comperi) sic intellegi, quasi ad eam quae antecedit enuntiationem pronomen relativum spectaret; quae tamen enuntiatio cum unam tantum notionem complectatur, dubitaverunt viri docti, num recte sic pluralis adhiberetur, quem ad plures sive res sive notiones referri debere opinatur Ellis in adnotatione ad v. 3; cf. etiam H. Bluemner, Nov. Ann., 1885, pp. 879

sqq. Illum igitur sensum cum L. Mueller exhibere vellet, singularem pro plurali posuit; *quae* autem lectionem cum et Ellis et Merrill retinere mallent, lacunam ille statuit, hic ita interpretatus est, ut *quae* ad *impia facta* spectare, *neglegis* idem quod *neglegenter committis* valere censuerit. Sed neque in neglegendi verbo sic simpliciter posito committendi notio inest sed omittendi, neque ex eo quo Merrill nisus est loco, Hor. C. I 28, 30–31, neglegenter ac temere facere idem esse efficitur. Iam vero H. Magnus, Ann. Burs., 1885, p. 258, brevissime sane quaesivit, an omnino iusta esset illa de qua dixi dubitatio, neque quid ipse de ea re sentiret, plenius exposuit. Venerat ei fortasse in mentem, apud Graecos interdum pronomen plurali numero poni, ubi singularem potius exspectes; qua de re nuper monuit Milden in dissertatione Hopkinsiensi quae inscribitur "Limitations of the Predicative Position in Greek," p. 33. Ille unum affert locum, de quo disputat, Isocr. I 34, alia exempla in Ponickavii de Isocratis Demonicea libello congesta esse testatur; qui liber cum mihi praesto non sit, apponam quae ipse collegi: Isae. III 48 γενομένων αὐτῶν, quod ad verba ὡς ἐξ ἑταίρας οὖσαν αὐτὴν ἐγγυᾶσθαι spectat; Isocr. XVII 24 τούτοις ἰσχυριεῖσθαι, i. e. τῷ τὸ γραμματεῖον διεφθάρθαι; Dem. XXIII 126 τυγχάνειν τούτων, i. e. τοῦ πολίτας γενέσθαι; LIX 86 ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν; Plat. Gorg. 448 A αὐτὰ ταῦτα; Ar. Ran. 598, 695–6. Etiam Dem. XXXVI 30 si, ut Sandys, Reiskii interpretationem sequaris, verba αὐτῶν τούτων idem significant atque id quod paulo ante praecedit τοῦτο; aliter in commentario suo, Act. Sem. Erlang. IV 131, Huettner interpretatur, sed minus probabiliter, qui neque αὐτῶν pronominis vim neque ἀξιωθεῖσι participii sensum satis videatur servavisse.

Catullum igitur ex imitatione Graecorum sic locutum esse credo, quamquam pluralem id genus etiam Romani fortasse in legibus edictis sim. usurpaverunt; cf. Rhet. ad Her. I 21 senatus decrevit, si eam legem ad populum ferat, adversus rem publicam videri ea facere; Fest., p. 233 M. e formula praetoria, uti nunc possidetis eum fundum . : . ita possideatis, adversus ea vim fieri veto. Et verba *adversus ea*, ad notiones modo unam modo plures spectantia, saepius recurrunt, sed ea paene pro adverbio fuisse ex Sc. de Bac. 24 apparet: quei advorsum ead fecissent quam suprad scriptum est: quo magis veri simile est, e Graeco Catullum potius quam e iuris sermone hausisse, praesertim cum Catulliano loco ille simillimus sit, quem e Rhet. ad Her. attuli, ubi verba ipsa

senatusconsulti fideliter tradita esse vix licet confidenter affirmare. Sed quod Cicero, C. M. 49, *illa* posuit, animadvertendum est, ea quae sequitur enuntiatione duas contineri notiones, quarum altera per participium, altera per infinitivos exprimitur; cf. Dem. XLI 15; Ar. Ran. 610 sq., 693 sqq.

At etiam in primo versus 4 vocabulo viri docti haesitaverunt, cum coniunctionem copulativam male adhiberi iudicarent; qua opinione aliqua ex parte moti sunt et Lachmann, ut hos versus in finem carminis relegaret, et Ellis, ut lacunam statueret. *Nunc* Baehrens, *num* coniecit Schwabe, quem Postgate secutus est; neque hanc coniecturam aut Riese aut L. Mueller improbavit, quamquam hic in textu nihil mutavit, *non* ille maluit, quod etiam Richtero placuit. Cur tamen coniunctio offenderet, Ellis non exposuit, dum nihil aliud nisi *nec* sensu carere dicit; quod autem de inepta affirmatione Baehrens protulit, id eo minus operae est refellere, quod rationibus parum aptis ipsius coniectura nititur. At Bluemner l. l. ita scripsit: "Der anschluss dieses gedankens an den vorhergehenden durch das blosse *nec* ist entschieden auffallend; man erwartet bei einem so starken gegensatze, wie er hier stattfindet, eine deutliche gegenüberstellung durch eine adversativpartikel, zum mindesten aber die reine negation, nicht den copulativen anschluss mit *nec*." Hoc quid sit, haereo; neque enim profecto id negare voluit, satis crebro apud Latinos coniunctionem copulativam occurrere, ubi linguae vel Germanicae vel Anglicae consuetudo particulam magis requirat adversativam. At ne hoc quidem dici potest, respuendam esse illam, si res plane dissimiles componantur, cum Ciceronis, Off. III 41, haec verba sint: "id quod utile videbatur neque erat." Sed mihi ne videntur quidem ea, quae hoc versu efferuntur, adeo cum antecedentibus pugnare, ut in coniunctione vis adversandi agnoscenda sit; de illo potius usu cogitandum est, quem tangit Naegelsbach, Stil[8]., p. 720: "*Und zwar nicht.* So steht neque allerdings zumeist in parenthetisch eingeschobenen Sätzen, wie Liv. 28, 42, 6 . . . 5, 53, 3 . . . Aber doch auch am Anfang selbständiger Perioden: 3, 36, 4." Eius generis etiam haec sunt: Liv. I 28, 6 nec ea culpa; Rhet. ad Her. III 15 nec hoc genus causae; ib. 39 nec nos hanc verborum memoriam; Liv. I 23 fin. nec mirari oportet; Vell. I 3, 3 neque est quod miremur; ib. 17, 1 neque hoc in Graecis; adde etiam locutiones quae sunt *nec mirum, neque iniuria.* In quibus omnibus vox, ut ita dicam, monentis est; et

a *non* tali modo *nec* differt, ut illud simpliciter et cum gravitate neget, huic minus gravitatis sed vis insit vividior, et illud quasi vocis intentionem, hoc quasi digiti sublationem reddat.

Altera sane exstat interpretatio, qua *nec* aliqui tuentur; nam id vocabulum "more prisco pro *non* positum" esse primus A. Statius, ut videtur (cf. Baehr. ad h. l.), tum Munro et eum secutus Merrill censuerunt. Breviter Munro in Adversariis rem tetigit, plura idem protulit in adnotatione ad Lucret. II 23, cum eis exemplis niteretur, quae in libello de particulis, p. 24, Ribbeck congesserat. Sed quae tum de *neque* indefinito Ribbeck disseruit, ea hodie vix quisquam in universum tuebitur; ita enim loqui videtur, quasi etiam apud eos, qui post Augustum scriptores fuerunt, *neque* haud idem quod *ne—quidem* valeat, sed pro *non* semper accipiendum sit. Neque vero nunc probatur (vid. e. g. Schmalz[3], p. 455), quod in excursu ad Cic. Fin. tertio, p. 821, Madvig affirmavit, *nec* pro *ne—quidem* Livium admittere noluisse; qui etiam sic admisit, ut per eam particulam neque adderetur aliquid neque res augeretur sed tantum expressius affirmaretur, velut I 25, 6 qui nec procul aberat; cf. Xen. An. I 3, 12 *καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ πόρρω δοκοῦμέν μοι αὐτοῦ καθῆσθαι*. Nuper autem (Philol. LVIII) Frederking, ei quoque sententiae adversatus quae ex auctoritate Madvigii usque adhuc valuit (cf. tamen etiam Kuehn. II 660–1), recte, ut opinor, contendit Ciceronem quoque *nec* tali sensu adhibuisse; id enim et Catullus fecit (LXVI 73 nec si, i. e. *οὐδ' εἰ*, cf. etiam Postgate ad LXII 59) et Lucretius (VI 1214 neque se possent cognoscere ut ipsi, i. e. *μηδ' αὐτοὶ αὑτούς*). Haec poetarum sunt, concedo; at Cicero, Caesari plane contrarius, ut adversus res novas timidus, ita in novis vocabulis locutionibusque audax fuit; qui si *et* pro *etiam* posuit, certe nulla causa est, quin eum etiam in negatione Graecos imitatum esse credamus. Neque vero in hac re primus novavit; nam *neque* pro *ne—quidem* etiam priscos admisisse Gildersleeve-Lodge, §480, n. 1, affirmant, idque Plauto Schmalz[3], 455 tribuit.

Aliud tamen est priscum illud *nec*, quod saepe apud Plautum aliosque eiusdem aetatis scriptores occurrere temere aliqui dixerunt, cum re vera in paucis tantum locis locutionibusque inveniatur. Hoc adverbium non nisi per *nec* recte scribi et O. Mueller (Suppl. Adnot. ad Fest., p. 387) et Buecheler (Nov. Ann., 1863, p. 785) existimaverunt; quare etiam Kayser in Cic. Legg. II 22 *nec* pro eo quod est in codicibus *neque* recepit. At ibidem

C. F. W. Mueller codicum lectionem retinet; cf. Ribbeck l. l. quaeque Planta, II 469 profert: "Das o(skisch) u(mbrische) p widerlegt die Meinung dass nec = non deiktisches c enthalte (Draeg. II 67 f.). Eher könnte man ein indefinites -que -c -p (also eigentlich "nicht irgend") neben dem copulativen annehmen (vgl. z. B. Schmalz², 461; Stokes-Bezzenberger bei Fick, II⁴ 62)." In compositis an etiam *neg-* factum sit, illis statuendum relinquo, quorum de talibus rebus iudicium est; sed *nec opinans* et *nec opinatus* pro compositis haberi nolo, cum et sic separatim scripta occurrant (cf. Ter. Andr. 180, Haut. 186 Umpf., Lucr. III 959) et in B. Alex. 63 et 75, B. Afr. 66 *neque op.* legamus, ut haec vocabula etiam extremis liberae reipublicae temporibus nondum in unum confusa esse colligas; sane in alio numero *necopinus* est adiectivum, quod neque vere compositum et coniunctim semper scribendum est.

Iam *nec* adverbium in XII Tabularum reliquiis occurrit: V 4 cui suus heres nec escit, 7 b ast ei custos nec escit, VIII 16 si adorat furto quod nec manifestum erit. Etiam V 5 plerumque sic scribitur, codices tamen *nescit* praebent, quod tuetur Stolz, ed. 2, p. 313; ed. 3, p. 126. His igitur locis vere adverbium est, quoniam nisi cum verbo non adhibetur; quamquam enim uno loco, VIII 16, adiectivo praepositum est, tamen vi sua verbum quoque afficit. At in eis locutionibus, quae multis saeculis postea apud iuris scriptores exstantes *nec* priscum exhibent, alia ratio obtinet; nam si de rebus nec mancipi aut de furto nec manifesto illi disserunt, nunquam hanc particulam ad verbum trahunt, sed cum vocabulo sequenti artissime coniungitur, neque ab *in-* differt nisi quod separatim scribitur; quod iam in Gai definitione satis appareret: III 185 nam quod manifestum non est, id nec manifestum est. At etiam clarior res fit, si particula nullo modo ad verbum referri potest, velut Gai. II 18: magna autem differentia est inter mancipi res et nec mancipi. At Plautinae aetatis media quaedam ratio est; particula enim, cum ad verbum quoque pertineat, tamen cum alia parte orationis, eaque adverbio, artius videtur coniungi, ut in his: Naev. B. P. 53 B., 71 M. quod bruti nec satis sardare queunt; Cat. agr. 141, 4 si quid tibi ... neque satis factum est; Turpil. ap. Fest., p. 162 M. nec recte dici mihi quod iam dudum audio. Et *nec recte dicere* sexies apud Plautum occurrere Lorenz ad Most. 240 docet: As. 155, 471, Bac. 119, Most. 240, Poen. 516, Ps. 1085; semel etiam *nec recte loqui*, Bac.

735. At plerumque *male dicere* vel *loqui* in consuetudine fuit, et *satis* si negative efferre volebant, *parum* dicebant. Neque vero negaverim, etiam *non recte* (ut Cic. Lael. 59) et *non satis* in usu fuisse, sed in his particula negativa ab adverbio disiungi potest, sicut Quintilianus, VII, pr. § 1 *satis non est* scripsit, in illis autem non disiungitur. Ergo si Plautina aetate non nisi in illis locutionibus *nec* pro *non* adhibetur, sic statuere licet, illas e vetustiore tempore receptas Plautum aequalesque eius ita admisisse ut nihil earum mutare auderent, *nec* autem indefinitum nisi in illis traditum non fuisse et e consuetudine loquendi iampridem abiisse.

Contra quam sententiam facere mihi quidem non videtur locus ille Ennianus, Trag. 78 R. cui nec arae patriae domi stant, fractae disiectae iacent; nam hic *nec* pro *ne—quidem* esse iam collocatio ipsa verborum et totius loci contextus satis evidenter declarant. Magis disputandi locus est in Enn. A. 288, 3 B., 453 M. sed nec pote quisquam undique nitendo corpus discerpere ferro; poterat enim fieri ut *nec pote* pro *nequit* veteres usurparent. Sed cum in Plauti fabulis et *pote* satis frequenter adhibeatur neque illud *nec* desit, tamen coniuncta nusquam inveniuntur; et *sed nec* si apud posteriores legimus (ut Ov. P. I 1, 19; Tac. A. IV 34; Mart. IV 87, 5), tum e Graeco id translatum esse facile concedimus. Veri simile autem est, saepius in certis coniunctionibus verborum tales translationes primum factas esse, velut *et* pro *etiam* Cicero aut post quasdam particulas aut cum pronomine posuit (vid. Gildersleeve-Lodge, §478, n. 2); et quamquam in eo quem Ennius versum exprimebat, Il. Π 107, οὐδὲ δύναντο est, haud mirum tamen si ille, cum verbum pro verbo non redderet, adversandi notionem maiore vi efferre et sic vertere maluit, quasi ἀλλ' οὐδέ legeretur. Quod si fecit, tum apud eum quoque, sicut apud Liv. I 25, 6, *nec* intendendi tantum vim habet, sicut apud Latinos interdum *ne—quidem* (cf. Rhet. ad Her. III 15, IV 10; Cic. Catil. III 24) et apud Graecos οὐδέ vel μηδέ; cf. Plat. Rep. 328 C; Philem. 99, 1 K.; Anaxandr. 12, 3 K. Atque particulam hoc sensu accipiendam existimo in Il. Α 119, Ψ 493 ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ ἔοικεν, quamquam Kuehner, Gr. Gr. II 834, Naegelsbachium secutus sic interpretatur: "weil sich's gar nicht einmal ziemt, geschweige denn dass es billig wäre"; quam interpretationem etiam Leaf, sed non sine dubitatione, recipit. At particula si duas notiones inter se opponit, aut exprimuntur ambae aut ex altera altera intellegitur; extrinsecus autem inferri nihil debet. Idem sensus est in Μ 212,

ubi particula bis ponitur; cf. etiam T 295 *οὐδὲ μὲν οὐδέ μ' ἔασκες*, e cuius simili loco pendere videtur Cir. 239 quod nec sinit Adrastea.

At tertius locus obstare videtur: Plaut. Trin. 281 sqq. nolo ego cum inprobis te viris, gnate mi, neque in via neque in foro neculum sermonem exsequi; sic enim et Brix et Schoell scripserunt, cum in A codice *neq. ullum*, in ceteris *ullum* sit. Atque olim magis placere poterat *necullus*, quia etiam *necuter* receptum erat; quod postquam nuper (Rh. M. LII) validis rationibus Birt expulit, de illo altero iam liberius dubitare licet. Et mihi quidem Plautus non secus atque is qui Cirim conscripsit (Cir. 270 nec ullo volnere) Graecum illud *οὐδὲ εἷς* in linguam Latinam transtulisse videtur; sed tamen si ei *necullum* vel *neque ullum* ex domestica copia in promptu fuisse concedimus, aliud nihil efficitur nisi hanc verborum coniunctionem eum ex vetustioribus recepisse; ipsum vero *nec* Plautum ita recepisse, ut id ad suum arbitrium adhibere et cum quolibet verbo coniungere posset, non efficitur.

Sane Cicero, cum in formis quibusdam legum confingendis inter alia vetusta etiam *nec* pro *non* admitteret, ita locutus est quasi nequaquam vetustissimum sermonem referre vellet; cf. Legg. II 18 "sunt certa legum verba, Quinte, neque ita prisca, ut in veteribus XII sacratisque legibus, et tamen, quo plus auctoritatis habeant, paulo antiquiora quam hic sermo est." Ex qua oratione haec colligere licet, et in legibus post decemviralem aetatem conscriptis *nec* adhibitum fuisse (cuius rei tamen nulla exempla supersunt) et id nisi in legibus exstare Ciceronem quidem non existimavisse. Quod tum quoque ille recte opinari poterat, si Plautini illius *nec recte* et *nec satis* Naeviani et eius, quo ipse utebatur, *nec opinatus* optime meminerat; neque enim in sermone suae aetatis *nec* quovis modo adhibitum sed solum in illis norat locutionibus.

At quod in Verg. Ecl. IX 6 *nec* priscum vulgo agnoverunt, animadvertendum est, magis id iure fortasse veteres grammaticos fecisse quam qui huius saeculi editores idem senserunt. Nam Donatus cum in Ter. Ph. 678 legisset

quae quidem illi res vortat male

haec adnotavit: "non desinit poeta ostendere avaritiam Demiphonis, qui nec ideo libenter fert dari aliquid Phormioni, quia sic commodum ei est. Virgilius [Ecl. IX 6] hos illi, quod nec bene vertat, mittimus hoedos." Grammaticus de ethesin tantum

loquitur, de oratione nihil dicit; at tamen ex eo ordine verborum, quem in versu Vergiliano exscribendo servat, suspicari possis, ut pro *male dicere* exstabat *nec recte dicere*, sic etiam *nec bene vertere* pro *male vertere* in aliqua consuetudine fuisse. Sed nunc editores *nec vertat bene* scribere malunt cum propter optimi codicis Palatini auctoritatem tum quia numerosius sic verba cadunt. Quae si vera lectio est, etiam hic Graecae linguae vestigia agnoscenda censeo, ut *nec* pro μηδέ sit; quod autem in enuntiatione et relativa et optativa intendendi causa particula adhibetur, id fortasse ne in Graeco quidem sermone multum in usu fuit, neque aliud mihi exemplum in promptu est; sed tamen fere simile illud est Antiphontis, I 23, ὃ καὶ ποιήσατε. At si quis aliter sentit, ei demonstrandum erit, *nec* priscos etiam pro *ne* admisisse; quod ad pervincendum non multum valet is locus, in quo solo ita admittitur, Cic. Legg. III 6 nec esto, ubi *nei* pro *nec* Buecheler l. l. scribi iussit.

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THE SYMBOLIC GODS.

A Greek philosopher, Euhemerus by name, who seems to have been neither fool nor cynic, declared that the gods originally were excellent and notable men, transplanted after death to heaven. There was also a school of Hindu 'legendarians' (*āitihāsika*) who made bold, for instance, to reduce the Açvins, the Διϝὸς κοῦροι (cf. Vedic *divo napātā*), to the position of pious kings of yore (*rājānāu puṇyakṛtāu*[1]). This is just what the author of the Odyssey does (xi. 300 ff): he makes heroes of them, Euhemerism.

'Kastor, the tamer of horses, and Poludeukes, skilled with his fist . . .
They died and received honor like unto the gods.'

The possibility of Euhemerism appears in many quarters of Indian religious history. The Hindus stood ready at all times to efface the line that parts gods and men. The gods sin and 'wipe off' their sins on a scape-god Trita who in turn wipes them off on wicked men. The gods perform sacrifices. Asceticism or spiritual fervor (*tapas*) is a creative instrument in their hands, but men vie with them in this; it becomes necessary at times to divert the *tapas* of great ascetics, when it threatens to shake the foundations of the universe, by dispatching (in the manner of the St. Anthony episode) divine nymphs on their customary mission. In Buddhism the gods are passably good Buddhists, as Professor Rhys Davids aptly puts it. The Brahmans say that there are two kinds of gods: divine gods, and Brahman gods; from their point of view this is, I am sure, neither as naïve nor as impudent as it has seemed to be at first sight. The gods descend from heaven (*avatar*) and men ascend to be gods. During the last fifty years there were still leading Vedānta preachers of the Brahma, so holy, so sanctifying in character and example, that their canonization by popular voice as Paramahaṅsas, 'supreme spirits,' comes dangerously close to identifying them with God himself.

We need not attempt to conceive of natural religion, of religion

[1] Yāska Nirukta xii, 1.

that is not controlled by academic commands, as ever entirely free from hero worship: the hero may be canonized or made into a god. The impressive object-lesson of superiority, physical or spiritual, may make a god of a tribal chief, a Roman emperor, or a Hindu ascetic. This is the true element in Euhemerism: in the outer world that surrounds each human being, there is a power, constant, intimate and compelling, namely, the power of other men. Let this but exhibit itself dominant or helpful to an unusual degree, and it must be conciliated or gratefully adored; here is some of the raw material out of which a god may be made. Yet science has wisely repudiated Euhemerism as a general theory of religion, because the contact between man and man is but a patch of the complex tissue of existence; there are other relations which man has to establish with forces even more exacting, and certainly more mysterious. At the present time Euhemerists are trying their hand exceedingly in the explanation of Vedic mythology. The theory is a convenient catch-all for almost any mythological fact of obscure origin, for it obliterates conveniently the distinction between things hard to interpret and things that require no interpretation at all.

Father-Worship.

Worship of the Manes (Fathers and Mothers) is in principle not very different from the preceding. What shall primitive man do with his deceased relations that have become poor relations all at once? Death does not rid him of them, for they appear in dreams and visions. They hover over the hearth, they are at the table and must be fed. The *çrāddhas*, feasts set out for the Fathers, are the most important religious act of the ordinary Hindu. The Greek δαίμων (*ἀνθρωποδαίμων*) and ἥρως require personal attention. The same is true of the Roman Lares and Penates who are coupled with the worship of Vesta, the goddess of the hearth; they all testify to the persistent intimacy between the living and the dead. Worship of the dead is an important factor in religion, rising here and there to a supreme position. It is predestined also to assimilate itself to god-worship. The dead may require order and government like the living; hence the Chthonic gods (Hades and Persephone, *χθόνιοι θεοί*) rule the spirits of the dead (*χθόνιοι, ἔνεροι*).[1] Or there may be a Father Eponymos, a pioneer Father, who discovers the permanent abode of the departed; hence Yama, the son of Vivasvant, who has found the

[1] Fairbanks, A. J. Ph. xxi. 243.

bright places where the Fathers carry on a delightful existence in his company. Yama is first of all a king; next, king of the dead, Pluto; and finally a god.

'Automorphism.'

In primitive times a rich field for religious impressions is found in what is usually spoken of as animism or spiritism. Both terms are open to objection; they can not belong to a primitive stage of religious evolution, since soul and spirit with their implied human twofoldness, baffling even to the modern philosopher, can not be counted conceptions of primitive savage man. But the narrower and best sense in which animism is used is not to be misunderstood; I mean what might be more properly called automorphism. Taking as a class the living organic beings ordinarily seen, that is, man himself and the animal world beside himself, we know that they are reproduced in man's consciousness in countless exalted and distorted forms. That is to say, they serve as a suggestion for other shapes, other bodies that evolve themselves before the mind with a degree of reality scarcely less than that of the man and beasts he meets in his daily life. Night, full of vague and flitting shapes; the fire that dispels them, while itself producing them; the clouds and vapors that hover over mountains and marshes reproduce and exaggerate the shapes of men and beasts to the point of independent creation, almost *ex nihilo*. Dreams, nightmares, delirium, and hallucination fill the mind with delightful and monstrous fancies in which the automorphic figures become so real that they may not be doubted. The Upaniṣads, an intellectually far advanced product of the Hindu mind, pretty nearly, if not quite, believe in the reality of dream-life. By its own light the human mind fashions the materials seen while awake into a new world of forms:

> 'In the state of dream he roameth up and down
> As a god creates for himself many forms,
> Now joyfully dallying with women,
> Now beholding monstrous forms.'
>
> —*Bṛhad-Āraṇyaka-Upaniṣad* iv. 3. 13.

How inextricable is the mutual entanglement of real and visionary life in the consciousness of early man we can scarcely realize, still less certainly can we count the number of more or less divine personalities, especially of the uncanny, demoniac sort, that have been recruited from visions.

Nature-Worship.

All this material for making gods taken collectively is in reality nothing but the deification of human persons, or persons shaped in the image of man. The religious object is the will of these persons; the religious motive is their conciliation; the religious act is praising and giving to these persons, that is, prayer and sacrifice. Now the discovery of the Veda has established the following important fact. From what precedes we may presume that primitive man was conscious of his own power of perception and volition, else how could he ascribe to others helpful or disturbing exercise of these functions? The Vedic hymns, though themselves high up in the scale of human production, have convinced us that primitive man at his very awakening to consciousness extended these simple processes of reasoning to inanimate nature, or, let us say even more broadly, to his inanimate surroundings. The phenomena and forces of nature, no less than the human and automorphic shapes are ever active; man's being and well-being is altogether dependent upon them. The earth that nourishes; the heavens that fructify the earth (father and mother); the sun, source of light; wind, rain, lightning and fire; they are all in motion and action. They are all, too, forces which man is bound to recognize as superior to himself. A simple step forward in primitive reasoning endows these forces with will and intention, personification follows of sheer necessity, and again man must establish a *modus vivendi* with these persons. The grander forces of nature are not the only living things. The forest is alive with trees, the plain with plants; the rivers with waters; the mountains with clouds; and even rocks and stones, more or less shaped, simulate form, life, will and intention. These processes go on as civilization dots the environment of man with artificial objects. The sheltering house has life, personality, and divinity; the 'goddess furrow,' Sītā, becomes in time one of the most charming figures of Hindu myth and story; the nourishing porridge, that puts on a home-spun garment, the staple fee of the Brahmans, in a moment of recklessness turns god; the battle-drum, the spear and the 'trusty blade,'[1] and even the senseless stone or stump by the road-side (fetish) may be at any moment irradiated by the will and intention that is seen shining in them to such an extent that they appear to be gods.

[1] Beowulf's swords, Naegling and Hrunting; King Arthur's Escalaber. Cf. Gummere, Germanic Origins, p. 246.

Symbolic Gods Defined.

But there is left over a kind of god even more shadowy than many of those egoistic (and egotistic) personages who can exercise their wills in a manner favorably or unfavorably to man. I mean the abstract gods, according to the usual designation; since, however, many of the abstract gods are not entirely abstract, let us say the symbolic gods. To this there can be no objection whatever; this type of divinity at whatsoever stage of development we may meet with it symbolizes something desired or feared. It is a quality or condition, good or bad, useful or noxious, that has turned divine; the quality itself may exist in nature, but it is not the special property of any one natural object. More often the quality is even more subjective; it exists only in the mind. Such gods, for instance, as 'Health,' and 'Immortality'; 'Fear,' and 'Grudge,' are symbolic to the last degree, they simply record a desire, an anxiety, a fear, an aversion. To sum up, the so-called abstract gods are the symbolic gods, in the first instance nothing but mental experiences of qualities, good and bad, subjective valuations of these qualities from the personal point of view of a given individual. We may, therefore, also define them as subjective gods, in distinction from all the other classes of gods, outlined at the beginning, who are in some way based upon an object, who are objective.

Chronology of the Symbolic Gods.

If I am not mistaken, the chronology of the symbolic gods is implied in the definition just given. I mean, as my readers will easily guess, that they are primitive, that the state of mind needed to form them is absolutely that of natural man; if the state of mind existed, some form of expressing it is not likely to have long been wanting. There is, to be sure, a vague feeling among readers of religious literature that there is something 'secondary' about these gods. We need but remember Virtue, Honor, Reputation, Love, and Hate, all spelled with capital letters, all common in modern poetry and oratory, to understand that symbolic divinities can be, and no doubt largely are the product of an advanced, artistic, plastic, reflective state of mind. That they are almost as common in Homer, Hesiod and the Veda as with modern poets proves only that ancient poetry operates with the same instruments and figures as modern poetry; or shall we say that modern poetry has not weaned itself from ancient models in this respect? The appeal to the imagination made by such glib personifications has at all times found response; they count among the safest

assets of him that speaks poetically or rhetorically. But though the records of artistic literature can tell us nothing about the actual time when these gods began, we may nevertheless reason safely that they are founded upon the bed-rock of early human consciousness. Can we imagine a time when a savage shaking with ague in the forest, or in his primitive hut, did not crave the quality 'warm'; or, when burning with fever, did not long for the quality 'cool'? The Atharva-Veda 'makes obeisance' to 'cool and to hot fever.' In various parts of the earth fever is cured by tying a frog, the coolest of animals, to the body of the patient.

How Symbolic Gods are Made.

The Veda has taught us the lesson of the nature-gods (anthropomorphic gods), so that we shall not forget it; it may serve us equally well with the symbolic gods. Symbolism is based upon the crude notion that qualities have a kind of independent individual existence, aside from the concrete objects that possess a given quality. Let us take, *e. g.*, the obvious fact that there is much in nature round about man that is red in color. Primitive man, though notoriously awkward in devising names for color, was surely conscious of that color-quality which we call red, as well as of the other principal colors. Now in jaundice the complexion turns yellow; yet all about in nature there is the quality 'red.' Naturally, the wish and aim of the jaundiced person is to apply to himself the abundant redness that is in nature: 'Oh, that I were red, instead of yellow!' He wishes red, he wishes away yellow: the wish positive or negative in connection with some quality is surely the first step in making a symbolic god. And now the wish is realized as much as possible, first in thought next in exclamation (prayer), and finally by hugging the desired quality as closely as may be, and by removing (exorcising) the abhorrent quality. This is charm and amulet. Red, the color of life and health ('heute roth morgen todt') is the quality, destined to become a god to those suffering from jaundice, and, less particularly, to all that crave health and life:

'Up to the sun shall go thy jaundice, in the color of the red bull do we envelop thee.'

'Into parrots, thrushes, and yellow wag-tails (*nota bene*, all yellow birds) do we put thy jaundice.'—(*Atharva-Veda* i. 22). And then something red is placed upon the patient to be worn as an amulet.

Soon we have a god 'Red' (Rohita). Now begins the process of piling upon this very simple fiction all possible myth-making acts derived from the grosser sphere of the visible gods. The thing that is most especially red and lusty in great nature is the sun; the god of red quality, Rohita, is drawn irresistibly to become an attribute, a special manifestation of the sun-god. It is not good for a god, any more than for man, to be alone; from the rib of the god Rohita (masculine, 'He-Red') is fashioned Rohiṇī (feminine, 'She-Red'). After that we may leave the happy couple to the tender mercies of poets, story-tellers, old women in the nursery, and even to philosophers; they will paint the two figures, with such outline, color, and perspective as they can command, into the great picture of the national pantheon. The God 'Red.

Let me hold closely to the thread of my argument. The simple-minded reasoning at the bottom of all this is that the quality Red, having some sort of objective existence, is in truth itself an object; if an object, we know from what has preceded, that it may have will: if will, intention: again, the real purpose of the god-making act is to coax that intention, so that it may be favorable to him that coaxes. Color is a very noticeable, a very salient quality, but any quality will do; so, *e. g.*, audible quality, the sound of a thing as conveyed by its very name. We may take it for granted that primitive folk are not able to distinguish very sharply between the name of a thing and its other more inherent qualities; yea, for that matter, between the name of a thing and the thing itself. Natural man manipulates language sensitively and fruitfully, without the interference that comes from a critical understanding of the processes of word-making. He is full of the belief—not quite dead yet—that the names of things are there by nature (*φύσει*); he is not the least bit worried by the truth that he himself and his ancestors have invented the names and have attached them to things (*θέσει*). Verbal Gods.

The Hindus were great grammarians and phonetists, but they never seemed able, not even in their Brahmanical and Buddhistic philosophies, to hold apart the names and the essence of things (*nāma* and *rūpa*). Hence their etymologies are almost invariably childish and silly. If the name of anything sounds in a certain way, that sound is for them as much part of the thing as its chemical constituents. Therefore the name, no less inherent a quality than the color of a thing, may become a trusted basis for making

divinities (*nomina numina*). There is a 'god barley.' The name of barley is *yava*; the verb stem *yāvaya* means 'defend.' The common formula, *yavo 'si yāvayāsmad dveṣaḥ* 'barley (*i. e.*, defender) art thou, defend us from hatred,' catches the theogonic process in the very act. It is easy to prove the example: if in Sanskrit *yava* were sounded with the sounds of *hordeum*, *gerste*, or ζειαί, there would be no god 'barley.' The Sanskrit word for life and living is *jīva*; any plant that has a similar sound, like *jīvantī* or *jīvalā* is life-giving, has supernatural power by virtue of its name. A favorite plant for sorcery is called *apāmārga*; its power comes to it from its supposed etymological connection with the verb *apa-marj* 'wipe away.' In Hindu charms this plant is constantly implored to wipe away diseases, to wipe out demons and wizards, to wipe off sins and evils of all sorts. For better or for worse the real divine element here is the 'god wiper.'

Mythology a Disease of Language.

In this remote corner of the land of myth we may find a safe, though very modest, home for the famous theory that myths are a disease of language. If we regard, as was once the fashion, analogy in language as a disease ('false analogy'), then mythology is a disease of language precisely in the degree that mythic figures are created or strongly modified by analogy at work upon the names of these mythic figures. Ἀφροδίτη and Ἀφροδύτη, whether they come from Shemitic Ishtar or not, are surely names the first of which coquets with *ἀφρός* 'foam,' the second both with *ἀφρός* and *δύω* 'enter.' If once these two verbal ideas were read into the name of the 'foam-born' goddess they became as much part of her mythogonic apparatus as was the famous root *dyu* 'shine' in the production of Ζεύς. Again and again the Hindu myth makes female relatives for mighty (*çakra*) Indra out of words for strength. Indra is at first *çacīpati*, 'lord of might.' But *pati* happens to mean 'husband' as well as 'lord'; *çacīpati* is thought to mean 'husband of Çacī'; hence we have his 'steady company' wife Çacī. Another, rather temporary wife, Prāsahā, is similarly abstracted from another of Indra's epithets, *prāsahas-pati* 'lord of strength.' His mother *Çavasī* 'Strength' is a painfully obvious precipitate from Indra's epithets *çavasaḥ sūnuḥ* and *putraḥ çavasaḥ* 'son of strength'; from the stem *çavas* 'strength' the old lady is derived with the help of the obligato feminine ending *ī*. Sanskrit scholars need not be reminded that *sura*, a common classical word for 'god' is but a pendant to *asura* 'devil,'

at a time when the latter word was felt in popular etymology to be *a-sura* 'not bright.' But *asura* at first meant simply 'spirit.' The goddess Diti, of undefinable character, is but an afterthought to Aditi, the goddess 'Boundlessness.'[1] I suspect that Aditi also, that vague and elusive mother of the substantial Indo-Iranian Ādityas (Mitra, Varuna, Aryaman, Bhaga), herself unknown in the Avesta, is an abstraction. If we get ourselves to regard the *āditya* as the 'gods of old' (*ādi* 'beginning' + suffix '*tya*') we have an epithet that fits them marvellously well; grant but the least darkening of the meaning of this adjective, its least advance from epithet to mythic person, and Aditi results almost of necessity as the basis of the seeming patronymic *āditya*.

Complete Abstractions.

We are ripe now for the final statement: Any quality, howsoever abstract it may seem to us, presents itself to natural man as something solipsistic; it is a thing *per se*; the visible quality 'red,' the audible quality 'defending' can claim no advantage over the quality 'down' in such formulas as the following:

'Thou that makest all men sallow, inflaming them like a searing fire, even now, O Fever, thou shalt become void of strength; do thou now go away *down*, aye, *into the depths*!'—(*Atharva-Veda* v. 22. 2.)

Or, another time:

'*Down* bloweth the wind, *down* burneth the sun, the cow is milked *downward*—*down* shall go thy ailment!'—(*Rig-Veda* x. 60. 11.)

There is no god 'Down' or 'Downer', but it seems to me that I see the fumes over the alembic condensing and shaping themselves into such a one; if there is no such god, clearly there might have been.

Professor Usener's 'Specialist Gods.'

Professor Usener, in his learned, important and—barring certain etymologies not quite *à la mode*—altogether delightful book, 'Götternamen,' has proposed the name 'sondergötter' for this style of god; Professor Gildersleeve[2] happily translates the word by 'specialist gods.' It seems to me that the name is a little too broad, and not quite as definite as it should be for the class of formations which we are discussing; it fails to bring out the subjective

[1] Cf. the purely linguistic production of *duḫkha* 'miserable,' out of *sukha* 'pleasant' (primarily of a chariot, 'having well-drilled naves of the wheels'); or the tentative *durāhā* 'perdition' as pendant to *svāhā* 'hail.'

[2] A. J. Ph. xvii. 356 ff.

element upon which I am endeavoring to lay stress. The god Agni 'Fire,' or even Ζεύς 'shining sky,' is also a specialist god; where, indeed, do we find anything but specialist gods, until there comes that final reflection which gathers up the 33 or the 3333 gods into a single god, or extracts all their virtue into a monistic or pantheistic menstruum? The really important distinction in the whole domain of god-making is between ready-made individuals and individual objects on the one hand, and subjective states of mind born of man's adjustment of himself to his surroundings in general, and enlivened by keen desire or fear into objective reality; heroes, Fathers, visionary personages, nature-forces, nature-objects and artificial objects on the one side, desires and fears on the other. In daily life, with a simplicity that carries us back to rudimentary human emotion, we still exclaim, or think, 'I wish I had,' 'I wish I were,' and proceed to build a castle in the air or in Spain. The passionate wish and the lurid fear have in folk-lore always tended to a certain kind of realization. The gift of a certain number of wishes (usually three)[1]; the wishing-cap and the magic wand; the bodily potency of the curse (wish of another, hostile wish), and the evil eye show how subjective emotion is conceived to glide over into objective reality. It is purely a matter of insistence; the shadowy figure, conjured up before the mind again and again, thickens in substance, grows sharper in its outline, becomes more and more visualized, so to speak, every time it presents itself to desiring and fearing man.

Haurvatāt and Ameretāt; the Goddess 'Grudge.'

The natural Aryan (Indo-Iranian) man cries out after health and immortality in endless exclamations that contain the words *sarva* 'sound' and *amṛta* 'immortal.' One Aryan people, the Persians, have made gods of these two prime desires. Haurvatāt and Ameretāt (Khordād and Murdād), mere abstract nouns from the adjectives just mentioned, figure among Ahura Mazda's angels, the Ameshaspents; they rule over the plants and waters that ward off disease; they are the gods of nutrition; they smite hunger and thirst; they nourish the blessed in Paradise.

The Brahman authors of the Vedic hymns get their living from those for whom they sing and sacrifice. Naturally they love the generous giver; their dislike of the stingy, grudging, or even poor employer, knows no bounds, and is expressed in a fashion

[1] See AV xi. 1. 10; Sacred Books of the East xlii. 181, 613.

that is the reverse of mealy-mouthed in numberless passages. One way of describing these much-disliked persons is *a-ri*, 'he that gives no wealth' (*ri*, a form of the stem in Lat. *res*); the abstract noun corresponding to *ari* is *arāti* 'ungenerousness,' 'grudge,' 'avarice.' The pretty hymn, Atharva-Veda v. 7, discloses Arāti as a full-fledged person; she is 'golden-complexioned, lovely, rests upon golden cushions,' in fact, quite an Apsaras or 'schöne Teufelinne'; yet she is cajoled to go away:

'Bring wealth to us, do not stand in our way, O, Arāti; do not keep from us the sacrificial fee, when it is being taken (to us)! Adoration be to the power of grudge, the power of failure, adoration to Arāti'!

'Him whom I implore with holy speech (Vāc Sarasvatī), the yoke-fellow of thought, the faith (that manifests itself through gifts) shall find to-day, aroused (in him) by the brown soma-drink'!

'To the golden-complexioned, lovely one, who rests upon golden cushions, to the great one, to that Arāti who wears golden robes, I have rendered homage.'

Brahma.

We must not forget that the symbolic gods are not all commonplace or mean like Haurvatāt and Arāti. The most exalted divine conception of gentile folk, Brahma, is the symbol of pious thought and holy utterance (λόγος), the outpouring of the soul in its highest longings; it is the best wish of a spiritually-minded and gifted people that has become divine essence and universal personal god.

Distinction Between Symbolic and Objective Gods.

It is true, however, that the symbolic gods are largely opportunist, very special, and even momentary; it is ordinarily not easy to personify and to surround with myth transparent subjective states of mind. The names of symbolic gods are slow to congeal into proper names, because they are checked by the entire family of words to which they belong. It is after all rather wonderful that a conception like Arāti does take on so much flesh and blood. They make up for this restriction by their endless number; many as are the visible objects that may be deified, more is the number of human moods, desires and ideals, fears and aversions. Those diaphanous names share in all the processes of language; analogy steps in and makes them almost unhealthily productive. Considerable as may have been the significance of the *di certi* of the Roman *indigitamenta* we must not take them too seriously. The

engrossing and loving care of child-life has produced over forty: Vaticanus prompts the child's first cry; Fabulinus, the beginnings of his speech; Edusa teaches him how to eat, Potina how to drink; he leaves the house with Abeona, Iterduca guides him on the way; Domiduca brings him home again, etc. It is almost like a noun-suffix that has gained favor and started on a career of indefinite propagation. After all these gods are to the end little more than formulated wishes.

The Sanskrit gods ending in *pati* 'lord,' beyond a certain point, are similarly verbal and analogical rather than corporeal. They range from the 'lord of food,' (*annapati*), 'lord of wealth' (*dhanapati*), 'lord of the field' (*kṣetrapati*), 'lord of the chariot' (*rathaspati*), 'lord (or lady) of the home' (*vāstoṣpati*, *sadaspati*, and *mānasya patnī*), to the much loftier conceptions, 'lord of speech' (*vācaspati*), 'lord of wisdom' (*medhaspati*), 'lord of righteousness' (*dharmaṇaspati*), and 'lord of divine order' (*ṛtaspati*). In many of them the *s* that precedes *pati* is purely analogical (*rathaspati*, *ṛtaspati*, etc.). And what does it all mean? After all nothing but the varying desires of the meaner or better human nature. And so to the end of the chapter, although different times, different symbolic gods. At one time, Liberty, Equality, Fraternity; at another, Humanity and Cosmopolitanism; again, Civilization, Colonization, and the Over-Goddess Commerce. But the wish remains father to the god.

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THE USE OF THE SIMPLE FOR THE COMPOUND VERB IN PERSIUS.

The historical development of the Latin language presents few phenomena of greater interest and importance than the peculiarities which mark the literature of the Silver Age. That the Latin of this period differs widely from that of the last century of the Republic is well known, though very many of the details are but imperfectly understood. The variety and complexity of the literary forces which combined to produce what is commonly called Silver Latinity, make it exceedingly difficult to estimate correctly the stylistic character of the individual author and that of the time. The training of the grammatical and rhetorical schools, the encroachments of the language of daily life, the careful study of the old masters, especially of Vergil and of Horace, and the professed aversion to uniformity in writing—all these and other influences united in the formation of a literary medium which is at once brilliant and commonplace, brilliant on account of its bold imagery and rhetorical coloring, commonplace because of the lack of transcendent genius and the monotonous recurrence of old forms. One of the most remarkable features of the later period, to which comparatively little attention has hitherto been paid, is the use of the simple for the compound verb. In a recently published paper[1] I attempted to show, on the basis of examples collected from the satires of Juvenal, the nature and effect of this substitution, and to point out some of the influences which were at work in its propagation as an element of style. The use of the simple verb in this pregnant sense is seen now and then in the poetry of the Republic and even in Cicero, while in Vergil—to some extent, no doubt, for metrical convenience—the simple forms are often adopted where the sense of the compound is required by the context. And yet, though by no

[1] 'The Use of the Simple for the Compound Verb in Juvenal,' in Transactions of the American Philological Association, XXXI, 1900, pp. 202–222. For the sake of brevity this article has been referred to below as Juvenal.

means a rarity in the classical period, this use is essentially a characteristic of the Silver Age, for not till then did it reach its full development.

The principal influences which caused this feature of style to become so widespread during the first two centuries of the Empire were the preservation of the simple verb in the sense of the compound from the archaic period, especially in religious and legal formulae, the more frequent appearance on the surface of the normally hidden undercurrent of popular speech, and the general dependence on the poetic models of the Augustan Age which is evident in the diction even of the later prose.[1] These influences, in some respects distinct, are yet so interwoven that it is often impossible to separate them, and the attempt to do so in most cases produces a result which is only partial and unsatisfactory. An effort to distinguish between the colloquial and the archaic elements in Apuleius, for example, cannot proceed very far so long as our knowledge of the spoken language is confined within the present narrow limits. On the other hand, the elevated diction of poetry reaching out after new and attractive forms in many respects runs parallel to the *sermo cotidianus*, whose leading characteristic is fondness for the novel and the striking in expression.[2] It has been said that Persius on the vantage ground of a secure social position displays greater freedom in his use of colloquialisms than Horace the freedman's son[3] On the whole, this is doubtless true; but there are in Persius only three simple verbs, used as substitutes for the compound form, that are clearly colloquial, a far smaller proportion than in Juvenal.[4] On the other hand, a comparison with the usage of the later satirist shows that Persius had more frequent recourse to this device, though few of his examples are as bold and striking as many of those in Juvenal; in other words, the use of the simple for the compound verb in Persius is more closely in line with the normal poetic diction of his time.[5]

[1] For a discussion of these influences see Juvenal, l. c., pp. 204, 205, 209 f.

[2] Compare Juvenal, l. c., pp. 205, 210.

[3] Teuffel, Studien u. Char.[1], p. 407; Gildersleeve, Introd. to Persius, p. xxviii.

[4] Compare Juvenal, l. c., pp. 205 ff.

[5] The proportion of usage is one example for every 25½ verses in Juvenal; in Persius, one for every 20 verses. Persius has 17 simple verbs

**Cadere* for *decidere.*—3, 102 uncta cadunt laxis tunc pulmentaria labris. Cf. Juv. (l. c., p. 210), who uses *decidere* in the same connection (6, 434). A metaphorical extension of this use is seen in 5, 91 sed ira cadat naso rugosaque sanna.

**Claudere* for *concludere.*—*a*) 5, 11 f. clauso murmure raucus nescio quid tecum grave cornicaris inepte. This stands in a passage which, as scholiast and edd. remark, is a reminiscence of Hor. Sat. 1, 4, 19 f., but the reading in the latter is conclusas hircinis follibus auras. A similar instance is found in Ovid, Fast. 6, 277 f. suspensus in aëre clauso stat globus. *b*) 1, 93 claudere sic versum didicit; so [Verg.] Ciris 20 et gracilem molli liceat pede claudere versum. Cf., on the other hand, Hor. Sat. 1, 4, 40 f. neque enim concludere versum dixeris esse satis; Cic. de Orat. 3, 48, 184 verba versu includere, and Juv., l. c., p. 211 f., s. v. *claudere* for *includere.*

**Ducere* for *educere.*—5, 4 vulnera seu Parthi ducentis ab inguine ferrum; Verg. Aen. 12, 378 ducto mucrone; Ovid, Fast. 4, 929 vagina ducere ferrum; Sil. 8, 340 vagina ducitur ensis. The regular word in prose, however, is *educere*; see, for example, Caes. B. G. 5, 44, 8; Cic. Inv. 2, 4, 14; Sall. Cat. 51, 36. Cf. Juv., l. c., p. 213.

Ferre for *afferre.*—*a*) 2, 53 dona ferens. This expression is very common; examples are Verg. Geo. 3, 22 dona feram; id. Aen. 2, 49 dona ferentes; Ovid, Her. 1, 27; Stat. Theb. 6, 168; id. Ach. 2, 146. Cf., however, Ovid, A. A. 2, 264 adferat in calatho rustica dona puer. *b*) 3, 48 f. quid dexter senio ferret, scire erat in voto. Similarly Verg. Aen. 11, 345 fortuna populi quid ferat, but cf. Cic. N. D. 2, 63, 158 quid enim oves aliud adferunt?

Findere for *diffindere.*—3, 8 f. turgescit vitrea bilis: 'findor'; Plaut. Bacch. 251 cor meum et cerebrum . . . finditur. The use of the simple verb with reference to passion is doubtless colloquial,[1] but in other connections it is common in poetry. Examples are Verg. Aen. 9, 413 fisso transit praecordia ligno, and Ovid, Med. Fac. 39 nec mediae Marsis finduntur cantibus angues.

used for 19 different compounds, and a total of 33 examples; Juvenal, 42 simple verbs used for 63 different compounds, and a total of 150 examples. Only seven simple verbs are so employed by both in common: these are indicated in the present paper by asterisks.

[1] Cf. Otto, Sprichwörter, p. 303, note.

**Haerere* for *inhaerere*.—5, 121 haereat in stultis brevis ut semuncia recti. Cf. Cic. Tusc. 4, 11, 24 inhaeret in visceribus illud malum, and Juv., l. c., p. 215.

Pellere for *expellere*.—1, 83 f. nilne pudet capiti non posse pericula cano pellere? Similar instances are not rare in poetry, e. g. Verg. Aen. 6, 382 f. pulsus parumper corde dolor tristi; Hor. C. 2, 2, 14; Ovid, Met. 14, 216; Sil. 7, 300, and even in prose, e. g. Cic. Fin. 1, 13, 43 (sapientia) maestitiam pellat ex animis, though here the phrase accounts to some extent for the absence of the prefix.

**Ponere* for *apponere*.—1, 53 calidum scis ponere sumen; 3, 111 f. positum est algente catino durum holus; 6, 23 nec rhombos ideo libertis ponere lautus. There is a striking passage in Martial in which he plays on this word, using it thrice, each time in the sense of a different compound[1]: 1, 43, 12 ff. ponere aprum nobis sic et harena solet. ponatur tibi nullus aper post talia facta, sed tu ponaris cui Charidemus apro. For further illustration of the colloquial use of *ponere* 'serve up' (at table), see Juv., l. c., p. 206.

**Ponere* for *proponere*.—1, 86 f. doctas posuisse figuras laudatur; 5, 3 fabula seu maesto ponatur hianda tragoedo; Cic. Tusc. 1, 4, 7 ponere iubebam, de quo quis audire vellet. Cf. the use of θεῖναι (θέσις) and Gildersleeve's note to Persius 5, 3. Possibly the technical term *ponere* 'paint' should be included here: 1, 70 f. nec ponere lucum artifices. Cf. Juvenal, l. c., p. 222.

Premere for *comprimere*.—5, 11 folle premis ventos; 5, 109 es modicus voti? presso lare? Similarly Verg. Geo. 1, 410 f. corvi presso ter gutture voces aut quater ingeminant; Hor. Epist. 1, 16, 37 contendat laqueo collum pressisse paternum; Ovid, Met. 9, 78 angebar, ceu guttura forcipe pressus. In such connections *comprimere* is quite regular; cf. Ter. Phor. 868 animam compressi, aurem admovi.

Radere for *eradere*.—2, 66 f. bacam conchae rasisse . . . iussit; 3, 49 f. damnosa canicula quantum raderet. For illustrations see Ovid, Am. 1, 11, 22 littera rasa, and Tac. Ann. 3, 17, 8 nomen Pisonis radendum fastis censuit. Cf., on the other hand, ibid. 4, 42, 3 Merulam . . . albo senatorio erasit. The natural use of *radere* is seen in 3, 114 (ulcus) haud deceat plebeia radere beta,

[1] *Proponere*, *apponere* and *opponere*; compare the similar play on different uses of *agere* in Mart. 1, 79.

and *deradere* occurs in 4, 29 seriolae veterem metuens deradere limum.

Rapere for *abripere*.—1, 100 f. et raptum vitulo caput ablatura superbo Bassaris; Ovid, Met. 13, 771 f. "lumen" que, "quod unum fronte geris media, rapiet tibi" dixit "Ulixes." For the use of the compound cf. 5, 159 canis nodum abripit; Plaut. Men. 193 nasum abreptum; Iustin. 15, 3, 8 abreptaque lingua feram exanimavit, and Claudian, Rapt. Pros. 2, 342 abreptasque dolet iam non sibi crescere fibras.

Rapere for *corripere*.—5, 141 f. nihil obstat, quin trabe vasta Aegaeum rapias; Verg. Aen. 6, 8 rapit silvas; Stat. Theb. 5, 3 campum sonipes rapit. In such connections, however, *corripere* is usual, e. g. Verg. Aen. 5, 145 (campum); ib. 5, 316 (spatia); ib. 1, 418, and Ovid, Met. 2, 158 (viam).

**Rumpere* for *dirumpere*.—1, 25 rupto iecore; 3, 27 an deceat pulmonem rumpere ventis? 5, 13 nec stloppo tumidas intendis rumpere buccas; 5, 158 rupi iam vincula; 5, 185 ovo . . . rupto; 6, 27 trabe rupta. Examples of both simple and compound verb may be found in Otto, Sprichwörter, s. vv. *rumpere* (p. 303) and *risus* (p. 301); cf. Juv., l. c., p. 207.

Scindere for *discindere*.—5, 154 duplici in diversum scinderis hamo; here, as in the passage from Vergil quoted below, the phrase suggests the force of the prefix. Plaut. Aul. 234 asini me mordicibus scindant; Verg. Aen. 2, 39 scinditur incertum studia in contraria volgus; Ovid, Ibis 278 viscera . . . scissa; Stat. Theb. 4, 660 scissas . . . ursas. But cf. Verg. Geo. 3, 514 discissos nudis laniabant dentibus artus.

Tangere for *attingere*.—3, 107 tange, miser, venas; but ib. 108 summosque pedes attinge manusque. The simple verb seems to have been technical in this sense: Sen. Epist. 22, 1 vena tangenda est; but Tac. Ann. 6, 50, 4 (medicus) pulsum venarum attigit. In Suet. Tib. 72 we find tentare venas.

Tendere for *extendere*.—1, 65 scit tendere versum; cf. Plin. N. H. 9, 85 lineam extendere. On the source of this metaphor see Gildersleeve's note.

Tenere for *continere*.—5, 99 teneat vetitos inscitia debilis actus.[1] This use of the simple verb is not rare in a certain sphere of prose and may be colloquial; cf. Cic. Vatin. 8, 20 vix risum tenebant;

[1] In this case the presence of *continet* in the preceding verse may have had an influence.

id. Att. 12, 38, 2 sed tenendus dolor est; Hor. A. P. 5 risum teneatis amici, and Sen. Epist. 113, 20 ut risum tenere non possis.

Vomere for *evomere*.—5, 181 pinguem nebulam vomuere lucernae; Verg. Aen. 5, 682 stuppa vomens tardum fumum; Ovid, Ibis 596 flammas Sicanis Aetna vomit. For the compound form cf. Verg. Aen. 8, 252 f. (Cacus) fumum . . . evomit, and Sil. 17, 593 evomuit pastos per saecula Vesbius ignes.

In order to show how very little attention has been paid to this important subject, and at the same time to furnish the interested student with a basis for investigation, it may not be out of place to conclude with a bibliographical list. Of course, it is not to be expected that every casual remark should be recorded here, but no important treatment, I believe, has been overlooked.

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THE MOTION OF THE VOICE IN CONNECTION WITH ACCENT AND ACCENTUAL ARSIS AND THESIS.

The fact that there is in all articulate speech an element of pitch needs no proof. It can be observed in every modern language. Its existence could be assumed for ancient Greek and Latin, even if there were no recognition of it in the writings of musicians and grammarians. As a matter of fact the presence of pitch in the tones of the human voice was considered of sufficient importance by many Greek theorists to warrant a formal analysis of the manner in which variation up and down took place.

Our chief authority for this analysis is Aristoxenus of Tarentum. In his *harmonica elementa*, I, §§25 ff., p. 8 Meib., p. 10 Westph., vocal motion is divided into two classes, the continuous (*κίνησις συνεχής*) and the intervallar (*κίνησις διαστηματική*). In the former the variation in pitch is such that the passage from one degree of pitch to another is through all intermediate degrees, and the pitch is nowhere stationary for a perceptible interval of time. In the latter the passage from one degree to another is by a leap, so that there is no fluctuation during the production of a note, but the pitch remains steady now at this, and now at that, degree. These two forms of motion characterize the speaking and the singing voice respectively, and the analysis of the pitch-changes seems to have been made chiefly for the purpose of differentiating these two kinds of utterance. Aristoxenus expressly identifies continuous motion with the variation of pitch which takes place in speaking, and intervallar motion with that which takes place in singing (*harm. elem.*, I, §28, p. 9 M, p. 11 W).[1]

Thus a comparison was instituted between the two most important forms of human utterance, speech and song, and the

[1] Later writers make the same or a similar classification: Vitruvius, *de archit.*, V, 4, 2; Aristides Quintilianus, *de mus.*, I, iv., p. 7 M, p. 4, 26 Jahn; Cleonides (Pseudo-Euclid), *introd.*, 2, p. 180 KvJ; Gaudentius, *introd.*, 1, p. 328 KvJ; Claudius Ptolemy, *harmon.*, I, iv., p. 8 Wallis; Martianus Capella, IX, 937 (318 G).

melodic or tonic element in the one was considered in connection with that in the other. Variation in pitch is common to both; it is the manner of the variation which is different. A succession of fixed pitches, that is, of musical notes, subject to certain rules in regard to the width of the intervening intervals, constitutes the melody of music proper. A succession of fluctuating pitches, while it may not conform to so definite rules, nevertheless presents a no less interesting phenomenon. Such a succession Aristoxenus calls λογῶδές τι μέλος, "a conversational melody" (*harm. elem.*, I, §42, p. 18 M, p. 17 W), Cicero, *cantus obscurior* (or. 17), Dionysius of Halicarnassus, διαλέκτου μέλος (*de comp. verb.*, xi.), τὸ τῆς φωνῆς μέλος, λέγω δ' οὐ τῆς ᾠδικῆς ἀλλὰ τῆς ψιλῆς and τὰ μέλη τῶν φθόγγων (*ibid.*, xi., fin.). The word προσῳδία and its Latin equivalent *accentus* imply the same conception.[1]

The nature of such prose tunes will depend upon many considerations. Every language has its own characteristic forms of melody, every individual speaker his own variations on the national air, if I may call it that. Statements have one form of melody, questions another. The various emotions, anger, compassion, hatred, contempt, and so forth, find expression in the tune which runs beneath the words. In many languages it would seem a hopeless task to formulate the laws which govern pitch-changes. Laws there must be, if they could but be unravelled. But in the case of ancient Greek, at least, the differences in pitch were so marked in point of size and so uniform in occurrence, that a formal classification of the variations could be made. Long before a system of written accent-signs was devised, the stable character of the melodic outline of Greek words as pronounced in ordinary speech was recognized. The pitch element in words was, it would seem, almost as much a fixed characteristic as is the stress or intensity element in English. The pronunciation of the individual speaker might present variations (in degree), but each

[1] Diomedes, p. 431, 1 Keil: accentus est dictus ab accinendo, quod sit quasi quidam cuiusque syllabae cantus. apud Graecos quoque ideo προσῳδία dicitur, quia προσᾴδεται ταῖς συλλαβαῖς. Servius, *de fin.*, p. 451, 10 K: accentus autem est quasi adcantus dictus, quod ad cantilenam vocis nos facit agnoscere syllabas. Martianus Capella, III, p. 65, 19 Eyss.: et est accentus ut quidam putaverunt anima vocis et seminarium musices, quod omnis modulatio ex fastigiis vocum gravitateque componitur ideoque accentus quasi adcantus dictus est.

word within the dialect had at any given epoch a normal scheme of high and low pitches, to which the pronunciation of all those who spoke the dialect tended to conform.

The existence of a tonic or melodic accent in the Greek language throughout the classical period and down to Roman times has been abundantly proved. It is not necessary in this connection to review the evidence on which the universal conviction of scholars on this point is based. Besides the testimony of Aristoxenus we have that of Plato and Aristotle.[1] We learn from Varro that Theophrastus and Eratosthenes were interested in the melodic accent of their language.[2] After the invention of the written accent marks by Aristophanes of Byzantium the subject of correct accentuation became naturally more and more important from the point of view of grammar, and the theory of the accents was handled by many writers. Dionysius Thrax taught that there were three accents, the three which became universal, acute, grave, and circumflex. Clear indications of the nature of the Greek accent are contained in the *de compositione verborum* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. He states at the beginning of chap. xi that prose diction to be artistic must attend to these four things, *μέλος*, *ῥυθμός*, *μεταβολή*, and *τὸ πρέπον*, and in the middle of the chapter that variation in pitch takes place within the compass of the interval of the fifth. The whole of a word is not spoken with the same pitch, but one part with *ὀξεῖα τάσις*, another with *βαρεῖα*, and another with both (one after the other, of course). In chap. xix he speaks of the accents as *τάσεις φωνῆς αἱ καλούμεναι προσῳδίαι*. The melodic element in the language was evidently far more important to literary and grammatical studies than any intensity or stress element of the sort found in most modern languages. Differences in intensity cannot but have existed, but in the absence of any formal consideration of them by ancient writers, it is reasonable to hold that intensity-variations were always affections of the whole sentence and not of individual words as such. The parts played in modern English by pitch and intensity would thus be reversed in ancient Greek. While in English stress concerns chiefly the pronunciation of individual words (although there exists an important sentence-stressing

[1] Plato, *Crat.*, 399 A–C; Arist., *rhet.*, III, 1, 4.

[2] Varro ap. Serg., *de acc.*, p. 189 Wilm. (Keil, *Gr. Lat.*, IV, p. 530).

superimposed upon the succession of word stresses), and pitch-changes affect the sentence as a whole either as an oratorical element or as a capricious manifestation of personal taste; in Greek, on the contrary, pitch concerned chiefly the pronunciation of separate words, and any oratorical effect produced by pitch-changes was effected through a superimposed melody demanded by the emotional character of the sentence as a whole, in the same way that oratorical emphasis is a concern of the whole sentence.

When we turn to the accentuation of the Latin language, we are not surprised, in view of the work done by Greek grammarians for their own language, to find that there exists a great mass of writing professing to deal with the corresponding phenomenon in Latin. But, whereas it is now all but universally conceded that the Greek προσῳδίαι were, what their name implies, semi-musical affections of words, there is not among Latin scholars the same unanimity in regard to the true nature of the Latin *accentus*. One party holds the view that in Latin of the classical period at any rate the verbal accent was essentially the same phenomenon as was observed by the Greek grammarians in Greek speech. The other party, now in a majority, would make the *accentus* an intensity or stress accent of the same general character as the accent in modern English and German. It is not my present purpose to offer any argument for or against either of these views, but it must be admitted by any one who will read the passages bearing on the subject in the writings of such authors as Cicero, Varro, Vitruvius, and Quintilian, to mention no writer of later date, that, rightly or wrongly, these authors *thought* that there existed in their language a verbal melodic accent, strictly comparable to the Greek accent. They may have been mistaken. If so, we may reject their evidence in reaching a decision as to the true nature of the Latin *accentus*. But even so, it is important to analyze the delusion under which they suffered, if only for the purpose of appreciating just how far it extended, and just how far it invalidates their evidence on other questions closely connected with that of the accent, as for example the metrical question. We must become alienists for the moment and for the purpose. Evidently the whole truth can never be reached if we confine ourselves to etymological and historical considerations, much less to those which are evolved from our inner consciousness. It is imperative that we regain the ancient conception of the matter, if we intend

to make even the slightest use of the doctrinal matter which the ancients have left us.

Now assuming for Latin a melodic accent, real or imaginary according to our preferences, let us consider the phenomenon presented to the ear by ancient accent in general, and its treatment by ancient theorists. For this purpose it will be convenient to imagine the changes in pitch values to be represented by a line traced by a moving point, in such manner that its motion from left to right denotes the passage of time, and its variation upward and downward the variation of acuteness and graveness.

In the first place there are only two possible directions, up and down, in which variation can take place. So long as pitch alone is under consideration, there is only one dimension for the movement. But the number of degrees which may be recognized in any system of denoting pitch is limited only by the ability which the inventor of the system may fancy he possesses to discriminate with certainty the finer grades of pitch. Theoretically there cannot be too exact a notation to denote the subtle gradations and variations of pitch easily detected by the trained ear. Continuous motion demands a more complete notation, if it is to be scientifically recorded, than does the intervallar motion of music proper. In practice however the more complicated the system of notation, the more easily will it break down. If the more striking variations from the mean tone of the individual voice are indicated, a sufficiently accurate record for practical purposes would seem to have been devised.

Another consideration bears upon the kind of motion involved in ordinary speech. If the definition in Aristoxenus of the continuous and conversational motion conforms to the facts as observed (and we have no reason to suppose that it does not), there are, strictly speaking, no stationary pitches at all in this form of motion. Says Aristoxenus, *harm. elem.*, I, §26, p. 8 M., p. 10 W.: "In the continuous movement the voice appears to the senses to traverse a certain space in such a way that it rests nowhere, not even, so far as our conception of the sensation goes, at the bounds, but is borne along continuously until the sound ceases."[1] And a little further on he says, *ibid.*, §28, p. 9 M., p.

[1] Aristoxenus, *harm. elem.*, I, §26, p. 8 M : *κατὰ μὲν οὖν τὴν συνεχῆ, τόπον τινὰ διεξιέναι φαίνεται ἡ φωνὴ τῇ αἰσθήσει, οὕτως ὡς ἂν μηδαμοῦ ἱσταμένη < ᾖ >, μηδ' ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν περάτων, κατά γε τὴν τῆς αἰσθήσεως φαντασίαν, ἀλλὰ φερομένη συνεχῶς μέχρι σιωπῆς.*

11 W.: "Now the continuous movement is, we assert, the movement of conversational speech, for when we converse, the voice moves through a space in such a manner as to seem to rest nowhere. In the other movement, which we call intervallar, the contrary process takes place. For the voice seems to rest at various pitches, and all say of a man who seems to do this, that he no longer speaks, but sings. Therefore in conversing we avoid having the voice rest unless we are forced at times by reason of emotion to resort to this style of movement; but in singing we do the reverse, for we avoid the continuous and strive to make the voice rest as much as possible. For the more we make each of the sounds one and stationary and the same, so much the more accurate does the singing seem to the senses. It is fairly plain from the above that of the two movements of the voice in respect to space, the continuous belongs to conversational speech, the intervallar to song."[1]

Now evidently a notation would be severely taxed if it attempted to indicate all the glides characteristic of our conversational speech. Not only are the bounds of such downward and upward movements difficult to determine from the nature of the case, supposing it to be true that all speakers employed exactly the same glides for the same words, but also the rapidity of the ascent or descent would defy accurate analysis.

A sentence in Greek, then, presented—what is seen in every language of which we can to-day study the actual sounds—a complicated succession of glides in pitch, some of them short, some long, some rapidly, some slowly rising or falling in pitch, some beginning and ending on acuter degrees of pitch, some on graver degrees, some passing from acute to grave, some from grave to acute.

[1] Aristoxenus, *harm. elem.*, I, §28, p. 9, 20 M: *τὴν μὲν οὖν συνεχῆ, λογικὴν εἶναί φαμεν. διαλεγομένων γὰρ ἡμῶν, οὕτως ἡ φωνὴ κινεῖται κατὰ τόπον, ὥστε μηδαμοῦ δοκεῖν ἵστασθαι. κατά γε τὴν ἑτέραν, ἣν ὀνομάζομεν διαστηματικήν, ἐναντίως πέφυκε γίγνεσθαι. ἀλλὰ γὰρ ἵστασθαί τε δοκεῖ, καὶ πάντες τὸν τοῦτο φαινόμενον ποιεῖν οὐκέτι λέγειν φασίν, ἀλλ' ᾄδειν· διόπερ ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι φεύγομεν τὸ ἑστάναι* (ἱστάναι libb.) *τὴν φωνήν, ἂν μὴ διὰ πάθος ποτὲ εἰς τοιαύτην κίνησιν ἀναγκασθῶμεν ἐλθεῖν· ἐν δὲ τῷ μελῳδεῖν τοὐναντίον ποιοῦμεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ συνεχὲς φεύγομεν, τὸ δὲ ἑστάναι τὴν φωνὴν ὡς μάλιστα διώκομεν· ὅσῳ γὰρ μᾶλλον ἑκάστην τῶν φωνῶν μίαν τε καὶ ἑστηκυῖαν καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ποιήσομεν, τοσούτῳ φαίνεται τῇ αἰσθήσει τὸ μέλος ἀκριβέστερον. ὅτι μὲν δύο κινήσεων οὐσῶν κατὰ τόπον τῆς φωνῆς, ἡ μὲν συνεχὴς λογική τίς ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ διαστηματικὴ μελῳδική, σχεδὸν δῆλον ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων.*

It is not therefore surprising to find that the various systems of denoting accents by written signs agree in this, that they ignore certain kinds of glides and speak of acute or grave or middle tones, without further indication of their nature. It is clear that the purpose of this apparent defect in the notations, is only to simplify the theory. Even upon syllables of the shortest duration there can have been no perceptible fixity of intonation, such as is heard in singing. Aristoxenus and other writers recognize this point. The moment a tendency towards fixed intonations can be detected, the conversational manner ceases and singing begins. Continuous motion is abandoned for the intervallar. But, inasmuch as the nature of a glide—its direction and extent—becomes more difficult to analyze in proportion as its duration is short, nothing essential is lost by marking short syllables or short vowels with only a general indication of the region of pitch in which they exist.

But in the system of accentuation which ultimately prevailed, acute accents are found not only on short but also on long vowels, and it cannot be claimed that the glides on such long vowels were imperceptible or unimportant. In this case it would seem that the accent denotes an upward glide.[1] The downward glide retained a special mark of its own, the circumflex accent.

At one time it would seem that all syllables were marked with accents, but in course of time only those syllables in general which contained an acute element were so marked. This acute element was denoted either by the acute or by the circumflex accent sign. Every word, not enclitic nor proclitic, bore one such point of acuteness and one only. This doctrine is found in both Greek and Latin theory.[2]

[1] Brugmann, *Griech. Gram.*[3] in Müller's Handbuch, §144, p. 151.

[2] Dionysius Hal., *de comp. verb.*, xi: *ταῖς δὲ πολυσυλλάβοις, οἷαί ποτ' ἂν ὦσιν, ἡ τὸν ὀξὺν τόνον ἔχουσα μία ἐν πολλαῖς βαρείαις ἐνεστιν.*

Cicero, *or.*, XVIII, 58: Ipsa enim natura quasi modularetur hominum orationem in omni verbo posuit acutam vocem nec una plus nec a postrema syllaba ultra tertiam.

Quintilian, *inst. or.*, I, 5, 30: namque in omni voce acuta intra numerum trium syllabarum continetur, sive eae sunt in verbo solae sive ultimae et in iis aut proxima extremae aut ab ea tertia. trium porro de quibus loquor, media longa aut acuta aut flexa erit, eodem loco brevis utique gravem habebit sonum ideoque positam ante se id est ab ultima tertiam acuet. est autem in omni voce utique acuta, sed numquam plus una nec umquam

Thus the melodic outline of a Greek sentence, and of a Latin sentence also, if the *accentus* of the grammarians was really the same as the Greek *προσῳδία*, comprised a succession of summits corresponding to the accented syllables of the more important words. There was a periodic fluctuation in the tone from regions of low pitch to summits of high pitch. There was a rhythmical rise and fall, running through the sentence.

In music proper the upward and downward movements, in which melody largely consists, received considerable attention, to judge from the somewhat complicated terminology which we find in the musical treatises. The usual words employed were *ἐπίτασις* and *ἄνεσις*.

Bacchius, *introd.*, §19, p. 6 M, p. 297 KvJ: *Μέλος δὲ τί ἐστιν; —Ἄνεσις καὶ ἐπίτασις δι' ἐμμελῶν φθόγγων γινομένη.*

Ibid., §45, p. 12 M, p. 302 KvJ: *Πάθη δὲ τῆς μελῳδίας πόσα λέγομεν εἶναι;—δ'.—Τίνα ταῦτα;—Ἄνεσιν, ἐπίτασιν, μονήν, στάσιν.*

Ἄνεσις τί ἐστι;—Κίνησις μελῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὀξυτέρου φθόγγου ἐπὶ τὸ βαρύτερον.

Ἐπίτασις δὲ τί ἐστιν;—Ἐπίτασίς ἐστι κίνησις μελῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ βαρυτέρου φθόγγου ἐπὶ τὸ ὀξύτερον.

Μονὴ δὲ τί ἐστιν;—Ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ φθόγγου πλείονες λέξεις μελῳδῶνται.

Στάσις δὲ τί ἐστι;—Στάσις ἐστὶν ὕπαρξις ἐμμελοῦς φθόγγου.

Gaudentius, *introd.*, 1, p. 3 M, p. 328 KvJ: *ἡ δὲ τῆς φωνῆς κίνησις ἐκ βαρυτέρου μὲν εἰς ὀξύτερον ἰούσης τόπον ἐπίτασις, ἀνάπαλιν δὲ ἄνεσις καλεῖταί τε καὶ ἔστιν.*

Aristides Quintilianus, *de musica*, I, v, p. 8 M, p. 5, 28 J: *ταύτης*[1] *δὲ εἴδη δύο, ἄνεσίς τε καὶ ἐπίτασις· ἄνεσις μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡνίκα*

ultima, ideoque in disyllabis prior; praeterea numquam in eadem flexa et acuta, quia in omni flexa est acuta. itaque neutra cludet vocem latinam. ea vero quae sunt syllabae unius, erunt acuta aut flexa, ne sit aliqua vox sine acuta.

Servius, *comm. in Don.*, p. 426, 15 K: unus autem sermo unum accipit accentum vel acutum vel circumflexum, utrumque autem simul habere non potest.

Martianus Capella, III, p. 65, 22 Eyss.: omnis igitur vox latina simplex sive composita habet unum sonum aut acutum aut circumflexum. duos autem acutos aut inflexos habere numquam potest, gravis vero saepe.

[1] It is not clear from the text to what *ταύτης* refers. It cannot refer to *τάσις* of the preceding line. Perhaps it goes with *τῆς κατὰ τὴν φωνὴν κινήσεως* four lines above.

ἂν ἀπὸ ὀξυτέρου τόπου εἰς βαρύτερον ἡ φωνὴ χωρῇ, ἐπίτασις δ' ὅταν ἐκ βαρυτέρου μεταβαίνῃ πρὸς ὀξύτερον.

Plethon, *Notices et Extraits* etc., XVI, 2, p. 234: *φωνῆς ἄνεσις [ἐστὶν ἡ] ἐπὶ τὸ βαρύτερον μεταβολή, ἐπίτασις δὲ ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ὀξύτερον, στάσις δὲ ἡ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὅσαγε κατὰ τὴν βαρύτητα ἢ ὀξύτητα τῆς φωνῆς μονή.*

But a more complete analysis of the melodic movements is found in a number of treatises. According to Aristides Quintilianus *μελοποιία* has three forms, *ἀγωγή*, *πεττεία*, and *πλοκή*. The first of these is not defined, but it is divided into three varieties, which are named and described. *Ἀγωγὴ εὐθεῖα* is an ascent by consecutive notes, *ἀγωγὴ ἀνακάμπτουσα* a descent of the same sort, while *ἀγωγὴ περιφερής* is a kind of combination of the first two, either ascending by the conjunct notes and descending by the disjunct notes, or *vice versâ*.

Arist. Quin., *de mus.*, I, xii. p. 29 M, p. 19 J: *ἀγωγῆς μὲν οὖν εἴδη τρία, εὐθεῖα, ἀνακάμπτουσα, περιφερής· εὐθεῖα μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς φθόγγων τὴν ἐπίτασιν ποιουμένη, ἀνακάμπτουσα δὲ ἡ διὰ τῶν ἑπομένων ἀποτελοῦσα τὴν βαρύτητα, περιφερὴς δὲ ἡ κατὰ συνημμένων μὲν ἐπιτείνουσα, κατὰ διεζευγμένων δ' ἀνιεῖσα, ἢ ἐναντίως· αὕτη δὲ κἀν ταῖς μεταβολαῖς θεωρεῖται.*

Bryennius, p. 502 Wallis, has the same analysis of *ἀγωγή* into *εὐθεῖα*, *ἀνακάμπτουσα*, and *περιφερής*, but I have not access to a text of his treatise. The doctrine seems to go back to Aristoxenus, for we have a corrupt passage giving a similar definition.

Aristox., *harm. elem.*, II, §70 f, p. 29, 31 M, p. 28 W: *Ἀγωγὴ δ' ἔστω ἡ διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς φθόγγων ἔξωθεν τῶν ἀρχῶν ὧν ἐν ἑκατέρωθεν ἀσύνθετον κεῖται διάστημα . . . εὐθεῖα δ' ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ . . .*

The same definition of *ἀγωγή* appears in

Cleonides (Pseudo-Euclid), *introd.*, p. 22 M, p. 207 KvJ: *δι' ὧν δὲ μελοποιία ἐπιτελεῖται δ' ἐστιν· ἀγωγή, πλοκή, πεττεία, τονή. ἀγωγὴ μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς φθόγγων ὁδὸς τοῦ μέλους.*

Ἀγωγή is thus an *ἐπίτασις* or *ἄνεσις* of consecutive notes in the scale.

A different set of terms, outlining a slightly different conception, is found in the anonymous treatise edited by Bellermann, Berlin, 1841, and by A. J. H. Vincent, *Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibliothèque du Roi*, Paris, XVI (1847) pt. 2, p. 5 ff.

Anonymus, *de musica*, §16, p. 52 ff. (Bell. p. 19, nos. 2 ff. and 84 ff.): *πρόσληψίς ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ βαρυτέρου φθόγγου ἐπὶ τὸν*

ὀξύτερον κατὰ μέλος ἐπίτασις ἤτοι ἀνάδοσις, ἣν τινες καλοῦσιν ὑφὲν ἔσωθεν. τοῦτο δὲ γίνεται ποικίλως, ἀμέσως τε καὶ διαμέσου· ἀμέσως μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐγγὺς φθόγγου, οἷον· ⊢Γ, ΓL, LF, FG, G⏑, ⏑Π, Π<. ἐμμέσως δὲ οἷον διὰ τριῶν F⏑, διὰ τεσσάρων FΠ, διὰ πέντε F<.

ἔκλῆψις δὲ τὰ ὑπεναντία τούτοις, ἀπὸ τῶν ὀξυτέρων ἐπὶ τὰ βαρέα ἄνεσις, ἣν τινες ὀνομάζουσι ὑφὲν ἔξωθεν, οἷον ἀμέσως μὲν GF, ἐμμέσως δὲ διὰ τριῶν ⏑F, διὰ τεσσάρων ΠF, διὰ πέντε <F.

πρόσκρουσις μέν ἐστιν ἐν χρόνοις δύο ἑνός, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ἐλάττονος, χρόνου δύο μέλη, τοῦτ' ἔστι δύο φθόγγοι, ἀπὸ τῶν βαρέων ἐπὶ τὰ ὀξέα, οἷον ἀμέσως μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἐγγὺς φθόγγου FG, ἐμμέσως δὲ διὰ τριῶν F⏑, διὰ τεσσάρων FΠ, διὰ πέντε F<.

ἔκκρουσις δὲ ὑπεναντία τούτοις, ἄνεσις ἀπὸ τῶν ὀξέων ἐπὶ τὰ βαρέα, οἷον ἀμέσως μὲν GF, ἐμμέσως δὲ διὰ τριῶν ⏑F, διὰ τεσσάρων ΠF, διὰ πέντε <F.

In this scheme we may notice first that the preposition προσ- in πρόσληψις and πρόσκρουσις evidently signifies a rise in pitch, and ἐκ- in ἔκληψις and ἔκκρουσις a fall. Next in regard to the couple πρόσκρουσις and ἔκκρουσις, as is pointed out by Vincent, the expression ἐν χρόνοις δύο shows that the rise or fall in question involved two *notes*, that is, that the movement is effected by a leap (is intervallar). The other couple, πρόσληψις and ἔκληψις, are therefore presumably glides, effected portamento-wise. This view of the matter is supported by the use of the term ὑφέν and by the fact that the musical notes[1] in the examples are the same for πρόσληψις and ἔκληψις as for πρόσκρουσις and ἔκκρουσις, except that the hyphen mark is written under the former. Lastly in regard to the subdivision of each of the four kinds of motion into species, of which one takes place 'immediately' and the other 'mediately,' since the former is in all cases described as occurring only from one note to a neighboring note in the scale, and the latter always between two notes not adjacent, but at an interval of a third, fourth, or fifth, we may rest satisfied to believe that the phrases ἀμέσως and ἐμμέσως (or διαμέσου) refer simply to the absence or presence of intervening notes in the scale.

In §14 of the same treatise as edited by Vincent (Bell., p. 84, no. 80, and p. 85, no. 81) tables are given with the Greek and corresponding modern notation of the four motions, πρόσληψις and ἔκληψις, πρόσκρουσις and ἔκκρουσις.

[1] The notes as printed above are only typographical make-shifts.

At the beginning of the section we find still another terminology.

Anonymus, *de musica*, §14, p. 43 (Bell., p. 82, no. 78): *ἀγωγὴ προσεχὴς ἀπὸ τῶν βαρυτέρων ὁδός, ἡ κίνησις φθόγγων ἐκ βαρυτέρου τόπου ἐπὶ ὀξύτερον· ἀνάκλασις* [MSS *ἀνάλυσις*, Vincent *ἀνάκλησις*] *δὲ τοὐναντίον.*

Here the ascending motion is called simply *ἀγωγή* (or is *ἀγωγὴ προσεχής* to be translated "*ἀγωγή* proper"?) and the descending *ἀνάκλασις*.[1]

Finally the fragments of Plethon published by Vincent (*Notices et Extraits* etc., XVI, 2, p. 234 ff.), entitled Κεφάλαι' ἄττα λόγων μουσικῶν, contain the following (p. 236):

Ἄρσιν μὲν εἶναι ὀξυτέρου φθόγγου ἐκ βαρυτέρου μετάληψιν, θέσιν δὲ τοὐναντίον βαρυτέρου ἐξ ὀξυτέρου.

In this passage the words *ἄρσις* and *θέσις* occur with a musical signification, but it is the only passage of which I know.

Now without attempting to reconcile any inconsistencies there may be in these passages, we may at least conclude that the subject of the movement of the 'voice' ('human and instrumental') received a complicated theoretical treatment at the hands of musicians. What practical gain was aimed at we can hardly guess. To us the very naming of the various species of motion seems superfluous. But the fact remains that the ancients treated the matter in this way. We are thus brought to the point where we cannot reasonably refuse to admit the possibility that if the phenomenon of a rise and fall of pitch in music had a terminology, the similar rise and fall in conversational speech may have had a similar terminology. In fact the line between speech and song could not be drawn with any degree of sharpness in ancient theory. The very fact of a formal separation of these two kinds of utterance according to the character of the vocal motion points to the existence of a manner of speaking resembling singing, and a manner of singing resembling speaking. The *κίνησις μέση* of Aristides Quintilianus, partaking of the nature of both *κίνησις συνεχής* and *κίνησις διαστηματική*, forces us to admit that.

Accentuation thus assumes a place in ancient theory under the general heading of the Movement of the Voice. The rise and

[1] The MSS have *ἀνάλυσις*, which can hardly be right. Vincent adopts *ἀνάκλησις*, following the Hagiopolite MS, but *ἀνάκλασις*, which Vincent mentions as possible (p. 195 n.), seems most likely, as it suits the other name for the same motion, *ἀγωγὴ ἀνακάμπτουσα*.

fall of the tone in musical melody was paralleled by the rise and fall in conversational melody.

Scattered here and there through the writings of the Latin grammarians are a number of passages in which I believe we can see traces of doctrinal matter regarding this melodic rise and fall. Inasmuch as these passages have often been cited in support of one or another theory in regard to the basis of ancient versification, a great deal of confusion would be removed if it could be shown that the passages, or, rather, their sources, really concerned the melodic or pitch accent of the Latin language of the classical period and not its versification at all, except in so far as pitch accent must needs affect versification indirectly, as it does all artistic utterance. The point at which the misunderstanding would arise would be in the use of the words *arsis* and *thesis* or their equivalents. That these words once had a melodic or accentual signification as well as the more usual rhythmical or metrical one is certain.[1] But when the accents lost their melodic character, the two uses might easily become confused. That this is what happened is the explanation suggested to account for the passages in question.

Sergius, after defining *tenor* or *accentus*[2] and explaining that

[1] This fact is sometimes lost sight of, but Weil and Benloew touch upon the matter in a note at p. 98 of their *Théorie générale de l'accentuation latine* (Paris, 1855), and John Foster in his *Essay on the Different Nature of Accent and Quantity . . . in the English, Latin, and Greek Languages* (Eton, 1763) devotes a postscript to chap. viii to "The Different Ἄρσις of Accent and and of Metre." In this work at p. 146 n. a passage from J. C. Scaliger (1484–1558), *De Causis Linguae Latinae*, is quoted, in which the accentual meaning of ἄρσις is given in the words: Syllabae igitur modus, quo tollitur in ea vox acutior, dictus a Graecis ἄρσις, recte sane, in alteram autem subeuntem cum demittitur vox, θέσιν appellarunt, minus commode :—quae melius κατάθεσις dicta fuisset.—vel *aequabilitatem* vocis potius appellassent. unde etiam in musicis ὁμοτενεῖς quidam dicuntur tractus, in quibus ἄρσις est nulla.

[2] Cf. Donat., p. 371 K : tonos alii accentus, alii tenores nominant. Priscian, II, 12, p. 51, 21 K : accidit unicuique syllabae tenor, spiritus, tempus, numerus literarum. tenor acutus vel gravis vel circumflexus. in dictione tenor certus, absque ea incertus, non potest tamen sine eo esse. Diomedes, p. 431, 3 K : accentus quidam fastigia vocaverunt, quod capitibus litterarum imponerentur ; alii tenores vel sonos appellant ; nonnulli cacumina retinere maluerunt. Idem, p. 456, 18 K : tenor quem Graeci dicunt tasin aut proso-

the term *accentus* is sometimes carelessly used to include the long and short marks, the hyphen, diastole, and apostrophus, says (p. 482, 14 K):

> his ita se habentibus sciendum est quod acutus et gravis et circumflexus soli sunt qui, ut superius diximus, naturalem unius cuiusque sermonis in voce nostra elationis servent tenorem. nam ipsi arsin thesinque moderantur, quamquam sciendum est quod in usu non sit hodierno gravis accentus.

Then follow rules for the accentuation of dissyllables, polysyllables, and monosyllables with acute and circumflex accents.

In this passage versification is not under discussion at all. Although the names of various feet are used, it is only in order to describe various quantitative combinations, for which versification afforded a convenient terminology ready made. The terms *arsis* and *thesis* cannot refer to the arsis and thesis of rhythm, unless one goes so far as to claim that it is here a question of accentual versification, in which a stressed accent has usurped the rôle played in classical verse by quantity. Commodianus is supposed to have already written accentual poetry, but there is little probability that such a system of versification would find recognition in what purports to be a commentary on classical usage.

Pseudo-Priscian defines accent as follows (p. 519, 25 K):

> accentus namque est certa lex ad elevandam et deprimendam syllabam uniuscuiusque particulae orationis, qui fit ad similitudinem elementorum, litterarum syllabarumque, qui etiam tripertito dividitur, acuto gravi circumflexo. acutus namque accentus ideo inventus est, quod acuat sive elevet syllabam; gravis vero eo, quod deprimat aut deponat; circumflexus ideo, quod deprimat et acuat.

Then after touching upon the "spurious" accents, the restriction of the Latin accent to two syllables, and certain exceptions to the Latin rule of accentuation, he gives the rules for accenting monosyllabic, dissyllabic, and trisyllabic words under all conditions of difference in vowel quantity.[1] Examples are given for every variety of quantitative aspect up to three syllables. Then he says (p. 521, 24 K):

dian, in flexibus vocis servandus est; nam quaedam acuto tenore, pleraque gravi, alia flexo desiderant enuntiari. Cledonius, p. 32, 5 K: tria habet cognomenta accentus; aut toni sunt aut tenores aut accentus; toni a sono accentus ab accinendo (Keil, acuendo), tenores ab intentione.

[1] So Diomedes, p. 430 K.

> ad hanc autem rem arsis et thesis sunt necessariae. namque in unaquaque parte orationis arsis et thesis sunt, non in ordine syllabarum sed in pronuntiatione: velut in hac parte *natura* quando dico *natu*, elevatur vox et est arsis intus, quando vero sequitur *ra*, vox deponitur et est thesis deforis. quantum autem suspenditur vox per arsin, tantum deprimitur per thesin. sed ipsa vox quae per dictiones formatur, donec accentus perficiatur, in arsin deputatur; quae autem post accentum sequitur, in thesin.

Here also there can hardly be any reference to versification. The extent of the arsis is determined by a property of the individual word, the *accentus*, the rest of the *pars orationis* is thesis. The ratio of 4:1 between rhythmical arsis and thesis is unheard of. The fact that the words *intus* and *deforis* correspond in their use to the terms *ὑφὲν ἔσωθεν* and *ὑφὲν ἔξωθεν* in the Anonymus passage, *de musica*, §16, p. 52 ff., quoted above (p. 65 f.), is also to be remarked.

In the following passage I suspect that the second sentence is parenthetical, and that *temporis* of the manuscripts should be emended to *tenoris*.

> Marius Victorinus, p. 40, 14 K: arsis igitur et thesis quas Graeci dicunt, id est sublatio et positio, significant motum pedis. est enim arsis sublatio pedis sine sono. thesis positio cum sono.[1] item arsis est elatio temporis (? tenoris) soni, vocis, thesis depositio et quaedam contractio syllabarum.

The writer then returns to the consideration of meter and shows how the various kinds of feet are to be divided into arsis and thesis, the arsis according to this doctrine invariably preceding the thesis.[2] But in the sentence beginning, *item arsis*, he merely adds incidentally, as it were, a non-metrical definition of the terms *arsis* and *thesis*.

The analysis of feet containing an uneven number of syllables into the constituent parts, arsis and thesis, seems to have called for rules. We are informed in certain passages that the proper division into arsis and thesis can be ascertained *from the accent*.

[1] Cf. Arist. Quin., *de mus.*, I, xiii, p. 31 M, p. 21 J: *ῥυθμὸς τοίνυν ἐστὶ σύστημα ἐκ χρόνων κατά τινα τάξιν συγκειμένων, καὶ τὰ τούτων πάθη καλοῦμεν ἄρσιν καὶ θέσιν, ψόφον καὶ ἡρεμίαν.*

[2] In regard to the trochee, p. 40, 14 K, it is clearly necessary to read *tollitur* for *ponitur*, and *ponitur* for *tollitur*, in view of p. 45, 2 K.

These passages are full of difficulties, which will perhaps never be cleared up, in view of the probability that the writers themselves did not understand what they wrote. In the last two of the following four passages in particular it seems impossible to reconcile the inconsistencies.

Terentianus Maurus, *de metris*, v. 1427 ff., p. 368 K:

pes adest supremus unus octo de trisyllabis,
ἀμφίμακρος: hunc priori (scil. ἀμφιβράχει) perspicis contrarium:
nam duae longae receptam continent intus brevem,
Romulos si nominemus, *Apulos* aut *Doricos*.
sescuplo metimur istum: quinque nam sunt tempora:
nunc duo ante tria sequuntur: nunc tribus reddes duo,
Italum si quando mutat Graius accentus sonum.
Apulos nam quando dico, tunc in arsi sunt duo:
Σωκράτην Graius loquendo reddet in thesi duo.
creticum appellant eundem, forte Curetum genus
quo modos ludo sub armis congruentes succinat.
primus iste pes locatur his ubique in versibus,
optimus pes et melodis et pedestri gloria.

Servius, *in Donatum*, p. 425, 7 K: arsis dicitur elevatio, thesis positio. quotienscumque contingit ut tres sunt syllabae in pede vel quinque, quoniam non licet in divisione temporum syllabam scindi, sed aut principio adplicatur aut fini, idcirco debemus considerare, media syllaba cui parti coniungi debeat, et hoc ex accentu colligimus. nam si in prima syllaba fuerit accentus, arsis duas syllabas possidebit; si autem in media syllaba, thesi duas syllabas damus.

Julianus, p. 321, 11 K: Quae accidunt unicuique pedi? Arsis et thesis, numerus syllabarum, tempus, resolutio, figura, metrum. Quid est arsis? Elevatio, id est inchoatio partis. Quid est thesis? Positio, id est finis partis. Quo modo? Puta si dicam *prudens*, illud *pru* elevatio est, illud *dens* positio. In trisyllabis et tetrasyllabis pedibus quot syllabas sibi vindicat arsis et quot thesis? In trisyllabis, si in prima habuerit accentum, ut puta *dominus*, duas syllabas vindicat arsis et unam thesis. Nam si penultimo loco habuerit accentum, ut puta *beatus*, arsis vindicat unam syllabam et thesis duas. Sic et tempora secundum quantitatem syllabarum sibi vindicat.

Pompeius, *comm.*, p. 120, 29 K: arsis et thesis dicitur elevatio et positio. ut si dicam *ego*, *e* arsis est, *go* thesis est. cui rei proficiat arsis et thesis, paulo post dicemus. interim arsis et thesis dicitur elevatio et positio. ut puta *Roma; Roma* prima syllaba arsin habet, secunda syllaba thesin. quid si quattuor syllabarum fuerit? duae erunt in arsi et duae in thesi. quid si octo? quattuor habet arsis et quattuor thesis. quid si tres sunt, id est, quid si impar numerus? si impar numerus fuerit, quotiens media syllaba accentum habet, arsis habebit unum tempus et thesis duo; quotiens prior syllaba habuerit accentum, arsis habebit duo tempora et thesis unum. ut puta *Camillus* quando dicimus, ecce media syllaba accentum habet: dicimus in arsi unum et in thesi duo. *Romulus* quando dicimus, prima syllaba habet accentum: dicimus duo in arsi, unum in thesi. ergo in istis, ubi non sunt aequales syllabae, quando debeat arsis duo habere tempora, unum thesis, vel quando unum arsis et duo thesis, ex accentu colligis. nam si media syllaba accentum habuerit, ultimae syllabae iungis plura tempora, ut arsis habeat unum, thesis duo; si prior syllaba habuerit accentum, arsi iunges plura tempora.

The most important point to determine in these passages is whether they are really concerned with versification or not. All profess to be. But it is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the statements made with the accepted doctrine in regard to the laws of ancient verse. In the first place integral words are given as examples of what are supposably the feet of verse, and conclusions as to the internal constitution of the feet are drawn from the pronunciation of the words. In the next place it is not clear how the accentuation can determine rhythmical arsis and thesis, unless the accent be a stress or intensity accent, and either the arsis or the thesis be of the same nature, or at least contain an intensity element. But even so further difficulties remain. Terentianus clearly brings quantity into consideration. His doctrine would seem to be that in words, or, as he calls them, feet, containing five morae, of the form —∪—, the division is 2 : 3 in Latin words, because the accent falls (by rule) on the antepenult (as *A-pulos*), but is 3 : 2 when a Greek word with the accent on the short penult (as Σωκρά-τηv) is involved. Feet of the forms ——∪ (βακχεῖος) and ∪—— (ἀντίβακχος) have been already disposed of

before the passage quoted. The ratio between arsis and thesis is stated to be sescuple, but the self-evident division is not specifically made for each foot. In regard to the amphibrach our author says that the ratio is necessarily 3 : 1, but that we are at liberty to give the arsis one time and the thesis three, or the arsis three and the thesis one. Since this ratio is not one of the three rhythmical ratios, this foot is rejected by the "musici."[1]

If the Servius passage conveys the same doctrine, we must consider that here also only the form —∪— is in question, for the division into rhythmical arsis and thesis of the forms ——∪ and ∪—— is self-evident. This involves emending the *vel quinque* of the manuscripts to *et quinque tempora*, and *duas syllabas* (in each case) to *duo tempora*. But if the rule is of late origin, and not a precept handed down from early times, another explanation is possible. We know that the feeling for quantity was no longer alive in the time of Servius.[2] The passage may then be regarded simply as giving a practical rule for a partial determination of the (extinct) quantities in trisyllabic feet (words) through an observation of the position of the accent (now, of course, an intensity accent). When the first syllable is accented, the second or middle must be short, and so, he says, the arsis (or first part of a foot) includes two syllables (according to the text, but, as remarked, Terentianus' rule calls for one only), and the thesis one; but when the middle syllable is accented, it must be long, and then, he says, the arsis has one syllable and the thesis two. It is not stated which of the eight trisyllabic feet, ∪∪∪, —∪∪, ∪—∪, ∪∪—, ——∪, —∪—, ∪——, ———, are covered by this rule, but some restriction is clearly necessary. The rule does not give satisfactory results on any rhythmical basis. For example we cannot suppose the form ∪—— to be divided into a rhythmical arsis of one mora and a thesis of four morae.

In regard to the Julianus and Pompeius passages the supposi-

[1] exigunt idcirco talem qui sequuntur musicam (v. 1426). I had at first taken *exigunt* in the sense of 'demand,' but the interpretation given above, which I owe to Prof. C. W. E. Miller, must be right.

[2] Servius, *ad Piquilinum de finalibus*, p. 1803, Putsche: nam quod pertinet ad naturam primae syllabae, longane sit aut brevis, solis confirmamus exemplis; medias vero in latino sermone accentu discernimus; ultimas arte colligimus. (G. Paris, *Étude sur le rôle de l'accent latin dans la langue française*, p. 30, n. 2.)

tion that only feet containing five morae are under consideration is precluded by the examples. Yet it is strange if the analysis into arsis and thesis of feet like dactyls and anapaests was regarded as difficult to effect without the aid of the verbal accent. It is quite possible, however, that the examples need emending. Furthermore to follow the directions literally, we are led to the curious result that the accent sometimes falls on the arsis (as *dómi-nus*), and sometimes on the thesis (as *be-âtus*). Nor are we at liberty to shift the position of arsis and thesis, for Julianus expressly announces the doctrine, a very common one, that the arsis invariably precedes the thesis in any foot, and Pompeius would imply as much in his first examples, *ego* and *Roma*. Another difficulty in the way of accepting these passages as dealing purely with the meter of versification lies in the examples *beatus* and *Camillus*, which are amphibrach in form. Pompeius himself says later, p. 125, 4 K, of the amphibrach: nulla divisio est. As in the Servius passage results contrary to all rhythmical theory are reached.

We are thus led to the conclusion that the arsis and thesis which according to the grammarians can be determined by the verbal accent are not the arsis and thesis of versification. Whatever may be the true conception of the latter, they are certainly not affections of individual words. The arsis and thesis of verse are complementary parts of a foot. But the arsis and thesis under discussion have no apparent relationship with true feet. The accent is a concern of the word, not of the foot. When the grammarians employ integral words as examples to illustrate the various kinds of feet found in verse, we overlook the fault in the method. But when we are asked to believe that the accents of these words played any rôle in verse, where it can only occasionally have happened that the words were coterminous with feet, we must decline to follow our preceptors.

The attitude of the ancient theorists in all this matter is of prime importance. The science of metric covered more than the subject of versification only; it included also the artistic disposition of long and short syllables in prose composition. Consider the doctrine of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. He states that ῥυθμός is necessary in artistic prose as well as in poetry.[1] Prose ought

[1] Dionysius of Halicarnassus, *de comp. verb.*, xi: ἐξ ὧν δὲ οἶμαι γενήσεσθαι λέξιν ἡδεῖαν καὶ καλήν, τέτταρά ἐστι τὰ κυριώτατα καὶ κράτιστα, μέλος

to be εὔρυθμος, however, and not ἔρρυθμος,[1] εὔμετρος and not ἔμμετρος. It ought to contain feet or meters (ῥυθμοί, μέτρα), but they should not be prominent.[2] If therefore the same terminology was used for various combinations of quantities in prose diction as was in use for poetic diction, nothing could be more natural; but the practice does not necessarily imply that the same phenomenon was under discussion. Indeed Dionysius fully recognizes the difference. Both the ἔμμετρος λέξις of poetry and song and the ἄμετρος λέξις of prose include what are called "feet" for want of distinguishing names.[3] But whereas poetry cannot employ certain feet, prose rejects none.[4] There is no real rhythm in prose, but only a quasi-rhythm, no real feet, but only quasi-feet. The indiscriminate mingling of heterogeneous feet is not forbidden.

The feet of prose diction are then a fact in ancient theory, but of rhythmical arsis and thesis properly speaking they can have had no trace. Therefore when we read in the Latin grammarians of an arsis and thesis found in feet which are identical in everything with individual words, we must look for some other definition for such a use of these terms than the usual one. Just what meaning the grammarians themselves attached to the terms may not now be discoverable. Perhaps to them the arsis was nothing more than the first part of a foot and the thesis the last, and so when a word filled the form of a foot, the first part of the word was the arsis and the last part the thesis. But if there was in earlier doctrine a verbal arsis and thesis of an accentual character, it is easy to see how, when the accents became converted into stresses, the principles regulating the one phenomenon might be

καὶ ῥυθμὸς καὶ μεταβολὴ καὶ τὸ παρακολουθοῦν τοῖς τρισὶ τούτοις πρέπον . . . ὧν μὲν οὖν στοχάζονται πάντες οἱ σπουδῇ γράφοντες μέτρον, ἡ μέλος, ἡ τὴν λεγομένην πεζὴν λέξιν, ταῦτ' ἐστί.

[1] *Ibid.*, fin.

[2] *Ibid.*, xxv: ὅπερ οὖν ἔφην, οὐ δύναται ψιλὴ λέξις ὁμοία γενέσθαι τῇ ἐμμέτρῳ καὶ ἐμμελεῖ ἐὰν μὴ περιέχῃ μέτρα καὶ ῥυθμούς τινας ἐγκαταμεμιγμένους ἀδήλως. οὐ μέντοι προσήκει γ' ἔμμετρον οὐδ' ἔρρυθμον αὐτὴν εἶναι δοκεῖν· ποίημα γὰρ οὕτως ἐσται καὶ μέλος, ἐκβήσεταί τε ἁπλῶς τὸν αὐτῆς χαρακτῆρα· ἀλλ' εὐρυθμον αὐτὴν ἀπόχρη καὶ εὔμετρον φαίνεσθαι μόνον· οὕτω γὰρ ἂν εἴη ποιητικὴ μέν, οὐ μὴν ποίημά γε· καὶ εὐμελὴς μέν, οὐ μέλος δέ.

[3] *Ibid.*, xvii, fin.: οὗτοι δώδεκα ῥυθμοί τε καὶ πόδες εἰσὶν οἱ πρῶτοι καταμετροῦντες ἅπασαν ἔμμετρόν τε καὶ ἄμετρον λέξιν, ἐξ ὧν γίνονται στίχοι τε καὶ κῶλα.

[4] *Ibid.*, xviii, init.: οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀπελαύνεται ῥυθμὸς οὐδεὶς ἐκ τῆς ἀμέτρου λέξεως, ὥσπερ ἐκ τῆς ἐμμέτρου.

transferred to the other. Thus the feet of prose also would be provided with a subdivision into arsis and thesis. The result would be a simplification on the surface of the doctrine, but a deep-seated confusion in essentials.

C. W. L. JOHNSON.

AUGUSTUS PRINCEPS.

It is a familiar fact that in the political development of the early Empire the cautious experiments of Octavianus Caesar all tended to preserve, or even restore, the forms and ostensible functions of the Republic, with the added device of successive cumulation on one person. The term *Augustus* was not particularly *civilis*[1] (to use a Roman term that did not lose its significance from Actium to the era of Trajan). *Princeps*, on the other hand, was eminently *civilis*. I was led to undertake a survey of the ancient tradition and theory on the subject, because I was struck by the fact that Mommsen differs not only from the almost unanimous opinion of modern students such as Hoeck, Madvig, Peter, Merivale and Ranke, but also from Dio, whom he criticizes severely.

In attempting to analyze the principles by which the second Caesar was guided in manipulating public affairs and in constructing the mechanism of the new government, we may safely emphasize these points: in the first place, Octavianus wished to avoid the political blunders of his adoptive father, and, secondly, his aim was to obliterate, as far as possible, the memory of some of his own acts during his triumviral period.[2] Julius Caesar indeed had truthfully said "nihil esse rem publicam, appellationem modo sine corpore ac specie," but he had underestimated the tenacious life of "*appellationes*" and of incidental sentiment and association.[3]

[1] Αὔγουστος ὡς καὶ πλεῖόν τι ἢ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ὢν ἐπεκλήθη, Dio 53, 16, 8.—In 27 B. C., on January 17, acc. to Censorinus, de die natal. 21, he was so greeted by an acclamation, "sententia L. Munatii Planci," who had not been a courtier at Alexandria to no purpose. Madvig, Verfassung u. Verwaltung des röm. Staates, I, p. 536, follows Orosius, VI 20, who places the event in Jan., 29 B. C. The Greek version Σεβαστός emphasizes the extraordinary character of the appellation; cf. the reluctance of Tiberius to use this name, Suetonius, Tib. 26.

[2] Cf. the apologetic and pseudo-republican strain of the Monumentum Ancyranum, as well as the spirit in which Velleius, for example, refers to the proscriptions of the second triumvirate.

[3] Cf. details of his "spernere patrium morem" in Suetonius, Iulius 76–77.

Octavianus determined upon the rôle of senatorial mandatary. As all the chief acts of the future administration were to be covered by *senatus consulta*, the ostensible elevation and purification of that august body was indeed a task of the first importance.[1] The first *lectio* occurred in 28 B. C., when Augustus and Agrippa were censors. According to the custom of the ancient Republic before the era of Marius and Sulla, an essential part of the censorial *lectio senatus* and an important privilege of the censors was the designation of a *princeps senatus*. In this *lectio* Octavianus was so designated. Dio 53, 1 *τὰς ἀπογραφὰς ἐξετέλεσε, καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς πρόκριτος τῆς γερουσίας ἐπεκλήθη, ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ ἀκριβεῖ δημοκρατίᾳ ἐνενόμιστο*. It was indeed, as Dio urges, a repristination of an institution peculiar to the *ἀκριβὴς δημοκρατία*, by which term Dio means the republican era before the rise of the men of personal power. For Dio aptly[2] summarizes Roman history down to 29 B. C. as embracing three periods: the kings, the republic, the *δυναστεῖαι*.

The institution of the *princeps senatus* as an incidental part of the *lectio senatus*, and thus of the census, is discussed by Mommsen in his Römische Forschungen, I 92 sqq. The literary tradition enables him to specify twelve,[3] beginning with M. Valerius Maximus, dictator of 494 B. C., and concluding with L. Valerius Flaccus, consul 100 B. C. He differs, for example, from Merivale,[4] whom he does not mention, in excluding Lutatius Catulus, consul of 78 B. C. This view of Merivale's is also put forward in Pauly, Real-Encyclopädie, IV 1248. Mommsen claims that the fact that Catulus was considered *princeps senatus* is due to misunderstanding. Dio 36, 14 says: *ὅτι τὰ . . . πρῶτα τῆς βουλῆς ἦν*. These words, to be sure, are not very explicit, but Cicero, in Pisonem, III 6, says: "me Q. Catulus *princeps huius ordinis* . . . parentem patriae nominavit." Mommsen argues[5] that this *principatus* differed from the formal one of earlier times, and was so

[1] Cf. Suetonius, Aug. 35. For the degradation of the Senate by Julius Caesar, cf. Dio 43, 47.

[2] Dio 52, 1. This summary exhibits the superior clearness of Dio's political vision. Cf. the "certamina potentium" in Tacitus, Annals, I 2.

[3] He sums up his list as thirteen, but there are only twelve in it.

[4] Merivale, p. 454: "the most celebrated of the list was Lutatius Catulus, whose position at the head of the senatorial oligarchy has been signalized at the beginning of this history."

[5] Staatsrecht, III 868, note 4.

merely "nach der öffentlichen Meinung." But by the latter standard no doubt Pompey, although he was absent at the time (63 B. C.) in his Eastern campaigns, was the *princeps*. Indeed, it seems probable that Lutatius Catulus was the formal *princeps senatus*. If so, the *lectio* in which he was designated was that of 70 B. C., which was complete and rigorous,[1] sixty-four names being stricken from the senatorial register. This census of 70 B. C. was the last complete and successful one before the census of Octavianus Caesar and Agrippa in 28 B. C. The census of 65 B. C.[2] was abortive on account of radical political differences between the censors, Catulus and Crassus, which led to their resignation without having reached either the *lectio senatus* or the *recognitio equitum*. Nor did those chosen in their stead accomplish anything, because, as Dio[3] says, the *tribuni plebis* blocked their action through fear of losing their seats in the *lectio senatus*. The latter function stands out as the crucial one in the sphere of the censorial *imperium*.

The *princeps senatus* enjoyed not so much a political function as a civil honor.[4] He had the first place in debate. Regarding his tenure of office Zonaras says, 7, 19 *προεῖχε τὸν χρόνον ὃν προεκρίνετο, οὐ γὰρ διὰ βίου τις εἰς τοῦτο προεχειρίζετο.* It is true that the censors at the next *lectio* had the abstract right to change the *princeps* even by substituting one of their own number, but it seems to have been done rarely, if ever. Thus Q. Fabius Maximus was designated as *princeps* by the censors of 209 and 204: he died in 203. P. Scipio Africanus, himself one of the censors, became *princeps* in 199; the censors of 194 and 189 ratified that choice[5]; Valerius himself, *princeps* of 184, and one of the censors,

[1] Liv. Epit. 98 : Cn. Lentulus et L. Gellius censores *asperam* censuram egerunt, quattuor et sexaginta senatu motis.

[2] Cf. Plut. Crassus, c. 13.

[3] Dio 37, 9 *ἐμποδισάντων σφᾶς τῶν δημάρχων πρὸς τον τῆς βουλῆς κατάλογον δέει τοῦ μὴ τῆς γερουσίας αὐτοὺς ἐκπεσεῖν.*

[4] Cf. Madvig, Verf. I, p. 137; Mommsen, Stsr. III 969 sq.; C. Peter, Röm. Gesch. III, p. 16.

[5] Cf. Livy 34, 44; 38, 28. Livy (39, 52) argues from the continuity of the honor against the date of the death of Scipio as claimed by Polybius and others, 183 B. C. In the *lectio* of the census of 184 the official records gave the name of L. Valerius, proof positive, according to Livy, that Scipio had died before that census: quo vivo nisi ut ille senatu moveretur, quam notam nemo memoriae prodidit, alius princeps in locum eius lectus non esset.

died before the censors of 179 came in. M. Aemilius Lepidus, himself censor in that year (179), became the next *princeps*, and remained so in 174, 169, 164, 159[1] and 154.

The real conception of the matter held in the republican era is well set forth in Livy 27, 11, where one of the censors claims that senatorial tradition designated the oldest living *censorius* as the proper candidate for *princeps*, while the other censor urged that in this case the *princeps civitatis Romanae*, Q. Fabius Maximus, should be chosen. We may say, I believe, that ordinarily the oldest living *censorius* was really the foremost citizen, and that conversely the foremost man in the senate was ordinarily the foremost citizen.

It might happen, of course, as in the case of M. Aemilius Lepidus, that, as the *princeps* was long-lived and actually maintained his formal preeminence in the senate, in the course of events he would cease to be *princeps civitatis*: he might indeed be outranked by the very censor who repeated the judgment of his predecessors in the work of *lectio*.

Thus L. Aemilius Paulus in the *lectio* of the census of 164 had for four years enjoyed the prestige of Pydna, and was undoubtedly the *princeps civitatis*; still he merely confirmed the previous *lectio* in giving the *principatus* to M. Aemilius Lepidus.[2] That the victor of Pydna was then the foremost man in the state would require no special demonstration, but as a matter of evidence we may quote Cicero, Brutus 80: Atque etiam L. Paulus Africani pater personam *principis civis* facile dicendo tuebatur. Nor did Scipio Aemilianus (whom Cicero incessantly presented[3] as the ideal representative of the republic before the decline) attain the formal *principatus*, although no doubt he was *princeps civis*.

The emergencies of the times brought young Pompey into unusual prominence, and subsequently into eminence, when socially he was merely as yet of the equestrian class, for, with the *lex Annalis* suspended, Pompey, having returned from the Sertorian and Slave war while still an *eques*, was made consul

[1] The word *sex* in Liv. Epit. 47 is palpably wrong. Perhaps the V of the original MSS was copied as VI, and so was transferred into the numeral word.

[2] Plut. Aem. Paul. 38, 6 *τῆς δὲ βουλῆς πρυέγραψε μὲν Μάρκον Αἰμίλιον Λέπιδον, ἤδη τετράκις καρπούμενον ταύτην τὴν πρυεδρίαν.*

[3] For example, in making him a chief interlocutor in some of the essays.

without even having been elected quaestor, and even as consul, after the *recognitio equitum*, he appeared in the *transvectio* of the Knights before the censors[1] of 70 B. C. to "give up his horse." And thus from that time forward Pompey, and not Catulus, came to be "*in re publica princeps*"[2] until Caesar's rise made a plurality of *principes* from "*Consul Metellus*," 60 B. C., down to Pharsalus, 48 B. C. Hence the familiar lines of Horace, Carm. II 1, 3 sq.:

gravisque
Principum amicitias et arma, etc.

The term *princeps* then, in the *new* or, as Augustus wished to have it seem, the *restored*, order of things, came to be the most common one in current usage, to designate the head of the state. It was no doubt well received because it suggested neither *rex* nor *dictator*, but was a good old republican term, and all its associations were of such a kind as to disarm suspicion and ill will. In a short time the term came to be one of most comprehensive significance. And so the foremost of modern scholars in the field of Roman antiquities, in the index of his *Staatsrecht*, has chosen this term in preference to the other more specific ones as the general designation for the entire sphere of the emperor. But he has taken especial pains also to emphasize his own conception of the term. To his mind Augustus is called *princeps* not as *princeps senatus*, but as *princeps omnium*, or as *princeps civitatis*.[3] "Dass der Kaiser auch *princeps senatus* ist, ist mit seiner Stellung als *princeps* nicht zu verwechseln, obwol dies schon Dio tut." And again[4]: "Aber diese Bezeichnung sagt auch weiter nichts aus als, wie Augustus selber es ausdrückt, dass der *princeps* der gewichtigste u. angesehenste Bürger ist," and this statement is

[1] Plut. Pomp. 22 *τότε δὴ προεκάθηντο μὲν οἱ τιμηταὶ Γέλλιος καὶ Λέντλος ἐν κόσμῳ καὶ πάροδος ἦν τῶν ἱππέων ἐξεταζομένων. ὤφθη δὲ Πομπήϊος ἄνωθεν ἐπ' ἀγορὰν κατερχόμενος, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα παράσημα τῆς ἀρχῆς ἔχων, αὐτὸς δὲ διὰ χειρὸς ἄγων τὸν ἵππον.*

[2] Cic. Fam. I 9, 11; cf. Mommsen, Stsr. II 751, note 4. Mommsen also cites Sall. Hist. III, oratio C. Licinii Macri 23: mihi quidem satis spectatum est, Pompeium tantae gloriae adulescentem malle principem volentibus vobis esse, quam illis dominationis socium. To which add Cic. Att. II 19, 3: huic ita plausum est ut salva republica Pompeio plaudi solebat (written in July 59).

[3] Stsrecht. II, p. 750, note 4.

[4] Stsr. II, p. 751.

supplemented by the footnote[1]: "Mon. Ancyr. 6, 22, nach dem griechischen Text ergänzt: praestiti omnibus dignitate (ἀξιώματι)." Again[2]: "Wo Dio[3] das berühmte Wort des Tiberius wiedergiebt, dass er nicht *imperator* sei sondern *princeps*, braucht er dafür nicht bloss das ungeschickte πρόκριτος, sondern es ist ihm der Begriff des Principats schon so völlig abhanden gekommen, dass er diesen πρόκριτος sogar zum πρόκριτος τῆς γερουσίας, zum *princeps senatus* macht." Again[4]: "Dass Augustus an der Spitze des Verzeichnisses stand, sagt er selbst, aber dass er sich *princeps senatus* nennen liess wie Dio will, widerlegen die Urkunden."

The view of other scholars had generally been that *princeps* was strictly based on *princeps senatus* and *developed* from it. Thus Hoeck[5]: "*Princeps*, ohne weitern Beisatz, wurde mitunter schon früher der erste des Senats genannt, und *in keinem andern Sinne* liessen sich die Kaiser anfangs so nennen. Die Steigerung des Begriffs vom Ersten des Senats zum Ersten der Nation erfolgte ebenso unvermerkt wie natürlich."

Merivale[6]: "the popularity which the assumption of this republican title conferred upon the early emperors," etc.

Carl Peter[7]: "Der Titel schloss ursprünglich keinen weitern realen Vorzug in sich als dass der Inhaber bei den Berathungen im Senat zuerst um seine Meinung befragt werden musste. Wie aber durch ihn Octavian gehoben wurde, so auch wiederum der Titel durch Octavian und die nachfolgenden Kaiser," etc.

Madvig[8]: "den Titel *princeps senatus* aus dem sich das blosse *princeps* als Bezeichnung des Regenten entwickelte [erhielt er] im Jahre 28, Dio 53, 1." And elsewhere[9]: "Der Name *princeps*, der aus der Ernennung des Augustus zum *princeps senatus* entspringt." Ranke[10] has the same view.

[1] Stsr. II, p. 751, note 3. [2] Ib., p. 752, note 1.
[3] Dio 57, 8. [4] Stsrcht. III 971, note 1.
[5] Röm. Geschichte vom Verfall der Republik, etc., 1841, I 1, p. 325.
[6] Merivale, III, p. 455. He aptly cites Pliny, Panegyr. 55 sedemque obtinet *principis*, ne sit *domino* locus.
[7] Röm. Gesch. III, p. 16. [8] Verf. u. Verw. I, p. 529, note.
[9] Ib., p. 534 sq.
[10] Weltgeschichte, III 2, p. 399: "Augustus selbst war wie Caesar *princeps senatus*," etc. I see now that Ernst Herzog, Geschichte und System der römischen Staatsverfassung, Teubner, 1887, vol. II, does not agree with Mommsen on the question of *princeps*. He says (p. 133): "Bei der Feststellung der neuen Senatsliste sodann liess er sich als *princeps senatus*

In stating my agreement with the scholars just cited I should like to bring forward several considerations that seem to me essential.

The term *princeps iuventutis* occurs frequently in the annals of the Augustan Era. It throws a strong light, as I believe, on the higher title of *princeps* to which it is the social or political stepping-stone.

The equestrian class, particularly the specific *centuriae equitum*, were indeed, as Livy 42, 61 calls them, *seminarium senatus*, and the bulk of the *centuriae equitum*, particularly in the later years of the Republic, were probably sons of senators. It is a matter worthy of note that in the centurial classification there were in the *pedites* both *iuniores* and *seniores*, but of the *equites* only *iuniores*. And in the term *princeps iuventutis* the latter word would seem to designate, not the entire youth of Rome, or of the empire, but of the *alter ordo*, particularly of those whose advancement from the equestrian to the senatorial class was merely, or chiefly, a question of time and maturity.

Socially and politically (apart from police, *annona* and *ludi*) the two *ordines* were the chief objects that Augustus had in view in the regulation of the new government; cf., for example, the *lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus*. Forcellini, s. v. *princeps*, goes as far as to say: "in libera civitate fuit princeps iuventutis cuius nomen primum recitavit censor ordinem equestrem recensens." What warrant (apart from a general postulated analogy with the *lectio senatus*) he has for this explanation I do not know.

Cicero (Fam. III 11, 3) calls Pompey (in June, 50 B. C.) "omnium saeclorum et gentium" and Brutus, "iam pridem *iuventutis* (princeps, scil.), celeriter, ut spero, civitatis"—certainly in a somewhat different sense from the Augustan usage, as Brutus

erklären, zunächst in keinem andern Sinne als in dem althergebrachten des ersten Votanten." Herzog has used the analogy of the *princeps iuventutis*, as I have independently done, and defends Dio against Mommsen. Dio was, of course, not unfitted, by his provincial birth, for a career which was almost entirely spent in the higher walks of provincial administration in widely distant (and only in a minor degree oriental) parts of the empire. As well might we call Ulpian a Syrian because he was born at Tyre. Prof. Schwartz, of Giessen, who is working on the Greek Historians of Rome for the new Pauly-Wissowa, is clearly influenced by Mommsen's view, when he calls Dio "der brave Bithynier."

was then 35 years of age. Cicero's designation of the son of C. Curio as *princeps iuventutis* (in Vatin. 10, 24) is merely a piece of political courtesy.

But in the Augustan era the designation of Gaius and Lucius Caesar as *principes iuventutis*[1] (as noted both in the Mon. Ancyranum and in other Inss.) distinctly elevated them to a rank second only to that of the *princeps* himself and made them leaders of those out of whom the senate was recruited. It was probably in this connection, too, that Augustus reestablished the *Troiae lusus* (actually fostered even by Caesar, cp. Suetonius, Julius 39). Young Ascanius-Iulus in Vergil, Aen. V 545, appears as *princeps iuventutis*, so to speak. Here, too, Augustus is repristinating a *priscus mos*, as he ostensibly did in all his institutions (Sueton. Aug. 43).

Madvig (I 530) urges that the character of the *principatus* as a magistracy with its apparatus of terms and fixed periods of tenure, was also marked by the fact, that "during the entire administration of Augustus, there was no formal indication at any time that it was to pass to others as something permanently established." With all due respect to the memory and authority of the eminent Latinist, I believe that his judgment is too absolute in its negative character. The entire manipulation of Augustus' family affairs was determined by the central idea of establishing the succession. Marcellus, Gaius and Lucius, Tiberius were the successive heirs that were designated. We may confidently say that they were the heirs *apparent*, with Agrippa as a constant contingency during his lifetime. Thus in the very triumph after Actium (Dio 51, 21), Octavianus gave a largess not only to the men, but καὶ τοῖς παισὶ διὰ τὸν Μάρκελλον τὸν ἀδελφιδοῦν.

Regarding Gaius, who died in February, in the year 4 A. D., see the *Cenotaphium Pisanum*, Orelli, No. 643: iam *designatum* iustissumum ac simillumum parentis sui virtutibus *principem*. It is true that this was not an official manifestation of the Roman senate, but the exuberant and adulatory resolution of a colony which looked to Gaius as *patronus*. Still we may take for granted that it was the expression of universal and current public opinion, an accepted item in the governmental policy of Augustus.

[1] The Greek equivalent is πρόκριτος τῆς νεότητος, or, as Madvig, I 552, n., says, πρόκριτος τῆς ἱππάδος.

Why does Mommsen reject Dio's explanation (53, 1; 57, 8) of *princeps* as πρόκριτος τῆς γερουσίας? In the first place, perhaps, because it runs counter to his own theory that *princeps* is equivalent to *princeps civitatis*. Furthermore, it does not fit so well with his theory of political balance and "Dyarchie" of *princeps* and senate. More weighty perhaps than these considerations is another cited above (Staatsr. III 971, n.): "Dass A. an der Spitze des Verzeichnisses stand, sagt er selbst; aber dass er sich *princeps senatus* nennen liess, wie Dio will, widerlegen die Urkunden." The inscriptions in Orelli-Henzen, as a matter of fact, give the titles of *imperator* (as *praenomen*), *pontif. maximus*, *cos.*, *tribunicia potestate* with definite years that had elapsed since tenure began, how often the title *imperator* had been earned in campaigns, *pater patriae* (after 2 B. C.), *augur* and other minor functions. Neither *princeps* nor *princeps senatus* is met with for Augustus. Dio 53, 1 speaks historically and specifically of the particular event as a part of *lectio* and *census*: τὰς ἀπογραφὰς ἐξετέλεσε, καὶ ἐν αὐταῖς πρόκριτος τῆς γερουσίας ἐπεκλήθη . . . This aorist needs no emphasis from us. Of Tiberius,[1] however, Dio speaks differently; compare 57, 8: πρόκριτός τε τῆς γερουσίας κατὰ τὸ ἀρχαῖον[1] καὶ ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ ὠνομάζετο. Here, it will be observed, we have an imperfect. Did Mommsen confound these items?

As a matter of fact, Dio has other equivalents of *princeps* than πρόκριτος; for example, in the *laudatio funebris* of Augustus spoken by Tiberius: Dio 56, 39, 5: προστασία ἑνὸς ἀνδρός = *principatus*; ib., §6: προκρίναντες ἠναγκάσατε χρόνον γέ τινα ὑμῶν προστῆναι, προκρίνειν being the formal designation of *princeps* and the προστασία the actual administrative power gradually associated with *principatus*.

Dio then does not, as far as I am able to see, say that Augustus was *regularly* called (sich nennen liess) *princeps senatus*. The occurrence (as in the case of Tiberius) or non-occurrence (as in the case of Augustus) of *princeps* in the inscriptions does not

[1] Why not? In his earlier years Tiberius affected the appearance of being *civilis* in every way; cf. Suetonius, Tiberius 26. Why should he not emphasize, then, the institutional etymology (if I may say so) of *princeps*? It was one of the characteristic traits of this Claudian, moreover, to emphasize "*consuetudo antiqua*." By merging himself again in the senate, so to speak, he disarmed in a measure that feeling of distrust which he knew that his native *hauteur* had bred in public opinion. Cf. Suetonius, c. 30.

seem to me to offer any argument either way for the original signification of *princeps*.

Augustus, through his fellow censor and closest political friend Agrippa, had bestowed (virtually) the first place in the senate upon himself. Is it not very probable that the senators and the Roman world in general (in that spirit of deference which anticipated the ultimate aims of this astute manager) dropped the limiting and modifying *senatus* from the title at the very beginning? Whether Horace, Carm. I 2, 49,

> hic magnos potius triumphos
> hic ames dici pater atque *princeps*

was prompted by recent action in the senate or by the official designation of *princeps senatus*, it is difficult to state. The element of utility in the relations between Horace[1] and Augustus is pretty well understood. It is possible, too, that the ode foreshadowed impending action of the government, and both tested and urged on that public opinion towards which Augustus was as supremely sensitive as he was supremely clever in anticipating, manipulating and conciliating it.

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[1] Plüss, Horazstudien, 1882, pp. 16–43, argues that 36 B. C. was the date of this ode and that it was elicited by the campaign against Sextus Pompeius. His arguments seem to be very subjective and his points farfetched. Special students of Horace such as Lucian Müller and Teuffel agree that the years 31–30 mark the *terminus a quo* of all ode-composition by Horace. Mitscherlich, Nauck, Kiessling all refer to the designation of *princeps senatus* of 28 B. C.

THE ATHENIAN IN HIS RELATIONS TO THE STATE.

The following discussion of certain of the legal and sociological aspects of Athenian life is based largely on the works of the Attic orators, and especially on the orations of Isaeus. Valuable material, it is true, has also been found in the works of authors belonging to other departments of Greek literature; but it is to Isaeus that the writer is particularly indebted, inasmuch as the works of this orator, in themselves, contain so much of the material necessary for reconstructing the life of the Athenians, and for understanding the influences by which that life was dominated. The pictures that Isaeus draws are not always complete in detail, it is true, and yet the essential outlines are there.

It may be noted at the outset that the life of the citizen of Athens was closely associated with the Athenian inheritance system; to consider the one apart from the other would be impossible. It might, perhaps, be more correct to observe, that the life of the Athenian was, to a large extent, molded and dominated by the inheritance laws. Another important factor must be considered in this connection, namely, the strong religious feeling which permeated the life of the individual and the inheritance institutions, and which found expression in the worship of the ancestors as well as of the gods, and in the solicitude of the Athenian with respect to the heir and with regard to the extension of the family line. Perrot, Droit Publique d' Athènes, pp. 132–133, well says, in this connection: "The sentiment which attaches to one another the individuals in the family the families in the race, the races in the phratria, the phratrias in the tribe, the tribes in the state—is the belief in a common ancestor, the adoration of this first father; . . . it is the respect with which that member of each group, to whom comes the honor of succeeding to the deified ancestry, sees himself surrounded. . . . This is the principle which dominates all this hierarchy of associations; this is the keystone which upholds all these concentric arches."

This deep religious feeling, that forms perhaps the chief motive for adoption, and strikingly manifests itself in the life of the individual and the state—this feeling constantly finds expression in the Greek writers. Everywhere one sees emphasized the importance of continuing the family worship; and following the glorification of the ancestors during the individual's life, we read of the homage that is to be paid to the individual himself after death—homage which every Athenian believed to be indispensable to his future happiness. A striking passage, illustrating the Athenian feeling for the dead, occurs in Isae. 2, 47, where the speaker exclaims: "I entreat you to render aid to us and to him also who is in Hades"—the thought being that, unless the adopted son be permitted to possess the inheritance and honor the dead, the latter will actually suffer in Hades. Similar ideas are expressed in a number of passages found in Isaeus (Cf. 9, 36; 1, 10).

If now we leave the sphere of the orators, we find in Homer and in the tragic poets manifestations of the same religious feeling. A most significant passage, showing that the Athenians looked upon the obligations to the dead as sent from Heaven, occurs in Soph. Antig., 450 ff. The king has demanded of Antigone whether she knew of his edict forbidding that funeral rites be paid her brother. She replies (to adopt the rendering of Jebb), "Yes, for it was not Zeus that published me that edict; not such are the laws set among men by the Justice who dwells with the gods below; nor deemed I that thy decrees were of such force, that a mortal could override the unwritten and unfailing statutes of Heaven." So, too, Antigone says (line 519): "Hades demands these rites."

Prof. Jebb remarks in this connection (Soph. Antig., Introd. p. 25) that Antigone, the nearest of kin to the dead, "is fulfilling one of the most sacred and the most imperative duties known to Greek religion," in paying the funeral rites to her brother.

The same authority observes (pp. 32–33): "It is true that the legends of the heroic age afford some instances in which a dead enemy is left unburied, as a special mark of abhorrence. . . . Yet these same legends show that from a very early period Hellenic feeling was shocked at the thought of carrying enmity beyond the grave, and withholding the rites on which the welfare of the departed spirit was believed to depend. . . . Achilles maltreated

the dead Hector. Yet, even there, the Iliad expresses the Greek feeling by the beautiful and touching fable that the gods themselves miraculously preserved the corpse from all defacement and from all corruption, until at last the due obsequies were rendered to it at Troy." (Il. 24, 411 ff.)

It is necessary to realize the depth and power of this religious feeling for the dead, and the dominating influence of ancestor worship among the Greeks, in order to appreciate the immense importance attached to the inheritance laws, and the anxiety of every Athenian with reference to an heir.

Closely associated with the thought of devotion to the dead was the feeling of dread lest one should die and leave behind a "desolate heritage". To pass away without leaving an heir to continue the family line and the ancestor worship, was, to the Athenian mind, not only a calamity but a disgrace, and many passages in Isaeus, as well as in Greek authors generally, indicate the genuine horror with which the Athenians regarded such a contingency. (Isae. 7, 30; 6, 5; Eurip. Alc. 655 ff.)

The adoption of a son, then, to insure the line and continue the worship of the ancestors was, naturally, widely prevalent; and the undercurrent of religious feeling is again perceived when one notes, still further, the duties of the heir, and the motives for adoption. We read in Isae. 7, 30: "All men who are about to die take forethought for themselves, ... that there may be some one to offer sacrifices to them and perform all customary rites." We learn from Isae. 9, 30, that the son was associated with the father in the performance of religious ceremonies during life; and it appears also from many passages that it was the solemn duty and privilege of the heir to visit the family altars and offer sacrifices (Isae. 6, 51; 9, 7; Xen. Mem. 2, 2, 13).

Thus the prominence of the religious feeling in the life of the individual and in the inheritance system is very apparent. But, apart from the point of view of the individual, it is to be remembered that the perpetuity of the family, the continuance of the domestic cult, and the maintenance of the ancestral possessions, were matters of great concern also for the state. Perrot, L'Éloquence Politique et Judiciaire à Athènes, p. 364, remarks: "It was a disastrous thing for the city that one of those altars upon which every year for centuries the hereditary sacrifices had been offered, should suddenly be seen to be neglected, and finally

abandoned. All those legendary heroes, those glorious ancestors, watched constantly over their descendants, and in return for the homage which they received, protected still this Athens, for which they had formerly lived, fought, and suffered. With every family that became extinct, the city was losing a protector, in allowing the family worship to perish with it. If it were often so, the gods of the lower world would finally become enraged against the city which they had so long favored."

In this connection, it is interesting to note a passage from Isaeus (7, 30), in which the speaker, after alluding to the obligations to the dead, and after remarking that it was customary for childless men to adopt a son, adds: "And not only do men take cognizance of this individually, but the state publicly recognizes these obligations. For by law the supervision of private homes is enjoined upon the archon, who shall see to it that they are not left desolate."

With this, one may compare a passage from the Antigone of Sophocles (lines 748-749), in which the king reproaches his son because the latter has taken the part of Antigone. Creon says, with reference to Antigone, who has just been caught in the act of paying funeral rites to her brother: "All thy words . . . plead for that girl." Haemon sternly replies, "And for thee, and for me, and for the gods below.[1]"

Closely in accord also with Perrot's utterances, above cited, is a passage in the Antigone (988 ff.) in which the aged prophet declares, that "the gods are wroth with Thebes; they will no longer give their prophet any sign by the voice of birds, or through the omens of sacrifice (lines 1016 ff.). The king himself is the cause, by his edict, forbidding the burial of the dead." Prof. Jebb remarks further (Soph. Antig., Introd. pp. 14–15): "The king's duty to the dead and to the gods below was now a duty toward the polluted state, from which his impiety had alienated the gods above." (Cf. lines 1065 ff.)

Nothing could more strikingly illustrate the Greek feeling for the dead than these passages from the great tragedy. Here we see that the king's refusal to permit a member of the family to bury the dead was actually calling down the wrath of Heaven upon the state.

Apart from religious considerations, the state also had strong

[1] The rendering is Jebb's.

political motives for insuring the perpetuity of the family, and the preservation of the ancestral possessions. It is to be remembered that the number of the citizens was limited, and especially the heads of rich families, who could discharge important public services, such as equipping a chorus. If, now, the family became extinct, and the property passed into the hands of some obscure person, he could and generally did find some pretext for contributing less liberally to the expenses of the government, and the glory of the state. This is forcibly brought out in Isae. 6, 38; 60–61. Here the speaker, having dwelt upon the distinguished public services of members of his house, promises to use his means for the glorification of the state, just as his family had done from time immemorial; and he calls attention to the fact that if the inheritance passes out of the family, the state can no longer expect to receive any such benefits; that, in fact, much of the property has already disappeared, to the detriment of the state.

Thus, the religious and political motives of the state for perpetuating the inheritance and the family are very apparent. In view of the existence of such motives, it was not strange that Athens watched so faithfully over the ancestral mansion and the family altar. The importance of the rôle played by the laws of succession can hardly be overestimated, and one can readily understand the eagerness of the Athenians to adopt an heir, if ever a break occurred in the family line.

If now we consider somewhat more in detail certain phases in the life of the Athenian, we shall still observe that the influence of the religious idea was dominant, and that the demands of the state were most uncompromising. For example, there was a curtailment of personal liberty in the marriage relation, and in the circumstances surrounding it. Every Athenian was forbidden to marry a foreigner, under pain of the severest penalties [(Dem.) 59, 16; 52]; evidently because such a union might tend to diminish patriotic feeling, and because the family cult under such circumstances, might eventually be neglected. Nor could an Athenian always choose his wife; if a father died without sons, leaving a daughter (the heiress) neither married nor betrothed, it became the duty of the next of kin to marry the girl, or otherwise to provide for her. An elderly uncle could thus claim a youthful niece; this obligation on the part of the next of kin is clearly established. (Isae. 1, 39; 3, 67; 10, 5; [Dem.] 43, 54; Andoc.

1, 117 ff.) And here again the explanation is obvious; the inheritance must be kept within the family. But the inheritance law went a step further; and, astonishing as it may seem, we find that too often there was no security even in the marriage relation, and circumstances might arise which would tear the wife from her husband, and give her to another. Isaeus says (3, 64): "And with reference to women who have been given in marriage by their fathers, ... if their father dies without leaving to them ... brothers, the law ordains that they be claimed in marriage by the next of kin, and many husbands (in this way) have actually been deprived of their wives." (Cf. Isae. 10, 19.)

Such was one of the results of the Athenian inheritance system, carried out to its logical conclusion. The property must be kept within the family, or else the state would suffer; the ancestor worship must be continued by the heir, otherwise the gods might become estranged, and might proceed to afflict not only the family, but the state. The rights and sacred affections of the members of the family are of minor importance; the individual and the family live chiefly to perpetuate religion and serve the state.

Besides all this, there were likely to be other grounds for unhappiness in the marriage of the heiress with the next of kin, for, even if their life proved to be a tranquil one, there was little satisfaction for either husband or wife in the possession of the estate. As Perrot, L'Éloquence Politique et Judiciaire à Athènes, pp. 371 ff., expresses it: "The inheritance was not transmitted to the daughter, but with the daughter. It did not belong to the woman, who, held in a perpetual state of legal incapacity, was disqualified to possess it. It belonged still less to the husband, who was a member of another family, and celebrated another domestic cult." He, then, was virtually the trustee, and the estate was held in trust for the son born from this marriage. "When this son had attained his majority," continues Perrot, "he left his father's house, and, although his father and mother were still living, he took possession of the estate of his maternal grandfather." (Cf. Dem. [43], 51; [46], 20; Isae. 8, 31; 3, 50.)

It was evident, then, that the position of the heiress was a peculiarly hard one, for, apart from her other trials, she was constantly confronted by the thought that she and her husband were considered of minor importance as compared with their son, and

that this heir might some day sweep them aside and enjoy for himself the rich inheritance that had cost his parents so dear.

In forming our estimate of the lot of the Athenian woman, we must remember that her position, however distressing from our point of view, was not, after all, at variance with the hard logic of the old institutions. It is necessary to bear in mind that the man's paramount duties were to the religion and the state, according to the Athenian point of view. Since, then, the woman was disqualified to serve the family and the state by performing the religious duties that devolved upon the heir; and since she was incapable of discharging the arduous and expensive public services that fell to the lot of the head of an influential family; therefore, from the point of view of the individual and the state, she was compelled to occupy a wholly subordinate position. It was cruel, and yet it was doubtless inevitable.

In connection with this general subject, it may perhaps be of interest to note Aristotle's criticism of one phase of the Spartan polity, which is summarized on p. 106 of the Susemihl & Hicks edition of the Politics, as follows: "The permission to give away or bequeath land at pleasure; the absence of any limit as to the amount of the dower; the unrestricted right of the father . . . to bestow an heiress upon any one he likes; all this combined has brought two-thirds of the Spartan land into female hands, and occasioned moreover terrible inequality of possessions, with a frightful diminution in the number of the men capable of bearing arms." (Cf. Arist. Pol. 2, 9, 14 ff.) The Athenian antipathy to all things Spartan, and the desire to avoid any such contingencies as those mentioned by Aristotle, may perhaps have influenced the Athenians in certain of their radical legislative enactments. At the same time, it must be acknowledged that they overreached themselves; and while believing that they were providing for the perpetuity of Athens, by subordinating the family so completely to the state, they were actually hastening their downfall as a nation.

Other aspects of the life of the Athenian citizen might be discussed, and many passages could be cited to illustrate his peculiar obligations to the state. In particular, one might note the startling dependence of the Athenian father upon the operation of the inheritance laws, and the striking contrast between his

own restricted power and the unlimited authority possessed by the Roman father over the members of his family. But to pursue these topics further would protract the discussion unduly; and enough has perhaps been said to establish the general principles.

In conclusion, then, it must be admitted that the family life of the Athenians in the time of the orators was often full of peril. Dominated as the family relations were by the obligations to religion and to the state, neither husband, wife, son nor daughter could tell when life's hope and happiness might not be shattered. There was something radically wrong in a system in which the very bulwarks of society—the sanctity of married life and the integrity of the family—were likely to be ruthlessly attacked at any moment. Far more pleasing is the picture of the old Roman father surrounded by his family; a father stern and often cruel, if you will, but secure in the possession of his own; the mighty unit in the massive and long-enduring Roman civilization.

It is amazing that the Athenians, with all their intellectual power and keenness, should have tolerated such abuses, and ignored the very safeguards of the nation's life. In their superstitious fear lest they should offend some deified ancestor, they trampled upon the most sacred rights of the individual and the family; they wronged the living in their frantic efforts to honor the dead. In their endeavors to create a more powerful governmental fabric, they utterly ignored individual liberty; theirs was the fatal error of destroying the integrity of the component parts, while striving to create a more perfect whole. In the ultimate analysis of the conditions which confront us, it is impossible to deny that the individual and the family existed for the state. In the age of Isaeus and Demosthenes, it is true, there seemed to be a tendency to break with old traditions, and men evidently had begun to realize that the institutions of the past were insufficient for the changed conditions of the times. But the lack of independent authority on the part of the father, the insecurity of the husband, and the consequent weakness of the family, were fatal; beyond question, this constituted one of the causes which made Greek society less permanent than the powerful and long-enduring civilization of the Romans.

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USE OF THE SUFFIXES -ĀNUS AND -INUS IN FORMING POSSESSIVE ADJECTIVES FROM NAMES OF PERSONS.

Latin adjectives in *-ānus* have received such extended treatment from Schnorr von Carolsfeld[1] that some explanation of the discussion of a closely connected subject, viz., the formation and use of possessive adjectives from names of persons, may properly be given at the beginning of the present article. While Schnorr von Carolsfeld has very thoroughly traced the general development of the Latin suffix *-ānus*, he does not profess to have made his collection a complete one for the classical period, and he has discussed very briefly the differences which exist in classical usage between the secondary formations and the gentile adjective. The personal suffix *-īnus* has not received treatment since Reisig,[2] and no reference is made either by Reisig or Schnorr von Carolsfeld to the important testimony of Varro and Priscian upon the proper limits of its use. I shall attempt to supplement the article of Schnorr von Carolsfeld under the two heads just indicated and at the same time to show the part which the suffix *-īnus* has played in this disputed question of the possessive formations.

The chief uses of these adjectives may first be briefly noted. Adjectives in *-ānus* formed from the names of persons are in their use commonly possessives, closely paralleled by the genitive, and this is the head to which they are referred in Priscian's detailed treatment (*Gr. Lat.* K. II, 69–82). A second use, i. e., the patronymic, is conveniently recognized by Priscian (p. 63) in the cognomen *Aemilianus*, assumed by a person who has passed, through adoption, from the *gens Aemilia* to another *gens*. In respect to the range of their use, it is obvious that these possessives, which are formed largely from the names of contemporary persons, are much more restricted than the corresponding genitives, and that they tend to occur in certain set phrases. Such expressions as we freely employ in English, 'the Smith mortgage,'

[1] *Archiv f. lat. Lex.*, I, 177–194.

[2] *Vorlesungen*, I, 237 f.

'the Tichborne trial,' 'the Clayton–Bulwer treaty,' etc., are suggestive and often exact parallels. The principle underlying the Latin usage appears to be that the possessives either refer to some act or quality of a person which is assumed to be well-known or notorious, e. g. *Clodianus furor*, or they are concise forms which belong to the language of business and commercial life, e. g. *Pomponianum nomen* ('debt'). The former head which includes the occurrence of these adjectives in well-known political, legal and literary references may be passed over here, and attention directed to the second or strictly commercial use. Cicero's *Letters* afford the most frequent examples of this use, which in some cases becomes more common even than that of the genitive. Hence in the *Letters* nearly two-thirds of the occurrences of the possessives (97 out of 156) relate to the purchase and sale of houses and lands, the settlement of property claims, the collection of debts, legacies, promissory notes, and the like. The substantives most commonly qualified by possessives are *domus*, *horti*, *villa*, *praedium*, *negotium*, *res*, *nomen*, also *auctio*, *bona*, *caput*, *coheredes*, *controversia*, *mancipia*, *praedes*, *syngrapha*, etc. The clearest illustration, however, of the predilection shown for the possessive forms in legal and commercial transactions may perhaps be drawn from the language of the jurisconsults, e. g. Dig. 8, 3, 33 essent mihi et tibi *fundi* duo communes *Titianus* et *Seianus; ib.* 5, 4, 7 verbi gratia . . . sunt *Seianae* et *Sempronianae* (*aedes*); cf. CIL. XIV, 2527 pertineat hoc sepulchrum ad possessionem *fundorum Naeviani* et *Calpurniani*.[1]

It is clear that the possessives in this use indicate only external and technical relations, and that the genitive alone can represent the individual in voluntary personal and social relations. For example, the possessive adjective is used with *villa* or *domus* in questions of bargain and sale, or of the local position of some hereditary mansion: Cic. *Att.* 1, 13, 6 *Autronianam domum* emit; *ib.* 4, 3, 3 ex *Anniana* [Milonis] *domo* eduxit viros. Where the possessor is viewed at the same time as the friend or the host, only the genitive is possible: Cic. *Mil.* 20, 54 devertit in *villam Pompeii*. Hence in the higher oratorical style arise certain restrictions upon the use of the possessive in property relations.

[1] On the frequency of this commercial use in the inscriptions, see the indices to the Corpus under *Fundi*, *Villae*; as II, p. 1195; IV, p. 256, etc.

For the purpose of the present summary a single illustration will suffice, i. e., in referring to his own clients and personal friends, Cicero does not use the possessive in the *Orations*, but writes always *bona* (*P.*) *Quincti*, *bona* (*Sex.*) *Rosci*, etc.

Cicero, as a rule, forms possessives with the termination *-ānus* only from the iā-stems of gentile adjectives, e. g., *Tullia*, *Cornelia*, or from those of an entirely similar form. The following formations of this kind, occurring in Cicero, may be noted as found neither in Lewis and Short nor in Georges:

Acutilianus, *Asuvianus* (al. *Avillianus*), *Brinnianus*, *Caerellianus*, *Calidianus*, *Canuleianus*, *Cispianus*, *Cuspianus*, *Fufianus*, *Fulcinianus*, *Hirtianus*, *Hostilianus*, *Lucinianus* (al. *Licinianus*), *Nanneianus*, *Paccianus*, *Pacilianus*, *Populianus*, *Safinianus*, *Scandilianus*, *Selicianus*, *Sthenianus*, *Tadianus*, *Trebonianus*, *Vedianus*, *Vennonianus*, *Veratianus* (al. *Neratianus*), *Vettianus*.[1]

A second and much smaller class consists of possessives which are formed without a previously existing gentile adjective. These forms may be due either to the original suffix *-nus* added to ā-stems, or to the developed suffix *-ānus* added to o-stems, but in the present discussion both classes may be conveniently treated together. Of these formations only a few gained general currency or were used by Cicero. *Fimbrianus* and *Lamianus* present no difficulty, as the stem is here entirely similar to that of the gentile adjective. Besides these there are found in Cicero only *Cinnanus*, *Sullanus*, *Scapulanus* (*Scapula*) and *Gracchanus*. The last occurs but once (*Brut.* 34, 128), and is very evidently avoided by Cicero in the *Orations*,[2] but is used freely later (Val. Max., Sen., Quint., Flor.). As Schnorr von Carolsfeld has shown (p. 186) in the case of *Lepidanus*, *Lucullanus*, *Augustanus*, substantially all the formations which were made near the close of the republican period waver in later usage and offer variant forms with the improper suffix *-iānus*, while, from the second half of the Augustan period on, new formations are made only in *-iānus*. The early forms *Cinnanus*, *Sullanus* and *Gracchanus* alone remain abso-

[1] The above collection has been made from the text, but the writer has since noted in vol. XI of the Tauchnitz edition of Baiter and Kayser the substantially complete enumeration of all the proper adjectives that are used by Cicero.

[2] *Vat.* 9, 27 *Gracchorum* ferocitate et cruore *Cinnano*; *Agr.* 1, 7, 21. 2, 29, 81, *Rab. Perd.* 4, 13, *Brut.* 58, 212, *Or.* 70, 233.

lutely fixed (perhaps also *Cleopatranus*). To the republican formations of this class, which continued in use to a greater or less extent, should be added *Crassanus*[1] (Plin. 6, 47 Detlef.), *Mamurranus* (CIL. XIV, 2431), *Cleopatranus* (Treb. Pol. *Tyr.* 30, 19. 32, 6), *Perpennanus* (ap. Prisc. K. II, 77, 11), and *Herculanus* (CIL. II, 4064, Gell. 1, 1, 3).

Without regard to the manner of formation, we may conveniently note here the extension of the purely Roman suffix *-ānus* (*-iānus*) to other than Roman words. The adjective *Herculaneus*, which is found in the popular speech as early as Plautus (later in Plin., Sen., Capitol., [Apul.] *Herb.*), presupposes a form *Herculanus*, and we have seen that the latter actually occurs in inscriptions and in Gellius. Cicero permits himself to form *Trophonianus* (*Att.* 6, 2, 3) from a mythological Greek name, and Catullus in a drinking-song makes *Thyonianus* (*c.* 27, 7). We meet also with *Phrixianus* (a popular formation: Plin., Sen.), *Annibalianus* (as cognomen: Vop. *Prob.* 22, 3), *Hasdrubalianus* (Sidon.), and from place-names *Phasianus* (Plin., Suet., Pall., Lampr.), and *Hyperboreanus* (Hieron.). From contemporary names presenting Greek stems are formed *Tereianus* (Plin.), *Patroclianus* (Mart.), *Nicerotianus* (Mart.), *Hermogenianus* (Cod. Theod.).[2] The Romanizing of Greek town-names in *-ίτης* through the addition of the Latin termination *-ānus*, as in *Neapolitanus*, *Taurominitanus*, etc., is well-known (Prisc. K. II, 79; Schnorr von Carolsfeld, p. 189).

The Romans of the Republic formed possessives in *-ānus* very freely from iā- and io- stems; with respect to all other stems, they were not agreed whether they should form the adjective in *-ānus*, in *-īnus*, or in *-iānus*. The most important testimony in ancient times upon this question is that given by Varro, *L. L.* 9, 42, 71 Sp.[3] In this passage Varro cites *Cascellianus* and *Aquilianus* as

[1] *Crassianus*: Vell., Val. Max., Flor.

[2] See further P. Meyer, *Die cognomina auf -ānus griechischen stammes auf den röm. inschriften*, Bern, 1886.

[3] Quae (vocabula) tamen fere non discedunt ab ratione sine iusta causa, ut hi qui gladiatores Faustinos; nam quod plerique dicuntur, ut tris extremas syllabas habeant easdem Cascelliani, [Caeciliani], Aquiliani, animadvertunto, unde oriuntur, nomina dissimilia Cascellius, Caecilius Aquilius . . . Faustius, recte dicerent Faustianos; sic a Scipione quidam male dicunt Scipioninos; nam est Scipionarios. (L. Müller supplied the lacuna: Faustus, quod si esset.)

the adjectives formed from *Cascellius* and *Aquilius* respectively, but he denies that any true analogy exists between these names and *Faustus*. On the contrary, he approves the usage of those who form from *Faustus* the adjective *Faustinus*,[1] and he declares that *Faustianus* is correctly derived only from *Faustius*. At a later period, as we learn from Charisius (*Gr. Lat.* K. I, 94), Velius Longus wrote a special book upon the same question, and his treatment was probably in many respects similar to the extended discussion of the adjectival suffixes *-ānus*, *-ēnus* and *-īnus* that we now find in Priscian.

The earliest example of the improper formations in *-iānus* which are here condemned by Varro, appears to be Cato, *R. R.* 7, 3 *colonea Quiriniana*. It is clear that these improper forms were already in general use at the close of the Republic, but they are carefully avoided by Cicero in the orations and philosophical works. Twice only in his letters to Atticus does he allow himself the use of the new adjectives : 12, 25, 2 *Drusianis hortis* (perhaps also *ib.* 22, 3, where M has *Drusia*); 16, 11, 8 *Lepidianis feriis*. If Varro himself uses *Caeliani* of the followers of Caeles Vibenna (*L. L.* 5, 8, 46), the possessive is to be regarded as properly formed from the gentile adjective *Caelius*, yet even Varro cannot wholly escape the prevailing tendency, as is shown by the assumption of a form *Diviana* (5, 10, 68) to explain *Diana*.

The question how far these possessive adjectives in *-īnus*, which the grammarians pronounced correct, were introduced into actual use may best be considered, after a brief summary has been given of the chief uses of the Latin suffix *-īnus*. With appellatives the most familiar use of the suffix is in forming adjectives from the names of animals, e. g., *aquilinus*, *bovinus*, *catulinus*, *columbinus*, *equinus*, *leoninus*, etc. Again, the suffix is freely employed in forming adjectives from the names of towns and peoples, e. g., *Agrigentinus*, *Centuripinus*, *Praenestinus*, *Saguntinus*, *Tarentinus*, cf. *Tiberinus*, etc. In the case of io- or iā- stems the primary suffix *-nus* is often employed, e. g. *Aricinus*, *Brundisinus*, *Canusinus*, *Latinus*, *Numantinus*, etc. In the formation of such

[1] In the same connection Cicero uses the genitive: *Sull.* 19, 54 *Fausti munus*. *Faustianus* is found later: Plin. 14, 62 . 63; Front. *Ep. de Fer. Als.* 3, p. 224 Nab.

national and geographical adjectives the suffix *-īnus* performs a function altogether similar to that of the suffix *-ānus*, and occasionally from the same place-name we find that both formations have been in use, e.g. from *Arpi, Arpanus* Varr., Plin., Front., Col., *Arpinus* Liv.; from *Spoletium, Spoletinus* Cic., Liv., Plin., *Spoletanus* Prisc. (*Gr. Lat.* K. II, 78); from *Veiens, Veientanus* Liv., Hor., Mart., Plin., *Veientinus* Inscrr.; *Hortanum* Plin., *Hortinus* Verg.; compare *Asculanus* from Asculum in Picenum, *Asculinus* from Asculum in Apulia. Finally, the suffix *-īnus* forms cognomina which commonly indicate the parentage of the person, i. e., the cognomen of the father, which is most often some well-known appellative, is borne by the son with the added suffix *-īnus*. Thus *Marcellinus* (Cic. *Div. in Caecil.* 4, 13) denotes the son of Marcellus, *Scaurinus* (Capitol. *Ver.* 2, 5) the son of Scaurus, and the like.[1] The following cognomina occur in Cicero: *Acidinus, Albinus, Balbinus, Caecina, Caesoninus, Calvinus, Censorinus, Corvinus, Flamininus, Laevinus, Longinus, Luscinus, Mancinus, Marcellinus, Porcina* (?), *Rubellinus, Saturninus, Viscellinus*. Such surnames are formed not only from o- and ā- stems, but occasionally also from io- stems through the original suffix *-nus*, e. g. *Flamininus* (?), *Antoninus*. Under the empire the use of these patronymics came more and more into vogue,[2] and often supplanted an ancient family cognomen, as in the case of the sons of Messala Corvinus, who took the name of *Messalinus* (Tib., Vell., Tac.). The termination *-iānus*, among its many other uses, has also at times a patronymic force, but rarely in cases where the appellative origin of the cognomen continued to be easily recognized. Sometimes we find both suffixes applied to the same stem in the formation of cognomina, i. e. both *Nepotinus* and *Nepotianus* occur in inscriptions, both *Macrinus* and *Macrianus* in the Scriptt. Hist. Aug.

[1] On the diminutive force of the suffix *-īnus*, which is doubtless derived from its use in the patronymic formations, see Olcott, *Word Formation of the Latin Inscriptions*, p. 134, and on the employment of the patronymic formations in *-īnus* as the personal cognomina of women, see Schneider, *Beiträge zur kenntniss der röm. personennamen*, p. 63 f.

[2] See especially the indices of the Corpus, and Friedländer's *Index* to the real and fictitious names used by Martial. Martial is fond of these names, which have a certain elegance or imply endearment, e. g. *Fabullinus, Faventinus*.

The formation of patronymic cognomina finally became the sole use of the suffix *-īnus* when applied to the names of persons, and Charisius[1] is quite right in denying wholly for his own age the existence of the adjectival use. But in the republican age the question was still an open one, and the adjectival use of the suffix *-īnus* was at least possible. Cicero, it is true, almost invariably avoided all controverted forms through the employment of the genitive,[2] but at times, chiefly in the *Letters*, he has made a tentative use of the formations in *-īnus*.

In an enumeration of such of these adjectives as occur in Cicero we may first set apart two which evidently belong to a much earlier period of formation, viz., *Sibyllinus* (Varr., Cic., Liv., Hor., Quint., Gell., Lact.), *Mamertinus* (Cic., Liv., Plin., Mart.); cf. also *matutinus* (from *Matuta*, cf. Prisc. K. II, 76, 18). Of the nine remaining forms found in Cicero only three occur more than once, viz., *Antiochinus*, *Iugurthinus*, *Verrinus*. Two classes may be conveniently distinguished, according as the termination is applied to purely Roman or to Greek and foreign names.

I. ROMAN NAMES.—Cic. *Ep. ad Brut.* 1, 15, 6 *Brutina*[3] *consilia; ib.* 1, 2, 5 *Plautinus pater*, Varro ap. Quint. 10, 1, 99 *Plautino sermone*, also Hor., Front., Gell.; Cic. *Verr.* 2, 1, 46, 121 *Verrinum ius*, 2, 78, 191 *Verrina cauda*, later *Verrinae* (*orationes*) in Priscian (II 201, 5. 357, 3 K.), Victorinus, Mart. Cap., and other grammarians; Cic. *Att.* 1, 13, 5 *Metellina*[4] *oratio*, also Festus, p. 363, 12 M. *aedes Iovis Metellina*, Treb. Pol. *Tyr.* 25, 4 *Isium Metellinum*. This last adjective appears to be an earlier formation, which at one time was admitted into general use. Compare the name of the Spanish city *Metellinum* (Itin. Ant. p. 416, 2), which perhaps, as Hübner conjectures (CIL. II, p. 73) was named after Metellus Pius; so also Plin. 4, 117 *colonia Metelli-*

[1] *Gr. Lat.* K. I, 93, 29 ff. cum sit Agrippa, mulierem Agrippinam dicimus, thermas vero Agrippinianas. . . . thermas Titinas ut pelles lupinas non dicimus, sed Titianas.

[2] The language long remained contented with the genitive even in some cases where the adjective lay apparently close at hand, e. g. *Appi Forum*. Except in strictly official language *lex Caepionis* is always an alternate form for *lex Servilia*, see Orelli's *Index Legum*, VIII, 268; cf. Cic. *Dom.* 16, 41 *M. Drusi leges*, etc. *Gracchana lex* occurs first in Florus (2, 1 sqq.), *Leoniana* or *Zenoniana lex* first in the jurisconsults.

[3] *Brutianus*, Vell., Val. Max., Lact.

[4] *Metellianus*, Schol. Gronov. ad Cic. *Cat.* 4, 5, 10.

nensis, Ptol. 2, 5, 6 Καικίλια Μετέλλινα (Müll.). Several Spanish place-names of a similar formation show that the suffix *-īnus* in this use was at one time widely current in Spain. See the examples cited below under *Caesarinus*, and compare Ptol. 2, 6, 27 Ὕδατα Κουίντινα (a Spanish locality).[1]

II. FOREIGN NAMES.—The suffix *-īnus* was felt to be especially applicable to personal names which were not purely Roman, but Greek or barbarian, and it apparently impressed on such formations something of an exotic character. Thus from *Aeacides* is formed in Plaut. *As.* 405 *Aeacidinae minae;* Cic. *Brut.* 33, 127, *N. D.* 3, 30, 74 *Iugurthina coniuratio,—Iugurthinus* first in Lucil. 11, 19 M., then Sall., Hor., Ov., Vell., ap. Quint. 8, 3, 29, Plin., Gell.; Cic. *Att.* 13, 45, 1 *Diocharinae epistolae* (i. e., addressed to Caesar's freedman, Diochares); *Fam.* 9, 8, 1 *Antiochinae partes* (i. e., of Antiochus of Ascalon), but elsewhere, notably in the philosophical works, only the Greek adjective *Antiochius*, or *-eus*, e. g. *Att.* 13, 12, 3. 25, 3, *Ac.* 2, 31, 98. 36, 115, etc.; *Phil.* 11, 7, 17 *Antiochinum bellum* (i. e., with Antiochus Magnus; wrongly referred by Orelli, *Onomast. Tull.*, and Georges to the city Antiochea), then Vell. 2, 39, 2, Gell. 4, 18, 7. 6, 19, 8 (Hertz).—Except in the case of Diochares and that of Antiochus of Ascalon, Cicero employs the Greek adjectives in the *Letters*, when he refers to the business relations of contemporary Greeks, e. g. *Att.* 6, 2, 12 *Pammenius;* 4, 10, 2 *Cyreus.*

From purely Roman names only the adjectives *Plautinus* and *Verrinus* remained fully current in the later language, and to each of these belongs a special history. *Plautinus* occurs first in two passages of the prologues of Plautus, which are the addition of a later hand, but belong to the second century B. C.: *Pseud. pr.* 2; *Cas. pr.* 12 *Plautinas fabulas.* In Varro's time, however, as is evident from Gell. 3, 3, 10, usage wavered between the forms *Plautinus* and *Plautianus.* Hence Cicero apparently avoided this adjective; for he uses *Plautinus* only once, while *Caecilianus* and *Terentianus* occur frequently. Varro, however, in his *quaestiones Plautinae* and in his treatise *de comoediis Plautinis* declared in favor of the form *Plautinus*, and, as we may see from Gellius' account, he adduced in its support the same arguments

[1] Benseler, *Wörterbuch der griech. eigennamen*, also cites Μαρκελλινά, the name of a fort in Dardania, from Proc. *Aedd.* 4, 4 (281, 56); cf. Μαρκῖνα, Strab. 5, 251.

which have been quoted above from the *de lingua Latina*. Hence it is to Varro alone that we owe the retention of the older form *Plautinus*. In like manner Cicero's puns upon the name of Verres attracted an altogether disproportionate amount of notice from Quintilian and later Roman critics, and thus fixed in the usage of the grammarians the phrase '*orationes Verrinae*.' The possessive is, however, here formed less from the proper name than from the appellative.[1]

With two exceptions (*Verrinus* and *Diocharinus*), the adjectives cited above are formed from o- and ā- stems. From consonant stems of the third declension formations in *-īnus* are mentioned both by Varro and Priscian,[2] though distinctly rejected by the former. Cicero has twice used this formation in the *Letters*: *Fam.* 7, 25, 1 vereor ne in catonium *Catoninos*[3] ('I am afraid he will send us Catonians to join our hero below');[4] *Att.* 16, 10, 1 *Caesarina celeritas*. The same form of the adjective is also preserved in the names of two Spanish colonies: Plin. 4, 117 *colonia* Norbensis *Caesarina* cognomine (Detlef.), and cf. Hübner *CIL.* II, p. 81; CIL. II, 694 *col(onia)* Norb(ensis) *Caesarin(a)*; Plin. 3, 11 Asido (*colonia*), quae *Caesarina* dicitur; CIL. II, 1315 *municipes Caesarini*.—Of the competing formations those in *-iānus* from -ōn-stems are admitted by Cicero, although very rarely, in the orations and philosophical works: *Har. Resp.* 1, 2 *Pisonianus; de Or.* 2, 61, 248 *Neronianus; Or.* 49, 165 *Milonianus*.

Schnorr von Carolsfeld is mistaken (p. 184) in denying alto-

[1] The same view is expressed by Wölfflin, *ALL.* I, 279.—There is no Roman gentile adjective *Verrius* corresponding to *Verres*, as Lewis and Short and Georges imply (De Vit only Verrēus or -īus). The Greek adjective *Verrius* or *-ēus* is found: *Verr.* 2, 2, 63, 154 *Verria* . . . Marcellia ('the Verres festival'); 3, 49, 117 lege Hieronica . . . *lege Verria*. In both cases alike the inferior codices show the form *Verrea*.

[2] *Gr. Lat.* K. II, 78, 13 ff. 'Piso Pisonis Pisonianus' quamvis quidam et 'Pisoninus' et 'Miloninus' dici putaverunt. . . . possumus tamen dicere, quod a 'Caesarius' et 'Milonius' et 'Pisonius' derivata sint 'Caesarianus,' 'Milonianus,' 'Pisonianus.' Priscian's argument for *Milonianus* rests on cogent grounds, e. g. Plautus forms from Ballio the adjective *Ballionius* (*Pseud.* 1064), the poets have *Iunonius* and similar forms, *Catonius* occurs as a cognomen Cic. *Ep. ad Brut.* 1, 2, 3 (M), Sen., Tac.; *Milonius*, Hor. *Sat.* 2, 1, 24, etc.

[3] *Catonianus*, Racilius ap. Cic. *ad Q. Fr.* 2, 6, 5, Sen., Mart., Dig.

[4] Here belongs also Hor. *Ep.* 1, 18, 82 *dente Theonino*.

gether the use of *Caesarianus* in Cicero, for it is found *Att.* 6, 8, 2 meros *terrores Caesarianos*.[1] Elsewhere, notably in the Philippics, the careful avoidance of this adjective is most evident.[2] In prescribing the formation '*Scipionarius*' from Scipio in the passage already cited (*L. L.* 9, 71), Varro shows little discrimination, and seems rather to have in mind the formation from the appellative, e. g. *scipionarius*, 'a dealer in staffs,' as *carbonarius*, 'a dealer in charcoal.'[3] Yet the possessive signification of the suffix *-arius* is distinctly recognized among its other uses by Priscian (*Gr. Lat.* K. II, 74 f.). *Ianuarius* and *Februarius* fall under this head. Cf. also Plin. 3, 121 *Carbonaria ostia* (Padi) (a popular formation). Olcott cites from the inscriptions *Iunonarium*, 'shrine of Juno' (CIL. XIV, 2867); cf. *Afrarius* (VI, 1620), *Graecarius* (XII, 3349), *Hierosolymarius* (Cic. *Att.* 2, 9, 1). The adjective *Catilinarius*, as Wölfflin has shown at length (*ALL.* I, 277 ff.), is avoided by all classical writers, and occurs first in Priscian.

The formations in *-īnus* cited above are confirmed by external evidence, and are subject to little doubt. A very different question may next be considered. In addition to the regular adjective with the suffix *-ānus*, was it also possible in the republican period to form from io- stems a less usual adjective with the suffix *-nus*? Such formations would naturally belong to a more archaic style, and could hardly be expected to occur outside of the *Letters*. Four such forms are actually transmitted in M: Asin. Poll. *ad Fam.* 10, 33, 4 *Hirtinus*[4] (*Hirtianus* Cic. *Fam.* 9, 18, 3, *Att.* 10, 4, 11); Cass. *ad Fam.* 15, 19, 1 *Catinus* (*Catianus* Cic. *Fam.* 15, 16, 1); Cic. *Att.* 1, 16, 10 *Marinus* (with a punning reference to

[1] By the side of *Caesarianus* is found the adjective *Caesareanus*, formed from *Caesareus:* Sen. *Ep.* 95, 70, Scriptt. Hist. Aug. (the invariable form, except Spart. *vit. Sev.* 6, 9), and acc. to the best codd., Nep. *Att.*7, 1, Flor. 2, 13 (4, 2).

[2] *Att.* 5, 6, 2. 10, 4 *Caesaris nomen* (with *nomen*, 'debt,' the adjective is the rule); 14, 13, 2 *Caesaris bello; Ep. ad. Brut.* 2, 6, 2 *animi partium Caesaris*, cf. Asin. Poll. *ad Fam.* 10, 33, 1; *Phil.* 1, 7, 16. 42, 109, etc. *acta Caesaris.*

[3] On the commercial use of the suffix *-arius*, see Olcott, *Word Formation*, p. 138 ff.

[4] Of these forms only *Hirtinus* and *marinus* are placed in the text by Wesenberg and Mendelssohn.

marinus) (*Marianus* Cic. *Agr.* 3, 2, 7, *de Or.* 2, 66, 266, etc.); *ib.* 10, 18, 1 *Hortensinus* (*Hortensianus ib.* 4, 6, 3). The possibility of such secondary formations on the analogy of place-names and of surnames cannot be absolutely denied, but in the absence of external evidence it seems perhaps more reasonable to regard these cases as due simply to mistakes of the copyist.

After the first part of the Augustan period possessive adjectives were formed, in general, only with the suffix *-iānus*, and without any limitations upon its use, except that, in the case of o- and ā- stems, Sallust, Livy and Quintilian appear to have avoided the use of the improper formations. The popular forms, on the other hand, occur in the greatest abundance in Martial, Tacitus and Florus. The adjectival suffix *-īnus* had now become practically obsolete, and only the following examples of its use can be cited: *Barcinus*, Liv., Sidon., cf. the name of the Spanish city *Barcino;* Sen.[1] *Suas.* 4, 5 *Fuscinae explicationes* (i. e., of Arellius Fuscus); Mart. 5, 37, 2 *Phalantinus Galaesus* (of the legendary founder of Tarentum); cf. Plin. 3, 121 *Philistina fossa* (where, however, it is not clear that the adjective is personal rather than ethnic); Mart. Cap. 6, 577 *sapis Midinum* (= *asininum*); cf. *orcinus* Suet. *Aug.* 35, Dig. 26, 4, 3, 3; *Nerinus* Nemes., Aus.; CIL. III, 3228 *legionum* [*G*]*ermaniciana*[*r*(*um*)] [*e*]*t Britannicin*(*arum*).[2] From the name of Alexander Severus we find in Lampridius both forms of the adjective, *Alexandrinus* as well as *Alexandrianus* (the former apparently adopted by the emperor himself for the sake of the possible reference to Alexander the Great); e. g. Lampr. *Sev.* 26, 7 *Alexandrina basilica; ib.* 25, 7; Treb. Pol. *Tyr.* 32, 3: Lampr. *Sev.* 25, 3 *aqua*, quae *Alexandriana*[3] nunc dicitur; *ib.* 40, 6, etc.; CIL. III, 797. 798 *legio Alexandriana.*[4]

The preceding examples represent a very rare and exceptional use, and show clearly how little the scruples of the grammarians

[1] But elsewhere *Montanianus, Seianianus.*

[2] The cases do not belong here, in which a cognomen terminating in *-inus* is employed as an adjective without change of form, e. g. Capitol. *Ant. P.* 10, 1 *menses Antoninus atque Faustinus.*

[3] Parallel to *Agrippianus, Antoninianus, Severianus*, etc. in the Scriptt. Hist. Aug., and in inscriptions.

[4] The manuscripts of Columella have *Cestina mala* (5, 10, 19) according to Schneider. It may be doubted whether this form is correct, or is due to a corruption of the *Sestiana mala*, which is read in Col. 12, 47, 5.

availed in the end to check the popular development of the language. A few of the cases cited above are later than the second century of our era, but the history of the personal suffix may properly conclude with the curious attempt by which Suetonius, in his character of grammarian and disciple of Varro, sought for the last time to revive its use on an extended scale. The popular formations in *-ianus* were, in Suetonius' time, in universal use, and it was clearly impossible for the historian to change the familiar phrases which were everywhere current in the city and the camp, e. g. *Marcellianum theatrum, Variana clades, Augustiani (equites), Germaniciani exercitus, Christiani (homines).*[1] Suetonius did not, however, scruple to change all less usual forms, and hence he shows us the following new formations: *Claud.* 11 *Augustinus*[2] *currus; de Gramm.* 17 *Catulina*[3] *domus; Cal.* 55 *Columbinum venenum; Claud.* 1 *Drusinae*[4] *fossae; Galb.* 3 *Viriathinum bellum.*

The differences in classical usage between the gentile adjective and the possessive admit of somewhat fuller statement than they have hitherto received. The essential distinction is clearly implied by Cornelius Fronto[5] (*Gr. Lat.* K. VII, 520): the gentile adjective is used of buildings which become public property, the possessive in *-anus* is used only of property which passes from one private owner to another. This usage shows clearly the importance of the ancient *gens* and the character of the Roman system, in which the individual was subordinated to the *gens*, and the *gens* subordinated to the state. Hence all public works and buildings completed by its single members are viewed as the

[1] Cf. also from consonant stems *Caesarianus, Gelotianus, Maecenatianus, Neronianus, Pisonianus.*

[2] *Augustiani* Tac., Suet.; *Augustanus* Plin., Ulp., Dig., Inscrr.

[3] *Catulianus* Plin. 34, 77 Detlefsen; Cicero has only the genitive, as *Att.* 4, 5, 2 *villam*, quae *Catuli* fuerat; *Q. Fr.* 3, 1, 4, *Att.* 4, 2, 4. 5, *Dom.* 44, 116 *Catuli porticus.*

[4] *Drusianus* Cic., Flor., Inscrr., Dio Cass.; *Drusiana fossa* Tac. *A.* 2, 8.

[5] Pompei porticus et Pompeia et Pompeiana. Pompei, si possidet; Pompeia, si publicavit; Pompeiana, si in alterius dominationem venit. If the Anonymus in J. W. Beck, *de differentiarum scriptoribus Latinis*, p. 73, states: Octavia porticus est, si privata fuerit; Octaviana porticus dicitur, si publica facta fuerit, the text is clearly corrupt and the correction obvious. The distinction which Fronto seeks to make between the genitive and the use of the adjective is of much less value.

monumenta of the *gens*[1]; they bear officially no distinctive personal designation, but only the common gentile name, and this usage is continued long after the introduction of the cognomen as a more distinctive name, and after the formation of possessive adjectives referring to single individuals within the *gens*. Apart from the commercial use, only that kind of possession which belongs to the military or the party leader, the jurisconsult, or the author is expressed in the classical language by the adjective in *-anus*, e. g. *milites Sertoriani* (Cic. *Verr.* 2, 5, 28, 72), *homines Sullani* (*ad Q. Fr.* 1, 1, 21), *iudicium Iunianum* (*Clu.* 1, 1), *ille Terentianus Phormio* (*Caec.* 8, 27).

The use of the gentile adjective may be classified under three leading heads, viz., referring to the *gens* itself, to laws and public works, to place-names and natural objects. The use with *gens* and its synonyms (*domus, stirps, familia, nomen*, etc.), with *lex* and *rogatio*, and with the names of the public roads is too well known to require illustration. In relation to the public works and buildings, the most familiar examples are afforded by the various basilicas, porticoes, senate-houses, fora, aqueducts, gates, bridges, colonies, etc., e. g. the *basilicae Aemilia, Aemilia et Fulvia, Asinia, Iulia, Opimia, Porcia, Sempronia*, etc.; *porticus Claudia, Flaminia, Minucia, Octavia, Pompeia, Vipsania*, etc.; *curiae Acculeia, Hostilia, Iulia, Pompeia*, etc.; *fora Augustum, Iulium, Ulpium*, etc.; *aquae Appia, Augusta, Claudia, Iulia, Marcia; portae Minucia, Naevia*, etc.; *pontes Aemilius, Fabricius, Minucius, Mulvius*, etc.; *coloniae Augusta, Iulia, Flavia, Pompeia*, etc.[2] Examples in Cicero of public buildings and monuments in addition to those already named are as follows: *Quinct.* 3, 12. 6, 25 *atria Licinia; Cael.* 25, 61. 62 *balneae Seniae; Att.* 1, 14, 1, *Sest.* 14, 33, etc., *circus Flaminius; Div. in Caec.* 16, 50, *Sest.* 58, 124 *columna Maenia; Clu.* 34, 93, *Flac.* 28, 66 *gradus Aurelii; Planc.* 7, 17 *fornix Fabius; Quinct.* 6, 25 *tabula Sextia; Fam.* 14, 2, 2, *Vat.* 9, 21 *tabula Valeria; Sest.* 15, 34,

[1] Cf. Tac. *A.* 3, 72 *basilica Pauli, Aemilia monumenta;* Val. Max. 4, 4, 8 *Maria monumenta* (where Kempf appears to follow the inferior codd. in reading *Mariana*).

[2] In the forms which have no corresponding gentile adjective in use, the genitive is always employed by Cicero, and often by later writers, e. g. Cic. *Dom.* 44, 116, *Att.* 4, 2, 4. 5. 3, 2 *porticus Catuli; Dom.* 38, 101, Liv. 8, 19, 4 *prata Vacci;* Tac. *A.* 3, 72, Plin. 36, 102 *basilica Pauli.*

Pis. 5, 11 *tribunal Aurelium.* Similar examples from other authors are the following: Liv. 39, 44, 7 *atria Maenium et Titium;* Vop. *Aur.* 1, 7. 8, 1 *bibliotheca Ulpia;* Plin. 36, 122 *fons Curtius;* Liv. 1, 23, 3. 2, 39, 5 *fossa Cluilia;* Plin. 3, 121 *fossa Clodia;* Hor. *C.* 4, 12, 18 *horrea Sulpicia;* Fest. p. 290 M. *horrea Sempronia;* Suet. *Aug.* 16 *portus Iulius;* Fest. p. 363 M. *scalae Tarquitiae;* Mart. 9, 3, 12 *templa Flavia;* Tac. *H.* 5, 11 *turris Antonia;* Paul. *exc.* Fest. p. 131 M. *turris Mamilia.*

The popular language early disregarded the distinction between public and private ownership, and introduced the possessive adjectives into the names of many of the public monuments. This use is carefully avoided by Cicero, but from the Augustan period on becomes more frequent in literature, and is especially characteristic of writers who represent the popular speech (Vitruv., Scriptt. Hist. Aug., Inscrr.) It is especially noteworthy that in several cases where the *gens* was comparatively obscure and some single member universally known, the gentile adjective goes almost entirely out of use (*Marius, Pompeius*). Cicero shows but a single case of wavering usage: *Verr.* 1, 7, 19 *fornix Fabianus.* This was undoubtedly the name of popular speech: Sen. *Dial.* 2, 1, 3, Treb. Pol. *Gall.* 19, 4 *arcus Fabianus;* cf. Front. *Aq.* 1, 20 *arcus Neronianus.* The ancient and more correct form, *Fabius fornix*, is found Cic. *Planc.* 7, 17, Quintil. 6, 3, 67.[1] A real exception is scarcely to be recognized in the *tullianum*, the "well-house" associated by popular etymology with the name of Servius Tullius; for here it was obviously not possible to use the neuter of the gentile adjective alone as a substantive. An undoubted departure, however, from earlier usage is afforded at the close of the Republic by '*theatrum Pompeianum*' (Plin., Mart., Tac., Suet.), a use which stands in marked contrast to '*circus Flaminius.*' The reason for this innovation plainly lies in the fact that the adjective of the political faction and of the camp (*Pompeianus*) was at this time far more in evidence than the ancient gentile formation (*Pompeius*). Hence the ancient form has disappeared wholly from the literature, and is preserved only in the official language of Augustus: Mon. Anc. 20 *Pompeium theatrum* refeci. Upon the analogy of '*Pompeianum theatrum*'

[1] In a quotation from Cic. *de Or.* 2, 66, 267, where the manuscripts and editors are divided between *f. Fabianus* and *f. Fabii* (Sorof, after L, *Fabii*).

later writers allow themselves to employ also *Pompeiana curia*[1] (Suet. *Caes.* 81), *Pompeiana porticus* (Vitruv. 5, 9, 1), in place of the classical and well attested *Pompeia curia* (Cic. *Div.* 2, 9, 23, Gell. 14, 7, 7), *Pompeia porticus* (Prop. 3, 30, 1, Plin. 35, 114). Other examples of this use of the possessives are as follows: Vitruv. 5, 1, 4 *basilica Iulia et Aquiliana*;[2] CIL. XIV, 140 *porticus Placidiana;* Vop. *Aur.* 41, 3 *curia Pompiliana;* Vitruv. 3, 1, 5, Val. Max. 1, 7, 5 *Mariana aedis* Honoris, Iovis; Mel. 2, 78 *Mariana fossa; id.* 2, 122, Plin. 3, 80, Ptol. 3, 2, 5 *Mariana colonia;* Val. Max. 2, 5, 6 *Mariana monumenta*, but *id.* 4, 48 *Maria monumenta*, according to the best codd. Under the empire possessive adjectives were also freely formed from praenomina and cognomina, and in these cases were necessarily the only adjectival forms in use, e. g. *theatrum Marcellianum*[3] (Mart., Suet.), *fossae Drusianae* (Tac.), *thermae Neronianae* (Mart.), *Titianae*[4] (Capitol. *Max.* 1, 4), *Severianae* (Spart.), *legiones Antoninianae, Maximinianae* (as purely honorary titles and parallel with *legio Claudia, Flavia:* Scriptt. Hist. Aug., Inscrr.). It is perhaps in opposition to '*thermae Titianae*' that Gellius writes *balneae Titiae* (3, 1, 1 Hertz).[5] In any case, the effect of these formations was necessarily felt in obscuring the sharp distinction between the possessive and the gentile adjective.

In the classical language the gentile adjective is the rule also with localities and natural objects which bear historical or commemorative names. Instances occur most frequently with *Forum, mons, silva*, etc., e.g. *Fora Aurelium, Cornelium, Iulium, Iunium*, etc.; *montes Augustus, Caelius, Cassius, Cispius, Claudius, Coelius, Herminius, Oppius, Pincius, Tarpeius*, etc., cf. *clivus Publicius; silvae Caesia, Maesia, Naevia, Scantia*, etc. Other examples of this use are as follows: Varr. *L. L.* 5, 154 *campus Flaminius;* Plin. 29, 12 *compitum Acilium;* Varr. *L. L.* 5, 148, Liv. 7, 6, 5 *lacus Curtius;* Hor. *A. P.* 32 *ludus Aemilius;* Varr. *L. L.* 5, 163 *nemora Naevia;* Liv. 1, 26, 10, Prop. 4 (3), 3, 7 *pila*

[1] Also the genitive, *porticus* or *curia Pompei:* Cic. *Fat.* 4, 8, Suet. *Caes.* 80. 84, Plin. 35, 126.

[2] Compare Vitruvius' use of *medianus* for *medius* (Schnorr von Carolsfeld, *l. l.* p. 188).

[3] Mon. Anc. app. 2 *Marcelli*, and often later.

[4] Martial has only the genitive *Titi*, as 3, 20, 15, etc.

[5] But both form and reference are uncertain (codd., *stitias* or *sticias*).

Horatia; Liv. 3, 54, 15. 63, 7 *prata Flaminia; id.* 2, 13, 5 *prata Mucia; id.* 3, 26, 8, Plin. 18, 20, Paul. *exc.* Fest. p. 256 M. *prata Quinctia;* Liv. 6, 20, 12 *saxum Tarpeium;* Lampr. *Heliog.* 17 *vicus Sulpicius.* Here also the popular language early introduced the use of the possessives, and such expressions often became the names in actual use in the provinces; hence they are frequently found in the literature, chiefly from the Augustan period. Thus the site on the African coast where the elder Scipio had made his camp was regularly designated as *castra Cornelia* (Plin. 5, 24. 29, Mel. 1, 34 P., Caes. *B. C.* 2, 30, 3. 37, 3; cf. Plin. 4, 117 *c. Servilia, c. Caecilia*), but the *sermo castrensis*, not distinguishing in this case between historical and contemporary names, preferred the possessive form, *castra Corneliana* (Caes. *B. C.* 2, 24, 2. 25, 6),[1] *castra Claudiana* (Liv. 23, 31, 3. 39, 8, etc.); cf. Ptol. 2, 5, 6 sq. Αικινίανα, Μανλίανα, etc. (names of Spanish towns with which *castra* is to be supplied). Similarly *Servilius lacus* (Cic. *Rosc. Am.* 32, 89, Fest. p. 290 M.) is the ancient name of the locality at Rome, but we find later also *Servilianus lacus* (Sen. *Dial.* 1, 3, 7); so also Mel. 2, 89 P. *Clodianum flumen*, cf. Ptol. 2, 6, 19. Livy has *saltus Marcius* (39, 20, 10), but *saltus Manlianus* (40, 39, 2). We find as place-names *aquae Sextiae* (Vell., Plin.), *a. Scantiae* (Plin. 2, 240), but *a. Posidianae* (Plin. 31, 5), *a. Persianae* (Apul. *Flor.* 3, 16, p. 353, 5 H.); *arae Muciae* (Plin. 2, 211), but *arae Sestianae* (*id.* 4, 111).

Finally, in the personal names given to varieties of cultivated plants and fruit-trees, the usage appears to have never become absolutely fixed. In such cases the possessive is much more usual, as is to be expected in the popular language, but Pliny and Columella employ the older form also very freely. Cato uses only the possessives, e.g. *oleae Sergiana, Colminiana, Liciniana* (*R. R.* 6, 1 sq.); Varro has the same forms, with the exception of *Colminia* for *Colminiana* (*R. R.* 1, 24, 1); cf. Plin. 15, 13 *olivae Licinia, Cominia, Contia, Sergia*, and *ib.* 20 *olivae Sergiana, Cominiana.* A typical passage is Col. 5, 8, 3 *oleae Algiana, Liciniana, Sergia, Naevia, Culminia.* The manufactured product is almost always the possessive, as Plin. 15, 8 *oleum Licinianum;* so always the names of condiments and perfumes in Martial (*Cosmianum, Capellianum*, etc.).

[1] Hence there is no need, with Meusel and Hofmann, to correct to *castra Cornelia.*

These results lend probability to the conclusion that the possessive adjectives in *-anus* are later[1] formations of the language, and that the gentile adjectives originally possessed a much broader, perhaps a wholly unrestricted use. This older usage was always retained in the ritualistic language, in the poets and in the authors of archaic tendencies (Varr. *L. L.* 5, 85, Tac. *A.* 1, 54 *sodales Titii;* Ov. *Pont.* 4, 5, 9 *domus Pompeia;* CIL. XIV, 3911 (carmen) *Aelia villa;* Gell. 9, 13, 20 H. *imperia Manlia*).

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE. ROBERT S. RADFORD.

[1] For examples of the extension of the suffix *-anus* in adjectives, see Schnorr von Carolsfeld, *l. l.*, p. 188. To these may be added *Lucanus*, *Venafranus*, *Africanus*, *Veientanus*, *Praetutianus*, etc. as the later forms of *Lucus* (Naev., Enn., Lucr., Varr.), *Venafer* (Cato, Varr.), *Africus* (Enn., Scip. Afr. ap. Gell. 4, 18, 3, etc.), *Veiens*, *Praetutius*. Compare also *Picentinus* (Sall., Mart.) for *Picens*, *Literninus* (Cic., Liv., Plin.) for *Liternus*.

THE FALL OF THE ASSYRIAN EMPIRE.

On the death, in 626 B. C., of Ashurbanipal (Sardanapallus), king of Assyria, his son Ashur-etil-ilâni succeeded to a troubled inheritance. A little more than twenty years before, Shamash-shum-ukîn, king of Babylon, the brother of Ashurbanipal, had endeavored to free himself from Assyrian control, to unite Babylonia under his sway, and thus to establish an independent kingdom with Babylon as its capital. To this end he incited to revolt the dependencies of Assyria and sought the aid of her enemies, his main reliance being placed in the neighboring kingdom of Elam. This formidable danger was overcome by the policy of Ashurbanipal and the ability of his generals. The rebellion was crushed, the allies defeated, and Shamash-shum-ukîn, besieged in Babylon and driven to the last extremity, cast himself into the flames rather than fall into the hands of his brother. It is doubtless this tragic circumstance, well vouched for by the annals of Ashurbanipal (col. IV, ll. 50 ff.), that has given rise to the well-known story of the fate of the last king of Assyria. In 647, the year following the death of Shamash-shum-ukîn, Ashurbanipal had himself crowned king of Babylon under the name of Kandalânu,[1] a measure intended to soothe the somewhat susceptible feelings of the Babylonians who could ill brook the degradation of the holy city to the position of a mere appanage of a foreign power. In this the king followed the example of his predecessors Tiglathpileser III and Shalmaneser IV. The kingdom of Elam was now destroyed; its capital, Susa, was sacked; its remaining cities were ravaged, and the whole country left defenceless. But although Assyria came out of the contest with success, her success was a costly one. The struggle had taxed the resources of the empire to the utmost, and the destruction of Elam removed a strong bulwark against the growing power of the Aryan Medes whose scattered communities were rapidly consolidating into a

[1] The Kineladan of the Ptolemaic canon. See Schrader, *Kineladan und Asurbanipal*, in *Zeits. für Keils.*, II, 222 ff.

united and aggressive state.[1] At the end of Ashurbanipal's reign they constituted a formidable menace to the security of the Assyrian empire. Nor were the Medes, whose migration into Asia was at least as early as the ninth century B. C., the only Aryan people who now came in contact with the Semitic rulers of Western Asia. In the reign of Sargon (722–705 B. C.) new swarms of barbarians appear in the North. Chief among these were the Gimirrâ or Kimmerians, at that time seated in the neighborhood of Lake Van to the north of the Armenian kingdom of Urartu, and, further east, around Lake Urumiah and along the northern borders of Media, the Ashguzâ or Ishkuzâ who, as Winckler has shown, must be identified with the people called Scythians by the classical writers.[2]

In the reign of Esarhaddon (680–668 B. C.), the Kimmerians driven from their settlements by the Scythians, moved westward overrunning Phrygia and the north-western provinces of Assyria, though Esarhaddon was able to divert their attack from Mesopotamia and Syria. In the reign of Ashurbanipal (668–626 B. C.), they invaded Lydia and took its capital Sardes, but here their course was checked, and soon after they were expelled from Asia Minor by the Scythians who pursued them, ravaging the country on all sides, as far as Palestine and the frontier of Egypt. The hostility between the Kimmerians and the Scythians was undoubtedly fomented by Assyria, whose obvious policy it was to play off one against the other. Esarhaddon, one of the shrewdest statesmen that ever sat upon the throne of Assyria, seems to have formed an alliance with the Scythian king Bartatua, the Protothyes of Herodotus,[3] and to have cemented it by giving him his daughter in marriage. At all events, it is certain that Esarhaddon formally consulted the oracle of the Sun god as to whether, in case this marriage should take place, Bartatua would prove a loyal friend of Assyria (Knudtzon, *Gebete an den Sonnengott*, No. 29), and, from this time to the fall of Nineveh, friendly relations appear to have been maintained between Assyria and her Scythian neighbors.

[1] Winckler, *Zur medischen und altpersischen Geschichte*, *Untersuchungen* 109 ff.; Billerbeck-Jeremias, *Der Untergang Ninevehs*, *Beitr. zur Assyr.*, III, 141.

[2] Winckler, *Kimmerier*, *Aŝguzäer*, *Scythen*, in *Forschungen* VI, 484 ff.

[3] Winckler, *Forschungen* VI, 488.

In Syria, where Ashurbanipal had been obliged to put down some sporadic revolts, the great Kimmerian and Scythian invasion, occurring towards the end of his reign, must have thoroughly disorganized the country. Egypt, which for a brief period under Esarhaddon and Ashurbanipal had been reduced to the condition of an Assyrian province, gained her independence about 645 B. C., and her energetic ruler, Psamtik I, cherished the ambition of regaining the long lost Asiatic possessions of his remote predecessors. Such then, at the death of Ashurbanipal and the accession of his son Ashur-etil-ilâni, was the situation of affairs. The Assyrian empire still extended from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, but to the West, Syria disorganized by recent events was ready to fall a prey to Egypt at the first favorable opportunity. To the North, the Scythians held full sway and, though for the time being friendly to Assyria, they were too powerful to be altogether comfortable neighbors. To the East, the Medes, enemies both of Assyria and of the Scythians, were pushing westward to the frontier of Assyria and southward into the defenceless land of Elam.

Of the reign of Ashur-etil-ilâni little is known. A brief inscription found in the south-east palace of Nimrûd (Kelach) gives his genealogy and states that he caused bricks to be made for building the temple of Ezida in Kelach (Schrader's *Keilinschr. Bibliothek*, ii, 268). Another inscription (*ibid.* iv, 156) is badly mutilated and gives no additional information. Contract tablets, found by the American expedition, are dated at Nippur in the second and fourth years of the reign of this king[1] so that he must have ruled both in Assyria and Babylonia until at least the year 622 B. C. It is probable that he died soon after this date. He had a daughter, Sheru'a-eterat, whose letter to the lady Asshur-sharrat, in regard to a point of etiquette[2] affords an interesting glimpse of Assyrian court life, but there is no evidence that he had a son. One event, however, of the utmost importance is known to have occurred in his reign, and this was the accession of the Chaldean Nabopolassar as king of Babylon. According to the Ptolemaic canon, Nabopolassar succeeded Kandalânu

[1] Hilprecht, *Keilinschriftliche Funde in Niffer*, *Zeits. für Assyr.*, iv, 164 ff.

[2] *Johns Hopkins University Circulars*, June, 1896, pp. 91 ff.; *Journ. Am. Or. Soc.*, xx, 244 ff.

(=Ashurbanipal) in 626 B. C. and reigned for twenty-one years, and this is amply confirmed by a series of Babylonian contract tablets dated up to the twenty-first year of his reign. To which of the Chaldean tribes he belonged is unknown, as also the circumstances attending his accession. Abydenus has preserved a tradition that Saracus, who succeeded Sardanapallus as king of Assyria, learning that an army numerous as locusts was coming from the sea to attack his dominions, sent his general, Busalossorus, to Babylon. Whereupon the latter, throwing off his allegiance, and securing an alliance by marrying his son Nebuchadnezzar to Amuhea, daughter of Ashdahak, Prince of the Medes, forthwith marched upon Nineveh. Saracus, informed of this, burnt himself in his royal palace (Müller-Didot, *Fragmenta Hist. Graec.*, iv, p. 282). The ultimate source of this story seems to have been Ktesias[1] and it is therefore suspicious, yet it may embody a genuine tradition.[2] As the brief rule of Ashur-etil-ilâni was apparently unknown to classical writers, it is not remarkable that events should be referred to the reign of Saracus (Sin-shar-ishkun) which really occurred in that of his predecessor. The account of the army coming against Babylon from the sea may well refer to a movement on the part of the Chaldeans, who saw in the death of Ashurbanipal (Sardanapallus) a favorable opportunity for reasserting their ancient claims. That Nabopolassar may have held a position of authority and made use of it to place himself at the head and reap the fruits of such a movement, is by no means improbable. And although he did not take part directly in the destruction of Nineveh, it is certain that the monarchy he established was essentially Chaldean in character, and that he subsequently acted with the Medes against Assyria. The marriage of his son Nebuchadnezzar with a Median princess, while not impossible, is at least open to doubt.

Ashur-etil-ilâni was succeeded by his brother Sin-shar-ishkun the Saracus of classical writers. Sin-shar-ishkun's descent from Esarhaddon is set forth in a fragment ingeniously restored by Winckler (*Revue d'Assyr.*, vol. II, 1889, p. 67), and in a mutilated tablet, apparently containing a grant of land, published by Father Scheil in 1896 (*Zeits. für Assyr.*, xi, 47), he is called the son of Ash-

[1] Winckler, *Forschungen* II, 172 ff. [2] Cf. Schrader in *ZK* ii, 228.

urbanipal. Portions of several inscriptions of Sin-shar-ishkun have been found, but all are either badly mutilated or merely fragmentary. The longest of these inscriptions, of which a transliteration and translation are given by Winckler in Schrader's *Keilinschriftliche Bibliothek* (ii, 270-273), refers to the building of a temple, and is dated in the eponymy of a certain Daddî the vizier, but as the eponym canon is incomplete there is no means of determining the precise date. In this inscription, as also in a fragment published by Winckler in *Revue d'Assyriologie* (ii, 67), the king refers to wars in which he claims that the Assyrian arms were successful. The gods, he says, "subdued his foes, overthrew his adversaries" (*KB*, ii, 270, l. 7); and again, "I revered the great gods, I frequented their temples, I prayed to their majesty. They stood by my side, rendered me gracious help, championed my cause, and subdued my foes. They bound fast my adversaries, and laid low the foes of Assyria who obeyed not my royal will" (*Rev. d'Assyr.*, ii, 67). Winckler is inclined to restore *Ma-da*]-*â*, 'the Medes' in line 2, but it is evident that *idâ*]-*â* 'at my side,' must be read here. However, as Mount Demavend (*šad Bikni*) is mentioned in another fragment (K, 1654), it is possible that Sin-shar-ishkun actually refers to a war with the Medes and that, as Winckler suggests, Herodotus' account (I, 102) of Phraortes' unsuccessful attack upon Nineveh may rest upon a historic basis. Two contract tablets are dated at Sippara in the second year of "Sin-shar-ishkun King of Assyria", and another is dated at Erech in the seventh year of his reign,[1] so that in 615 B. C., or later, he still ruled in Babylonia.

Prof. R. F. Harper's *Assyrian Letters* contains (No. 469) a communication from the people of Erech to the king, in which they state that a dispute about certain lands had been decided in their favor by "thy father Ashurbanipal" (rev. 1; cf. obv. 12). This must, of course, have been addressed either to Ashur-etil-ilâni or to his brother Sin-shar-ishkun. As late therefore as the year 615 B. C., and probably somewhat later, since the precise duration of Ashur-etil-ilâni's reign is not known, there is no evidence that Nabopolassar held dominion anywhere except in the city of Babylon and the district immediately adjoining, while there is positive evidence that parts, if not the whole, of Babylonia

[1] *Keil. Bibliothek*, iv, 174-176.

were still held by Assyria. At some time before the year 611 B. C., the situation must have changed, since a contract tablet dated at Sippara, in the fifteenth year of Nabopolassar, king of Babylon, indicates that he then had possession of northern Babylonia. He seems about the same time to have gone further and to have made a successful invasion into the Mesopotamian possessions of Assyria. Three inscriptions of Nabopolassar are known, all belonging to the latter part of his reign. In one of these (*Keil. Bibl.* iii², 6) he states that he connected Sippara with the Euphrates by means of a canal, and this could only have been done at a time when the city was actually under his authority. The fact that, in this brief inscription, he styles himself simply *Šar Babili* "King of Babylon" and not king of Sumer and Akkad should not be pressed too far, since his son Nebuchadnezzar, who undoubtedly ruled over all Babylonia, employs the same title in several of his shorter inscriptions. Another inscription of Nabopolassar (*Keil. Bibl.* iii², 8; *Beitr. zur Assyr.* iii, 528) relates to his restoration of the temple of Belit at Sippara, and contains a distinct reference to his military operations: "When Shamash, the great lord, marched by my side, subdued my enemies, and turned the country of my adversaries to pasture land and heaps of ruins, then for Belit of Sippara, the exalted lady, my queen, I built anew E-edina, her abode, and made it shine like the day" (col. I, 20—col. II, 10). In another inscription (*Keil. Bibl.* iii², 2; *Beitr. zur Assyr.* iii, 525) the reference is more definite: "When, at command of Nabû and Marduk, who love my sovereignty, and through the mighty weapon of the terrible god Girra who smites down my enemies with the thunderbolt, I subdued Subaru and reduced that land to pasture field and ruin," (col. I, 21-29)—the king then goes on to describe the building of the great temple tower of Babylon and its dedication with imposing ceremonies in which his sons Nebuchadnezzar and Nabû-shum-lîshir took part. In the last two inscriptions Nabopolassar calls himself King of Sumer and Akkad, and therefore claims sovereignty over all Babylonia. Subaru, of whose conquest Nabopolassar boasts, was a district of northern Mesopotamia,[1] and in this connection it is significant that a contract tablet exists dated at Babylon in the seventeenth year of Nabopolassar *Šar*

[1] Winckler, *Forschungen* II, 153 ff.

Kiššati 'King of the world',[1] so that in 609 B. C. he bore the title which, according to Winckler, pertained specially to the ancient Mesopotamian kingdom whose capital was Harran. This rapid extension of the dominions of Nabopolassar argues at least a temporary helplessness on the part of Assyria, and would seem to have coincided with the events described in Herodotus I, 103-106. The Greek historian states that the Median King Cyaxares, after thoroughly organizing his army, invaded Assyria and, defeating the Assyrians in the field, had actually invested Nineveh when the siege was raised by an army under command of Madyes, son of Protothyes, King of the Scythians. By means of a stratagem Cyaxares and his Medes got the better of these fresh opponents, after which they captured Nineveh and subdued Assyria with the exception of Babylonia. The story of Cyaxares' stratagem is not very probable, but the essential features of Herodotus' account are borne out by all the known facts in the case.[2] Protothyes (Bartatua) was in all probability the son-in-law of Esarhaddon, and therefore it is not unlikely that his son Madyes was the nephew of Ashurbanipal and the cousin of Sin-shar-ishkun, and from the time of Esarhaddon there is no evidence that other than friendly relations existed between Assyria and the Scythians. In any event Madyes could hardly have viewed with complacency the aggrandizement of his Median enemies and their absorption of the fairest portions of Western Asia. The intervention of the Scythian king at this juncture was, in fact, a political necessity. At first he was successful and the Medes were forced to raise the siege and retire to their own territory. The relief of Nineveh, which probably occurred in the year 610, and the diversion of the Median attack afforded Sin-shar-ishkun an opportunity which he was prompt to utilize, and he seems to have made a vigorous effort to drive Nabopolassar out of Mesopotamia and to recover the territory he had occupied in that quarter. Such, even then, was the prestige of the Assyrian arms that many cities of Babylonia either were lukewarm to the cause of Nabopolassar, or openly sided with Assyria. The Babylonian monarch, deprived of the Median support he had hitherto enjoyed, hard pressed in Mesopotamia by the Assyrians, and attacked at home by the

[1] Published by Strassmaier, *Zeits. für Assyr.* iv, 143-144.

[2] Cf. Winckler, *Forschungen* VI, 490.

disaffected Babylonian cities aided doubtless by Assyrian troops, now found himself in a situation all but desperate. Had Sin-shar-ishkun at this crisis been left unhindered in other directions, there can be little doubt that he would have crushed his Chaldean opponent and restored, in some measure at least, the ancient glories of Assyria. But fate was against him, and his success was of brief duration. The Medes, having signally defeated the Scythian forces, now returned to the attack. They swept over Assyria ravaging and burning in every direction, and Nineveh was once more besieged.

The stele of Nabonidus[1] found by the German expedition at Babylon, which contains the only cuneiform account of the fall of Assyria at present known, thus depicts the scene (col. II): "He (the god Marduk) gave him (Nabopolassar) a helper, granted him an ally. The king of the Ummanmanda, whom none could withstand, he made submissive to his (divine) command and brought him to his aid. Above and below, right and left, like a storm he overwhelmed the land, taking vengeance for Babylon in full measure. The king of the Ummanmanda, knowing no fear, destroyed all the temples of the gods of Assyria, while, as for those cities of Babylonia which were hostile to the king of Babylon or came not to his aid, he destroyed their sanctuaries, leaving not one; like a storm he utterly laid waste their cities. The king of Babylon, at the command of Marduk to whom sacrilege is an abomination, laid no hand on the shrines of the gods." According to Nabonidus, therefore, Nabopolassar left the work of destruction to the Medes and took no part in it himself.

In the same inscription (col. X, 13 ff.) Nabonidus states that he restored the temple of Sin in Harran which had been destroyed by the Ummanmanda and lay in ruins for fifty-four years. In the Abu-Habba inscription (*Keil. Bibl.* iii^2, 96 ff.) he states that the restoration of this temple was undertaken at the beginning of his third year. In 608, therefore, or 607—the former being the more probable date—Mesopotamia was invaded and Harran was destroyed by the Medes.[2] The relief of Nabopolassar from his

[1] Messerschmidt, *Die Inschrift der Stele Nabuna'ids Königs von Babylon*, *Mittheilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft*, 1896, 1.

[2] Here, as elsewhere, Nabonidus uses Ummanmanda in the general sense of Northern barbarians. See Winckler's note, Messerschmidt, *o. c.* p. 71.

perilous predicament and the chastisement of the disaffected Babylonian cities were doubtless effected at the same time. It is possible, as Messerschmidt suggests (*o. c.*, p. 14), that Nabopolassar was in the neighborhood of Harran and that this movement of the Medes was undertaken in his behalf, but it may be explained on other grounds. Nineveh, the objective point of the Median attack, lay close upon the Tigris, and from the western bank of the river ran the highways communicating with the fertile plains of Mesopotamia whence both troops and supplies could be drawn. It is not necessary to suppose that, from the first, the whole military strength of the Assyrian empire was massed within the walls of Nineveh. It is more than probable that strong bodies of Assyrian troops controlled the country beyond the Tigris, of whose strategical importance Sin-shar-ishkun was well aware. Indeed, it is hardly likely that the troops which had been operating in this quarter against Nabopolassar had as yet been withdrawn. The Babylonian cities on the Assyrian frontier could also render effective aid if so disposed, and their recent antagonism to Nabopolassar gave them little choice as to how they should side. So long as the country beyond the Tigris held out for Assyria, the reduction of Nineveh was a well nigh hopeless task. It was necessary, therefore, that this district should be rendered useless both as a source of supplies and as a base of military operations. This seems to have been effected by dispatching strong detachments to thoroughly ravage the country, destroy all opposing forces, and render harmless the frontier cities of Babylonia. Their object accomplished, the Median detachments could rejoin their main body before Nineveh, leaving to Nabopolassar the easy task of holding the devastated district in subjection.

When the Medes, after reducing Assyria east of the Tigris, proceeded to dispossess their Scythian neighbors and to extend their dominions in Asia Minor,[1] Mesopotamia was left to Nabopolassar and the wily Chaldean thus enjoyed the fruits of a vicarious victory.

Nineveh was now cut off from outside aid, but behind her strong fortifications her garrison could still offer a stubborn resistance. When at length the Medes prevailed and the city fell, all was not yet lost. A strong line of defences connected

[1] Winckler, *Forschungen* VI, 49; Herodotus, I, 103.

Nineveh with Kelach, a fortress little inferior to the fallen capital in strength, and thither Sin-shar-ishkun fell back to make a new stand. But fate was against him once more. An unusual rise of the Tigris undermined the wall, and the city, now at the mercy of the besiegers, was sacked and burnt.[1]

Thus, shorn of her wide possessions and reduced to her last stronghold, fell the great Assyrian empire, and it is characteristic of her whole history that she fell with her face to the foe, fighting to the last. According to tradition, the siege of Nineveh lasted for two years, and this, if it be taken to include the whole course of events down to the fall of Kelach, is doubtless correct. It was therefore in the year 606 B. C. that the reign of Sin-shar-ishkun came to an end together with the last remnants of the monarchy he represented.

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[1] For a detailed account of the siege of Nineveh see *Der Untergang Ninevehs und die Weissagungsschrift des Nahum von Elkosch*, by Col. Adolf Billerbeck and Dr. Alfred Jeremias, *Beitr. zur. Assyr.* III, 87-188. For the fall of Kelach cf. especially Col. Billerbeck's remarks, *ibid.* p. 131.

NE EMISSES, NE POPOSCISSES, AND SIMILAR EXPRESSIONS.

The expressions *ne emisses* (Cic. in Verr. II, 3, 84, 195) and *ne poposcisses* (Cic. ad Att. II, 1, 3), etc., are commonly regarded as volitive subjunctives, representing *ne emeris*, *ne poposceris*, etc., projected into the past. This theory makes it necessary to explain the pluperfect tense as due to analogy with the behavior of the perfect subjunctive in certain subordinate clauses, when projected into the past, e. g. *si emeris*, *nisi poposceris*, which become *si emisses*, *nisi poposcisses*. Until recently I have myself accepted this view,[1] because no other possible explanation of these strange expressions occurred to me. However, I have never been able to accept a similar theory for the origin of such uses of the pluperfect subjunctive as that illustrated by *restitisses* in Cic. pro Sestio 20, 45. To be sure there was a strong temptation to associate the affirmative with the negative expression, as *restitisses* apparently means "you should have resisted", just as *ne emisses* apparently means "you should not have bought". But the tense of *restitisses* seemed to me a serious difficulty in the way of the theory that it represents a volitive use of the subjunctive. It was, I thought, conceivable that *ne emisses* should be *ne emeris* projected into the past,[2] but *restitisses* could not similarly be traced back to a *restiteris*, for no such use of the perfect subjunctive as *restiteris*, in the sense of "resist thou", is known in Latin; and a present tense would, when thrown into the past, become *resisteres*, instead of *restitisses*. On the other hand, the pluperfect tense in affirmative expressions could not

[1] See my Studies in Latin Moods and Tenses, p. 226, and the Latin Prohibitive in American Journal of Philology, Vol. XV, pp. 315–316, note.

[2] This, however, involved the necessity of assuming that Cicero (strangely enough) projected into the past in his most dignified styles a type of expression (*ne emeris*) which is itself carefully excluded from such styles. See American Journal of Philology, XV, p. 134–135. The necessity of making such an unreasonable assumption is in itself enough to bring the validity of that theory into serious doubt.

well be explained after the analogy of the pluperfect in negative expressions like *ne emisses*, since that would necessitate the assumption that the type *ne emisses* had become firmly established before the type *restitisses* arose, while all the evidence is against any such assumption. It was on account of these considerations that I ventured in my Studies (p. 226) to dissociate the two uses and to explain affirmative expressions like *restitisses* as having originally meant "you would have resisted", with some such ellipsis as "if you had done your duty", and as having from this original use developed the meaning "you should have resisted". Something like a parallel seemed to me to exist in the development of meaning undergone by certain other expressions. For instance, *nec putaueris*, when used in the sense of "nor would you suppose", distinctly and prominently implies the manifest impropriety of supposing the thing referred to and probably came at times to be felt as amounting practically to "nor ought[1] you (under the circumstances) to suppose". Similarly *cur gaudeas?*, starting with the idea "why would you rejoice (under the circumstances)?", "what reason is there for rejoicing?" (i. e. it would be absurd to rejoice) came to mean "why should you re-

[1] In his discussion of my theory regarding a Subjunctive of Obligation or Propriety in Latin (see his Critique of Some Recent Subjunctive Theories), Professor Bennett forgets that the idea of "propriety", as well as that of "obligation", is involved in my theory. By clinging to the word "ought" in applying the theory to concrete cases, he makes the interpretation sometimes seem forced and unnatural. For instance, in Trin. 627, *noli auorsari neque te occultassis mihi*, he translates "don't turn away and you oughtn't to hide". This is, I believe, the only passage in which a prohibition immediately precedes this use of *nec* and is therefore the passage in which my interpretation seems least natural. Still even here it makes perfectly good sense to interpret "don't turn away—nor had you better hide". If "ought" is to be the one word by which my theory is to be tested, the word must be understood as used with the various shades of meaning recognized by lexicographers, viz., as meaning not merely "to be bound in duty by moral obligation", but also, and quite as often, as meaning "to be necessary, fit, becoming or expedient, to behoove" (Webster). "You ought" in English frequently means "you'd better", "you need to", etc. The fact that the word "ought" has taken on all these meanings proves that an expression of obligation may easily become one of mere propriety, and forms therefore a sufficient justification for associating the two conceptions as I have done.

joice?"[1] But I must confess that such a development of meaning does not seem so natural in a contrary-to-fact expression like *restitisses* as in expressions like *nec putaueris* and *cur gaudeas?*. Further consideration has convinced me not merely that the two types of expression represented by *restitisses* and *ne emisses* must be associated as being affirmative and negative forms of the same modal use, but that both the common view regarding the mood, and the one previously held by myself, are fundamentally wrong.

The best and clearest statement of the common view with which I am acquainted is that found in the Appendix (§362) to Bennett's Latin Grammar, from which I quote the following, enclosing in brackets a sentence added by Professor Bennett in his Critique, p. 27:

"Corresponding to the jussive *loquatur*, 'let him speak', 'he's to speak', there developed an imperfect use, *loqueretur*, 'he was to speak', 'he should have spoken'. This use is manifestly a derived one, since one cannot now will a person to have done in the past what he obviously has failed to do. An expression like *loqueretur*, therefore, must have been formed after the analogy of *loquatur*. The pluperfect subjunctive also occurs in this sense

[1] Bennett (Critique, p. 22 f.) regards such a development of meaning as impossible. But a similar development has actually taken place and can be historically traced, in the meaning of the English word "should", which sometimes indicates obligation, sometimes (in the first person) mere contingent futurity. This development of meaning was due wholly to a confusion in the popular mind, somewhere in the history of the language, between the two conceptions. Bennett remarks: "what a person would do . . . bears no necessary or natural relation to what he ought to do. Sometimes one would do what one ought. Oftener, I fear, one would do what one ought not". This last assertion may be true. But the fact remains that the ideas "ought to do" and "destined to do" have very frequently, both in ancient and modern languages, come to be expressed by one and the same mechanism, and that this has been due to the intimate association, at times, of the two conceptions involved. For instance, the words "shall" in English, "sollen" in German, "devoir" in French, all start with the idea of "ought", but "I shall go" has come to mean that the act will certainly take place, and "er soll" and "il doit" are often used in the sense of "he is destined to"; "*faciendum est*" means "ought to be done", but it also means "must be done"; again in *id faciendum curauit* the idea of obligation is entirely lacking; "*oportet*", "δεῖ", "χρή" are all used both of what "ought to be" and of what "must be"; "obliged" means "under obligation", but "he is obliged to go" refers to an act that is of necessity going to happen.

[evidently an attempt to bring out more distinctly the reference to the past], as *eum imitatus esses*, 'you ought to have imitated him'. The volitive character of these expressions is shown by the fact that the negative is regularly *ne*."

This explanation recognizes as involved in the expressions *ne emisses* and *ne poposcisses* two ideas, viz., the volitive idea, in the form of a prohibition, and the idea of obligation or propriety, in the form of a mere assertion that an obligation, as a matter of fact, existed (equivalent therefore to some form of *oportet* with the infinitive). These two ideas are wholly different and distinct. A prohibition cannot at the same time be an assertion that merely states something. If therefore both of these ideas are suggested by *ne emisses*, as is assumed by the interpretation we are considering, it follows that one of them must be the idea primarily expressed and the other must be merely an implication involved. That is, the expression *ne emisses* must be primarily a prohibition (the idea of obligation being merely implied), or else primarily a mere assertion that an obligation existed in the past. Let us consider the possibility of each of these two alternatives.

The first alternative is absolutely impossible, a fact fully recognized by Bennett in the passage above quoted. His own language is sufficient comment on this point, viz., "one cannot now will a person to have done in the past what he obviously has failed to do," or will him not to do what he obviously has done.

But it is practically certain that the other alternative is equally impossible. To suppose that the Romans themselves felt these expressions as mere assertions of any sort would involve us in insurmountable difficulties. For instance if these expressions were mere assertions that an obligation existed in the past (and were therefore equivalent to some form of *oportet* with the infinitive), the *ne* could then be accounted for only by supposing that the expression originated in some volitive use of the subjunctive and that, in the developed use, the *ne* was simply retained from the earlier volitive. But before *ne*, the negative of the volitive, could be used to negative a mere assertion that an obligation existed in the past, it must necessarily have been used with expressions which were identical *in form* with direct independent expressions of the will, but which nevertheless so prominently implied the idea of an obligation that they, after a time, came to be regarded as sometimes amounting to mere statements that an

obligation existed. Otherwise there would be no starting point from which the development might proceed. But it has been seen that *ne emisses* does not have the form of any possible expression of the speaker's will. Therefore this use of *ne* in an expression which, we are for the moment assuming, has already come to be felt as a mere assertion of the existence of an obligation, cannot have originated in such an expression as *ne emisses*, or any similar expression referring to the past. If then, *ne* has come to be used in mere assertions, it must first have been so used in assertions referring to the present. In other words, we must assume that such expressions as *ne emeris*, *ne emas*, first began to be felt as mere assertions that the act ought not to be performed. After *ne* had begun to be frequently associated with assertions of this form, it might then have easily drifted away from this original use and come to be used in assertions that the act ought not to have been performed in the past, i. e. in assertions that did not even retain the *form* of an expression of the speaker's will.[1] But no syntactician, so far as I know, ever claimed that *ne emeris*, *ne emas*, etc., are ever mere assertions that the act ought not to be performed, i. e. that they mean merely "it is not proper for you to buy", "you ought not to buy". Such expressions are universally regarded as prohibitions, involving no more idea of obligation or propriety than the imperative *ne eme*, *ne emito* itself. If *ne emeris* means nothing more or less than "do not buy", then it is inconceivable that, in an expression like *ne emisses*, *ne* is suddenly felt as the negative of a mere assertion that an obligation existed. This forces us back upon the other alternative again and we must assume to be true what we have already agreed cannot be true, namely, that *ne* is used only because *ne emisses* is still felt distinctly as an expression of the speaker's will (a prohibition) and one requiring therefore the negative associated with the volitive. For, be it remembered, the Subjunctive of Obligation or Propriety, from first to last, early and late, persistently clings to *non* as its negative—or rather, *non* clings to it.[2] There is absolutely no exception to this statement, unless *ne*

[1] Even then the pluperfect tense would have been inappropriate.

[2] See my Studies on this point. If the explanation of *ne emisses* etc. offered in the present paper is correct, the chief support for the theory that the subjunctive of obligation ever arose from a volitive subjunctive is gone.

emisses, ne poposcisses, etc., which we are discussing, form such exceptions.

A still further obstacle, and a very serious one, in the way of the theory I am combating is formed by the use of the pluperfect tense—a tense probably unknown to the volitive subjunctive. If *loqueretur* is formed after the analogy of *loquatur*, after the analogy of what is the pluperfect tense used? It does not seem satisfactory to say merely that the pluperfect is due to a desire to bring out more distinctly the reference to the past. How does the pluperfect in such cases refer any more distinctly to the speaker's past than the imperfect? The imperfect tense refers as distinctly to the past as anything possibly can, and there is, in such a context as that in which these expressions occur, never any danger of the slightest ambiguity. Is it then conceivable that a Roman would ever hesitate to use the imperfect tense for fear that some one would think he was referring to the present? The question seems answered with the asking.

It follows from the considerations above advanced that *ne emisses, ne poposcisses*, etc. cannot be either prohibitions or negative assertions. The theory we have been discussing does not satisfactorily account either for the negative, or for the pluperfect tense. Apparently then we have from the very outset been traveling in the wrong direction. I am now convinced that these expressions are developed from the optative. If we proceed upon this assumption, the explanation of all the phenomena is at once greatly simplified. The pluperfect tense, which is wholly inexplicable and without parallel if the expressions be regarded as volitive in origin, now becomes perfectly regular and exactly what would be expected. The *ne*, too, now seems perfectly normal since some idea of an unfulfilled wish, i. e. of regret that something happened which ought not to have happened, still remains prominent enough in the expressions to justify the retention of the negative *ne*. Such expressions of regret used of the past might easily lean toward the idea of obligation or propriety. On the other hand, one can hardly conceive of anything which he feels ought not to have happened, about which it would seem very unnatural for him to wish that it had not happened. Such expressions might well have been used now with the one idea uppermost, now with the other.

The use of the imperfect subjunctive in *ne comesses* and *ne*

faceres, cited by Bennett from Plautus (Men. 611, Pseud. 437), forms no obstacle to the explanation I am advocating, as the imperfect subjunctive is occasionally used in early Latin (and rarely in later times) to express an unfulfilled wish in the past (see, for instance, Gildersleeve-Lodge §261, note 2), and the developed use might have retained this peculiarity of tense-usage. The occasional use of *non*[1] will then be on the same footing as the occasional use of *non* with other optative subjunctives. It is true that *utinam* might have been expected with the pluperfect tense, but as *utinam* is very frequently omitted with the present and perfect tenses of the optative subjunctive and sometimes with the imperfect, it is not unreasonable to suppose that it might occasionally be omitted also with the pluperfect. Indeed many scholars recognize its occasional omission with the pluperfect.[2] The omission would seem especially natural as soon as the meaning of the expression began to drift away from the idea of mere wishing. At any rate it seems far less difficult to suppose that these curious expressions have their origin in the optative subjunctive than to regard them as representing a development from the volitive.

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[1] See Clement's Prohibitives in Silver Latin (Amer. Jour. of Phil., Vol. XXI, 2).

[2] See Allen and Greenough §267, D, note 2; Harkness §558, 2; see also the comments of editors and Gildersleeve-Lodge §261, note 2, on Tibull. 1, 10, 11-12.

NOTES ON THE LATIN VERBS OF RATING.

I.

The Stylistic Use of Pro.

With a number of verbs of rating *pro* with the ablative is used instead of the genitive of value. This is, ultimately, a development of the use of *pro* with the force of 'in the place of,' 'instead of,' 'for,' seen in such examples as Cat. p. 37, 16 (Jordan) numquam ego argentum pro vino congiario . . . disdidi. Of the intermediate stages in the development one is to be found in the occurrence of *pro* in expressions of price. Cp. Plaut. Most. 823 tris minas pro istis duobus . . . dedi. Another is its use with verbs of viewing, judging, considering, etc. Cp. Plaut. Stich. 571 sese ducit pro adulescentulo; Ter. Ad. 48 hunc . . . habui, amavi pro meo; Cic. Verr. 2, 4, 33; and the frequent occurrence of *pro certo habere* and similar expressions, as in Cic. Att. 10, 6, 3 Pompeium pro certo habemus per Illyricum proficisci in Galliam; Sall. C. 52, 17; Liv. 23, 6, 8; id. 25, 10, 1. Many examples of this usage might be given. It emerges at an early period and maintains itself throughout the history of the language.

It is from this subjective use of *pro* that the construction of *pro* with the ablative as a substitute for the genitive of value is immediately developed; I mean the use of *pro* with the ablative of some word, which, with a verb of rating, is usually put in the genitive. *Pro nihilo* is the phrase that occurs most frequently; *pro magno* turns up occasionally, and possibly other combinations might be found. Examples are *pro nihilo esse* instead of *nihili esse*, *pro nihilo habere* instead of *nihili habere*, *pro nihilo putare* instead of *nihili putare*.

Neither Plautus nor Terence seem to have used *pro nihilo*, although many instances of *nihili* are found. The only example that I have noticed in early Latin is Caecil. ap. Varr. L. L. 7, 103 (Spengel) tantum rem dibalare ut pro nilo habuerit. It is first fully developed by Cicero who clearly prefers it to *nihili*, as being more formal, as making a rounder phrase, in those of his works in which special attention is paid to style. Of *nihili* there seem to

be only five examples in all his works; of *pro nihilo*, on the other hand, some thirty have been noted, seventeen of which occur in the philosophical writings, eleven in the speeches, two in the letters. The statistics are significant. The phrase, well adapted to the fuller style of the philosophical works, is not in keeping with the conciseness and brevity of the letters.

In almost every case it occurs in the cadence of the sentence, and in a large number of examples it stands as the last member of a climax. In this, which is perhaps its most characteristic position, the stylistic effect is most clearly seen. Cp. Fin. 1, 32, 61 quam contemnet, quam despiciet, quam pro nihilo putabit; Tusc. 3, 17, 36 ut omnia . . . contemnas et pro nihilo putes; Off. 1, 9, 28 contemnant et pro nihilo putent; ib. 1, 21, 71 quod gloriam contemnant et pro nihilo putent; de Or. 2, 84, 344 magnitudo animi, qua omnes res humanae tenues ac pro nihilo putantur; Mil. 24, 64 ut . . . contempsit ac pro nihilo putavit! Div. in Caecil. 7, 24 contempsit semper ac pro nihilo putavit; Fin. 3, 8, 29 despicere ac pro nihilo putare; ib. 3, 11, 37 non requirat et pro nihilo putet; Caecin. 19, 56 respuat . . . et pro nihilo putavit; Vatin. 9, 23 solus conculcaris ac pro nihilo putaris; Fin. 4, 14, 37 relinquat et pro nihilo habeat herbam; Off. 5, 24 contemnere et pro nihilo ducere; Tusc. 5, 10, 30 opes contemnere eaque . . . pro nihilo ducere.

Elsewhere it is used alone: cp. Phil. 2, 23, 56 quoniam condemnatum esse pro nihilo sit; Att. 14, 9, 1 di immortales, quam mihi ista pro nihilo! Fin. 2, 13, 43 quae . . . visa sunt pro nihilo; Phil. 1, 6, 14 ut . . . rempublicam pro nihilo haberemus; Dom. 14, 38; Tusc. 5, 26, 73 quam pro nihilo puto! Fin. 5, 24, 72; Lael. 23, 86; Phil. 10, 3, 6; Fam. 10, 26, 3; Tusc. 5, 32, 90 pro nihilo pecuniam ducere; Verr. 2, 16, 40.

Other examples of *pro nihilo* occur here and there in classical and silver Latin. Cp. Sall. J. 31, 25 quae . . . pro nihilo habentur; Liv. 2, 61, 5 tribunos . . . pro nihilo habebat; id. 33, 46, 3; Sen. Dial. 11, 10, 3 habuisse eadem pro nihilo ducit; id. N. Q. 4, 13, 10 pro nihilo est familiaris rigor; Pers. 1, 30 ten cirratorum centum dictata fuisse pro nihilo pendes? Sil. Ital. 2, 494 pro nihilo esse; Plin. N. H. 18, 31, 319.

In later Latin we find it taken up by some of the church fathers. Cp. Lactant. 1, 725, 12[1] philosophiam . . . pro nihilo conputent;

[1] The reference is to volume, page and line of the Vienna edition.

Sulp. Sev. 226, 12. Lucifer uses it in several passages: 108, 7; 178, 25 dignaris pro nihilo habere persequi servos unici filii dei; 291, 6; 44, 9 haec omnia ducens pro nihilo; 52, 25; 134, 8; 245, 4; 291, 16; 291, 31. Cp. Paul. Nol. 2, 438, 22 qui autem pro nihilo me habent, ad nihilum redigentur; id. 2, 438, 9; 2, 439, 10. Gregory of Tours 2, 707, 1 (Arndt) has oblectamenta pro nihilo reputata; id. 2, 715, 13 contumelias pro nihilo habuerunt; and, what is of special interest, examples of the combination of *pro nihilo* with verbs other than those of rating, namely *respuere* and *deducere*. The same thing occurs in Orosius 352, 12 with *contemnere:* et ipsi pro nihilo contempti sunt. ' This development is in direct line with the Ciceronian phraseology already pointed out, e. g. Tusc. 3, 17, 36 contemnas et pro nihilo putes; Fin. 3, 11, 37 respuat . . . et pro nihilo putet.

II.

A Group of Partitive Genitives.

In the expressions *boni consulere, aequi bonique facere, nihil pensi esse*, the genitives are partitive. *Aliquid boni consulere* means to consider something as forming part of that which is good; *aliquid aequi bonique facere*, to count something as part of that which is fair and good; while in *nihil pensi* we have the same partitive genitive as in *nihil mali, nihil novi*. These genitives should, therefore, be differentiated from the genitives of value *magni, parvi* etc., which go back to an original genitive of quality *magni pretii, parvi pretii*. Their classification under the head of the Genitive of Value, adopted by almost all our grammars, is in some cases perhaps simply a matter of convenience, yet in one of the more recent productions of this now prolific field identity of origin seems to be implied. The fact that the expressions had become stereotyped, and that the Romans in their everyday use of them did not feel their partitive origin, does not affect the question. Neither did they feel the genitives *magni, parvi* with verbs of rating as genitives of quality. Roby's explanation (§1191) that *boni, aequi*, and *pensi* are locatives may now be fairly regarded as exploded, at any rate, wherever Latin grammar is studied seriously. His theory seems to survive, for the most part, only in some of the smaller editions of Latin authors, and it is accordingly somewhat surprising to find it cropping up in so pretentious a work as Spooner's edition of Tacitus' Histories.

At least some such idea is apparently involved in his note at 1, 46 neque genus quaestus pensi habebat: "*pensi* is a genitive of price, literally 'at any value.'"

Boni consulere.

That this was an old formula we know from Quintilian Inst. Orat. 1, 6, 32 sit enim 'Consul' a consulendo vel a iudicando, nam et hoc 'consulere' veteres vocaverunt, unde adhuc remanet illud 'rogat boni consulas,' id est bonum iudices. Cp. also Paul. ex Fest. (p. 29 de Ponor) 'consulas' antiqui ponebant non tantum pro 'consilium petas' et 'perconteris,' sed etiam pro 'iudices' et 'statuas.' It survived as an archaism, occurring sporadically in all periods of the language. An old fashioned homely phrase, it is found most frequently in writings in which there is a tendency to use colloquial Latin, or where at least there is no effort made in the direction of an elevated style.

We find it first of all in Plaut. Truc. 429 boni consulas. Cp. Cist. 468 ut illud quod tuam in rem conducat, aequi consulam. Cato uses it Orat. Reliq. (p. 41 Jordan) eane fieri bonis, bono genere gnatis, boni consulitis? and Varro L. L. 7, 4 M. potius boni consulendum quam . . . reprehendendum. It occurs in Priap. 53, 6 consule poma boni, in familiar address to the least dignified of Italian deities, and in Ovid's pleading line, Trist. 4, 1, 106 carmen, interdicta mihi, consule, Roma, boni. Cp. Ep. ex Pont. 1, 3, 94 and 3, 8, 24. Augustus, a man of plain speech, makes use of it in his letter to Horace, Suet. de poetis (p. 47, 8 Reifferscheid) libellum tuum, quem ego . . . boni consulo. Columella 10, praef. 5 has boni consulat, si non sit dedecori. It is a mannerism of Seneca's; cp. Ep. 17, 7 id boni consulet; ib. 123, 1 hanc coqui ac pistoris moram boni consulo; Ben. 1, 8, 1; ib. 5, 17, 5; 7, 1, 1; Dial. 1, 2, 4 quicquid accidit boni consulant; 11, 10, 6. In all these instances it has a direct object. Somewhat less definite is Ben. 2, 28, 1 hoc initium est: boni consulamus. With si clause Ep. 75, 4 sed si ita conpetit, ut . . . , boni consulet; ib. 88, 14 si quid remittitur, boni consulo; ib. 108, 10. Other examples are Plin. N. H. 33 prooem. 2, 4; ib. 8, 16, 44; Quintil. 6 prooem. 16 boni autem consulere nostrum laborem; Plin. Ep. 7, 12, 3 quod si feceris, boni consulam. Apuleius, true to his archaizing tendency, shows some examples: Flor. 1, 7 fin. Apol. 16 med., with accusative and infinitive, ego non mirer, si

boni consulis me de isto distortissimo vultu tuo dicere; ib. 99 init. In Met. 8, 9 we have a development in the addition of the superlative: boni ergo et optimi consules, si. . . . Met. 6, 3 is probably another example of the use of *optimi*, although in this case many of the MSS have *optime*. We find it again in its simple form in Dig. 4, 4 fin.; ib. 23, 3, 12, 1; Auson. Ep. 16, 1 (p. 175 Sch.) quod tu etsi lectum non probes, scriptum boni consules; and in a number of places in the letters of Symmachus, with accusative 1, 20 (15), 3 ut . . . has adlegationes boni consulas; 1, 30 (24); 4, 58, 1; 8, 49; with accusative and infinitive 3, 11, 1 deesse huic epistulae Atticam sanitatem boni consule.

Aequi bonique facere.

This phrase is more distinctly colloquial. It occurs in Ter. Heaut. 788 ceterum equidem istuc, Chremes, aequi bonique facio. Cp. Plaut. Mil. 784 aequi istuc facio, 'that's all the same to me.' Cicero Att. 7, 7, 4 has qui totum istuc aequi boni facit; Liv. 34, 22, 13 in a speech ceterum si . . . nos aequi bonique facimus; Apul. Met. 1, 5 init. istud quidem quod polliceris aequi bonique facio; ib. 11, 18 oblationes honestas aequi bonique facio; Symm. 1, 50 (44), 1.

Nihil pensi esse, habere, etc.

Of the expressions in which *pensi* occurs, the earliest type is exemplified in Plaut. Truc. 765 nec mi adeost tantillum pensi iam quo capiam calceos. Of the same kind is Sall. C. 52, 34 quibus si quicquam umquam pensi fuisset . . . ; cp. also Liv. 26, 15, 4 quis neque quid dicerent neque quid facerent quicquam unquam pensi fuisset; id. 34, 49, 7; 42, 22, 3 illi cui nihil pensi sit; 43, 7, 11 quibus nihil neque dicere pensi sit neque facere; Sidon. Apoll. Ep. 3, 13; Greg. Tur. 1, 149, 26 (Arndt) in Cantino autem nihil sancti, nihil pensi fuit.

In all these examples *esse* is the verb used. *Nihil (nec quicquam) pensi habere* is probably not much later in origin, although its first appearance in extant literature seems to be in one of the *sententiae* ascribed to Caecilius Balbus (p. 127 in Friedrich's edition of Publilius Syrus) nil pensi habere insanientem est vivere. Sallust uses it C. 23, 2 neque dicere neque facere quicquam pensi habebat; ib. 5, 6; 12, 2 linked with *moderati:* pudorem pudicitiam . . . nihil pensi neque moderati habere; id. J. 41, 9 nihil

pensi neque sancti habere; Sen. Ben. 1, 9, 5; Suet. Ner. 34; id. Dom. 12. In Gell. 13, 12, 2 we find a variation of the phrase in ratum pensumque nihil haberet, where the form of *pensum* is probably due to that of *ratum*. Lactantius 1, 481, 1 has nihil denique moderati aut pensi habent, dummodo . . . , where the phraseology is very similar to that of Sallust C. 12, 2 cited above; Sulp. Sev. 103, 8 certe Ithacium nihil pensi, nihil sancti habuisse.

So far, it will be observed, the genitive invariably depends upon some negative word or phrase such as *nihil* or *nec quicquam*. Just when the freer type was developed, in which the negative is no longer used, and the genitive depends directly upon the verb, cannot be definitely ascertained. The first evidence of this emancipation is perhaps found in Liv. 34, 31, 3 in me quoque vobis quid faceretis, minus pensi esse, but the first positive example is Val. Max. 2, 9, 3 nec pensi duxerat isdem imaginibus ascribi. This precedent is followed by Tacitus, Ann. 13, 15 neque fas neque fidem pensi haberet; Dial. 29 nec quisquam . . . pensi habet quid . . . Cp. also Symm. Ep. 1, 73 (67); ib. 1, 75 (69) hunc ut pensi habeas; 3, 17, 1 ut in reliquum pensi habeas amicitiae diligentiam. It is in this last stage of its development that *pensi* comes closest to the Genitive of Value.

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THE PENTAPODY IN GREEK POETRY.

There is nothing more striking in the history of Greek metres than the fact that at the beginning of the literature we find so highly developed a form of verse as the dactylic hexameter, a tetraseme hexapody, evidently not representing the people nor coming from them. The solemn, majestic dactylico-spondaic verse, so well adapted to song in service of the gods, had naturally been employed by those early leaders of the people, the priests; it was used in the course of time, in the form of the hexameter, to the exclusion of all other measures; we find it so used by the great poet himself in the two works which mark for us the beginning of the literature. How long the process of evolution and firm establishment of this composite verse lasted we may never know; certainly long enough to make its use a fixed law which no one might easily transgress. The first change is seen in the introduction of the elegiac distich; but this is still dactylic, and the hexameter is still a component part. All admiration is therefore due the man who could completely break away from the thraldom of binding custom and introduce new verse forms, especially those which were dear to the people: we have in this at least one reason why Archilochus should be placed next to the immortal Homer. Archilochus it was that gave to Greek literature the triseme, the iambic and trochaic forms of verse; it was he that brought forth the tetrapody and the tripody; in Archilochus, too, we find the first possibilities of a pentapody. It is true, the second member of the elegiac distich—the broken hexameter—was called a pentameter by the ancient writers on metrics, and it still keeps the name; but in cases like this even those who insist most earnestly on the necessity of paying due honor to the theories of the ancients must recognize that their methods were not always right.

To the student of metres the pentapody has always been an interesting combination of verse feet. Not naturally a verse which appeals to the people it has yet become one of the most familiar in modern literature, although everywhere its first appear-

ance calls for explanation, and that explanation is not always forthcoming. Abstractly considered as a combination of units the number five might seem to be symmetrical enough, but in verse it is the τετράς that has held its own for the poetry of nations, and for Greek poetry it is besides this the ever-insistent duodecimal element which wins the victory over the decimal. In modern song and hymn for the people it is certainly the tetrapody and the tripody that reign supreme; wherever a pentapody shows itself it is felt to be at least unusual. In some cases such pentapodies are easily resolved into the component dipody and tripody, as in the hymns 'Abide with me, fast falls the eventide'; 'Jerusalem, du hochgebaute Stadt'; 'Ich habe gnug, mein Jesus lebet noch'; in other cases this is not so readily done, as in Luther's 'Jesaia dem Propheten das geschah.' In all, however, the music will be found to have taken up an even number instead of the number five, and this change is brought about by lengthening the note on a syllable either at the beginning or at the end of the line, or by pause. It is of considerable importance in the study of the pentapody on Greek ground to bear in mind that in the best period it is altogether restricted to lyric poetry, never used in continuous stichic arrangement, and by no means largely used in lyric poetry.

Like the hexapody it is apparently a composite verse, but that it in all cases so originated is not so certain. Of the several kinds of pentapody which we meet in Greek poetry the dactylic and the iambic-trochaic seem to be not so much a composition as rather a new creation, a conscious enlargement of a series which already included tetrapody and hexapody. In the dactylo-epitrite (Doric) group we have to deal with an evident union of different elements; not only was the composition felt at first, but it must also have been felt, more or less, throughout. The ease with which the component parts are separated is one of the striking features of its use. The logaoedic group includes especially the Sapphic and the Alcaic pentapodies, and the pentapody of the skolia, the Phalaecean; all of these are very familiar verses which might easily produce on the mind of the reader the impression that the pentapody is an ordinary phenomenon in Greek poetry. They are part of a series of lines which mark the simplest and earliest union between the trochaic and the dactylic elements, and which are

of all logaoedic combinations the most popular. The series includes the Adonic, the Pherecratean, the Glyconic, and the lines named above, that is, monodactylic[1] logaoedic dipodies, tripodies, tetrapodies, and pentapodies. In the case of the pentapody we have different names if the dactyl occurs in different feet, but the lines are all only different manifestations of the same general type, just as the Glyconic remains a Glyconic, no matter in which foot the dactyl is found. In the formation of these pentapodies the tendency to make use of monodactylic logaoedic lines was no doubt fundamental, but it seems not unlikely that they were in part based on lines like those of which Archilochus has left us three: these are the fragments 101[2]; 102, *ὑφ' ἡδονῆς σαλευμένη κορώνη*; 116. We are here standing on the border-land between pentapody and hexapody; there may have been syncopation of the last foot (as is generally supposed), the single long syllable being extended to occupy the time of the entire foot, or the last two syllables may form a trochee, the last being short in the syllaba anceps, just as we not infrequently find a long syllable similarly shortened in the final dactyl of an Aeolic dactylic pentapody.[3] For Archilochus it was perhaps the former feeling that was uppermost: with him it may have meant a syncopation of the trimeter which he himself introduced; but the other scansion could easily, and soon, arise. The line becomes fairly familiar after Archilochus, and, with the tendency to form monodactylic logaoedic lines, it is not difficult to conceive how the use of a tribrach in the third foot (the metre being regarded as trochaic with anacrusis) could have led to the formation of both the Sapphic (with, and without, anacrusis) and Alcaic verses. Such a tribrach we have in Alcman 75 *ἤδη παρέξει πυάνιόν τε πόλτον*, in which, it is true, there is a possibility of synizesis in the third foot, but the tribrach is more likely. It is most interesting and suggestive to note that the strophe of Bacchylides I (3),[4] of the recently dis-

[1] In three of the skolia (9, 11, 12), two dactyls are employed, but this is due to the exigency of the use of the names Harmodius and Aristogiton.

[2] In citations of the melic and the iambic poets the numbering of Bergk (fourth edition) is given.

[3] Cf. Alcaeus 25, *ἀντρέψει τάχα τὰν πόλιν· ἃ δ' ἔχεται ῥόπας*; Sappho 32; 101, 2; Theocritus 29, passim.

[4] The numbering of these odes is that given in Smyth's edition of the melic poets; numerals in parentheses give Kenyon's arrangement.

covered odes, consists of a line like that from Alcman just cited, two tetrapodies,[1] and a Sapphic pentapody. This certainly proves that Bacchylides felt the line as a pentapody (if he felt the Sapphic line as a pentapody); but it also proves no less that the iambic line in question was closely associated in his mind with the Sapphic. When we find on line 85 of the same ode the tribrach in the second foot, where the dactyl is found in the Phalaecean, there is even more suggestion, all culminating in the use of the simple iambic line of Archilochus in the corresponding line of the antistrophe, line 89. There are no pentapodies that are more familiar and none deserve to be called popular to the same extent. Other logaoedic pentapodies are essentially different: none of them occur more than a few times in the literature, not a few only once, and all are creations for the time being, their formation rendered possible by the existence of the monodactylic types and of the dactylic pentapody. In many it is difficult to avoid the feeling of composition, so much so that at times it is not easy to decide whether we have dipody + tripody, or pentapody. It is only the eurhythmic structure of the whole that can finally decide the question, and where the material is not full enough we may never know the answer.

Before taking up a rapid survey of the use of the pentapody in Greek poetry it may be well to bear in mind that here as elsewhere, if not more than elsewhere, one looks in vain for agreement among the editors, either as to the reading or as to the proper division of the lines, with the result that pentapodies appear and disappear according to the editor one follows. Again, where there is agreement as to what constitutes a line, the decision as to whether we have a pentapody or not is often fraught with more than ordinary difficulty: what at first sight seems to be a five-foot line is often shown by a study of the whole ode to be a case of dipody + tripody; or, and this is a possibility always to be borne in mind, we may have to deal with syncopation, either at the beginning or at the end of the line, so that what seems to be a pentapody is really an hexapody. In the following the

[1] In these tetrapodies we have the addition of anacrusis to the fourth line of the Alcaic stanza.

guidance of Schmidt[1] will be followed in the main throughout. It may be that for Germany Gleditsch[2] is right in the conclusion of his statement that "infolge der Unwissenschaftlichkeit und Willkürlichkeit seines Verfahrens hat er unter den Philologen nur einen beschränkten Anhängerkreis gefunden," but we must resent the protasis. If any are arbitrary it is those who preceded Schmidt, including the ancients; and surely if his method is not truly scientific, one must despair of ever reaching a definition of the term.

We have seen that Archilochus gives us three examples of a possible pentapody, although in him these lines are perhaps to be scanned as syncopated iambic trimeters. In Alcman[3] we find the first dactylic pentapody: 51, *οὐ γὰρ ἐγώνγα, Φάνασσα, Διὸς θύγατερ.* We also find the Aeolic[4] dactylic pentapody in 17. In 71, *αἴκλον Ἀλκμάων ἁρμόξατο*, we have a trochaic[5] pentapody, if the line is complete in the fragment quoted by Athenaeus, IV 140 C. Of lines like those cited from Archilochus Alcman gives several: 1, 3; 4; 6; 7; 36; 74A; 74B; 75; 81. They are probably to be taken as pentapodies. Fragment 62, *Εὐνομίας τε καὶ Πειθοῦς ἀδελφά*, gives us the first example in Greek literature of the monodactylic logaoedic pentapody, if Plutarch (de fort. Rom. c. 4) has not omitted any words in his quotation; as it stands we have in this first example the rare use of the single dactyl in the first foot. In fragment 39, *χρύσιον ὅρμον ἔχων ῥαδινᾶν πετάλοισι καλχᾶν*, if we put the last word on the second line, we have another dactylic pentapody, although Bergk's reading, *πετάλοις ἴσα καλχᾶν*, making the

[1] Schmidt has shown in § 31 of his Antike Compositionslehre that the pentapody occurs as the principal member of the period only in commatic songs, and he adduces a representative collection of examples from the tragic poets and from Pindar to prove his point. Other writers on metrics generally content themselves with the statement that the pentapody occurs rarely and give a few examples of the more familiar types.

[2] Metrik der Griechen und Römer, § 3 of the introduction.

[3] From Alcman to Simonides inclusive all pentapodies are given.

[4] See Hephaestion, p. 24, Westphal's edition.

[5] It has also been taken as iambic, but cf. 70, *κἠπὶ τᾷ μύλᾳ δρυφῆται κἠπὶ ταῖς συναικλίαις*. Both the trochaic and the iambic pentapodies are very rare and occur later in the dramatic poets. The trochaic occurs in Aesch. Agam. 765 = 775; Soph. Aj. 405 = 424; Eurip. Troad. 290: the iambic in Aesch. 408 = 425; generally there is doubt as to the arrangement, as in Aesch. Suppl. 136 = 146; Eur. Iph. Aul. 1523.

line an hexameter, is probably correct.[1] Besides these pentapodies there are several lines which might seem to be of the same class, but are to be scanned otherwise. Such are 60, 5, *καὶ κνώδαλ' ἐν βένθεσι πορφυρέας ἁλός* (where we have dipody + tetrapody, the scheme of the whole being 33433 242 333); 83[2]; 87, 2. In Alcman, then, we find only a few examples of the dactylic pentapody and possibly one each of the trochaic and of the monodactylic logaoedic type, while the iambic line of Archilochus is well represented by nine examples.

In the poem attributed to Arion several pentapodies occur, dactylic and logaoedic, but the poem represents a later period, and so does not count for that which we are now considering.

In Alcaeus we find above all the monodactylic line which goes by his name: 1; 9; 13 B (incomplete); 14; 18; 19; 20; 21; 22 (incomplete); 23 (Hiller-Crusius (35) gives a different reading); 26; 34; 35; 65; 68; 74. The Sapphic line occurs in 5; 36; 77. Aeolic pentapodies are found in 25 and 93. 89, *οὐδέ τι μυνάμενος ἄλλυι τὸ νόημα* (quoted by the scholiast to Hom. Od. XXI 71), as it stands might seem to be a dactylic pentapody, but it is of a kind such as is found nowhere else. Either *ἑαύτῳ* is to be added,

[1] Bergk at first read the line without change or addition, thus giving us an early specimen of dactylo-epitrite verse, but one of a kind that does not occur in the later poets who use the metre. The reading would be interesting as recalling Pindar's unusual line, Pyth. III 4, *Οὐρανίδα γόνον εὐρυμέδοντα Κρόνου, βάσσαισί τ' ἄρχειν Παλίου φῆρ' ἀγρότερον*, where the division is different, the scheme being either 5 4 2 or 3 2 2 2 2. Nowhere else does Pindar give us in the dactylo-epitrite metre a pentapody containing four dactyls, or a tripody consisting of three. It is interesting, too, to note that the tendency to make use of epitrite combinations, so natural to the language, and showing itself constantly in iambic and trochaic lines, appears after a dactyl in Alcman 62, cited above.

[2] These two lines:

περισσόν. αἰ γὰρ Ἀπόλλων ὁ Λύκηος.
Ἰνὼ σαλασσομέδοισ' ἂν ἀπὸ μάσδων

are quoted by Hephaestion (p. 46), in the chapter in which he gives his explanation of the Sapphic and the Alcaic verses, and of the Sapphic and the Phalaecean with anacrusis. It is not surprising that the presence of two ionics in the lines quoted, or of a choriamb in the Sapphic, and also in the Alcaic, should have appealed to Hephaestion; when, however, he finds an ionic (in anaclastic form) as the central element of the Phalaecean with anacrusis (Sappho 58 and 59) we can only wonder at the ingenious results of his search.

making the line an hexameter, or *μυνάμενος* should be changed to *μυνώμενος* (cf. *μύνῃσι* Hom. Od. XXI 111), the line then being ionic. 94 gives us (possibly) the first example of the Doric pentapody, which later became so familiar a type:

ἦ ῥ' ἔτι, Δινομένη, τῷ Τυρραδήῳ
τἄρμενα λάμπρα κέαντ' ἐν Μυρσιλήῳ;

Hephaestion distinctly says, (p. 51,) that these are examples of the so-called *ἐγκωμιολογικόν*, that is, of the Doric pentapody. As we lack the setting it is impossible to speak with certainty: it is not unlikely that to Alcaeus the lines were logaoedic and that there was syncopation at the end of the line.

Bergk's troublesome dual fragment, 55, is interesting as giving us a Sapphic line with anacrusis: *ἰόπλοκ' ἄγνα μελλιχόμειδε Σάπφοι*; this line is given by Hephaestion himself as an example of the *Ἀλκαϊκὸν δωδεκασύλλαβον*. Bergk assumed that the other line, *θέλω τι Fείπην, ἀλλά με κωλύει αἴδως* is one of the same kind, but this is manifestly wrong, as the assumption compels us to admit either an impossible use of two dactyls, or else a violent synizesis between the last two words. Whoever wrote the second fragment, it was undoubtedly written in the Alcaic metre, and *αἴδως* is to be separated from the rest (see Smyth's note to Sappho viii). As to the Sapphic line with anacrusis, it seems to have been a recognized type; witness its use by Stesichorus (49), and the fact that the ancients gave it a name.

102, *ἔγω μὲν οὐ δέω ταῦτα μαρτυρεῦντας*, might be taken as an asynartete hexapody; it seems rather to be an example of the Archilochian line discussed above, now unquestionably a pentapody.

Sappho gives us first her own line in 1; 2; 3; 4; 5; 6; 7; 9; 10; 11; 12; 13 (incomplete); 14; 15 (incomplete); 16; 17; 18; 19; 20 (incomplete); 22; 26; and in the ode to her brother Charaxus: a comparatively small number when we bear in mind that antiquity had an entire book of odes composed by Sappho in this metre. There are more Aeolic dactylic pentapodies of hers preserved than of either Alcman or Alcaeus: 32; 33; 34; 35; 37 (H.–Cr. change so as to produce a different verse); 38; 39; 101 104. Hephaestion quotes 33 as an example of the acatalectic pentameter, 104 for the catalectic type. Of these, too, antiquity possessed an entire book. In 103 we have the Archilochian line, which Hephaestion cites (p. 14) as his example of a catalectic

line, and he plainly states that the last syllable takes the place of an entire foot: it is more than likely that for Sappho the line was a pentapody. The Alcaic line occurs in the famous fragment 28, supposed to be her answer to Alcaeus 55, and in 29. The Phallaecean with anacrusis is found in 58 and 59: part of the ordinary Phalaecean is probably in 21 and 105. 57A, *χρυσοφάη θεράπαιναν Ἀφροδίτας*, might be regarded as a Doric pentapody, but is undoubtedly, as Bergk says, logaoedic. In 51, *κῆ δ' ἀμβροσίας μὲν κράτηρ ἐκέκρατο*, and 54,[1] *Κρῆσσαί νύ ποτ' ὤδ' ἐμμελέως πόδεσσιν*, we have a type of line such as occurs not infrequently in the later poets: lines of this kind contain a logaoedic tripody (especially a Pherecratean), together with a cretic or a choriamb, either of which may be at the beginning or at the end of the line. Such lines may be pentapodies, but the division into dipody and tripody is always a possibility, or we may have an hexapody by syncopation at the end of the line.

Coming to Stesichorus we find the dactylic pentapody used in 8 and 50, 3; the latter after one of the dactylo-epitrite kind, an unusual combination. Dactylo-epitrite pentapodies are now an assured metrical condition. The looseness of the tie between the parts is shown in 35, 37 and 42, where the epitrite occurs between two dactylic tripodies, an arrangement which is met with not infrequently in Pindar. In 29, 1 an epitrite precedes a series of dactylic tripodies: the dipody is pro-odic and there is no pentapody. In 51 a dactylic tripody precedes a ditrochee: according to Hephaestion (p. 25) such a line (without anacrusis) was called a Praxillean verse and he speaks of it as logaoedic. If this combination was ever felt as dactylo-epitrite, the feeling soon was lost, for in the large number of Pindaric odes written in that metre three dactyls are not found in pentapodies, although they do occur in tetrapodies. If 46 is complete, we have a rare iambic pentapody with resolution in the second foot. 36 is hardly complete; as it stands it would be a cretic + syncopated Glyconic, that is, an hexapody. The second line of the famous palinode (32), *οὐδ' ἔβας ἐν ναυσὶν εὐσέλμοις* is not a pentapody but an hexapody by syncopation of feet at the end. Such heaping of long syllables, each constituting a foot, is not at all usual in Doric poetry; in logaoedic verse it is somewhat more frequent,

[1] Hephaestion cites this as an example of ionic verse.

beginning with Simonides. 17 is probably a tetrapody like Ibycus 1, 4.

Ibycus presents only a few instances of the use of pentapody. An apparent example is found in Bergk's reading of 1, 10; here the reading πεδόθεν for παιδόθεν brings the line into harmony with the dactylic character of all that precedes, and it removes the pentapody. 21 is a Praxillean verse with anacrusis. 6, 2 and 22, 2, which might be taken as dactylo-epitrite, especially the former, are to be taken as logaoedic.

Anacreon also has but few pentapodies. Hephaestion cites 70, ὀρσόλοπος μὲν Ἄρης φιλέει μεναίχμαν, as an example of the encomiologicum: this line as well as 72 and 72 B might easily be considered Praxillean verses, especially the latter. On the other hand 71, 73 and 74 are possible examples of the first-named line. All are probably logaoedic with syncopation at the end. 31, 32, 33 and 37 are all lines which might be taken as pentapodies, but are not. In view of Anacreon's fondness for the use of ionics they might be referred to that class; as logaoedics they would be hexapodies. 36, αἰνοπαθῆ πατρίδ' ἐπόψομαι, as it stands looks like a pentapody; it may have belonged to some ionic system. All the changes suggested remove it from the list of pentapodies. 79, κοίμισον δ', ὦ Ζεῦ, σόλοικον φθόγγον, looks like part of a trochaic tetrameter; it may have been an epitrite line; if so, we have syncopation of the last two feet.

In Simonides we see the dactylo-epitrite pentapody firmly established. It is found in: 7; 8; 57; 70; 71, the last two perhaps logaoedic. 23 might seem to contain in the second line a catalectic pentapody added to an epitrite, but the line is better taken as 2 3 2. Three dactyls precede a dipody in the logaoedic lines 53; 68; 69; 80 (in two cases there is lack of agreement as to the reading): these lines are all variants of the Praxillean line. In fragment 10, 2 we find a dactylic pentapody after an epitrite; the first line has also been scanned as a pentapody by syncopation of feet at the beginning; it is, however, altogether uncertain. 57, 3 might be considered a rare form of the dactylic pentapody; the rest of the fragment shows it to be tripody + dipody. An Alcaic line without anacrusis is found in 37, 13 (Danaë and Perseus), and in line 15 a Phalaecean with anacrusis of two short syllables. The Alcaic line without anacrusis occurs also in 73 and the Phalaecean in 74. In 4, 4; 32, 3 and 36, 4 we find after

a tripody three long syllables which are to be scanned, by syncopation, as three feet, making the lines hexapodies. 12, 4 (ending in a cretic) is tripody + dipody; in the same way the division is to be made in 36, 39 and 46.

Lamprocles, Pratinas, Diagoras, Cydias and Praxilla give us each a few examples of the types of the pentapody which have been seen in the poets preceding. From Praxilla we have only two specimens of the line which bore her name, and these are the two quoted by Hephaestion (p. 25). It is also interesting to observe that we have in Pratinas 5 (as in Bacchylides 28) a trochaic pentameter.

In Bacchylides and Pindar, in the latter of whom especially there is more of pentapody material than in any of the poets that precede, the Doric pentapody reaches its largest use. In Bacchylides most are of this type. His logaoedic lines are all simple. In 31 we have a cretic pentapody such as Aristophanes makes use of in the Acharnians and the Knights. In Pindar we find much greater freedom in the treatment of the logaoedic pentapodies: a single dactyl is found in the fourth foot; tribrachs and syncopated feet are freely used, and, in general, combinations are employed such as we do not find before. The proportion of Doric to logaoedic lines in Pindar is about 3:1. The large use of the two forms of the Doric pentapody in Pindar and Bacchylides served to make them the most extensively used of all pentapodies in the literature as we have it, and, as has been seen, they are the least certain of all. But these two poets are not the only ones to make use of the Doric form: others show how familiar a verse it had become. Its use in folk-song, in the Chalcidian love-song, is interesting. Of the tragic poets Euripides is especially fond of it, using it in the Alcestis, Andromache, Hecuba, Electra, Medea, Rhesus and Troades. Sophocles has it in the Trachiniae, and Aeschylus in the Prometheus. The same combination of feet is sometimes employed in logaoedic verse: Euripides has this form in the Bacchae, Helena and Hippolytus; Sophocles in the Ajax; Aristophanes in the Knights, Clouds and Ecclesiazusae. In Aristophanes these pentapodies are, of course, comic reminiscences of the higher lyric style; thus Eqq. 1265, *ἦ θοᾶν ἵππων ἐλατῆρας ἀείδειν μηδὲν ἐς Λυσίστρατον*, recalls the epinikian strain.

In the later lyric poets the pentapody is not avoided, nor on

the other hand is it much used. The lines found are altogether those simpler forms which we see in the earlier period. Especially interesting is the use of the Aeolic dactylic pentapody in Theocritus, 29. The tendency to play with metres in the effort to produce something which might appeal to the eye shows very clearly that the poetry of the Alexandrine period was no longer truly lyric, that it was intended to be read, not sung. In the attempt to produce verses which in the written form might resemble some concrete object, as an ax, or an egg, or an altar, or a shepherd's pipe, or the wings of love, series of lines of gradually diminishing length were employed, and so the pentapody was naturally made to do duty in its turn, or else a line of the same general length, as a syncopated hexapody. Theocritus, Simmias, Dosiadas, Besantinus, all show examples. In these artificial attempts the writers made use of the most familiar forms, the dactylic, the iambic (such as were cited from Archilochus) and the Phalaecean.

Of the tragic poets we find in Aeschylus a preference for the early types, the dactylic being the only form used in the Eumenides. In his logaoedic pentapodies he rarely uses tribrachs (in most cases there is a difference of opinion as to the arrangement of the lines); still less two dactyls, Sept. c. Theb. 321 being the only example that is generally admitted; syncopation at the beginning of the line is found in four of the plays. The Doric pentapody does not show itself except in the Prometheus. In Sophocles we find in the main the same conditions except that he uses more than one dactyl in logaoedic lines with some freedom; pentapodies containing tribrachs seem certain only[1] in Oed. Col. 216, 218, 220, 222, where the lines are probably to be taken each as tripody + dipody. In Sophocles, too, there is but little of the Doric pentapody. In Euripides, on the other hand, there is much more of this form of verse, the number of lines in the Medea and the Andromache being especially large. In the treatment of logaoedic lines there is more freedom in his plays: tribrachs are used without hesitation, even three occurring on one line, Bacch. 598 and Phoen. 1548 (here again editors are by no means agreed as to the arrangement). The largest number of pentapodies is found in the Medea, the smallest (1) in the Cyclops. Aeschylus

[1] Schmidt adds in his scheme of the choral odes Oed. Col. 1449 = 1464 and Trach. 885.

has the largest number in the Agamemnon, Sophocles in the Ajax. The Antigone and the Oedipus Tyrannus, the best of the latter's plays, show no certain examples: this is all the more striking as they are the only extant tragedies of which this may be said. Aristophanes has examples in the Acharnians (largely paeonic), Knights, Clouds, Birds, Thesmophoriazusae, Frogs and Ecclesiazusae. The total number of occurrences in each of the dramatic poets is as follows: Aeschylus 119; Sophocles 52; Euripides 183; Aristophanes 43. Compare with this a total of 833 for Pindar, 616 of which are dactylo-epitrite.

Ordinarily pentapodies do not occur in immediate sequence in the choral odes: two together are found in Bacchylides (11 times); Pindar (84); Aeschylus (20); Sophocles (11); Euripides (22); Aristophanes (5): three together in Bacchylides (1); Pindar (8); Aeschylus (6); Euripides (10); Aristophanes (2): four together in Pindar (26): five together in Euripides (2). The two examples of five in immediate sequence are found in the Medea 410–416 = 421–427. Some editors allow only three pentapodies here, reading the last two differently. While it is true that this large use stands alone, it is hard to believe that Schmidt is not right in his division of the lines and his scansion: certainly the lines make five perfect Doric pentapodies. The cases of four consecutive pentapodies in Pindar all occur in the fourth Pythian ode, one at the beginning of each strophe and antistrophe, and they are generally admitted; they make the unusual instances of heaping in the Medea all the more likely.

The pentapody associates itself not infrequently with dochmiac verses; it is then generally pro-odic, although other positions also occur. Of the three tragic poets Euripides shows this tendency most.

In popular song we have first of all the monodactylic pentapody of the skolia found in the first fourteen of our collection. The use of two dactyls in 9, 11 and 12 has been referred to. 15 is an Alcaic stanza. 28 is written in monodactylic hexapodies and a tetrapody, closing with a pentapody which in the first strophe is a Sapphic line, in the second a Phalaecean. The Sapphic line occurs, too, at the end of 30. The Phalaecean is also found in the first of the carmina popularia if we accept, with Bergk, the reading πλεῖστον οὖλον ἴει, ἴουλον ἴει, in Athenaeus XIV 618 E, but the other reading which repeats the word οὖλον has good authority for it.

This popular use is reflected in Aristophanes Eccl. 938–9 = 942–3. Two instances of the Phalaecean among iambic trimeters are met with in Aristophanes, Wasps, 1226–7, verse 1226 being a quotation of the first line of a skolion, and verse 1227 a comic continuation in the same metre.

To sum up: the pentapody is used most frequently in those forms which most easily admit a separation into dipody and tripody (this includes all Doric pentapodies and a considerable number of logaoedics as well, especially those which begin or end in a cretic or a choriamb); most of the certain pentapodies which remain are of the logaoedic type, the familiar monodactylic lines being most important, although many other forms are used, especially in Pindar and Euripides; the dactylic group is fairly represented in all periods, while least frequent of all are the iambic, the trochaic and the cretic.

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HORACE AND LUCILIUS: A STUDY OF HORACE SERM. I, 10.

The fourth satire of the first book of Horace deals with the legacy of literary theory which the practice of Lucilius had bequeathed to Roman literature, rather than with the great satirist himself. But the somewhat subtle repudiation of the spirit of Lucilius, which was the main argument of that composition, had provoked the jealous champions of the founder of Roman satire less than the brief words of censure directed against his slovenly form. The result was to bring the personality of Lucilius prominently into the quarrel with the theory of satire which Horace had inaugurated. Returning now to the censure of form, which he had made before, Horace adds direct and emphatic criticism of the spirit of Lucilius, but his vehemence is evoked rather by the hostility of living enemies than by antipathy to the dead poet. Horace, in the progress of his own development, had come to feel that satire in the spirit of Lucilius was illiberal, or at all events alien to his own nature, and in the fourth poem of this book had set forth his protest in an impersonal way.[1] But no writer so young and with so brief a career behind him could challenge the position of a national figure like Lucilius with impunity. His protest had been met with hot counter-protest, and under the fresh smart of hostile criticism this composition is written. In its present form it is apparently the last of all in the first book, but in its conception and first execution it must have followed quickly upon the hostile reception accorded to the fourth.

Nempe incomposito dixi pede currere versus
Lucili. Quis tam Lucili fautor inepte est,
ut non hoc fateatur? at idem, quod sale multo
urbem defricuit, charta laudatur eadem.
nec tamen hoc tribuens dederim quoque cetera: nam sic
et Laberi mimos ut pulchra poemata mirer.

[1] Cf. the writer's article in A. J. P., vol. xxi, pp. 121 ff., Horace, Serm. I 4: A Protest and a Programme.

The poet points out that the praise which he had awarded to Lucilius has its sharp limitations and is far from being general.

> Ergo non satis est risu diducere rictum
> auditoris ;[1] et est quaedam tamen hic quoque virtus:

If these words are to apply to Lucilius as well as to Laberius (as must of course be the case), it is not the laughter of mere clownishness which is meant, but the bitter laughter provoked by harsh and abusive jest[2] such as Horace describes (in I 4, 35 and 78 ff.) as the characteristic aim of satire as usually conceived. But in admitting that mere ability to provoke a laugh is a merit, and in implying that this is the only ground of recognition which he is willing to concede to Lucilius, Horace shows that he had meant to limit the praise which he had formerly bestowed upon his predecessor. And so in the following verses, while he does not deny that Lucilius had developed some features of the style and spirit of satire, he sets over against these qualities certain ideal demands which he misses in the earlier poet.

> est brevitate opus, ut currat sententia neu se
> impediat verbis lassas onerantibus auris,
> et sermone opus est modo tristi, saepe iocoso,
> defendente vicem modo rhetoris atque poetae,
> interdum urbani, parcentis viribus atque
> extenuantis eas consulto.

The wide divergence of commentators in the detailed interpretation of these words seems to demand a careful effort to arrive at the poet's exact meaning. Concerning *brevitate* there is of course no room for dispute, but with the second precept the difficulties begin. In the phrase *sermone tristi* the editors and critics are apparently unanimous in giving a false interpretation

[1] *Auditoris*: 'Man erwartet vielmehr entweder *lectoris*, oder im Anschluss an die Exemplification auf Laberius *spectatoris*: aber der Witz setzt eigentlich Hörer voraus' (Kiessling). The word is drawn rather from the theoretical discussions of the proper limits of jest, which take account not only of that which it is right to say, but also of that which it is fitting to hear (hence *ἀκούειν* and *ὁ ἀκούων*, Arist. Eth. Nic., IV 14, passim).

[2] Sale multo urbem defricuit (cf. Plutarch, Comp. Arist. et Men. 4: *οἱ δὲ Ἀριστοφάνους ἁλες, πικροὶ καὶ τραχεῖς ὄντες, ἑλκωτικὴν δριμύτητα καὶ δηκτικὴν ἔχουσιν*), with which cf. Persius' reminiscence: secuit Lucilius urbem. For Laberius cf. Macrobius' characterization, Sat. II 7, 2: asperae libertatis equitem Romanum.

to *tristi*. But it does not here mean 'serious' or 'earnest'. It defines accurately the harsh means by which Lucilius provoked the laughter of his reader with the language of abuse or invective. It designates the cutting jest which aims to hurt and not to please, as in Serm. II 1, 21: quanto rectius hoc quam *tristi* laedere versu.[1] It is the quality of satire in Lucilius which Horace has above praised, but praised with reserve. And so here, against a quality to which he does not deny occasional merit (*modo*), he places the frequent (*saepe*) or constant requirement of a tone of playful humor (*iocoso*). As elsewhere, the theory of satire which Horace presents is identical with the post-Aristotelian theory of comedy, which demanded a union of τὸ πικρόν (σφοδρόν) with τὸ χαρίεν.[2] In the succeeding lines—defendente vicem modo rhetoris atque poetae, interdum[3] urbani—there is present the same relation of balance or antithesis between a characteristic which Horace recognizes in Lucilius, and a quality which he demands but fails to find in him. While it is clear that the latter quality, the subtle εἰρωνεία of the *urbanus*, is the requisite which Horace misses in Lucilius, unfortunately we are scarcely in a position to determine how far there was reason to censure him for excess of poetical or oratorical qualities of style. But Juvenal may afford an illustration of the dangers in this direction to which the satirical spirit, untempered by a kindly humor, is exposed.[4] Furthermore, the portion of the fourth satire, in which Horace denies poetical character to his own work (and to Lucilius), is scarcely intelligible except on the assumption

[1] Similarly the *criminosi iambi* of Carm. I 16, 2 are the *tristia* of vs. 26 ib., and cf. Lucil. 963 (Lach.): idque tuis saevis factis et *tristibu*' dictis.

[2] Cf. Platonius π. κωμ. (Dübner II), in characterization of Aristophanes, and the writer's Excursus on the Theory of Satire in Persius, A. J. P., vol. XXI (1900), p. 140, to which add Hermogenes' definition cited below (p. 155).

[3] *Interdum* merely gives variety to the enumeration, and is not to be taken strictly in the meaning of 'sometimes' (zuweilen), as L. Müller understands it, making this objectionable meaning a ground for changing *urbani* to *urbane*. The usage is well shown by Propertius I 3, 41, who has modo . . . rursus . . . interdum, and II 15, 5 (III 7, 5 Mül.) modo . . . interdum.

[4] Cf. Juvenal's lines VI 634 ff.: fingimus haec altum *satura sumente cothurnum* || scilicet, etc.—which are perhaps a truer characterization than the poet meant to give of himself.

that literary criticism had attributed to Lucilius poetical qualities which were alien to the spirit and purpose of satire, and which may have been derived from Greek criticism of the old comedy when once the dogma of Lucilian imitation had been established: ἡ δὲ παλαιὰ (ἔχει) τὸ δεινὸν (*rhetoris*) καὶ ὑψηλὸν (*poetae*) τοῦ λόγου (π. κωμ. V vs. 7).

From the time of Lambinus it has been recognized that the words *urbani parcentis viribus atque* || *extenuantis eas consulto* are an endeavor to interpret the Greek εἴρων, a type of refinement and subtlety which Horace, among Roman writers, is one of the first to attempt to characterize.[1] And more effective than the scathing wit of Lucilius is the playful humor of the εἴρων:

Ridiculum acri
15 fortius et melius magnas plerumque secat res.

It is a precept of Gorgias which had become the common property of rhetorical theory: δεῖν ἔφη Γοργίας τὴν μὲν σπουδὴν διαφθείρειν τῶν ἐναντίων γέλωτι (Arist. Rhet. III 18). The forms of jest, Aristotle continues, have been named in the Poetics and the gentleman must select a form appropriate to himself. ἔστι δ' ἡ εἰρωνεία (corresponding to *ridiculum*, as defined in the preceding *urbani parcentis*, etc.) τῆς βωμολοχίας (corresponding to *acri*, as defined by the preceding description *risu diducere rictum* and *sermone tristi*) ἐλευθεριώτερον (ib. extr.). But as the doctrine had become common property we need not suppose that Horace had the words of Aristotle in mind.[2]

16 Illi, scripta quibus comoedia prisca viris est,
hoc stabant, hoc sunt imitandi: quos neque pulcher
Hermogenes umquam legit, neque simius iste
nil praeter Calvum et doctus cantare Catullum.

It has been observed that in many respects, not only in this satire but also in the fourth, the attitude of Horace toward Lucilius is analogous to Aristotle's relation to the old comedy. But an important difference should be noted, due to the fact that

[1] Cf. Ribbeck, Über den Begriff des εἴρων, Rh. Mus. vol. XXXI (1876), p. 389 'In den vergröbernden Nachbildungen [der attischen Komödie] der Römer ist der Zug so gut wie verloren gegangen'.

[2] Similarly the author of the Rhet. ad Alex. ch. 35: χρὴ δὲ ἐν ταῖς κακολογίαις (to which satire as a *carmen maledicum* is related) εἰρωνεύεσθαι.

Horace does not wholly share Aristotle's point of view.[1] The latter had repudiated the spirit and style of the old comedy without any reservations. But this sweeping condemnation did not prevail among later critics. Plutarch, to be sure, is animated by the same spirit of hostility in his Comparison of Aristophanes and Menander, but for the most part subsequent literary theory, while recognizing in the old comedy the scurrilous wit which Aristotle condemned, found in it also a liberal spirit of jest, and justified the presence of both (et est quaedam hic quoque virtus). From such criticism was developed the general formulation of comic theory (Hermogenes, *π. μεθόδου δεινότητος*, ch. 36, Sp. II, p. 455, 18): *κωμῳδίας δὲ πλοκὴ πικρὰ* (*acri*) *καὶ γελοῖα* (*ridiculum*). A striking illustration of this estimate of old comedy, so different from Aristotle's, is found in Cicero, in an ethical passage on the limits of appropriate jest, which is otherwise thoroughly Aristotelian. For, in illustration of the liberal jest, he names *Atticorum antiqua comoedia* (De offic. I 104). Similarly Persius, although like Cicero reproducing the Aristotelian theory of the legitimate forms of humor, nevertheless names the three canonical writers of old comedy as ideal representatives of the appropriate spirit in satire (Sat. I 123 ff., with which cf. V 16).

It is this point of view which Horace also represents in the verses above. *Hoc stabant* cannot grammatically, and does not logically refer to the whole description preceding (as many editors interpret), except in so far as the sum of the preceding is contained in *ridiculum acri*,[2] etc. At all events *ridiculum* takes up the essence of the description of the *urbanus* in verse 13. Thus, like Cicero and Persius, Horace praises the writers of the old comedy for their command of an appropriate and becoming form of jest. *Hoc sunt imitandi*—in their command of this quality (*ridiculum*), rather than in their use of the *acre*, are the writers of the old comedy to be imitated, as they were not imitated by Lucilius. For though he is proclaimed as an emulator of them, it is only in their license of speech and their harsh wit that he has reproduced them. But Hermogenes and Demetrius

[1] It has seemed necessary for the interpretation of vss. 16 ff. to repeat here in summary, matter which the author has presented more fully in the A. J. P., vol. XXI (1900), pp. 140 ff.

[2] Cf. Porphyrio ad loc.: ad id autem pertinet *hoc stabant*, quod dixerit *ridiculum acri*, etc.

(*simius iste*?), with their affected admiration for Lucilius and their resentment of all criticism of him, have never read a play of the old comedy, and in prating of him as a Roman Aristophanes or Cratinus, they do not know that he failed to take from those writers that in which their chief strength lay.

This passage yields incidentally an important result for the history of Roman satire, for it shows that the dogma of Lucilius' relation to the old comedy was not an invention of Horace (as Kiessling, ad Serm. I 4, 6, held), but was a current formulation of the genesis of Roman satire in Horace's day. It is perhaps somewhat surprising to find the friends of Lucilius and the critics of Horace among the quondam νεώτεροι, a school of poetry which we are not wont to associate with the patriotic and national tendencies which kept fresh the fame of Lucilius. But in lieu of fuller information concerning the literary tastes and affinities of this school, it will suffice to point out that Valerius Cato, the friend of Catullus and the professional representative of the group—qui solus legit et facit poetas—is the open champion of Lucilius.[1]

An interpretation of the whole satire is not now contemplated, but only a treatment of the parts bearing upon Horace's estimate of Lucilius, in which current interpretations seemed to require correction or more accurate definition. Therefore the criticism of Lucilius for interspersing Greek with Latin words may be passed over, as well as Horace's justification of his choice of satire as a medium of literary expression. At verse 50 he returns to his indictment of the form of Lucilius, and defends himself against the imputation of affecting superiority to his predecessor because he claims the right of criticism, which Lucilius himself had freely used.

53 nil comis tragici mutat Lucilius Acci?

The words are uttered in a tone of ironical interrogation, as Porphyrio points out,[2] and the irony is contained not only in

[1] Defensore tuo, in the doubtful verses prefaced to this satire in MSS of the III class.

[2] Et hoc interrogativa figura cum ironia quadam pronuntiandum, quia ex contrario intellegendum est. *comis* autem Lucilius propter urbanitatem dicitur, et *mutat* pro eo quod est *emendat* positum est. Porphyrio comments on the two words in which the irony lies. What he means by

mutat, but also in *comis*. Besides ironical reference to the usual meaning 'kindly', *comis* perhaps contains suggestion of an etymological word play upon κωμῳδός (κωμῳδεῖν), evoked by juxtaposition of *comis* with *tragici*, and by the analogous relation of the poets of the old comedy to their tragic contemporaries.[1]

Quid vetat et nosmet Lucili scripta legentis
quaerere, num illius, num rerum dura negarit
versiculos natura magis factos et euntis
mollius ac siquis pedibus quid claudere senis,
hoc tantum contentus, amet scripsisse ducentos
ante cibum versus, totidem cenatus? Etrusci
quale fuit Cassi rapido ferventius amni
ingenium, capsis quem fama est esse librisque
ambustum propriis.

Horace selects two possible explanations for the harshness of Lucilius' verse. They are not alternative, but parallel, for both are true. As for the first, it presents no difficulties; as the spirit of the man was harsh, so the form of his verse was the expression of it, and lacked that smoothness of movement which a kindlier nature would have found as the vehicle of its thought. It is a type of criticism which is not uncommon.[2] Concerning *rerum natura* some have thought that it designates the general crudeness of the time, but there is no reason for deserting the natural significance of the words—the harsh nature of the subject-matter (res = πράγματα). But why should Horace suggest an excuse for Lucilius which he does not invoke for himself? Or why should Lucilius find the matter of satire a more difficult material to handle than the Greek satirists, Archilochus and the comic poets? It is not only that the matter was in itself difficult,[3] but chiefly the form chosen by Lucilius which made it so. For while the Greek iambic and comic poets had employed the natural conversational metres, the trochaic and iambic, Lucilius had endeavored

urbanitas may be seen by his comment on vs. 3 of this satire: salem pro urbanitate posuit, and especially ad Serm. I 3, 40: Luciliana urbanitate usus in transitu amaritudinem aspersit.

[1] Cf. Döderlein, Kiessling, and Orelli-Mewes ad loc.

[2] Cf. Cicero, Brutus 101: C. Fannius ... et moribus et ipso genere dicendi durior. ib. 117: Q. Aelius Tubero ... ut vita sic oratione durus incultus horridus.

[3] Cf. Epp. II 1, 168 on the difficulty of comedy—ex medio quia res arcessit.

to cast the familiar matter of social and personal satire into a form which had only been employed in Latin for the epic.[1] And it can scarcely be denied that the hexameters of Lucilius reveal a certain uncouth, plunging movement, even in more finished specimens of his work, such as the lines on *virtus*, the metrical effect of which Mommsen compares to and renders by German 'Knittelverse' (doggerel).[2] On the other hand "the fragments of his trochaics and iambics are much simpler, much less depart from the natural order of the words, than those of his hexameters; a fact which reminds us of the great advance made by Horace in adapting the heroic measure to the familiar experience of life (Sellar, p. 248)." The subject-matter therefore is harsh in relation to the form chosen for its expression.

Thus, for either or both of the reasons named, the verses of Lucilius are so ill-made and have so rough a movement, that his aim would seem to have been only to put together, somehow or other, hexameters in quantity, with the result that the bulk of his writing is so great that it would have furnished fuel for his funeral pyre, as is the story of Cassius Etruscus. Here, as in the fourth satire (vs. 14), Horace turns the edge of his attack by the use of an illustration. As there Crispinus is the foil, so here Cassius Etruscus, but in both cases, of course, the underlying criticism is directed against Lucilius.

Fuerit Lucilius inquam
comis et urbanus, fuerit limatior idem
quam rudis et Graecis intacti carminis auctor
quamque poetarum seniorum turba: sed ille,
si foret hoc nostrum fato delapsus in aevum,
detereret sibi multa, etc.

It is commonly held that the poet here turns from criticism of Lucilius to recognition of his good qualities, and that accordingly *inquam* harks back to the praise bestowed in verses 3 and 53; but quite incorrectly. The passage grows immediately out of the preceding inquiry into the reasons for the harshness of Lucilius' verse. Horace has named as explanations of it the harsh nature of the poet himself, and the harshness of his subject-matter in

[1] That Horace only takes account of the hexameters of Lucilius in his criticisms appears from Ser. I 4, 6 and vs. 59 above. Cf. Luc. Müller, Quaest. Lucil. p. XIII (brief and results inconclusive).

[2] History of Rome (6th German ed.), vol. II p. 446.

relation to the form chosen. Now he turns the same thought about in the form of two hypothetical concessions: 'Grant that his nature was kindly and urbane, grant that he was more finished than was to have been expected of a pioneer in a form of poetry as yet unhewn (*rudis*) and unshaped by the hands of Greek predecessors.' It will be seen that *illius dura natura* is balanced in the concessive form by *comis et urbanus*, while *rerum dura natura*, as an explanation of the crude form of Lucilius, is offset by *limatior quam rudis et Graecis intacti carminis auctor*. Together the two concessive clauses introduced by *fuerit*, comprehend the spirit and the form of Lucilius.

Horace has already pointed out that, in contrast to the vehemence of Lucilius, there was place in satire for the more subtle wit of the *urbanus*. He has said in verse 7 that Lucilius' conception of wit was coarse, and in verses 14–17 he has contrasted the means by which his effects were produced with the more successful humor and banter of the old comedy, which he was supposed to have imitated. Finally in the passage just preceding he has designated the nature of Lucilius as harsh. Does Horace then in fact mean to yield any one of these hypothetical concessions which he makes with the iterated *fuerit*? Certainly not. It is a familiar manner of giving cumulative force to an argument by conceding for argument's sake that which it is well understood is not conceded in fact. 'Even if I granted all this concerning Lucilius, I should still hold that he must have written very differently if he were to satisfy the demands of the present. How much more so, since he was not kindly nor urbane, since he did not even satisfy the demands we may justly make of a pioneer, and since he is not more finished than many of the older poets.' As a matter of grammatical usage it is probably superfluous to point out that this form of concessive expression may or may not contain the writer's real thought or the objective fact.[1] The characteristic feature of the construction is that the admission is made for argument's sake. Consequently the number of instances

[1] On the construction cf. Madvig 353 (English transl. 352): Eine Annahme oder Einräumung von etwas *das sich nicht so verhält* oder das man unentschieden lässt und nicht bestreiten will u. s. w. Examples in Roby 1622. Cases where the concession is clearly not in accordance with the writer's feeling or the fact, Liv. 44, 38 (quarta pars . . . relicta erat. sed fuerimus omnes), Cic. De fin. II 61.

is large where it is plain that the concession does not represent the real thought of the writer or the fact, and indeed, even where it does, there is frequently a reservation of feeling which implies its untruth. Therefore in designating Lucilius as *comis et urbanus*,[1] Horace makes a concession contrary to his own belief and feeling for the sake of adding cumulative force to his argument. That the words do not represent Horace's own thought may be seen finally from *limatior . . . quamque poetarum seniorum turba*. For though it is true that Horace is not friendly to any of the earlier Roman poets, we cannot readily believe that he failed to recognize, for example, the immense inferiority of Lucilius to Terence in elegance and finish.[2]

There remain but one or two points which we may regard as criticism of Lucilius. If he were alive to-day

> detereret sibi multa, recideret omne quod ultra
> perfectum traheretur, et in versu faciendo
> saepe caput scaberet, vivos et roderet unguis.

Porphyrio comments: non cessat autem Lucilium tangere quasi incuriose scripserit, nor need we hesitate to refer the words which follow to criticism of Lucilius, although such reference is apparently not entertained by many editors and is expressly repudiated by some.

> Saepe stilum vertas, iterum quae digna legi sint
> scripturus, neque te ut miretur turba labores,
> contentus paucis lectoribus. an tua demens
> vilibus in ludis dictari carmina malis?
> non ego: nam satis est equitem mihi plaudere, ut audax,
> contemptis aliis, explosa Arbuscula dixit.

[1] The epithets, although chosen to offset Horace's own words above (*illius dura natura*, vs. 57) may well represent a current characterization of Lucilius by his admirers. Cf. Cic. De orat. I 72 (*homo perurbanus*) and De fin. I 7 (*urbanitas summa*). In Serm. I 4, 90 Horace criticises the indulgent habit of giving complimentary names to indiscriminating license of speech; hic tibi *comis et urbanus* liberque videtur.

[2] See Sellar, p. 248, who refers to Munro's criticism in the Journal of Phil. VII 294 q. v. It will be remembered that Horace has reproduced almost verbatim a considerable passage of the Eunuchus (46 ff.= Serm. II 3, 259 ff.), and that in the Epistle to Augustus and the Ars Poetica Terence escapes the censure which is so generously apportioned to Plautus, Ennius and Accius.

men moveat cimex Pantilius, aut cruciet quod
vellicet absentem Demetrius, aut quod ineptus
Fannius Hermogenis laedat conviva Tigelli?
Plotius et Varius, Maecenas Vergiliusque,
Valgius et probet haec Octavius optimus atque
Fuscus et haec utinam Viscorum laudet uterque.
ambitione relegata te dicere possum,
Pollio, te, Messalla, tuo cum fratre, simulque
vos, Bibule et Servi, simul his te, candide Furni,
compluris alios, doctos ego quos et amicos
prudens praetereo: quibus haec, sint qualiacumque,
adridere velim, doliturus, si placeant spe
deterius nostra.

But one who has followed the strong personal feeling of this satire through from its initial words will not readily believe that criticism of Lucilius subsides so suddenly at this point, and passes over into merely general precept on the demands of finished execution. Horace has said above rather extravagantly (vs. 51) that there was more in Lucilius that deserved to be eliminated than to be left; but as in verse 61 he dulls the point of his keenest shaft by the insertion of a comparison, so here (vs. 72) he puts in the form of an universal rule a statement which his audience (and certainly the hostile critics to whom he is addressing himself) cannot well have understood otherwise than as a judgment that Lucilius was scarcely worth a second reading. Again in the words following (neque te ut miretur), in the form of a general injunction, the poet declares the audience for whom he writes, and not without contrast to what he esteems the vulgar popularity of Lucilius, or perhaps even in contrast to a well-known utterance of the latter concerning the audience to which he made his appeal (in book XXVI). At all events one cannot fail to recall in this connection the *publica eruditorum reiectio* (Pliny, N. H. praef. 7) of Lucilius, which was expressed in words which Munro[1] reconstructs thus:

Nec doctissimis scribuntur haec neque indoctissimis:
Persium non curo legere, Laelium Decumum volo.

The passage is brief and the reconstruction of actual words is not certain, but the use made of it by Cicero and Pliny leaves no doubt about the general meaning.[2] Certainly it is an interesting

[1] Journal of Philology, vol. VIII (1879), p. 210.

[2] Cf. De orat. II 25: Lucilius . . . dicere solebat ea quae scriberet neque ab indoctissimis se neque ab doctissimis legi velle, etc. Madvig, ad De

commentary on the great popularity of Lucilius if he did in fact (as seems to have been the case) make open profession that he wrote for the average man, and not for a select literary circle. Horace on the other hand is content with few readers, men of whose judgment (*docti* vs. 87) and friendship (*amici* ib.) he is assured. He will not read to any but his friends and even to them only under compulsion (I 4, 73), nor does he care to see his books thumbed by the sweaty fingers of the rabble (ib. 72). The whole passage breathes the arrogance of an exclusive literary coterie, conscious of ideals beyond those which had hitherto satisfied a democratic taste; in its conscious contrast to the professed aim of Lucilius, it forms a fitting and triumphant conclusion to the warfare of protest which the poet had raised against undiscriminating admiration of elements of harshness in the spirit and form of satire, to which the force of an almost binding tradition had been given.

The purpose of this analysis has been to ascertain as carefully as possible, and without reference to utterances of a later time, the attitude of Horace toward Lucilius as expressed in this composition.[1] It will be seen that only in the general recognition of his predecessor as the originator of the poetical form, and in acknowledgment of his skill in the employment of the harshest weapons of satire, does he treat Lucilius with consideration. His condemnation extends not only to the form but also to the spirit of the earlier satirist. In contrast with this severe arraignment is the first satire of the second book, with its frank and generous recognition of some admirable qualities in Lucilius and an avowal of discipleship, which neither this poem nor the fourth of this book contains. It belongs to a later time and sounds a note of assured position and success, which is no longer disturbed by the hostility of carping critics. But the generous treatment which it accords to Lucilius has done not a little to obscure the fact

fin. I 7, suspects that different utterances of Lucilius are in Cicero's mind in the two allusions: altero non doctissimis nec tamen rudibus se scribere significabat, Laelii exemplo utens, altero indoctis et vulgo.

[1] The writer regrets that, in spite of diligent search, the dissertation of Herwig, Horatius quatenus recte de Lucilio iudicaverit, Halle, 1873, has remained inaccessible.

that in this satire Horace's criticism of Lucilius is sweeping and uncompromising.[1]

EXCURSUS: GRAECIS INTACTI CARMINIS AUCTOR.

The interpretation of this line has been given in the paraphrase above: 'More finished than was to have been expected of the pioneer in a form of poetry as yet unhewn and unshaped by the hands of Greek predecessors'. This is the conception of the passage which is implied in the comments of the scholiasts, it was held by the earliest modern editors, and since Hermann's[2] defense of it has been entertained by many modern editors. It is criticised as grammatically impossible because Lucilius is apparently compared with himself. It must be acknowledged that the phrase is brief and open to the charge of obscurity, but there is no sphere of language so subject to short-cuts of expression as that of comparison. Nor is Lucilius here, strictly speaking, compared with himself. He is compared rather with an imaginary *auctor* in circumstances like his own. A parallel which admits of no ambiguity is cited by Hermann from Tacitus, Hist. III 53: Litteras ad Vespasianum composuit iactantius quam ad principem.[3] The simplest and most natural confirmation of this view is afforded by verse 48, in which Horace alludes to Lucilius as the *inventor* of satire.[4]

[1] The general attitude of interpretation toward this poem is expressed by K. F. Hermann's (Disput. de sat. Rom. auct. Marburg 1841) comment on vs. 54: quum hoc Horatio per totam satiram propositum sit, ut quantum possit Lucilio concedat, modo ne curam et diligentiam in eo maiorem agnoscere cogatur, quam quae re vera in eius carminibus appareat, vel hac de causa *ea interpretatio* praeferenda erit, *quae plus laudis in illum conferat.* The favorable interpretation began in antiquity, so that against the obvious meaning of the language and the context, *saepe ferentem* ‖ *plura quidem tollenda relinquendis* (vs. 50) was distorted into praise, and *tollenda*, as if *excerpenda* (v. Porph. ad I 4, 11), is interpreted by *laudanda* and *imitanda.* Ps.-Acro ad loc. Cf. also Porphyrio on vs. 1. The comment of Ps.-Acro is probably drawn from Porphyrio (cf. Porphy. on I 4, 11), whose note is lost. It is probable that the distortion of Horace's meaning is due to archaistic affinities, which Porphyrio elsewhere reveals.

[2] K. F. Hermann, Disputatio de satirae Rom. auctore ex sententia Horatii Serm. I 10, 66 (Marburg, 1841).

[3] See other examples ap. Hermann pp. 13–15.

[4] But a zealous advocate of Ennius has faced the difficulty—with what success the reader may judge. On vs. 48 L. Müller says: Lucilius heisst

The criticism which has done most to displace this interpretation, and to cause preference to be given very widely to the reference of the words to Ennius as the *carminis auctor*, is the fact that in Serm. I 4 Horace has already said that Lucilius is a close follower of the old comedy, and therefore can here scarcely affirm with consistency that Lucilius in taking up satire found it *Graecis intactam*. This objection has already been met by pointing out that the harshness of Lucilius' subject-matter did not so much lie in the subject-matter itself, as in the treatment of it in a metrical form not appropriate to its nature. In relation to the hexameter the *res* were as yet rough and unhewn, for the practice of Greek predecessors had not pointed the way to the successful employment of this verse for the familiar matter of satire. The reference, it will be seen, is to form and not to content, and the passage therefore in no way comes into conflict with the affirmation of Lucilius' dependence on the old comedy, a dependence which is expressly stated to have been one of spirit and not of form (*mutatis tantum pedibus numerisque*). And what else than allusion to form can *limatior* contain? Obviously the *labor limae* by which the raw material is wrought into a work of art is a question primarily of form, and the more naturally so in view of the sharper distinction between form and content which belongs to all ancient literary theory. This is furthermore the interpretation of Porphyrio, who says against the lemma *Graecis intacti carminis auctor*: hoc ideo dictum, quia nulli Graecorum hexametris versibus hoc genus operis scripserunt. (That Horace has in mind only the hexameter verse of Lucilius has been indicated). The status then in Horace's time of the inquiry into the relation of Lucilius to predecessors was, that in matter and spirit he drew from the old comedy, but that in form he was independent of Greek models. It is probably this conclusion which, with patriotic exaggeration, Quintilian represents in the famous words *satura quidem tota nostra est*.[1]

dem Horaz inventor weil er die ursprüngliche Satura erst in die gute Gesellschaft eingeführt hat. Compare with this the same editor's note on vs. 66: Gemeint ist Ennius der durch seine sechs oder mehr Bücher Satiren zuerst die altrömische Satura in die Literatur einführte.

[1] Quintilian groups the non-dramatic Greek poets with reference to metrical form, viz., the writers of hexameter, elegiac, iambic, and lyric verse. The Roman poets are arranged in the same order, except that,

Supplementary, but by no means contradictory, to this conclusion, is the account of Roman satire which is presented by the Byzantine writer Johannes Lydus in his treatise *De magistratibus reip. Rom.* Although of doubtful absolute value for the history of satire, yet it affords an interesting illustration of the philological methods which constructed many of the ancient data of literary history, and casts some light on the particular question in hand. In a literary digression on the beginnings of the drama at Rome, Lydus enumerates the various forms of comedy, and among them the Ῥινθωνική, which is the occasion for a further digression concerning Rhinthon, ὃς ἑξαμέτροις ἔγραψε πρῶτος κωμῳδίαν. ἐξ οὗ πρῶτος λαβὼν τὰς ἀφορμὰς Λουκίλιος ὁ Ῥωμαῖος ἡρωικοῖς ἔπεσιν ἐκωμῴδησε. μεθ' ὃν καὶ τοὺς μετ' αὐτόν, οὓς καλοῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι σατυρικούς, οἱ νεώτεροι τὸν Κρατίνου καὶ Εὐπόλιδος χαρακτῆρα ζηλώσαντες τοῖς μὲν Ῥίνθωνος μέτροις, τοῖς δὲ τῶν μνημονευθέντων διασυρμοῖς χρησάμενοι τὴν σατυρικὴν ἐκράτυναν κωμῳδίαν (I 41). 'Stuff and nonsense' (tolles Zeug) is L. Müller's comment, and indeed this seems to be the general verdict, with the exception of Kiessling (ad Serm. I 4, 6), who believes that we have in this an authentic account of the genesis of Lucilian satire going back to Varro.[1]

The text is not perhaps free from corruption. At all events there is a difficulty of grammatical interpretation here which has not received attention, although the meaning of the whole passage depends upon it. For if, as Leo and Marx point out, μεθ' ὃν

following the elegy, a place is given to satire, for which there is no corresponding Greek category. The allotment of position would seem to have been determined by metrical considerations, in order to place here the remaining writers of hexameter; because the humorous and critical tone of satire differentiated them sharply from the serious writers of the same verse, and made it inappropriate to group them simply with those who employed the heroic measure. Satire therefore is given an independent position, and because there were no canonical Greek writers of satirical or comic matter in hexameters (for neither the pseudo-Homeric poems of parody nor the cynic σίλλοι received attention in the grammarians' canon), this department is claimed for the Romans as exclusively theirs.

[1] Cf. Leo, Hermes, vol. XXIV (1889), pp. 81 ff., and F. Marx, Int. Hexas, p. 11, Prog. Rostock 1888. The error which is common to all discussions of this passage is the failure to note that the source which Lydus reproduces had no other purpose than to explain the origin of the hexameter verse in Lucilius and subsequent Roman satire.

excludes Lucilius from the class of the imitators of old comedy, by the same argument the remainder of the phrase—(*μετὰ*) *τοὺς μετ' αὐτόν, οὓς καλοῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι σατυρικούς*—excludes the other Roman satirists from this class, and leaves no place for the existence of any *νεώτεροι*, if such imitation did not begin until *after* Lucilius and *after* his successors. But in view of the uniform doctrine of Lucilius' dependence on the old comedy, it cannot be doubted that the source of Lydus, at all events, gave the current version of the relation of satire and its founder to comedy. The meaning, which it would seem that the account must have contained, may be given therefore somewhat as follows: 'From whose time (and including whom) on, the younger group of those whom the Romans call satirists, emulating the manner of Cratinus and Eupolis, making use of the metrical form of Rhinthon and of the jesting criticism (*διασυρμοῖς*) of the comic poets mentioned, produced satire' (*τὴν σατυρικὴν κωμῳδίαν*). The younger group, the *νεώτεροι*, to whom Lydus' Greek has assigned so uncertain a place, are the representatives of the developed form of satire, Lucilius, Horace, Persius, Juvenal, in contrast to an older group, Ennius and Pacuvius, who used the name without developing a fixed type in respect either to form or spirit. It is the same contrast which is given in Diomedes' account of satire by the words *sed olim carmen*, etc., descriptive of the form before Lucilius, and in Quintilian by *alterum illud etiam prius saturae genus*.[1]

The essential point for our purpose is that the satire of Lucil-

[1] Although it would seem not improbable that Lydus has obscured his source, perhaps from ignorance of the separation of the satirists into two groups, yet it is perhaps worth while to suggest that an intelligible meaning can be restored to his words by a very slight change, thus: *μεθ' ὃν καὶ οἱ* [MSS. *τούς*] *μετ' αὐτόν, οὓς καλοῦσι Ῥωμαῖοι σατυρικούς, οἱ νεώτεροι, τὸν Κρατίνου κτλ.* 'After whom, those likewise (*καί*) after him, whom the Romans call satirists, viz., the younger group, emulating, etc.' *οἱ νεώτεροι* is added as a corrective to the general designation *σατυρικούς*, as explained in the text. It is important to keep in mind that the purpose of the account is to set forth the relation of Lucilius and subsequent satire (hence the appropriateness of *καί* 'likewise') to Rhinthon in the matter of metrical form. The relation to old comedy is only incidental to the presentation of this discovery of the aetiological author of this account. Therefore the current doctrine of Lucilius' indebtedness could be taken for granted as comprehended in the general statement of the relation of the younger group of

ius, and hence subsequent Roman satire, here receives a twofold explanation. Its form, that is the hexameter, was derived from Rhinthon, its matter and spirit from the old comedy. Whether there is any truth in the statement of Lucilius' relation to Rhinthon[1] is a matter of indifference for our present inquiry, but at all events it casts some light on the questions in hand. We have seen that in Horace Lucilius is represented as having derived the spirit, but not the form, of his work from the old comedy; that in the matter of form, the employment of the hexameter, he was a pioneer. Thereupon some later philologian pointed out that the use of the heroic verse for the treatment of comic and satirical matter was not *Graecis intactum*, but had already been employed before Lucilius by Rhinthon, and in accordance with the hasty inductions of ancient philological science, affirmed that Lucilius had taken his metrical form from this source. The manner is well known. For every observed custom or phenomenon whether of national life or literature, the Greek or Roman antiquarian investigator, yielding to a natural, but naïve fondness for the objective and concrete in the explanation of origins, raised the question '*quis invenit*'; and in accordance with the ingenuity and learning of his answers earned the applause of his time and of posterity. It is thus that Cicero praises Aelius Stilo, antiquitatis nostrae et *in inventis rebus* et in actis scriptorumque veterum litterate peritus (Brutus 205), and the sum of Bibaculus' praise of the philologian Valerius Cato is omnes solvere posse quaestiones (Suet. De grammaticis 11). Many examples of such explanations of customs by reference to a specific *inventor* as well as discussion of rival claimants, are to be found in the Quaestiones Romanae of Plutarch. In the field of literary history the habit is best characterized by the familiar lines of Horace: quis tamen exiguos elegos emiserit auctor || grammatici certant, etc. The satire of Lucilius presented to the Roman philologian a question

Roman satirists to Cratinus and Eupolis. It is curious that Aristophanes is not named. The reason may be that the essence of old comedy is given by these two names, Cratinus for τὸ πικρόν, Eupolis for ἡ χάρις. Aristophanes' pre-eminence consisted only in a combination of their characteristics (τὸν μέσον ἐλήλακε τῶν ἀνδρῶν χαρακτῆρα. Platonius π. κωμ. II extr.).

[1] Whether Rhinthon composed works, whether of a dramatic or non-dramatic character, in hexameters is not clear. Cf. Leo, l. c., p. 83, and Kaibel, Comic. Gr. frag., vol. I p. 184.

to be approached in this spirit. In Roman literature he was the first to employ unchallenged the satire of personal attack and invective. Was he the *inventor*, or not? Doubtless there were those who championed his primacy in this field; but at an early time Roman philology had named as the source of his spirit the παρρησία of the old Attic comedy. The question of form presented a more baffling problem; but at some time in the history of Roman philology, perhaps even as late as a period subsequent to Juvenal, the question was solved, and the form and content of Roman satire were thus explained with reference to Greek sources. It is such a solution that this account presents. The method in both cases was the same, but the solution offered for the problem of form has no more claim to our consideration than the earlier effort to name a single source for the spirit of Roman satire. We now recognize that it is no more possible to name a single source of influence in the development of an individual genius of prolific vigor, than it is to trace the origin of a national or religious custom to a specific author or occasion. The one, like the other, is the product of a multitude of influences which in large part, must elude any effort of investigation.

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THE AIM AND RESULTS OF PLATO'S THEAETETUS.

In one of his essays Matthew Arnold speaks of "the barren logomachies of Plato's Theaetetus", and therein voices the impression which this dialogue leaves on the minds of many readers, to whom it seems a mere exhibition of dialectic,—capricious, ill-planned, accomplishing nothing and leading nowhither. Even such a scholar as Professor Kennedy in his edition (pp. 234-5), while admitting that there are certain miscellaneous positive results in the first thirty chapters, regards the subsequent elenchi as "little more than gladiatorial word-fights, intended by Plato to exercise and display the dialectic skill which he had acquired at Megara, and at the same time to amuse and puzzle the minds of his readers by the parables or myths of the waxen tablets and the dove-cage." Grote thought that Plato here "intends to qualify the mind for a life of philosophical research," "to bestow a systematic training on the ratiocinative power" (p. 391); again, "To form in men's minds this testing or verifying power, is one of the main purposes of Plato's dialogues of search, and in some of them the predominant purpose, as he himself announces it to be in the Theaetetus[1]" (p. 338). Professor Jowett finds more in the dialogue than this: "Like Theaetetus we have attained no definite result. But an interesting phase of ancient philosophy has passed before us. And the negative result is not to be despised. For on certain subjects, and in certain states of knowledge, the work of negation or clearing out the foundations must go on, perhaps for a generation, before the new structure can begin to rise. Plato saw the necessity of combating the illogical logic of the Megareans and Eristics. For the completion of the edifice, he makes preparations in the Theaetetus, and crowns the work in the Sophist" (IV, p. 264). Zeller goes

[1] He refers probably to the concluding words of Socrates in the dialogue; but this is an observation of a character in the drama, and can no more be ascribed to Plato, than the utterances of Hamlet, to Shakespeare.

farther and includes the *Theaetetus* among the dialogues which "point unmistakably to a time when Plato had already laid the corner stone of his system in the theory of ideas" (Plato, Eng. trans. p. 126), and in his brief analysis (pp. 171–3) shows a certain nexus of thought in the successive arguments.

It is the object of the present paper to combat such a view of the dialogue as is voiced in the phrase of Arnold or the quotations from Grote; to exemplify and expand the view hinted at by Zeller; to show in detail the purpose and results of the *Theaetetus*. It is, upon the face of it, improbable that at the period of life and development at which Plato had arrived when this dialogue was written, his object should have been merely to represent the character and method of Socrates, or to give an exercise in intellectual gymnastics,—aims which were doubtless predominant in some of the earlier dialogues.[1]

An attempt will be made, in this paper, to show the presence of a plan in this dialogue: that the definitions follow one another in logical sequence; that in each a closer approximation is reached to a satisfactory (from Plato's point of view) definition of knowledge; that in the examination of each definition results are attained, which are employed in the subsequent stages of the inquiry; that in the process an analysis and definition of various mental processes is made—a psychology indicated; and, finally, that there is an unspoken, but not, probably, an unconscious, trend of the thought to Plato's characteristic solution of the problem of knowledge. Plato, the eclectic philosopher is here examining the theories of his predecessors and contemporaries as to knowledge; he submits them to the test of his dialectic battery; certain positions are shattered, others are left standing—sound foundations, as our author thinks, upon which to erect the superstructure of his own theory of knowledge. It is true the superstructure is not erected, no satisfactory definition of knowledge is adduced; but the discussion is brought to such a point that the hypotheses by which Plato did meet the difficulty of the existence of knowledge—the hypothesis of "ideas" and of "reminiscence"—are made natural or even inevitable. In show-

[1] Without attempting to fix very accurately the date of the Theaetetus, one may safely conclude from the historical indications of the prologue, general style, and philosophical content that this dialogue belongs to the middle period of the author's literary activity.

ing this, it will be needful to follow the thread of the dialogue, to emphasize the main points established, and to neglect many details and digressions. We must be careful, too, to take the standpoint of Plato and of his age; we must not, as Grote does, argue from the modern position, and suppose that whatever may be inept or illogical to us, must have seemed inept or illogical to Plato. A slight change in point of view or in expression will often serve to show that what seems at first sight absurd to a hasty modern reader is really a plausible, or even accepted, notion of our own day. In this connection we must not fail to bear in mind that to Plato τὰ ἀληθῆ and τὰ ὄντα are interchangeable terms; that the Greeks of that time had not separated the conceptions of truth and of reality. The axiom that, if a thing is true, it *really exists* lies at the basis of Plato's theory of knowledge.

I.

The inquiry which is the subject of this dialogue is—What is knowledge? To this question Theaetetus, after a false start, answers that knowledge is sense-perception (αἴσθησις)—a definition which has been credited to Aristippus, and which was at least current. This theory is at once identified with the doctrine of Protagoras, that man is the measure of all things, and with the Heraclitean principle that all things are in a state of flux. Grote takes exception to this identification as unfair to each of the three theories, and considers this portion of the dialogue as, in consequence, nugatory. But Plato's main object here is not to present and combat philosophical systems. This might be guessed even from the fact that the youthful Theaetetus is the person here submitted to Socrates' dialectic, and not some competent protagonist of philosophy. There is a dramatic fitness in Plato's selection of characters for his dialogues. When the subject is courage, Nicias and Laches are the fitting interlocutors; if temperance, the temperate Charmides; if it is the defects of the Sophists, Protagoras, Prodicus, and others are introduced upon the stage; when the ethics of the rhetoricians is discussed, Gorgias is present to see fair play, as it were, although a more manageable character than Gorgias maintains the discussion. But Theaetetus and Theodorus are not characters who could be supposed adequate to the defence of philosophical theories; nor is Plato intent

on overthrowing philosophical opponents. Theaetetus is the impersonation of candour and common sense, and Plato is seeking for some account of knowledge which may commend itself to a fair and rational way of thinking. Now, from Plato's point of view, if knowledge be sense-perception, man *is* the measure of all things. For, as the discussion proceeds to show, sensations vary with different men; hence if sense-perceptions be true, not only is man the measure, but the things themselves (τὰ ὄντα) must also vary, and all things be in a state of flux. Plato, in short, accepts in regard to *sensations*, and also in regard to certain notions, such as "greater" and "less," the principle of relativity; that man is here the measure, and that these things are in a state of flux, i. e. have no permanence.

Next (chapters XVI–XXVI) the doctrine of Protagoras is examined *upon its own basis*. Is the definition of Theaetetus forgotten in a side issue? By no means; if Plato can overthrow the doctrine of Protagoras, and show that there are *some* things of which man is not the measure, some things in regard to which the opinion of one man is better than another, these things must lie outside the sphere of sensations; of them sense-perception will not be knowledge. The definition of knowledge as sense-perception will be overthrown as defective; for even if sense-perception *be* knowledge, there will be some knowledge which is not sense-perception.

Such is the connection of this part with the main line of the dialogue; let us follow the discussion itself. If sense-perception be knowledge, it is argued that animals, as possessing sensations, are as much the measure of truth as men—a *reductio ad absurdum*. Again, the world regards the opinions of certain men as having, in certain matters, greater validity than those of the ordinary man; hence, in the opinion of the world in general, man is not equally the measure of all things. Such considerations, however, only furnish presumptions against the principle; accordingly, there follow (chaps. XXII–XXIII) what are intended to be the conclusive arguments. The first of these is, as Grote points out, fallacious. It may be briefly stated thus: Protagoras maintains that whatever a man thinks is true to that man; but the vast majority of mankind think that Protagoras' opinion is *not* true; hence it *is* not true. The proper conclusion is that it is not true to *them*. But though this reasoning is fallacious in form, it seems

to be substantially sound; the dictum of Protagoras as interpreted by Plato is self-contradictory; if each man's opinion be equally valid with that of every other man, there is no absolute truth. For among the large variety of opinions possible upon a subject some one must (even by mere chance) more closely approximate to the existing reality than another; hence if one opinion be equally valid with the others there can be no reality corresponding to any opinion. It is probable that Plato did not notice that Socrates' argument is fallacious. In his time, whether through lack of a formulated logic, or through the difficulty of distinguishing words from things, fallacies were less easy of detection; and never is a sophistical argument more likely to escape notice than when it leads to a conclusion manifestly, upon other grounds, true. In any case a more effective refutation follows: in regard to future events, the opinion of one man is found to accord more closely with the event than that of another; hence in this case, one man is more a measure of truth than another. Besides, the opinions of experts are found to be more likely to approximate to the facts in their own particular sphere, than those of other men; yet one man's sense-perception is as true as another's. Hence there is knowledge that is not sense-perception.

But not only is this definition thus shown to be inadequate, it is also false. The principle of Heraclitus is true in regard to sensations; these have no permanence of any kind; they are not among τὰ ὄντα. Now, neither truth nor untruth can be predicated of what does not exist; hence there can be no knowledge (in Plato's sense) of sensations. Theaetetus' first definition of knowledge is completely overthrown.

Further, an important corollary is deduced (chap. XXX), which offers no difficulties in the original, and may therefore be briefly stated. Sensations are not apprehended by the senses themselves but by a central organ, the intelligence (ἡ ψυχή); this organ has the power of comparing sensations and of arriving at notions which are not apprehended by the senses themselves. It is through this intelligence that we arrive at the notion of existence, and as existence is always implicated in truth, we must henceforth seek for knowledge in the operations of the intelligence.

II.

Sensation is the lowest of mental states; and it was fitting that Plato in his pursuit of knowledge should begin at the foot of the mental scale; but having succeeded in excluding sense-perception from the domain of knowledge, he now considers the next higher mental process, that of *opinion*[1] (δόξα, δοξάζειν). In this investigation (chaps. XXXI–XXXVIII), it is worthy of note that the argument finally employed to refute the definition of knowledge as right opinion, might have been used at the outset, and would, doubtless, have then been used, had Plato's only object been to overthrow the definition. But, in truth, he wishes, as in the first stage of the discussion, to sift what is called opinion, in search of clues to the realm of knowledge. Before proceeding to this second stage, we should note something which underlies the whole of this portion of the dialogue,—the assumption, which Plato (whether or not it commends itself to the modern mind) evidently regards as axiomatic, that false knowledge is not knowledge at all: one may have a true or a false opinion; but false knowledge is a contradiction in terms; one either knows or does not know a thing.

Socrates, accepting for the nonce Theaetetus' second definition of knowledge as true opinion, points to a difficulty in regard to false opinion. If two things, A and B, are both known, it is evident that they cannot be confused; hence false opinion is in this case impossible; so also, if one is known and the other not known; in short, false opinion is impossible within the domain of knowledge. Still false opinion does undoubtedly exist; and a second attempt is made to find how and where this is possible. At this point is introduced the comparison of the soul to a wax tablet which receives impressions through perceptions. After an elaborate enumeration, by the help of this symbol, of all possible cases of judgment in regard to two things present in the mind, it is found that false (as well as true) opinion is possible, not as between two things known, or as between two things perceived, but as between a thing known and a thing perceived; in other words, false opinion is possible in referring perceptions or other products of sensation

[1] "Opinion," in Plato's mind, seems to correspond to what we call empirical knowledge,—knowledge for which we cannot assign the grounds, which is unreasoned and accidental, and whose truth, in consequence, we cannot ascertain.

to general notions (which are attained, as we saw above, through the intelligence). As Socrates says, "False opinion arises not in the comparison of perceptions with one another, or of thoughts with one another, but in the bringing of a perception and thought together.[1]" This does not contradict the conclusion formerly arrived at, that false opinion cannot exist; for we were then considering the sphere of knowledge; but perception, which is outside the sphere of knowledge (chap. XXX), is involved in all cases investigated by means of the figure of the wax tablets. Suddenly, however, at this point (§196), an example is brought forward to show that, even in the case of the known, false opinion may actually exist, although this has been shown *a priori* to be impossible. Here we are in a quandary. It does not seem that Plato, in this paradox, is merely amusing himself with dialectic subtleties, but that he was profoundly puzzled by this possibility of error in the realm of the *known*. His seriousness is attested by the minuteness and care of the psychological analysis in this part of the discussion. In the search for some explanation of this dilemma, Socrates (i. e., I believe, Plato) falls upon the use of the verb 'know' (*ἐπίστασθαι*), which has not yet been defined. Now, Plato was perfectly cognizant of the fact that 'to know' cannot be defined without defining 'knowledge,' which is the point at issue; what he seeks is to define the relation of 'knowing' to 'knowledge.' He reduces the two unknown terms to one, by defining 'knowing' in terms of 'knowledge': to know is to possess knowledge (*ἐπιστήμης κτῆσις*). He further shows by the comparison with doves in a cage that 'to possess' (*κεκτῆσθαι*) is different from 'to have' (*ἔχειν*). Knowledge which is 'possessed' is latent or potential; in order that we may *have* knowledge, i. e. in the fullest sense know, the potential must be made actual. In this process mistakes seem possible; and this, in turn, may serve to explain how false opinion is possible in the sphere of knowledge, i. e. as regards general notions. Thus a further step is made towards the solution, yet Plato is not satisfied; how can a man not know what he knows? The further solution of this difficulty is not found in the dialogue, but we shall have occasion to recur to it later.

[1] *εὕρηκας δὴ ψευδῆ δόξαν, ὅτι οὔτε ἐν ταῖς αἰσθήσεσίν ἐστι πρὸς ἀλλήλας οὔτ' ἐν ταῖς διανοίαις, ἀλλ' ἐν τῇ συνάψει αἰσθήσεως πρὸς διάνοιαν* (§195 C-D).

Plato, having thus investigated the process of 'opinion', as at an earlier stage he investigated 'perception', and having cleared it up in some degree and attained some results by the way, quickly dismisses Theaetetus' second definition (as he might have done at the outset) by showing in a special case that true opinion may exist without knowledge, and, therefore, cannot be knowledge (§ 201).

III.

We now reach the third stage of the discussion and Theaetetus' third definition: Knowledge is true opinion combined with definition (λόγος).[1] This as it might seem, somewhat peculiar definition of knowledge evidently springs from the desire of excluding that element of mere empiricism, of chance, which we noted as pertaining to Plato's conception of opinion. The clause added to the former definition is intended to limit its application to such opinion as is based upon reason, or is clearly apprehended and understood; to exclude mere empirical guess-work, and include what we might call scientific or reasoned knowledge. Again, as in the previous stages, the dialogue turns forthwith to what seems to be a side issue, but, again, this apparent digression results in a *reductio ad absurdum* of the definition.

The point upon which the argument which results in this *reductio ad absurdum* hinges, is the fact, admitted in our day as well as accepted in this dialogue, that no definition or description can be given of what is elementary. We define one thing in terms of another; the latter, perhaps in terms of a third; but sooner or later we must come to the ultimate constituents of thought. A triangle may be defined in terms of lines; a line, in terms of points; but we can go no further. So with other elementary notions; to a man born blind we cannot define or describe 'redness'.

With this explanation let us return to our text. The definition is taken for granted; it implies, since elements cannot be defined, that they cannot be known. Only complexes then can be known. Now, a complex must either be the sum of its elements and equal to them all taken together, or else a whole which springs from and is different from its elements. But, in the first case, the

[1] *τὴν μὲν μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ δόξαν ἐπιστήμην εἶναι, τὴν δὲ ἄλογον ἐκτὸς ἐπιστήμης* (§ 201 C-D).

knowing of the complex would imply the knowing of the elements, which, as we have seen, cannot be known; in the second case, the complex is a new unit; is therefore elementary, and cannot be known.[1] Thus the acceptance of Theaetetus' third definition results in demonstrating the impossibility of knowledge.

As objection might be taken, however, to the meaning assigned to definition (λόγος), or to the assumption that elements are unknowable, this third definition is now attacked in a more systematic way (Chaps. XLII–XLIII). 'Definition' may have any one of these meanings: (1st) expression in language; but this cannot be the meaning here, for *all* right opinion may be expressed in language, and we have already shown that *all* right opinion is not knowledge. (2nd) 'Definition' may mean enumeration of the ultimate elements; this is the sense in which we employed the word in the *reductio ad absurdum* above; but we now proceed in a way less open to cavil. A thing is known (according to Theaetetus' third definition) when we have a right opinion of it with an enumeration of elements added; but elements have no elements to be enumerated, therefore cannot be known.[2] Our third definition would thus absurdly read: Knowledge is right opinion accompanied by an enumeration of things not known. (3rd.) 'Definition' may mean the statement of the characteristic difference.[3] But this will not help us; for in order to have a right opinion about anything, we must be able to distinguish one thing or notion from another; so the definition which bids us add the characteristic difference to right opinion, bids us add what we have already, in order that we may learn

[1] What Plato means may be made clearer by a modern illustration. The elements, in the first alternative, are like the various colours in the spectrum; if we are acquainted with the spectrum, we are also acquainted with all the primary colours, red, yellow, etc., since the whole spectrum is merely the sum of these. The elements in the other alternative resemble these same primary colours in relation to white light; they combine to form a new unit which arises out of them, but is not equal to the sum of them; white light, although it is produced by a complex of colours, is an elementary sensation, and cannot be described in terms of red, yellow, etc., as can the spectrum.

[2] This is of course in harmony with the results of the first stage of the dialogue; for the elements enumerated in a definition are sense-perceptions, and these cannot be known.

[3] τὸ ἔχειν τι σημεῖον εἰπεῖν, ᾧ τῶν ἁπάντων διαφέρει τὸ ἐρωτηθέν. Again τὴν διαφορὰν ἑκάστου, ᾗ τῶν ἄλλων διαφέρει.

what we know already. In fine, the addition by means of which Theaetetus has attempted to improve his second definition turns out upon analysis to be no addition at all; the third definition is, therefore, nothing more than the second, which has already been exploded.

Theaetetus has no further definitions to suggest, and Socrates closes the dialogue without indicating that any results, other than the purely negative one of showing the inadequacy of the definitions proposed, have been attained. That, however, need not have been the opinion of the writer of the dialogue; in truth, it is sufficiently manifest that various positive results have been attained, such as an insight into the nature of sense-perception, the establishment of a central mental organ, the intelligence, etc. We need not enumerate these; but rather let us ask the question, are these results of a miscellaneous character, or do they lead in a given direction? is there a philosophic unity in the dialogue? In the first stage of the discussion sense-perception and the whole world of sensations of the concrete is excluded from the domain of knowledge; knowledge must be sought in the operations of the intelligence,—in the results that it seems to attain by comparing sense-perceptions with one another. In short, we establish the sphere of knowledge to be general notions or concepts. In the second stage, however, we discover that all even of the successful operations of the intelligence are not productive of knowledge; all true opinion is not knowledge. More important still, for the general purposes of the dialogue, are the results attained with regard to knowledge itself; that it exists in two forms, *latent* and *actual*; and that the possibility of error in the sphere of knowledge must, in some at present inexplicable manner, lie in the process of making the latent actual. In the third stage we learn that if a complex is known, the elements also must be known; but the elements, or sense-perceptions, cannot be known. Hence our knowledge cannot arise from sense-experience.

Such results as these might well lead to the scepticism professed by some of Plato's opponents, or by such a philosopher as Hume. But throughout the *Theaetetus*, we feel that the author tacitly assumes the possibility of knowledge, nor was the disposition of Plato's mind such as to rest in scepticism. Accept the possibility of knowledge, and consider where the dialogue leaves us. The sphere of knowledge must be in concepts; but if these are

known, they cannot arise from sensations or experience. They must therefore be intuitive or transcendental. But if thus given, they must be perfect, free from error; they must, accordingly, be knowledge in the *latent* form. Errors which actually are found in concepts must, then, arise in the process of transmuting latent, into actual knowledge. We see everything prepared for the hypotheses by which Plato cut the Gordian knot of the possibility of knowledge. As concepts cannot arise from experience, and since we have no experience of real existence, general notions are the result of the contemplation of real existences in a previous phase of the life of the soul; but through the limitations of body and matter, this knowledge of real existence is rendered latent. The process of making this knowledge actual is that of *anamnesis* or reminiscence; imperfect revival is the source of errors in the sphere of knowledge.

This dialogue is, therefore, a demonstration, as far as demonstration is possible, of Plato's positive theory of knowledge. The whole subject is investigated as far as reasoning can go. The final step is not made—the explanations afforded by the doctrine of *ideas* and *anamnesis*—because this final step is a pure hypothesis. Like other hypotheses—like the modern scientific hypotheses of the existence of atoms or of a luminiferous ether—it is not susceptible of proof; but like them it justifies itself by affording a solution of the problem. It seems scarcely credible, when one notes how the dialogue leads up to this solution, that the writer did not have the hypothesis more or less definitely conceived. Especially does the somewhat unmotived and, for the argument, purposeless introduction of the distinction between "possessing knowledge" and "having knowledge", seem to indicate that the writer must have had the theory of *anamnesis* already in mind.

Why, it may be asked, should Plato have left unexpressed in the *Theaetetus*, the main outcome of the discussion. To answer this, one must look at certain peculiarities of his work and development. Plato was both a philosopher and a literary artist; it was under the artistic impulse and through the desire to represent and defend the character and teachings of his master that the earliest dialogues were written. But, as years went on, the literary bias was gradually subordinated to the philosophic. In his latest works literary charm is wanting not merely in the dramatic set-

ting but in the very style. This is markedly true of the *Laws*; and here too Socrates is absent, no doubt because the positive and dogmatic character of the teachings was inconsistent with his character and method. Between these two poles of Plato's work we trace an easy transition. The dialogue, originally employed for artistic purposes would naturally be later employed by the active philosophic mind of Plato, as an instrument for clarifying his own ideas. The earliest dialogues would doubtless represent actual discussions which had been maintained by the living Socrates. But what more natural than that his pupil, in pursuit of truth, should imaginatively represent the keen intellect of his master, applying his dialectic to topics which the latter had never actually treated. The dialectic method would be, in Plato's earlier years at least, the natural method for the attainment of philosophic results; but as his views grew more positive, the dialogue with Socrates as its central figure would become inadequate for the expression of the writer's mind. There would be a point in Plato's development where he would be hampered by his form; and this point seems to be represented in the *Theaetetus*, where we find, on the one hand, the dramatic framework, literary skill and charm in some of the digressions, and the original Socrates of the earlier dialogues; on the other hand, passages of strenuous and dry dialectic, criticism of contemporary theories, and numerous positive results. It is notable that in the *Sophist*, so closely linked by its framework with the *Theaetetus*, the chief place in the discussion is transferred from Socrates to the Eleatic stranger, who may more appropriately give utterance to the positive teachings of this dialogue. "In the Timaeus, Sophist, and Politicus," as Jowett notes, "Socrates' function as chief speaker is handed over to the Pythagorean philosopher Timaeus and the Eleatic stranger, at whose feet he sits and is silent." And so in the *Republic*, to quote Jowett again, "the Socratic method is nominally retained . . . but any one can see that this is a mere form, the affectation of which grows wearisome as the work advances." The artistic plan of the *Theaetetus* hampers Plato in the expression of his views, and this taken with the fact alluded to above, that the keystone of Plato's theory of knowledge was pure hypothesis, incapable of demonstration, would serve to account for the *apparent* inconclusiveness of the *Theaetetus*.

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ON THE USES OF THE PREPOSITIONS IN HOMER.

The Homeric poems furnish the best field for the study of the Greek prepositions, because they are there employed with greater freedom and variety than elsewhere and the origin and development of their uses may more easily be traced. In the Iliad and Odyssey prepositions not only enter into composition with verbs or govern cases—to which uses they are for the most part confined in prose—but they are also used independently of verbs or cases in tmesis or as adverbs. Further freedom in their use is seen in the fact that they are not unfrequently doubled and postponed.

Hitherto complete statistics on these various phenomena have been wanting. This article is an attempt to supply this want and embraces a tabulation of the frequency of the various prepositions, the numerical relation of the cases, doubling of prepositions, postposition, tmesis, and the adverbial use.

Frequency. In point of frequency Homer has an average of one preposition in every 3.4 lines, that for the Iliad (3.3) being slightly higher than that for the Odyssey (3.5).[1] Tycho Mommsen (in his Beiträge zu der Lehre von den griechischen Praepositionen, Berlin, 1895) has shown that there are well marked differences in the aggregate frequency of prepositions according to period, department, author, etc. Poetry, as we might expect, has fewer prepositions than prose. Epic and lyric poetry in general excel tragic and comic, though variations occur both in different poets and in the works of the same poet. In prose the historians excel the philosophers and the orators.

Numerical relation of the cases. Mommsen has also shown that the numerical relation of the cases with which prepositions are used is an important element in style and may serve to differentiate the periods and departments of Greek literature. As stated by him (Beiträge, p. 19) "the preponderance of the dative with prepositions belongs to the older and poetic

[1] Mommsen's average for the Iliad is 3.14, for the Odyssey 3.95.

language, that of the accusative to the younger language and prose, that of the genitive to the rhetorical and philosophical elements in poetry and prose." The marked preponderance of the dative in epic poetry is seen from the fact that 42.07% of the prepositions in Homer are used with this case. We naturally expect this from the great number of concrete locative situations afforded by the subject matter of epic poetry. Hence ἐν and ἐπί are the favorite prepositions. There is an element of picturesqueness in this phenomenon. The dative, more strictly defining the locality or limiting it to a narrower sphere, gives color and emphasis (cf. Forman, The Difference between the Gen. and Dat. used with ἐπί to denote Superposition, Balto., 1894, p. 43).

The numerical relation of the cases in Homer is as follows: 22.23% are used with the genitive, 42.07% with the dative, 35.70% with the accusative. The Iliad and Odyssey show about the same preponderance of the dative, while in the Odyssey the genitive has lost and the accusative gained, each in about the same degree.

Doubling of prepositions. The doubling of prepositions gives a picturesque fulness to the expression. It makes the preposition doubly deictic. Homer has 80 examples, the most frequent double prepositions being διαπρό (21), παρέκ (19), ὑπέκ (18), διέκ (12). The Iliad shows much greater freedom in doubling prepositions than the Odyssey, having 50 of the above 80 examples. In this respect the Odyssey is in accord with its general tendency to use the more distinctively poetic licenses less freely than the older Iliad.

Postposition. The normal position of the preposition is immediately before its case. In poetry, however, it is found not unfrequently after the word which it governs, i. e., it is postponed. In Homer where the transition from local adverbs to prepositions proper was not yet complete and the position of the preposition had not yet become rigidly fixed, postposition is to be regarded as a freedom of the language. In succeeding poets it became more and more a conscious means of poetic effect. The êthos of postposition may be seen from the fact that it is found largely in the higher spheres of poetry, while in prose it is rare and confined mostly to the earlier period (cf. Kühner, §452, 2).

Homer postpones 7.85% of his prepositions (Iliad 8.13%, Od.

7.50%) or nearly one in every 13. Of the 645 examples of postposition in the Homeric poems, 255, or about 3.1% of the whole number of prepositions, are cases of pure anastrophe, 390, or 4.7% of the whole number of the prepositions, are cases of interposition between the noun and adjective or dependent genitive. The latter cases are here included in postposition, though the feeling is somewhat different from that which prevails when the preposition follows the simple substantive or both the substantive and its qualifying adjective. Instances of interposition without anastrophe, i. e., interposition between the adjective or dependent genitive and the substantive may be mentioned here, though they are not to be included under the head of postposition. Homer shows a marked fondness for this kind of interposition, using it almost twice as freely as interposition between the substantive and adjective and almost as often as postposition in general. He has 600 examples of this phenomenon, so that 7.3% of all his prepositions are thus used.

As might be expected, the great majority of the cases of postposition occur with the dative, which in this use predominates even more strongly than in the general ratio of the cases given above. The ratio for postposition is as follows: gen. 22.2%, dat. 45.4%, acc. 32.3%.

The scansion of all the lines in which postposition occurs reveals the fact that there are preferences for it at particular points in the verse. Prepositions are most frequently postponed in the first (191 examples) and the fourth (165 examples) foot.

Adverbial use of prepositions. The fact that Homer has over one-fifth as many instances of prepositions used adverbially as with cases furnishes abundant evidence that prepositions were originally adverbs. Here the Iliad is slightly less free than the Odyssey, the average for the former being one in 17.3 lines, for the latter one in 15.7 lines.

The above figures are based on the aggregate independent use of the prepositions (i. e., without a case), and hence includes both tmesis and the adverbial use proper. It is impossible to determine with exactness what uses in Homer fall under the head of each of these subdivisions. Strictly speaking, whenever a preposition is so used that it cannot be said to govern a case, it is adverbial, and the term tmesis has no place in the Homeric poems. Still, as it seemed desirable to make some distinction

between tmesis and the adverbial use pure and simple, the plan that has here been followed has been to classify as adverbial only those instances in which the preposition does not in Homer enter into composition with the verb and so cannot be said to be separated from it by tmesis. It appears that the strictly adverbial use is a little less than one-fourth as frequent as tmesis. The adverbial use is considerably more common in the Iliad than in the Odyssey (Il. once in 83 lines, Od. once in 98.4 lines), while tmesis is slightly less common in the former than in the latter (Il. once in 21.9 lines, Od. once in 18.8 lines).

The êthos of tmesis—as well as that of the adverbial use—is seen from the fact that it belongs predominantly to the higher spheres of poetry. It lays stress on the preposition by giving it an independent place in the sentence. This stress is sometimes further emphasized by anastrophe. The effect in epic poetry is different from that in lyric and tragic. In the former tmesis is used less consciously and more for picturesqueness, while in lyric and tragic it is used more for emphasis (cf. Pierson, Rhein. Mus., XI, p. 90 ff.).

The prepositions most freely used as adverbs are *περί*, *ἀμφί*, and *ἐν*; those most frequently used in tmesis *κατά*, *ἐκ*, *ἐπί*.

The results of this investigation show that prepositions, both in their frequency and their case relation are an important element of style in the Homeric poems, and that the marked preponderance of the dative case, the doubling of the prepositions, and their free adverbial use contribute in no small degree to picturesqueness. Of the two poems the Odyssey has in general employed the more distinctively poetic features of prepositional usage less freely, thereby showing an advance toward the later and more formal principles which were to govern the uses of the prepositions.

PREPOSITIONS WITH ONE CASE.

Prep.	*ἀντί*	*ἀπό*	*εἰς*	*ἐκ*	*ἐν*	*πρό*	*σύν*	*διέκ*	*ὑπέκ*	*ἀποπρό*	*διαπρό*
Il. . .	7	273	374	406	989	28	113	1	13	1	3
Od. .	3	99	449	284	904	6	75	11	2	0	0
Total .	10	372	823	690	1893	34	188	12	15	1	3

PREPOSITIONS WITH TWO CASES.

Prep.	*διά*			*κατά*			*ὑπέρ*			*παρέκ*		
	gen.	acc.	total	gen.	acc.	total	gen.	acc.	total	gen.	acc.	total
Il. .	76	42	118	50	333	383	30	23	53	1	5	6
Od. .	21	35	56	18	253	271	19	8	27	1	3	4
Total	97	77	174	68	586	654	49	31	80	2	8	10

PREPOSITIONS WITH THREE CASES.

Prep.	*ἀμφί*				*ἀνά*				*ἐπί*				*μετά*			
	gen.	dat.	acc.	total	gen.	dat.	acc.	total	gen.	dat.	acc.	total	gen.	dat.	acc.	total
Il. .	1	59	98	158	0	6	84	90	60	358	224	642	3	123	107	233
Od. .	1	29	37	67	0[1]	3	59	62	104	186	189	479	2	92	57	151
Total	2	88	135	225	0	9	143	152	164	544	413	1121	5	215	164	384

PREPOSITIONS WITH THREE CASES, CONTINUED.

Prep.	*παρά*				*περί*				*πρός*				*ὑπό*			
	gen.	dat.	acc.	total	gen.	dat.	acc.	total	gen.	dat.	acc.	total	gen.	dat.	acc.	total
Il. .	40	134	90	264	51	58	48	157	17	7	144	168	99	132	35	266
Od. .	27	85	43	155	28	27	24	79	10	14	135	159	27	55	27	109
Total	67	219	133	419	79	85	72	236	27	21	279	327	126	187	62	375

[1] In three places (Od. 2, 416; 9, 177; 15, 284) *ἀνά* is followed by the genitive of going on board ship. These, however, are best regarded as cases of tmesis.

All Homer.
Total number of prepositions with cases in Homer, 8198
Average frequency, one in 3.403 lines.
Total number of occurrences with gen., 1823; 22.23 %
" " " " " dat., 3449; 42.07 %
" " " " " acc., 2926; 35.70 %

Iliad.
Total number of prepositions with cases in the Iliad, 4746
Average frequency, one in 3.306 lines.
Total number of occurrences with gen., 1160; 24.46 %
" " " " " dat., 1979; 41.70 %
" " " " " acc., 1607; 33.84 %

Odyssey.
Total number of prepositions with cases in the Odyssey, 3452
Average frequency, one in 3.508 lines.
Total number of occurrences with gen., 663; 19.21 %
" " " " " dat., 1470; 42.58 %
" " " " " acc., 1319; 38.21 %

TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF EXAMPLES OF POSTPOSITION OF EACH PREPOSITION AND THE PER CENT. OF ITS TOTAL NUMBER OF OCCURRENCES.

Prep.	Iliad	Od.	Total	%	Prep.	Iliad	Od.	Total	%
ἀντί	5	0	5	50.	διά	10	5	15	8.6
ἀπό	28	16	44	11.8	κατά	10	24	34	5.2
εἰς	20	28	48	5.8	ὑπέρ	6	4	10	12.5
ἐκ	20	18	38	5.5	ἀμφί	9	7	16	7.1
ἐν	71	67	138	7.3	ἀνά	8	6	14	9.2
πρό	4	0	4	1.2	ἐπί	108	34	142	12.6
σύν	2	6	8	4.2	μετά	11	8	19	4.9
διέκ	0	0	0	0	παρά	13	8	21	4.9
ὑπέκ	1	0	1	6.6	περί	11	9	20	8.5
ἀποπρό	0	0	0	0	πρός	2	1	3	.91
διαπρό	2	0	2	66.6	ὑπό	45	18	63	16.8

Total number in all Homer, 645; 7.85 %
" " " Iliad, 386; 8.13 %
" " " Odyssey, 259; 7.50 %

TABLE SHOWING THE NUMBER OF EXAMPLES OF TMESIS AND THE ADVERBIAL USE OF EACH PREPOSITION.

	Tmesis				Adverbial			
Prep.	Il.	Od.	Total	Freq.	Iliad	Od.	Total	Freq.
ἀντί . .	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ἀπό . .	74	41	115	241.7	0	0	0	0
εἰς . .	14	12	26	1069.3	0	0	0	0
ἐκ . . .	107	101	208	133.6	0	0	0	0
ἐν . . .	72	54	126	220.6	27	32	59	471.2
πρό . .	6	2	8	3475.3	7	3	10	2780.3
σύν . .	19	18	37	751.4	0	0	0	0
διά . .	10	9	19	1463.3	0	0	0	0
κατά . .	109	101	210	132.4	0	0	0	0
ὑπέρ . .	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
ἀμφί . .	30	37	67	414.9	41	23	64	434.4
ἀνά . .	35	36	71	391.6	1	1	2	13901.5
ἐπί . .	104	103	207	134.3	17	4	21	1323.8
μετά . .	12	8	20	1390.1	4	2	6	4633.8
παρά . .	21	34	55	5055.5	11	6	17	1635.4
περί . .	34	34	68	408.8	43	37	80	347.5
πρός . .	19	17	36	772.3	7	5	12	2316.9
ὑπό . .	49	33	82	339.1	7	2	9	3089.3
ἀποπρό .	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	13901.5
ἀμφιπερί .	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	13901.5
διαπρό .	0	0	0	0	16	2	18	1544.6
διέκ . .	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
παρέκ . .	0	1	1	27803.0	2	6	8	3475.3
περιπρό .	0	0	0	0	2	0	2	13901.5
ὑπέκ . .	0	3	3	9267.7	0	0	0	0
Total	715	644	1359	Il. 21.9 Od. 18.8 20.4	189	123	312	Il. 83.0 Od. 98.4 89.1

A. S. HAGGETT.

AN ERRONEOUS PHONETIC SEQUENCE.

The 'law' of Thurneysen and Havet, that *av* is the normal Latin representation of Aryan OW, further defined and dated by Lindsay,[1] Horton-Smith[2] and Buecheler,[3] has been much in evidence for the last four or five years. In a short review, originally written for 'Brief Mention' in the American Journal of Philology,[4] I pointed out that *ovis* (and *boves*) had not been satisfactorily accounted for by the defenders of the law, and avowed for myself a negative attitude. Recently Solmsen,[5] and before him Kretschmer[6] and Hirt,[7] have modified the law by exempting from its operation the *ov* group when tonic by Latin accentual laws.

I need not here call the roll of all the distinguished scholars that have already accepted this phonetic change as proved in some sort, but I trust that the expression of a negative opinion on my part may nevertheless meet with a fair hearing.

It is inevitable that the proofs of phonetic change shall differ in completeness and certainty, nor will perplexing exceptions always down. Thus the first expounders of this change might derive *fovet*, *movet*, *vovet* from the nearly gratuitous construct-forms **fevet* etc., while for *ovis* (and *boves*) they could offer nothing better than the pleas of 'dialect admixture' and 'borrowed from the Greek,' pleas especially lacking in cogency in this case, particularly when the phonetic change was specifically dated in the third century B. C.[1–2]

The later delimitation of the law not only accounts for *ovis*, but takes *fovet* etc. as they stand,—2d conjugation forms of the *monet* type. But the new restriction brings with it fresh exceptions that must in turn be submitted to the analysis that sublimates and refines away.

For *fovet* etc. paradigms like the following are presented: 2d sg. *foves*, 2d plur. **favétis;* out of this variation *foveo* and *faveo* were both engendered, while only *caveo* survived (not **coveo*), and *moveo* (not **maveo*). Such levelling within a paradigm is capable of illustration, as a comparison of German *war: waren*

with English *was: were* will remind us. We may even admire how, in the pick and choose of these construct Latin paradigms, first the pres. sg. and 3d plural have predominated over the rest of the plural and all the imperfect and future, and *vice versa;* and again, how from the interplay twain verbs have come, of different case construction, but not alien significance, viz., *favet* and *fovet.*

The words *cávus* and *cávea* offer a further difficulty in the new statement of the law, though it is claimed that Spanish *cueva,* Portuguese *cova* vindicate a Latin *covos,* borrowed about the time of the Roman occupation of the Iberian peninsula, say 201 B. C.[1] To explain these exceptions Solmsen does not plead the influence of *cavérna* and trisyllabic forms of *cavâre,* which are not registered in Plautus, but rather pleads that, when **coves* and *cavétis* were alternating in the verb-paradigm, the vocally similar adjective stem **cóvo* was caught up along with **cóves.* Possibly, yes; but, this is very far from convincing. As to the illustration from the survival of archaic *foedus* 'ugly' along with the retention, in legal language, of the archaic spelling of *foedus* 'treaty,' there being for both words a period when both spellings must have been in vogue, that is an independent proposition a scholar may be doing well to maintain, if he likes. That a new *caves* was growing up beside old **coves* sheds no light on the new creation of *cavos* from **covos.* Regarding this verb, a Plautine scholar might wonder why the imv. *cave* did not dictate the vocalization, as this form alone is used by Plautus over 60 times, while the forms with accented *á* are at least four times as numerous as with unaccented *a.*

To be able to explain away exceptions to a theory furnishes no really corroborative evidence for it. Really convincing evidence for a phonetic law can be furnished by nothing short of the strong positive testimony of etymologies quite beyond reasonable question. It is to be feared that scholars sometimes fall into the almost unavoidable psychological error of proving their etymologies by their laws. The following are the etymologies on which Solmsen more especially bases the particular modification of the law we are now discussing.

1) *favissae* 'cellars' : *fovea* 'pit.' For him who has no etymological theory to defend, a candid examination of the passage[2] on which all our knowledge of this word depends will leave a doubt whether *favissae* or *flavissae* is its original form, even

though Varro provides for the latter a specious derivation from *flare* 'to coin.' The gloss[9] seems to be not *flavissae* but *flavissae specus*, where, for all we know, *flavissae* may be adjectival, like *Tullianum*, and derived from some forgotten builder, a *Flavius*. Or we may connect *flavissae* as an adjective with Gr. φρέαρ 'well',—Homeric *φρήϝαρα, nom. plur. to the *n* (or *nt*) stem, with *l* in Latin by dissimilation, as in Armenian *albiur*. This enables us to derive *flavissae* (*ă* from *ə*) from **flavə̆n-vent-tā-* 'rich in wells' (cf. Skr. *udan-vánt-* 'rich in water'),—a *columbarium*[10] sort of *specus*, to wit. The same derivation will account for *favissae* which might, in the *r*-flexion of the stem, have lost its first *r* by dissimilative process.

But even rejecting the form *flavissae* altogether, we may interpret these caverns of many compartments as 'honey-combed,' and connect with *favus*. Inasmuch as *favus* has been derived from **fovos*, we may ask why it may not be better explained from Gr. χαῦ-νος 'porous' (: *fau-ces* 'jaws').

2) *favilla* 'glowing cinder'; *Favonius* 'West Wind': *fovet* 'warms.'

So far as mere definition goes the above words might have a common origin, and I confess to a teacher's partiality for keeping together as many Latin words as possible, because it simplifies classification. Still I can see no sound reason for denying the cognation of *favilla* [from **faves-slā*, cf. Gr. φαεννός from *φαϝεσ-νό-ς 'shining' (of fire)] with φάϝος 'light' (once in the Odyssey connoting 'torch'), while the wind *Favonius* was the 'clearing' wind *par excellence*, as the passages from Plautus[4] show. *Favonius* forms a striking counterpart of the German adjective *heiter* as applied to the wind. With this group also *faustus* 'bright, auspicious' belongs.

3) *cavilla* 'jeer, taunt' : κόβᾱλος 'impudent knave, pert rogue.'

This comparison might be allowed to pass, if the *av/ov* change were already well authenticated. But at best it would be only one of those cognations not demonstrably inconsistent with the phonetic laws; *v* and β may both be the product of a labialized guttural *media*, but nothing short of the discovery of a *tertium comparationis* could demonstrate this; for *v* may just as well be a true W, or a labialized guttural aspirate, while β may be a true B. Nor do these words correspond so nearly in sense and structure as to demand their identification. Similarly, only the discovery

of a *tertium comparationis* can cogently demand the equation of Lat. *combretum* and Lith. *szveñdrai.*[11]

[I may note in passing that a recent synopsis[12] has reported me as admitting that my comparison[13] of the structure of Lat. *ferend-ae* and Skr. *bháradh-yāi* was unphonetic, though I was contending expressly for the normal phonetic identity of prim. Italic *-end-* and Skr. *-adh-*, with the cautious admission that, inasmuch as Gr. φέρεσθαι, the *tertium comparationis*, diverges in its εσ from both the other terms, no one could prove for this specific formation that Lat. *en* and Skr. *a* actually did represent a primitive nasal vowel, nor that *dh* and *d* varied, whether in the primitive speech, or in prim. Italic, in this particular nasal environment. Yet either of these propositions is in complete accord with recognized phonetic changes.]

To return to *cavilla:* I see no good reason to reject the oldtime explanation by dissimilation from **calvilla* (: *calumnia* 'abuse,' *calvitur* 'deceives'). We may even give that up for the sake of argument, and still explain *cavilla* as a cognate of Lettic *kauns* 'shame, disgrace, insult;' cf. Hesychian καῦ-ρος· κακός, and καυαλός 'silly talker,' a signification seen in Plautus, *Aul.* 638 aufer cavillam; non ego nunc nugas ago. This group of words we may connect with Gr. καίει 'burns,' as we speak of '*burning* shame, insult,' a metaphor renewed in the slang of to-day, in 'scorches,' 'roasts,' both in the sense of 'jeers at.'

I may be permitted to note in passing that κόβᾱλοι, used by Aristophanes of certain kobold creatures invoked by thieves, may be cognate to Skr. *kābavá-s* 'disease-demon' (in the Atharvan, the folklore Veda). Had the Sanskrit word a usage in the fable literature, we might even advance the theory that *kābavá-s* is a folklore name from India that has wandered via Greece all the way to the *kobold* of German fable.[13a]

4) *avillus* (with a variant in the glosses[9], *abellus*) 'agnus recens partus' (Anglice, 'lambkin'): *ovis* 'sheep.'

When Solmsen, to dispute the derivation of *avillus* from *agnus* 'lamb,' declares for **agnellus* or **agniculus* as the only possible Latin diminutives of *agnus*, I wonder if I have read him aright. Unless in the group $g^{w}n$ the guttural lost its rounding completely before the close of the primitive Italic period, I see no way to deny the cognation of *agnus* and *avillus* that would not make us question *scamnum : scabellum, signum : sigillum, asinus : asellus,*

geminus : gemellus. The very definition of *avillus*, to say nothing of its gender, seems to me to proclaim its cognation with *agnus* rather than with *ovis.*

5) *aububulcus.*

The glosses[8] define this word by 'pastor bovum' (*vel* 'bovium'). Loewe's correction of this definition to *pastor ovium* yields a material all too uncertain for etymological purposes, at least as evidence for setting up a phonetic law. It takes a great deal for granted to assume that a compound **ŏ́vi-bubúlcus*, with secondary accent on *ŏ́v-*, would suffer the same change as pretonic *ov* ⏜,—in the terms of Solmsen's theory. We may safely leave *aububulcus* to the textual critics,[9] who have already corrected to *bubulcus* and *aut bubulcus*, as well as to *aubulcus.*

6) *favet : fovet.*

The cognation assumed in this formula is, all things considered, the one most favored by the upholders of the law. It may as well be admitted at the outset that these words are, after a fashion, synonymous; but how are they synonymous, and when? The answer is, in their most general and pale significance, and rather late in the language. Their meanings converge. In differentiated etymological cognates the senses should diverge. For converging words of great phonetic similarity we might expect manuscript confusion. We might even expect syntactical confusion. For this pair such a case has been pointed out. But Buecheler,[14] after a thoroughly satisfying justification of the rather unusual phraseology *coeptantem—fove*, subsequently seems inclined,[8] if I read between the lines aright, to interpret *fove* as an archaism for *fave.* He further points out a case of *foveo* archaic for *faveo* in Charisius,[15] where the words *faveo tibi foveo te* stand at the end of a paragraph rubricated 'Dativi et accusativi casus.' But I object that in the entire paragraph of 18 examples we have but three structural types: 1a, *adsideo praetori et praetorem* (15 times); 1b, *accedo tibi, id est eadem tibi sentio, et te* (1); 2, *timeo tibi, id est ne eveniat tibi, et timeo te* (1); and 3, the phrase under discussion. If the same verb were intended to be repeated we should accordingly expect *faveo* (*foveo*) *tibi et te*, or by bare possibility, *f. tibi et f. te.* There is no objection, so far as I can see, to supposing that the grammarian—in what is, after all, nothing but a practical teacher's list of *memorabilia* and *discernenda*—has inserted, as a final member,

a pair of verbs almost identical in sound, but taking different case constructions. He has nearly done this again in the middle of the next rubric but one: *adnitor* [*id est adiuvo*] *hanc rem, nitor hac re.*

But though we may dismiss these cases as devoid of any independent significance, a more serious case for the identification of *fovet* with *favet* is offered by Buecheler's interpretation[3] of the following inscription found on the base of a tiny golden image, supposed to be that of a weasel, viz.: FOVE L. CORNELIAI L. F., the date of which he assigns, because the praenomen of the woman is given, to a period before Hannibal, let us say somewhere about 225 B. C.—a date in beautiful harmony with the surmise already mentioned.[1, 2] Buecheler's interpretation is *fave Corneliae*, a request to a deity[16] to show regard unto Cornelia. A prayer on a votive offering without mention of the deity addressed may, for all I know, be a normal type of inscription, but it cannot be denied that, so long as the deity's name is withheld, the way is open for a different interpretation. The interpretation I have advanced[4] for this inscription is *fui Corneliai* 'I was Cornelia's.' This may be expounded under several aspects: 1) as a mark of ownership on an heirloom, perhaps a pendant to necklace[17]; 2) as the utterance of a dead pet[4] imaged in gold; 3) as a warning that the image was out of the hands of the rightful owner, a sort of "stolen from J—n Sm—h" dog-collar inscription.[1])

The explanation of FOVE (E = FI) as the accented form of *fui*, or as a true perfect beside the possibly aoristic *fuit*, is linguistically beyond cavil. But unfortunately no other certain *o*-perfect has yet been found for the Italic languages, though the handbooks venture on their reconstruction, and would doubtless welcome the real thing. That FOVE is a unique form need not

[1]) I cannot better state the objection to this interpretation than by quoting from a personal note in description of the little object written at my request by Prof. Dressel: "Ihre deutung der inschrift würde ich ohne weiteres acceptieren, wenn der schriftcharakter auf eine ältere zeit hinwiese; ich glaube aber kaum, dass der gegenstand älter ist als etwa 150–100 v. Chr." I see nothing to hinder us from accepting this date for the object, while regarding the inscription as representing an older type. Besides the use of the praenomen, already mentioned, Dressel[17a] notes that the dative (I say, gen.) ending -AI speaks for an early date. Further, the form of the L is semiarchaic, and we might note in comparison how our jewellers often use black letter or German text.

rule out my explanation; is not POVER a unique form for *puer*,[18] and possibly, I can but think, even a false archaistic orthography? For still other explanations of FOVE I shall presently ask a moment's patience.

I have challenged above the synonymity of *favet* and *fovet*, on the ground that it is late and confined to their vaguer, figurative uses. The etymologist must try to fix the earlier and more specific senses. If we note that *fovet* means 'warms,' and specifically 'foments'; that *fomentum*, already metaphorical in Cicero's time, means a 'poultice' (generally hot) for medicinal application; that *focula* (Plautus) means 'warming-pan'; and that *fomes* means 'kindling-wood,' we are not doing violence to unite all these significations, and define the root by 'applies to the fire, applies fire to.' Of the cognations hitherto advanced for *fovet*, that with Skr. *bhāvayati*—actually rendered *fovet* by the Petersburg Lexicon—is, *pace dixerim certorum doctissimorum*, hardly to be considered; for *bhāvayati* means *fovet* only in its palest general sense. The cognation with Gr. θοός 'quick,' in the sense of 'gives rapidity,' has even less to recommend it. The connection with Skr. *dāhayati* 'burns, makes burn' is more nearly satisfactory. But decidedly the most satisfactory, as it seems to me, is the one I now propose. I note Gr. χύ-τρα 'pot, potful of sacrificial pulse,' χύτροι 'hot baths' (at Thermopylae), χοή 'drink-offering, libation,' χόανος 'hollow pit for casting molten metal' (cf. Skr. *havanī*, defined by native lexica, but not yet verified in the literature, by 'sacrificial fire-pit'); and further I note Skr. *juhóti* 'pours into the sacrificial fire, offers,' *havi-s* 'offering,'—usually of boiled porridge. The common root to all these words means 'pours into the fire, offers.' Now comparing for their signification *focula* with χύτρα; *fomentum* on the one hand with χύτροι, and on the other with χύτρα and *havi-s*; and noting for *fomes* 'kindling' that the fat offerings (in the Vedic ritual, *ghee*) did in fact serve as fuel to nourish the flames withal;—it seems to me that we cannot separate the group of Latin words above from the Sanskrit and Greek words grouped after it. There is no phonetic let or hindrance, as χειά 'hole': Lat. *fovea* 'pit' shows.

Besides the merit of bringing *fovea* and *fovet* together, this etymology would enable us also to connect FOVE (i. e. FOVES?) on the weasel inscription with Skr. *havi-s*, supposing the little

object to be either a votive offering, or, a trifle pompously, the "offering of friendship".

[I may add in passing, supposing FOVE to be the name of the little quadruped represented, further etymologies. The weasel is often named for its beauty,[19] and gave its name to a cap of skin, and next (?) to one of metal (cf. Lat. *galea* and Gk. γαλέη 'weasel'),—though independent origin of these terms from the signification 'shining, bright', is not impossible. Thus FOVE might be made out a cognate of Skr. *chavī* 'skin, beauty', from a primitive base, S)KHαWYĒ. Or the weasel, particularly the ferret and ermine varieties, may have been named from its white, bright color,—and even the common weasel is white-bellied, with back of reddish brown. So we might compare with FOVE Skr. *dhavalá-s* 'white'. Inasmuch as Gr. αἴλουρος means both weasel and cat, it would then be possible to explain together FOVE (sc. *animal*?) and *feles*,—from prim. Italic **feveles*, with *ē* from *éve* in quick speech: I note for the structure the Sankrit pair *chágas*, *chágalás* 'goat', and for the vocalism Gr. νεφ-έ-λη. The spelling *faeles* in manuscripts of Varro and Cicero is absolutely incapable of proving the priority of *ae* to *ē* in this word.[20] Other names of the weasel possibly present this same signification: thus beside γαλέη we may note γαλήνη 'calm' (with the epithet 'white' in the Odyssey). Does γάλα 'milk' also belong with these words? In German slang I have heard milk called *weissheit*. Might not Cymric *bele* 'weasel' be referred to the Celtic group belonging to the root *bē* 'shines'?[21] Still other names of the weasel seem to mean 'nimble, quick',[19] and hence FOVE might be connected with Gr. θοός 'quick', θώς (note the plural θώαντες) 'jackal'. Those Avestan scholars who render *gaδwa* by 'cat'[10] might find its etymon in FOVE, and connect both with Skr. *gandhá-s* 'perfume', with the bad sense of 'stink' in modern Persian derivatives.

Inasmuch, however, as the proof has not been rendered that FOVE does mean weasel, I recommend none of these etymologies.]

If the current etymologies for *fovet* fail to bring conviction on the semantic side, they but fail the more for *favet*, as a secondary form of *fovet*. There is a separate etymology for *favet*, connecting with O. Bulg. *govĕti* 'religiose vereri', Lith. *gausus* 'abundant', Lettic *gausa* 'abundance, prosperity'.[22] But these Balto-Slavic words seem to me rather to be cognate with Skr. *juhóti* 'offers sacrifice', especially *gausus*, which corresponds in sense to the Greek advb. χύ-δην (Lat. *fuse*) 'copiously'. To reconcile

Avestan *zaoθra* 'offering' with this group we must assume variation between palatal and unlabialized guttural.[23]

For *favet* I have two explanations to offer, either of which seems to me to account for the signification and case construction of the word. If we render it by 'regards, looks upon', German '*sieht an, achtet* (*auf*)', we may make it a cognate of Homeric θηέομαι 'I gaze at with interest, marvel at, admire'; θαῦμα 'wondrous sight'. But if we make a study of the earlier usage of the word we shall reach a different definition.

Naevius, 56:[24] dubii fauentem per fretum introcurrimus, "doubtful we dart through the gaping strait"—the Symplegades, I conjecture.

Ennius, *Trag.* 250:[25] fauent faucibus russis | cantu plausuque premunt alas, "they (the cocks) gape with jaws wide open (*russis* from *revorsus*, or from *russus* 'red'?) etc."

Ennius, *Ann.* 376:[26] matronae moeros complent spectare fauentes, "and the dames fill the walls, gaping to behold."[1])

Accius, 510:[24] cives ominibus faustis augustam adhibeant | fauentiam, ore obscena dicta segregent, "let the folk accord the omens blest a solemn wide-mouthed attention, and from their lips ill-omened speech remove."

Ennius, *Annales*, 414:[26] hic insidiantes vigilant, partim requiescunt | contecti gladiis sub scutis ore fauentes, "here they set an ambush; some watch, some begin to nap, covering themselves, swords (handy), beneath their shields, with mouths ayawn."

With these passages before us, we can hardly avoid the conclusion that the specific sense of *favet* in the early period was 'gapes at, admires'. By this etymology *favissae* and *favus* may both be explained as cognates of *favet*. The phrase *favete linguis* lends itself to explanation as a substitute for *ore faventes*, connoting the wide-mouthed hush of astonishment, though at Naevius 111–2 (cf. Enn. *Tr.* 250 V. cited above), regum filiis | linguis faueant atque adnutent seems to mean 'at kings' sons marvel with tongue and nod'; while the pale sense 'marvel at' is all I can find in Ennius, *Annales* 289:[26] Romanis Iuno coepit placata fauere.

I note that the word is solemn, and not used by Plautus, save in the Amphitruo prologue, in the form *favitores* 'claqueurs'.

[1]) Here compare Shakespeare's King John, ii, 1, 375:

> And stand securely on their battlements,
> As in a theatre, whence they gape and point
> At your industrious scenes and acts of death.

We have now passed in review the evidence on which Solmsen chiefly relies to establish the change of *ov* to *av* in Latin. We have seen that *aububulcus* and *f(l)avissae* are not of a philological certainty to invite confidence in their etymological explanation, though *favissae* may be explained as a derivative of *favus* 'honeycomb' (: Gr. χαῦνος 'porous'), or *f(l)avissae* as cognate—with dissimilation—to Gr. *φρή(Ϝ)ατα 'wells'. There is no convincing reason for separating *favilla* 'glowing cinder' and *Favonius* 'clearing wind' from Gr. φάϜος 'light, glow—torch'. The old explanation of *cavilla* from **calvilla* (*calumnia*), or its derivation from the root of Gk. καίει 'burns' (cf. Lettic *kauns* 'shame, insult'; Hesychian καῦ-ρος· κακός, καναλός· μωρολόγος) are more plausible than the comparison with Gr. κόβᾱλος 'demon'. The diminutive *avillus* (with variant *abellus*) 'lambkin' must not be separated from *agnus* 'lamb'. For *fovet* the definition 'applies to the fire, applies fire to' suits the more specific usage of the word and its derivatives, whence follows cognation with Gk. χέει 'pours', Skr. *juhóti* 'pours into the fire, offers'. Thus *fovea* '(sacrificial) pit' [and FOVE 'sacrificial offering'?] meet a common explanation with *fovet*. Further, FOVE may be a unique form of *fui*, or, if it means 'weasel', be explained in sundry other ways. For *favet* an apt definition is 'regards, looks upon', German 'sieht an, achtet (auf)', whence might follow its cognation with Gr. θαέομαι 'I gaze at with wonder'; θαῦμα 'wonder'. But the early and more specific usage of the word demands the definition 'gapes (at), admires';—whence we must infer, for the structure of *favet*, derivation from the base of Gr. χαῦνος 'porous', χάος 'yawning, void', while the sense corresponds to χάσκει 'yawns, gapes', metaphorically extended to 'gapes at, marvels at, admires'.

That arguments still remain in favor of the older statement of the law, I do not gainsay. One of these is furnished by *cavus* 'hollow', beside which is a rustic *cohum*, which modern scholars, correcting Varro, have defined by 'hollow in a plough'. Further, Spanish *cueva*, Portuguese *cova* proceed from an earlier **cova*. I may spare myself the trouble of proving the originality of the *a* in *cavus* by noting that, without exception, so far as I can learn, scholars connect Gr. καυλός 'stalk', Lith. *káulas* 'bone', and Lat. *caulae* 'passages', deriving all these senses from 'hollow'.[20] As to Gr. κοῖλος 'hollow', κῶος 'den', κόοι 'caves' there is nothing to prove a lost *Ϝ*, rather than a lost *ϳ* or *σ*, until a

yet undiscovered inscription or manuscript, with *F*, or *υ*, etc., comes to light. Meantime we may define κῶ-ος by 'lair', and derive from κεῖται 'lies'. I note τὰ κῷα, 'the indented sides of the dice', where the best authorities seem to warrant the subscript iota. Should this term be connected with the island of Cos, as the name of the opposite side of the dice, τὰ χῖα, seems to show, then we might ask ourselves, with an atlas before us, how Cos got its name? Thus the equation of Lat. *cohum* with κῶος need not involve *cavus* at all. If it did, κόοι with *o* may show a specific dialectal shortening of vowel in Greek.[27] For the Iberian words cited we might advance the notion of a Greek source (Massilia), which would be to admit the *F* in the Greek word (cf. κόϝιλαι in Alcaeus, 15, 14, but Pomtow reads κοίιλαι). The Iberian words may just as well, however, be of Germanic origin from, or in some way affected by, an early Low German cognate of English *cove*. I note in passing, but without stopping here for further explanation, that a connection is possible between *cavea* 'cave' and Gr. καίει 'burns' (cf. *aedes* 'house', but originally only 'hearth'),—the 'fire', to wit, of the primitive cave dweller, of a Robinson Crusoe, reduced to primitive conditions. And the primitive man,[28] Robinson Crusoe's man Friday, uses fire as his chisel, his tool of excavation; *cavat*, 'he hollows out with fire'.

If FOVE be not certainly for *fave*, and I think the affirmative of this proposition incapable, with our present material, of proof; if the originality of the *a* in *cavus* be not put in question by Gr. κόοι; if *cohum* and Iberian **cova* be susceptible of explanation without assuming Italic **cova*;—I see no material left for dating our supposed law.

In Latin *lavit* 'bathes' beside Gr. λόει 'washes', we have a really strong case for the law, as Armenian *loganam* 'I bathe myself' may be taken to warrant *ŏ* for the primitive period. Since no clear case of a form in *e* belonging to this group has been pointed out, some scholars are ready to explain the *a/o* variation as a primitive gradation. It is possible that a wider survey of this group may discover a cognate in Gr ἀπο-λαύει 'enjoys'. An analogous correlation of senses is found in Latin *madet* 'is wet, drenched, full of': Skr. *mádati* 'rejoices'; further repeated in Skr. *módate* 'rejoices, is merry': Gr. μυδᾷ 'is wet'; and we can scarcely doubt that *madet* and μυδᾷ are ultimately cognate, if we note the diphthongal Lithuanian *maudyti* 'to bathe'. The Ger-

man verb *laben* means 'to wash, quicken, refresh', with some question as to which signification is primary. The primitive bath involves some form of rubbing, scrubbing or scraping (stripping), and nothing prevents our connecting German *waschen* with O. IR. *faiscim* 'I squeeze'.[29] Similarly Lith. *máuju* 'I strip' ('remove by cutting or scraping'), *maukiù* 'I strip smooth (Lat. *mūcus* 'snivel') are cognate with O. Bulg. *myti* 'to bathe'. A similar semantic series is found in ῥαίνει 'sprinkles', ῥαίει 'strikes', ῥέει 'flows', if these be correctly grouped together.[30]

Now by bringing Skr. *lāva-s* 'cutting' into the group with *lavat* 'scrubs', we may set up a root LĀW[31] 'cut, scrape, scour',—and in the trade of the tanner scraping and scouring are one and the same operation. In Latin, moreover, we might expound *lēv-it* by 'has rubbed',—cf. particularly *delet* (from **delev-et*?) and *delev-it* 'has rubbed out', *lēv-is* 'smooth', Gr. λεῖος from *ληϝyος(?)—so as to fit into a long-vowel series with *lavit*, from a root LĒW. The root LĀW may be identified with LĒW by regarding the ā in the Greek words as in some way secondary, like the problematic ᾱ of πλᾰθος.[32] Then λόει[27] belongs to LŌW, the deflected form of LĒW.

Still another possibility: the reduced grade to a root L̆Ē̆W—and all the long-vowel forms may be long-grades in a short-vowel series —would be either *l̆ŭ̆-* or *l̆o̯w*. In Latin we might derive from *l̄w* not only *lavat*,—shortened from **lāvat* by the rule of vowel before vowel,[33] *v* between similar vowels not preventing this; or originally short, if Osthoff's claim for *la-* from *l̆o̯* be right—[34] but also *alveus* 'tub' and, with secondary meaning along the lines of well-known vulgar phrases, *alvus* 'belly'. As *lavat* has all the look of a denominative, we need not scruple to define it by 'tubs', in the dialect of Old England. The word *alūmen* 'alum', a scouring substance used by the dyer, may also belong to this group.

I do not feel it advisable, however, to make *lavit* (3d conjug.) a form structurally different to λόει, especially in view of Lucilius' *elovies*, though a consideration of the corresponding citations makes me raise the question whether *elovies* is not cognate to *elevit*.[35] That *lavat* is the product of **lovat*, with assimilation of *o* to the following *a*, and more particularly in forms accented like *lavātis*, seems to me a proposition we may not refuse to grant, even though we cannot prove it directly. The Latin glossaries[9] gives us *lacatio* for *locatio*, *clabaca* (i. e. *clavaca*) and *claucus* for *cloaca*.[36]

Summing up here the discussion of *lavat*: semantic parallels can be adduced to support a cognation between *lavat* and Gr. *ἀπολαύει*, 'enjoys', deriving both from LEW, LOW in a long-vowel series (with problematic *ā* in the Greek forms). Whatever the vocalism of its root be, a reduced grade *l̥w* is possible, whence in Latin *ălv-*, or *lāv-* (? *lăv-*). Or, inferring from *elovies*: *λόει* original **lovit*, the change in *lavit* may have come about by a specific Latin vowel assimilation in *lavámus*, *lavátis*, etc.

A sound etymology cited for the law seems to me to be Lat. *pavet* 'is fear struck, trembles': Gr. *πτοεῖ* 'frightens', cf. *πτήσσει* 1) 'frightens', 2) 'cowers, is frightened', *πτώσσει* 'crouches', *πεπτηώς* 'crouching'. But beside *pavet* is *pavit* 'strikes', with the same correlation to *pavet* 'is frightened' ('is fear-struck') that we see in *iacit* 'strikes': *iacet* 'lies, is struck'. In Gr. *πταίει* 1) 'trips', 2) 'stumbles' we have a specialization of the meaning of *πτοεῖ* and *πτήσσει* on the one hand, and of *παίει* 'strikes' on the other [cf. *π(τ)όλεμος*, *π(τ)όλις*]. The whole secret of the vocalism of this group we need not examine here, but merely justify the *a* in *pavet*, *pavit* by the *α* of the Greek forms.

Apparently strong evidence for the law is yielded by *cavet* 'is wary, bewares': *κοεῖ* 'hears, heeds'. If the specific sense of *κοεῖ* is 'hears', as it may well be, why need we separate it from *ἀκ-ού-ει* (cf. *ἀκοή* 'hearing')? Hesychius furnishes the further forms *κοᾷ· ἀκούει*, and *ἐκοᾶμες· ἠκούσαμεν*. Accepting Kretschmer's[37] explanation of *ἀκ-ού-ει*: Gothic *h-aus-jan* 'to have sharp ears', *κ-ο-εῖ* corresponds in its reduced grade with *h-aus-jan*. The accord between the vocalism of *κοᾷ* and of *ἀκροάομαι* constitutes a further argument for their cognation with *h-aus-jan*.

If we follow the current definitions, *θυσ-κόος* means the 'sacrificing priest', and Hesychian *θυσκεῖ* means 'make burnt offerings'. These and Hesychian *κοίης* 'priest' we might connect with *καίει* 'burns',[38] deriving *κοίης* from **κωϝγης* and *θυσ-κόος* from °-*καός*, with assimilation of *α* to the neighboring *ο*'s. To the same root we may safely allot O. Bulg. *kovati*, Lith. *kauti* 'to forge'. In English *hews* the sense of 'hammers metal' has yielded to 'hammers with metal, cuts'. In Skr. *kávaca-s* 'coat of mail, bodice, jacket', Gr. *καυνάκης* 'cloak',[39]—said to be of Persian manufacture—, [*κυνέη* 'helmet' (?)], *καυσία* 'felt hat', *κῶας* 'fleece', Lith. *kauras* 'carpet' we have further cognates. Nearly the entire shift of meaning of these words is exhibited by English *corselet*, *corset*, if we start with 'coat of mail' as the primary signification. How-

ever, felt-making, with its beating and heating, is not unlike forging in its mechanical processes.

We may see in the Balto-Slavic words how naturally the sense of 'forges' develops from 'burns,' and we need not be told how easily technical terms shift from a special art to artistry in general, e. g., in τέκτων, Skr. *tákṣati*[40] and their cognates; so also in Latin, in *faber* 'smith,' *fabre* 'skilfully, ingeniously.' Thus with O. Bulg. *kovati* 'to forge' we may connect Skr. *kaví-s* 'wise, shrewd' and, with a bad sense, *kavatnú-s*, *kavarí-s*, 'selfish, stingy.' Certain Slavic cognates[41] develop the sense of 'treacherous' and so do other words of the same meaning, e. g. English *forges*, Gr. πλάσσει, Lat. *fabrefecit* (see e. g. Plautus, Most., 892). I see no reason why we may not explain Lat. *cavet* 'is wary' as a denominative to an adjectival **cavo-* 'cunning, wary,' a slightly opprobrious counterpart of Skr. *kaví-s* 'wise.' For the vocalism of the root it will be well to note Hesychian κῶα· ἐνέχυρα 'sureties,' with the same legal sense as *cautio* in Latin.

I briefly sum up the meanings found in the above group: A., verbal: 1) burn, (s)melt, 2) forge,—2a) counterfeit, deceive—, 3) hew, cut, etc. with a transfer from metal working to wood working; B., adjectival: workmanlike, skilful, wise, cunning, wary.

We are now prepared to add certain other words to this group,— Lat. *cūdit* 'forges,' Skr. *kū-ḍayati*, *kū-layati* 'burns'; Lat. *cau-tes*, Skr. *kū̆-lam* 'cliff,' from the sense of 'cut,' cf. English *scar* 'scaur' : *shear*. With this pair we can join the explanation already advanced for Lat. *cavus* (v. on *cavea*, p. 199), though *cavus* perhaps means literally 'cleft,' as *cau-dex* may mean 'cleft wood.' Greek is prolific of forms in κῡ̆-, e. g., κῡδάζει 'abuses' (: *cavilla*, v. supra, p. 192), κῡ̆-διστος 'most skilful, reputed for skill,' κύ-ρει 'strikes, hits upon, gets,' κυ-ρίσσει 'strikes (with horns).'

In all the forms already adduced the initial *k-* seems to be a pure guttural, but Gothic *hawi* 'hay' and Gr. ποίη 'fodder' bear association with this group if we construct a base QOW-YĀ. It is a fact of some importance that the four labializing languages all fail to labialize before *u*, and I see no reason why this phenomenon may not be dated in the Aryan period, whence beside QOW we might expect KU; or, even dating the phenomenon in the derived languages, we may look for confusion of *q* and *k*. Thus we may not only reconcile Gr. ποίη with this group, but also compare Skr. *kāvyá-s* 'wise, seer, poet,' *kāvya-m* 'poem' with Gr. ποιητής 'poet.' I note that Homer uses ποιεῖ of the acts of the smith and the car-

penter, and after him it is used of the sculptor and poet. We may illustrate by O. Eng. *lār-smiþ*, 'lore-smith,' *wundor-smiþ*, 'miracle doer,' *wrōht-smiþ*, 'crime-doer,' *gryn-smiþ*, 'grief-causer' etc., which show a similar generalization of meaning. It is hardly necessary to add that ποιϝέει may be legitimately deduced from *πŏϝγει, and no Sanskrit scholar, I take it, will be particularly drawn to its equation with *cinóti* 'heaps, gathers,'[42]—even with Lat. *struit* 'heaps, builds' before his eyes.'

We have now passed in review the evidence for Latin *av* from *ov*, and I have offered for all alleged cases explanations, phonetically normal, and semantically plausible, not involving the equation of Lat. *av* with the *ov* of any other language,—save for the single group *lavit* : λόει, and here, besides other possibilities, we cannot disprove the suggestion that in *lavâre* vowel assimilation has taken place.

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[1] Lindsay, Lat. Lang., p. 235. [2] Horton-Smith, Am. Jr. Phil., 16, 457. [3] Buecheler, Rhein. Mus., 52, 392. [4] Vol. 20, 90. [5] K. Z., 37, 1 seq. [6] Woch. Klass. Phil., 1895, 923 [and again in the current volume of K. Z.]. [7] Indog. Ablaut, §35, a. [8] Varro, *ap.* Gellium, 2, 10. [9] Goetz, *Thesaurus Glossarum Emendatarum*, s. v. [10] v., e. g., Guhl und Koner, Leben d. Griech. u. Roemer, fig. 413. [11] Transac. Am. Phil. Assoc., 29, 18[1]. [12] Indog. Forsch., Anz., 11, 173. [13] v. the essay cited at 11. [13a] [but v. Andresen, deutsche Volksetymologie[3], 9]. [14] Rhein. Mus., 51, 326. [15] Keil, *Gram. Lat.* 1, 296. [16] v. also 4. [17] v. Schreiber's Atlas, xviii, 5. [17a] C. I. L. xv, 7065. [18] v. Buecheler, *Carm. Epigr. Selec.*, no. 34. [19] v. Hehn's Kulturpflanzen u. Hausthiere[6], 588. [20] *pace* Schrader, B. B., 15, 129. [21] Fick–Stoke's Woert., p. 164. [22] v. Brugmann, Grundriss, 1[2], 600 and Bezzenberger, (in title no. 21), p. 163. [23] v. Hirt, B. B., 24, 218 seq., 290. [24] Ribbeck's *Scaen. Rom. Poesis Frag.*[1] [25] Vahlen's *Ennii Frag.* [26] v., e. g., Hoffmann, Gr. Dial., 2, 437. [27] v. Brugmann, Gr. Gram.[3] §39. [28] v. Mason, Woman's Share in Primitive Culture, 32 et al. [29] v. Kluge, Etym. Woert., s. v. [30] v. Prellwitz, Etym. Woert., s. v. [31] v. Hirt, cited in no. 7, §115. [32] v. G. Meyer's Gr. Gram.,[3] §35, Hirt, l. c., §283. [33] Solmsen, l. c., 2[1]. [34] but v. Brugmann, Grundriss, 1,[2] §514, anm. 2. [35] *ap.* Nonium, p. 103, lines 27, 24. [36] Schuchardt, Vokalismus, 1, 179. [37] K. Z., 33, 563 seq. [38] so Prellwitz, l. c., s. v., κοιάομαι, with a query. [39] *pace* Schrader, l. c., p. 131. [40] v. the etymological lexica of Prellwitz and Uhlenbeck, s. vv. [41] v. Miklosich, Woert., p. 153. [42] *pace* Brugmann, l. c., p. 589; Gr. Gram.[3] §178.

THE CONNECTION BETWEEN MUSIC AND POETRY IN EARLY GREEK LITERATURE.

Ὅτι δὲ πρὸς τὴν μουσικὴν οἰκειότατα διέκειντο οἱ ἀρχαῖοι δῆλον καὶ ἐξ Ὁμήρου· (Athenaeus, xiv, 632 c.)

It is a familiar fact that in some of the most highly developed forms of Greek literature, the sister arts of poetry, music and dance were combined and produced a homogeneous effect. Thus an ode of Pindar's was not merely a poetical but also a musical composition, which was composed not to be read, but to be sung to instrumental accompaniment, and not only sung, but danced with appropriate and expressive gestures. It is, in fact, this union of the arts that accounts for the marvelous elaboration of form which the greatest of Pindar's odes exhibit.

In most of the forms of melic poetry, of which the Pindaric ode is an example, poetry, music and dance are inseparable. No one art is employed to the exclusion of the other two. In the drama, however, while all three arts are utilized at one time or another, they are employed in combination only in the lyrical parts, and even here there are exceptions.

This union of the arts in the most complex of Greek literary forms is due, not to any artificial process of combination, but to the survival of earlier and even primitive ideas. Aristotle, "master of those who know," looking back as an historian over almost the whole field of Greek classical literature, realizes that the arts of poetry, music and dancing stand in essential unity and rest upon a common basis. They are all imitative arts, imitating by means of language, melody or rhythm the characters, passions and actions of men.[1] Rhythm, indeed, may be said to be common to all three, for poetry is rhythm expressed in words, music is rhythm expressed in sounds, and the dance is rhythm expressed in bodily movements.[2] Greek literary history furnishes

[1] Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1. 4 and 1. 5.

[2] Butcher, *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*[2] (Macmillan, 1898), p. 138.

abundant illustrations of this union of the rhythmic arts. The lyric or dramatic poet was necessarily a musician, and not only wrote the verses to be sung, but gave them their musical setting.[1] More than this, he possessed a practical knowledge of *orchestic*, and, as χοροδιδάσκαλος, originally taught the chorus the various gestures, postures and attitudes, which, under the name dancing, aided in the expression of emotion and the interpretation of his verse.

In these days most of us would probably be slow to admit that our complex art of music is in any sense imitative of human life, while dancing has been vulgarized, and as a fine art has almost disappeared from our midst. But though each of these sister arts now moves along independent lines, still there can be no doubt that the Greek view of their essential unity—based upon the common rhythmic element—is in strict accord with primitive conceptions, and may even to-day be illustrated in the customs of many aboriginal peoples.

The union, for example, of song and dance, is almost universal among the primitive peoples of the world. The aborigines of America, Africa and Australasia almost invariably combine dancing with vocal and instrumental music.[2] Dance and song, indeed, are "so unified, that it is neither possible to treat of the subject of primitive dance without primitive music, nor to make it even probable by means of ethnological examples that they ever were separated."[3]

The third member in the triad, poetry, can hardly claim a status as ancient as that of dance or music. Among primitive races vocal music often exists without language of any sort, the expressions used being mere aids to vocalization. In many cases though definite words are used, these are practically meaningless. Poetry, indeed, however simple, has an intellectual basis and implies a certain amount of mental cultivation. It is, however, not infrequently developed by races that are still in a primitive stage of culture, in which case it is invariably set forth in the

[1] Cf. Emil Reich, *Hungarian Literature* (London, 1898), p. 30: "Music in Hungary is the vocal and instrumental folk-lore of the people, and no lyrical poet of the Magyars could help writing without having in view the musical adaptation of his poem."

[2] Wallaschek, *Primitive Music* (London, 1893), *passim*.

[3] *Ibid.*, p. 187.

form of song. The Maoris, Australians and Tahitians have song-poetry of a comparatively artistic value.

An important feature of all primitive music is its preference for rhythm as compared with melody. The Iroquois Indians, for example, have a highly developed sense of rhythm in their music and dances, but their melodies are very poor.[1] The Samoans, a highly musical race, always keep time well, though they care little for distinct melodies; while among the Siamese, a people devoted to song, "modulation and expression," we are told, "were sacrificed to power and rhythmic effect."[2] In fact, in the music of primitive races, melody is always a matter of slight consideration. "We do not meet with a single instance among savages of melody, fixed according to musical principles."[3]

Among savages, dancing and singing directly reflect pleasurable and painful states of mind. The native Australian sings, when hungry or sated, when angry or glad. The songs of Indians vary distinctly in character, according as the occasion is a mournful or merry one. The Greenland Eskimos can express various passions in their dances and drum music. Similarly, nearly all aboriginal people recognize the great emotional power of music and use it both to cure disease and to banish evil spirits. Under the influence of his native rhythms, the Australian rushes to the hunt and the fray, or is soothed into tranquillity and submission.[4] Even among the most civilized nations of to-day, no art takes such a direct hold upon the emotions as music. You will see more emotion in a concert-room than in an art-gallery, and this is especially true when the music is of the simpler, more tangible kind.

In the light of these facts, the testimony of Greek philosophers as to both the ethical and the imitative character of music is more intelligible, inasmuch as Greek music, though far removed in point of development from that of primitive races, was much simpler than the modern art. Just as in China music has been under state supervision, and edicts have been issued against effeminate airs, so Plato, in the firm conviction that melodies and rhythms are expressive of character and react upon it, would have the whole musical art controlled by authority.[5] "A musical training," he tells us, "is of supreme importance,

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 51. [2] *Ibid.*, p. 21. [3] *Ibid.*, p. 230. [4] *Ibid.*, pp. 39, 44 ff.
[5] Plato, *Republic*, iii, 398 C ff.

because rhythm and melody sink into our inmost soul, and take hold of it most powerfully."[1] Hence the importance of admitting into education only the right kind of rhythms and melodies—those, namely, which will contribute to the upbuilding of a manly, noble and beautiful character. Unwholesome music, through its pernicious effect upon the citizens, may ultimately disturb the most important institutions of the state.[2] It is in a similar spirit that Aristotle recognizes in musical forms the very image and reflection of human passions and character.[3] The various modes of Greek music have their own peculiar character, imitating various states of feeling and affecting the hearers in distinctly different ways. Even the curative properties of music are recognized by Aristotle, who speaks of sacred melodies, in which men laboring under religious frenzy have found healing and cleansing for their souls.[4]

Thus we see how, even in the late days of Plato and Aristotle, Greek music preserved some of the striking features of the primitive art. It was still in a comparatively rudimentary stage and maintained a close hold upon human life, exerting with its marked rhythm a strong psychical and even physical influence. It was simple and direct, a vehicle for emotional expression, and appealing directly to the feelings of the hearer. As with Chinese music, its modes were believed to be full of significance and moral import. The connection between words and tune was close and vital, the time of the music coinciding perfectly with the metre of the verse. The unified art was, however, in such a stage, that poetry was the dominant element, the music being subsidiary and serving not to obscure, but to emphasize and illustrate the force of the words. To Plato, indeed, music without words is a meaningless anomaly.[5] Further, though the Greeks were familiar with harmony,[6] of which even savage nations have some knowledge,[7] they never employed it in vocal music, their choruses being sung in unison, so that the poetry did not become indistinct amid a variety of melodies.

[1] *Ibid.*, 401 D. [2] *Ibid.*, iv, 424 C. [3] Aristotle, *Pol.* v (viii) 5. 1340 a 18.

[4] *Ibid.*, 7. 1342 a 10: ἐκ δὲ τῶν ἱερῶν μελῶν ὁρῶμεν τούτους, ὅταν χρήσωνται τοῖς ἐξοργιάζουσι τὴν ψυχὴν μέλεσι, καθισταμένους, ὥσπερ ἰατρείας τυχόντας καὶ καθάρσεως. [5] Plato, *Laws* ii, 669 E.

[6] Westphal, *Die Musik des griechischen Alterthumes* (Leipzig, 1883), p. 24.

[7] Wallaschek, *Primitive Music*, pp. 139 ff.

In view, then, of the intimate relations maintained between music and poetry even in the late days of Greek literature, let us endeavor to ascertain how close a connection existed between them in the age portrayed for us in the earliest of our extant literature, the epic.

It must, of course, be assumed that the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* are the resultant of a long process of antecedent development. The epic, indeed, presupposes lyric sources, which in their turn, if we may draw conclusions from the customs of various aboriginal races, go back to a primitive drama of a pantomimic character.[1] Of such a drama we learn very little from Homer.[2] In one passage from the *Iliad*[3] we have a reminiscence in a dance of youths and maidens, headed by two κυβιστητῆρε or professional players, who perform in dumb show.[4] A similar scene in the *Odyssey* represents a minstrel singing to the lyre, while the κυβιστητῆρε perform.[5]

Of the lyrical forerunners of Homeric epic, we have much more knowledge. Thus Homer mentions several forms of both choral and solo lyric. The *paean*, for example, was sung by the Achaeans after a sacrificial feast to propitiate Apollo.[6] It was also sung as a song of victory after the death of Hector.[7] Of the *threnus*, or lament for the dead, we have an instance near the close of the *Iliad*,[8] where Hector is bewailed.

> παρὰ δ' εἶσαν ἀοιδοὺς
> θρήνων ἐξάρχους, οἵ τε στονόεσσαν ἀοιδὴν
> οἱ μὲν δὴ θρήνεον, ἐπὶ δὲ στενάχοντο γυναῖκες.

Here follow solos, sung by Andromache, Hecabe and Helen, respectively (of 21, 12 and 14 verses in length), with whom the mourning women wail in accord. Similarly, over the body of Achilles a threnus is chanted by the Muses themselves responsively, while the Nereids and the Achaeans join in the lamentation.[9] The *hymenaeus* is described in connection with the Shield

[1] Wallaschek, *Primitive Music*, p. 271.

[2] Unless otherwise indicated, I use this name to embrace only the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*.

[3] Σ 590–605.

[4] In Hector's boast, οἶδα δ' ἐνὶ σταδίῃ δηίῳ μέλπεσθαι Ἄρηι (H 241), there is doubtless a reference to an ancient war-dance, in which a battle-scene would be acted in pantomime. To such a scene there is also an allusion in Π 617, where the Cretan Meriones is called a good dancer (ὀρχηστής).

[5] δ 17. [6] A 473. [7] X 391 ff. [8] Ω 720 ff. [9] ω 60 ff.

of Achilles.[1] Pipes and strings (*αὐλοὶ φόρμιγγές τε*) with dancing accompany the bridal song.

The *linus* was one of the early Volkslieder of Greece, being a plaintive nature-song on the death of a beautiful youth who typified the passing of summer. As described by Homer, it was a solo sung by a boy to his own string accompaniment, while youths and maidens danced, shouted and gesticulated in concert.[2] In the *Odyssey*, Calypso and Circe are represented as singing (*ἀοιδιάουσ' ὀπὶ καλῇ*) as they ply the loom.[3] Nothing is said as to the burden of their songs. Here the noise of the shuttle would be a substitute for the music of strings. In the *Iliad*, Achilles occupies his leisure time in singing the glories of heroes (*κλέα ἀνδρῶν*) to the accompaniment of a clear-toned harp (*φόρμιγγι λιγείῃ*).[4]

Doubtless, other varieties of song, religious and secular, were familiar to Homer, but we must confine our attention to those actually mentioned in the epics, of which the most important are the lays setting forth the *κλέα ἀνδρῶν*. In these we must recognize the immediate predecessors of the epic poems, which—whatever be our theory of epic composition—must be regarded as embracing a number of *epyllia* or songs of an epic character. Such an *epyllion* was the song of Phemius,[5] dealing with the return of the Achaeans from Troy, "the newest song to float about men's ears,"[6] or that of Demodocus,[7] setting forth Odysseus' quarrel with Achilles, or again the same bard's song on Odysseus and the wooden horse.[8] A song of this sort is described by Alcinous[9] as *ἀοιδῆς ὕμνος* or 'linked song', *ὕμνος* having its early meaning as derived from the root found in Latin *suere*, English 'sew'.[10] Thus *ὕμνος*, as used of song, and the once disputed *ῥαψῳδία* have precisely the same original force, a fact well illustrated by the phrase which Hesiod[11] applies to himself and Homer in the words *ἐγὼ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἀοιδοὶ μέλπομεν ἐν νεαροῖς ὕμνοις ῥάψαντες ἀοιδήν*.[12]

The numerous legends of early Greek bards, such as Orpheus, Musaeus, Eumolpus and Olympus, point to a wide diffusion of

[1] Σ 491 ff. [2] Σ 569 ff. [3] ε 61, κ 221. [4] I 189.
[5] α 326. [6] α 352. [7] θ 73 ff. [8] θ 499 ff.
[9] θ 429. [10] Cf. Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets*, p. xxvii. [11] Fr. 244 Rz.
[12] Cf. Sittl, *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur*, I, p. 119, who compares *ῥάπτειν* with *singen* and *siuwan* (Eng. 'sew'). Koegel, *Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur*, p. 143, connects *singen* with *seq-* (*insece*, *ἔννεπε*, and therefore *sagen*), but not so Kluge.

minstrelsy throughout Greece in prehistoric days. In the catalogue of the ships[1] is told the story of such a traditional bard, the Thracian Thamyris, who is evidently regarded by the author as a wandering minstrel, ready to enter into contests of song. These bards, to be sure, figure nowhere else in the *Iliad*. Achilles, as we have seen, was his own minstrel, and the ἀοιδοί, who in Ω 720 chant the threnus over Hector, were professional mourners who led the dirge. In the *Odyssey*, however, the ἀοιδοί have a recognized position at court, and here, prompted by the Muse[2] or "stirred by the god",[3] they sing (ἀείδειν) to their own string-accompaniment both κλέα ἀνδρῶν and tales of the gods,[4] making a selection from their *répertoire* of their own accord[5] or, on request, taking up a narrative at some particular point[6] in the story. In the palace of Alcinous, Demodocus, on one day, besides accompanying with his lyre the dance of the Phaeacian boys,[7] sang three lays, two about Odysseus, and one on the love of Ares and Aphrodite.[8] Other subjects for the minstrel's song (ἀοιδή) recorded in Homer are Orestes,[9] Penelope,[10] and Clytaemnestra.[11]

The minstrel[12] is skilled in lyre and song[13] and his art is described[14] by the expression κίθαρις καὶ ἀοιδή. He accompanies the dancing,[15] and ὀρχηστύς and ἀοιδή are mentioned as closely associated pleasures.[16] Evidently the art of the Homeric minstrel is in that primitive stage, when singing, playing and dancing are intimately connected and almost form a single interest, such as is well illustrated by the description of the *linos* in Σ 569 ff.[17] The dance, however, does not usually accompany the minstrel's song, and in his performance (a combination of vocal and instrumental

[1] B 594 ff. [2] θ 73. [3] ὁρμηθεὶς θεοῦ, θ 499.

[4] Cf. Theocritus, xvi, 1, 2.

> αἰεὶ τοῦτο Διὸς κούραις μέλει, αἰὲν ἀοιδοῖς
> ὑμνεῖν ἀθανάτους, ὑμνεῖν ἀγαθῶν κλέα ἀνδρῶν.

[5] θ 45. [6] θ 500, ἔνθεν ἑλών. [7] θ 262. [8] θ 266 ff.

[9] γ 204. [10] ω 197. [11] ω 200.

[12] In connection with this whole subject, compare Koehler, "*Über den Stand Berufsmässiger Sänger im Nationalen Epos Germanischer Völker*," in *Germania*, XV (1870), pp. 27 ff.

[13] φόρμιγγος ἐπιστάμενος καὶ ἀοιδῆς, φ 406.

[14] α 159; cf. N 731; B 599, 600.

[15] Cf. ψ 145. [16] α 421, θ 253, ρ 605, σ 304.

[17] See above, p. 210, also Prickard, *Aristotle on the Art of Poetry*, p. 21.

music) it is the story—the words used—which affords the main charm for the hearer.[1] This story, however, is set forth in song, and if divested of its musical garb would no longer be a tale of minstrelsy, such as appealed so powerfully to the Greeks of Homer's day.[2]

This musical dress for epic narrative is regularly defined by the verb *ἀείδειν*. Though an instrumental accompaniment was as regular a feature of the minstrel's art as vocal song, yet *ἀείδειν*, embracing as it did the narrative, was much more representative of the entire performance than such a verb as *κιθαρίζειν*, which in fact is found in Homer only once,[3] or *φορμίζειν*, which occurs only three times.[4] On the other hand, *ἀείδειν*, as applied to Phemius, Demodocus and bards in general, is used no less than twenty-eight times. It is also used twice of Achilles, as he sings the *κλέα ἀνδρῶν*,[5] and twice of the Muses themselves, once as they sing in Olympus while Apollo plays the lyre,[6] and once of their contest with the boastful Thamyris.[7] This, then, is the prevailing application of the verb, for of actual singing in other connections (presumably in combination with words), *ἀείδειν* or the allied *ἀοιδιάειν* is used only eight times. It is also found once in connection with the nightingale's song,[8] and once is used figuratively of the bow-string, which, when touched by Odysseus, sang "like a swallow."[9]

There still remains one instance of the word in Homer, and that is in the opening line of the *Iliad*. Here, in the invocation to the Muse, the poet calls upon the goddess to do that which he himself does under her inspiration. The epic poet, who, like his own Achilles or Demodocus, sings the *κλέα ἀνδρῶν* is himself a minstrel guided by the Muse, and as his first word (*μῆνιν*) introduces the theme of his story, so the second (*ἄειδε*) expresses the mode by which it is to be presented to his hearers.[10]

[1] Cf. *ρ* 519, *ἔπε' ἱμερόεντα βροτοῖσιν.*

[2] Cf. *ρ* 518–521. *ὡς δ' ὅτ' ἀοιδὸν ἀνὴρ ποτιδέρκεται, ὅς τε θεῶν ἐξ*
ἀείδῃ, δεδαὼς ἔπε' ἱμερόεντα βροτοῖσιν,
τοῦ δ' ἄμοτον μεμάασιν ἀκουέμεν, ὁππότ' ἀείδῃ·
ὣς ἐμὲ κεῖνος ἔθελγε παρήμενος ἐν μεγάροισιν.

[3] Σ 570. [4] In the *Odyssey* only, the instance in Σ 605 being spurious. [5] I 189, 191. [6] A 604. [7] B 598. [8] *τ* 519. [9] *φ* 411.

[10] In the corresponding line of the *Odyssey*, *ἔννεπε* is used, as elsewhere *ἔσπετε* (cf. B 484), from the root found in *insece, sagen, say*. The two terms

We are all, of course, familiar with a common use of the verb 'sing', and its equivalents in various languages, according to which the poet is represented as a *singer*, whose productions are veritable *songs*. This use, it is needless to say, is more or less artificial, and for the most part is a mere imitation of the language of early poets, who actually did sing their compositions. How often, for instance, has this use of ἀείδειν in Homer suggested a word for the more learned, less naive poetry of later times? In *arma virumque cano* Vergil imitates the opening of the *Odyssey*, but his verb he takes from that of the *Iliad*. Milton's "sing, heavenly Muse!" comes directly from μῆνιν ἄειδε θεά. But Homer, living as he did in the very hey-day of Greek minstrelsy, and being himself the greatest of all the ἀοιδοί,[1] is little likely to have used the verb in these opening words of the *Iliad* in a purely artificial sense—a sense in which he employs it nowhere else, and which is at all times rare in Greek literature.[2] Thus in his great epic the word retains its primary and natural meaning. The poet was indeed a *singer*, and Homeric poetry preserves this notable feature of the primitive poetic art. It was intended to be actually *sung*.

As we have said, an instrumental accompaniment was a regular though less essential feature of the art of the ἀοιδός.[3] As Odysseus and the swineherd drew near to the palace, "the sound of the hollow lyre rang around them,"[4] ἀνὰ γάρ σφισι βάλλετ' ἀείδειν Φήμιος. Similarly, when Telemachus and the disguised Athene came among the suitors, an attendant placed a lyre in the hands of Phemius, and ἦ τοι ὁ φορμίζων

are in no sense contrasted, yet they are not synonymous. The one, ἀείδειν, involves the other, ἐνισπεῖν, and expresses not only the fact of telling a story, but also the manner of doing so. Compare what is said below on λέγειν τε καὶ ᾄδειν in Plato.

[1] Cf. Hesiod, Fr. 244 Rz., ἐγὼ καὶ Ὅμηρος ἀοιδοὶ μέλπομεν κ. τ. λ.

[2] The verb applicable to our 'the poet sings' or 'writes' is ποιεῖν or simply λέγειν, not ᾄδειν. Plato nowhere uses ᾄδειν of the poet from whom he quotes. See p. 217 below.

[3] It is hardly necessary to call attention to the prominence of the harp or similar stringed instrument among the early Germanic and various other peoples. (Cf. Koegel, *Geschichte der deutschen Litteratur*, p. 142; "the non-strophic epic song was regularly delivered with harp accompaniment." For its importance among the Old English, see Padelford, *Old English Musical Terms*, (Bonn, 1899) pp. 2, 6 ff.

[4] ρ 261–3.

ἀνεβάλλετο καλὸν ἀείδειν.[1] It is a question whether in these passages ἀναβάλλεσθαι is used of the instrumental prelude, "sounded the prelude to his sweet singing", or of the opening of the song itself, "lifted up his voice in sweet song". The latter interpretation is supported by a passage in the Hymn to Hermes[2]

τάχα δὲ λιγέως κιθαρίζων
γηρύετ' ἀμβολάδην, ἐρατὴ δέ οἱ ἕσπετο φωνή,

where ἀμβολάδην "by way of prelude" certainly modifies γηρύετο. However, even if Phemius "touched the chords in prelude to his sweet singing", it does not follow that the lyre was confined to the prelude and that the rest of the song was purely vocal. If such an interpretation were applied to the opening of Pindar's First Pythian, we might infer from the beautiful apostrophe of the χρυσέα φόρμιγξ, which "with quivering strings gives the prelude to choir-leading overtures",[3] that only the prelude, but not the ode itself was accompanied by the strings. No one has ever imagined this.

Tradition indicates that in reference to the lyre accompaniment there may have been some distinction between Homeric and Hesiodic epic. Hesiod is said to have been excluded from a Pythian musical contest, because he did not accompany himself on the lyre,[4] and Pausanias finds fault with a sculptor for representing Hesiod with a κιθάρα on his knees, when the poems themselves show that, as he sang, he held in his hand a laurel staff,[5] viz. that which the Muses gave him when they consecrated him to their service. In Homer, the staff is held as a sign of authority by heralds, judges and speakers in the assembly, but is never mentioned as a symbol of minstrelsy. Pindar, however, himself a Boeotian, and therefore probably more familiar with Hesiodic than Homeric symbolism, assigns the ῥάβδος to Homer, for "by the staff of his divine heroics he set forth the excellence (of Ajax) for others to sing".[6]

However, the very fact that Hesiod presented himself at a distinctly musical contest would show that whether he employed

[1] *a* 155; so *θ* 266, of Demodocus.

[2] l. 426.

[3] ἀγησιχόρων ὁπόταν προοιμίων
ἀμβολὰς τεύχῃς ἐλελιζομένα.

[4] Pausanias, 10. 7. 3.

[5] *Ibid.*, 9. 30. 3; Hesiod, *Theog.* 30.

[6] κατὰ ῥάβδον ἔφρασεν θεσπεσίων ἐπέων λοιποῖς ἀθύρειν, Pindar, *Isth.* 3. 56.

the lyre or not he regarded his work as belonging to the musical art. Moreover, we must remember the striking difference in tone and intrinsic worth between Homeric and Hesiodic verse, much of the latter being mere prose in contents, though verse in form, so that Hesiod may not have found much favor at a Pythian contest. And finally, we must not forget that in thus gossiping about the old epic poets, Pausanias "seems to repeat the stories of the time when the richer and more elaborate lyric poetry came to look upon the old epic recitation as bald and poor."[1]

The successors to the Homeric ἀοιδοί are the so-called rhapsodists. The term ῥαψῳδός is of late origin, occurring first in Herodotus,[2] who tells us that Clisthenes, tyrant of Sicyon (*circa* 596–565 B. C.) stopped the rhapsodists from contending for prizes in Homeric verse, because Argos and the Argives are celebrated throughout. The verb ῥαψῳδεῖν first appears in the *Ecclesiazusae* of Aristophanes,[3] and in Plato,[4] who applies it to Homer and Hesiod themselves. Hesiod's own expression ῥάψαντες ἀοιδήν, and Pindar's designation of the Homeridae,[5] ῥαπτῶν ἐπέων ἀοιδοί, illustrate the meaning of the first element[6] in the compound,—a compound which could hardly have been formed before it was necessary to distinguish between varieties of ἀοιδή. Thus the term ῥαψῳδία, 'stitched, i. e. linked or continuous song,' did not originate until other forms of ἀοιδή came into prominence, and chiefly such as are associated with *melic*, a name which is probably due to the grouping of words and music in members (κατὰ μέλη),[7] as contrasted with the unbroken continuous flow of epic and certain other forms of verse. Similarly, rhapsodists were sometimes called στιχῳδοί,[8] because the poetry they rendered consisted of single lines, which were not grouped in melic systems.

Closely connected with the rhapsodists is that body of verse which has come down to us known as the *Homeric Hymns*. These *Hymns*, showing as they do much diversity of language and tone, evidently belong to different times and places, and

[1] Mahaffy, *Greek Literature*, vol. I. p. 117, note 2.

[2] 5. 67. [3] 1. 678. The play was produced in 393 B. C.

[4] *Rep.* x, 600 D. [5] *Nem.* 2. 2.

[6] See above, p. 210. For another explanation, see Croiset, *Histoire de la Littérature Grecque*, Vol. I, p. 412, note 3.

[7] Cf. Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets*, pp. xviii ff.

[8] Schol. *ad* Pind. *Nem.* 2. 1.

testify to the wide-spread and long-continued custom of rhapsodizing. We learn from Pindar[1] and Plutarch[2] that rhapsodists composed hymns as preludes to their rendering of Homeric and other poetry. Hence, besides ὕμνοι, we also find the word προοίμια frequently used of these compositions,—a term appropriate enough to the smaller *Hymns*, though less so to the larger ones, some of which are long enough to be of independent interest.

The *Homeric Hymns* were composed by rhapsodists in connection with various religious festivals, at which there were contests of song. Of such contests we have frequent notices from the close of the seventh century B. C. on, while tradition carries us back to the time of Homer himself. The most notable contest was connected with the Panathenaea, where by a law of Solon's it was ordained that rhapsodists should render Homer in consecutive, not hap-hazard order.

The most complete description which we possess of the rhapsodist's art is that given by Plato in his *Ion*. It is not necessary to give the details of this familiar picture, but we may note one important fact. Even in Plato's day the rhapsodist's rendition of Homer was regarded as a kind of musical performance. Thus ῥαψῳδία is not only a branch of μουσική,[3] but it is grouped[4] with αὔλησις, κιθάρισις and κιθαρῳδία as a kindred art, and as each of the other terms designates a form of vocal or instrumental music, it seems clear that ῥαψῳδία is regarded in a similar way. Moreover, the verb ᾄδειν is used of Ion's rendition of the *Odyssey*[5] and of the performance of rhapsodists in general,[6] and further, a portion of Homer as presented by a rhapsodist is even called by Plato a μέλος,[7] a word which certainly implies a distinctly musical element.

Notwithstanding Plato's language, Professor Jebb claims[8] that "the rhapsode of Plato's time clearly did not *sing* Homer to music," for though ᾄδειν is used of Ion's performances, "that word was applicable to any solemn recitation: thus Thucydides applies it to the reciting of an oracular verse."[9] Jebb seems to forget that "singing and recitation—as the very word recitative should be enough to remind any one—pass into each other by degrees imperceptible to any but a technical ear."[10] Moreover, the use of

[1] *Nem.* 2. 1. [2] *De Musica*, 6. [3] *Ion*, 530 A. [4] *Ibid.*, 533 B.
[5] *Ibid.*, 535 B. [6] *Ibid.*, 532 D. [7] *Ibid.*, 536 B. [8] Jebb, *Homer*, p. 80.
[9] Thucydides, 2. 54.
[10] Saintsbury, *The Flourishing of Romance and the Rise of Allegory* (Scribner's 1897), p. 48.

ᾄδειν in Thucydides affords weak support for Jebb's contention. It is found only in the second book, four times in all. In chapter 8 we read: καὶ πολλὰ μὲν λόγια ἐλέγοντο, πολλὰ δὲ χρησμολόγοι ᾖδον κ. τ. λ., where there is a distinct contrast between ordinary speaking and a professional mode of rendition, quite possibly singing.[1] In chapter 21 ᾄδειν is similarly used of the chanting of oracles by professional χρησμολόγοι, and in chapter 54 it is employed thus twice, for with ᾄσονται we must doubtless supply οἱ χρησμολόγοι and in the case of ᾄδεσθαι the agency would be expressed by ὑπὸ τῶν χρησμολόγων. If the laws in certain states were "conveyed to the people in forms of music and poetry," why not oracles as well?[2]

Again, a study of Plato's use of ᾄδειν in other dialogues will confirm the view that in the *Ion* the word does imply *musical* presentation. Thus the phrase λέγειν τε καὶ ᾄδειν,[3] which is used several times, shows that ᾄδειν means more than λέγειν. In substantive form the words become λόγοι τε καὶ ᾠδαί.[4] In fact, λέγειν is used of plain speech, and ᾄδειν of the same speech, when it becomes song, such as a lover sings.[5] In one case, ᾄδειν is combined with ποιεῖν, the latter being used of poetical composition, the former of the rendering of the poem.[6] Of the fifty-four cases of ᾄδειν given in Ast's *Lexicon Platonicum* there are probably very few where the word is not used literally of singing.[7] In two, it is said to be equivalent to *celebrare*.[8] In only two is it supposed to equal *pronuntiare*, but an examination of the passages[9] shows

[1] We must supply λόγια with the second πολλά and "der Unterschied liegt in ἐλέγοντο und ᾖδον" (Classen).

[2] See Butcher, *Some Aspects of the Greek Genius* (Macmillan, 1893), p. 185: "we read of laws arranged as catches and sung after dinner."

[3] Cf. Lachmann's article (1833) *Über Singen und Sagen*, in *Kleinere Schriften*, ed. by Müllenhoff (Berlin, 1876), pp. 461 ff.

[4] Plato, *Lysis*, 206 B.

[5] *Ibid.*, 205 D.; 205, E; 206 C. Cf. *Sympos.* 214 B. (al. ἐπᾴδειν); *Gorg.* 502 B.

[6] *Lysis*, 205 D.

[7] This may include the singing of birds (Phaedr. 85 A) and even the crowing of cocks (*Sympos.* 223 C).

[8] *Lysis*, 205 C: ἃ ἡ πόλις ὅλη ᾄδει, and 205 D, ἅπερ αἱ γραῖαι ᾄδουσι.

[9] *Laws*, ix, 854 C and D. Lucian, *Herod.* 833. 1, uses ᾄδειν of the mode in which Herodotus presented his histories at Olympia, but we may note that (1) the historian was supposed to enter a contest, which was presumably musical (οὐ θεατὴν ἀλλ' ἀγωνιστὴν παρεῖχεν ἑαυτόν) and therefore ᾄδειν is probably used by analogy; (2) his books were called after the Muses in

that there it is used metaphorically, the laws proclaimed being treated as hymns and preludes (*προοίμια*).[1]

In an enumeration of the early Greek musicians, beginning with Amphion, the fabled inventor of the citharoedic art, Plutarch includes Thamyris, Demodocus and Phemius, whose tales, he assures us, were similar to the poems of Stesichorus and the old lyric writers, who composed hexameters and set them to music (*μέλη*).[2] Terpander, too, "set airs, according to his nomes, to the verses of Homer as well as his own, and sang them at public contests".[3] Terpander, in fact, was an Homeric *ῥαψῳδός*,[4] whose own compositions, called later *προοίμια κιθαρῳδικά*,[5] are very possibly represented in the extant *Homeric Hymns*.[6]

From this passage in Plutarch we may draw two important inferences. In the first place, we have positive testimony that Homeric hexameters (non-strophic) were sung by Terpander, even as hexameters were sung afterwards by Stesichorus, the latter's, however, being in strophic form. In the second place, the citharoedic art existed long before Terpander, who, by his musical improvements, merely enriched and enlarged its scope. Thus the innovation here attributed to Terpander consisted not in the singing of Homeric verse, but in singing it according to definite musical styles, represented by his so-called *nomes*. If the more elaborate music of Terpander could be applied to Homeric verse,

consequence of the recitation, and (3) he belongs to the infancy of prose, and his style has many traces of its poetical origin. Cf. Dionys. Halic. *de Thucyd.* ch. 23, p. 865.

[1] See above p. 215 f. In Plato, *Rep.* ii, 364 C, *οἱ μὲν κακίας πέρι εὐπετείας διδόντες*, Muretus suggested *ᾄδοντες* for *διδόντες*, but the change would not accord with Plato's use of *ᾄδειν*.

[2] *De Musica* 3 : *οἱ ποιοῦντες ἐπη τούτοις μέλη περιετίθεσαν.*

[3] *Ibid.*, *τοῖς ἐπεσι τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοῖς Ὁμήρου μέλη περιτιθέντα ᾄδειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν.*

[4] "Every ancient *ἀοιδός* is a rhapsodist, not because he sews songs together, but because he is a composer and reciter of epic songs (*ῥαπτὰ ἔπη*). He recites his own and can also recite those of others". (Comparetti, *The Traditional Poetry of the Finns*, translated by Anderton,—Longmans, 1898—p. 357.)

[5] Plutarch, *De Mus.* 4 : *πεποίηται δὲ τῷ Τερπάνδρῳ καὶ προοίμια κιθαρῳδικὰ ἐν ἔπεσιν.*

[6] Cf. Wolf, *Prolegomena ad Homerum* §§ 106-7 (pp. 64-5, Bekker); Müller, *Greek Literature*, I, p. 206; Sittl, *Geschichte der griech. Litt.* I, p. 122.

there could certainly have been little trouble in combining with it the simpler music of earlier days.

According to Timomachus, as quoted by Athenaeus,[1] Stesander the Samian was the first citharoedus to present Homeric poetry at Delphi, his selections being taken from both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*. Here the innovation consists not in singing Homer to a lyre accompaniment, but in competing in the Pythian citharoedic contests with Homeric verse, instead of poetry composed by the citharoedus himself. The original contest at Delphi, according to Pausanias, consisted in the singing of hymns to the god Apollo,[2] and Eleuther is mentioned as the first who competed with a song which was not his own.[3] It was a tradition recognized by Athenaeus[4] that Homer himself had given all his poetry a musical garb, and Chamaeleon is quoted as saying, in a work on Stesichorus, that not only the verses of Homer, but also those of Hesiod, Archilochus, Mimnermus and Phocylides were sung (*μελῳδηθῆναι*).[5]

This important statement of Chamaeleon's is in complete accord with the inherent probabilities of the case. The poetry of the Greeks, as of all other nations,[6] was originally song-poetry, and the changes from sung to merely spoken poetry (*ψιλὴ ποίησις*) came not before, but long after Homer. It will not do to claim that Homeric verse was not sung, because it is not strophic.[7] If a strophic arrangement were a necessary prerequisite for song, Homer's verse would have been strophic, like the songs of the *Edda* or the Vedic hymns. But in the *Kalevala*, or epic poetry of the Finns, there is an "absolute want, at all times, of strophic division",[8] and yet the epic runes (called *laulu* 'song', in distinction from *luku* 'reading', or magic rune which is merely recited) were actually sung to the accompaniment of the *kantele*, or instru-

[1] Athenaeus, xiv, 638 a.

[2] Pausanias, x, 7. 2, *ᾄσαι ὕμνον ἐς τὸν θεόν*.

[3] *Ibid.*, x, 7. 3.

[4] Athenaeus, xiv, 632 d, *μεμελοποιηκέναι πᾶσαν ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ποίησιν*.

[5] *Ibid.*, xiv, 620 c.

[6] "The Japanese name for 'poem' is allied to the word 'to sing,' and it is the opinion of the native literati that in olden days all poems were sung" (Chamberlain, *The Classical Poetry of the Japanese*—Boston, 1880, p. 22).

[7] Westphal, *Griechische Rhythmik* (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 211 ff.

[8] Comparetti, *The Traditional Poetry of the Finns*, translated by Anderton (Longmans, 1898), p. 299.

ment of five strings, corresponding to the Greek φόρμιγξ. "In Finland there is no difference in form between ἔπος and μέλος."[1]

In Greece, the continuous, unbroken hexameter verse is alone in evidence long before we meet any other. Not only so, but the earliest form of historical lyric is the same. The early lyric hymns were dactylic, as were also the nome, prosodia, paean, hymenaeus and threnus.[2] How strong a hold hexameter verse had in lyric poetry may be inferred from the fact that four hundred years after Terpander it was still used by Timotheus of Miletus, in his νόμοι κιθαρῳδικοί, which are defined as ἔπη.[3]

The first deviation from epic verse-form is the elegiac couplet, which is derived from the hexametric series by a slight modification of every alternate line, so that a continuous metrical paragraph is broken into small sentence-groups. This couplet, which first comes into view in the seventh century B. C., proved a fitting vehicle for personal reflection of all kinds, and though so closely allied to the stately verse of the epic, was soon found to be applicable to the most heterogeneous subjects. Elegy (a word of Asiatic, non-Greek origin) is closely linked with the music of the flute, and in its earlier days, whether associated with a funeral or a banquet, a call to arms or sentimental moralizing, was undoubtedly sung.

On this point the testimony of Plutarch is very explicit: ἐν ἀρχῇ γὰρ ἐλεγεῖα μεμελοποιημένα οἱ αὐλῳδοὶ ᾖδον.[4] Mimnermus, the elegiac poet, was a noted flute-player, and his name was associated with a particular tune for the flute, known as the κραδίας νόμος.[5] How the elegies of Theognis were rendered may be inferred from the poet's words on his beloved Cyrnus:

> καί σε σὺν αὐλίσκοισι λιγυφθόγγοις νέοι ἄνδρες
> εὐκόσμως ἐρατοὶ καλά τε καὶ λιγέα
> ᾄσονται.[6]

—they were sung to a flute-accompaniment. As for Solon, we all remember the story of how he recovered Salamis for the Athenians. "Mounting the herald's stone, he sang through the elegy, which thus begins: 'I am come myself as a herald from lovely Salamis,' using song-embellished words, in lieu of simple

[1] *Ibid.*, p. 31. [2] See Smyth, *Greek Melic Poets*, Introduction.
[3] Steph. Byz. Μίλητος.
[4] *De Musica*, 8. [5] *Ibid.* [6] Theognis, 241-3.

speech."[1] Solon's language reminds one of the fact that Japanese envoys once *sang* important speeches at foreign courts. After Solon's day the children of Athens were taught to sing (ᾄδειν) his poems,[2] and Chamaeleon's statement, already quoted, that the works of certain of the non-melic poets were once sung, includes Mimnermus, Phocylides and Archilochus.[3]

The poet last mentioned, Archilochus, is the reputed inventor of the iambic trimeter,[4] and since the iambic, as Aristotle clearly shows,[5] is of all verse-forms the least removed from prose, it is here, if anywhere in Greek poetry, that we should expect the element of music to disappear. And yet, as we have seen, the verses of Archilochus, (including, no doubt, his iambics), were once sung, even as in later times they were presented in the theatre by rhapsodists, as were also the iambics of Simonides.[6]

It is here, however, in iambic verse, that we may detect the first indications of a tendency to divorce music and poetry in Greece. Plutarch states that "Archilochus, according to tradition, first showed how iambics could be partly spoken[7] to the stroke of the lyre, and partly sung (thereto); afterwards, the tragedians followed this custom; then Crexus, taking it from them, applied it to dithyrambs." Thus it was Archilochus who first substituted speech for song in the least elevated type of poetry, though even here he still retained the instrumental music. This mode of delivery was adopted in tragedy, and in time made its way even into one form of melic poetry, the dithyramb.

The innovations in metres and poetical delivery attributed to Archilochus are coincident with the great advance in the musical art with which the name of Terpander is associated. Archilochus and Terpander flourished in the first half of the seventh century B. C., and among the ancients it was a disputed question, which was the older of the two.[8] Be that as it may, Terpander and

[1] Plutarch, *Solon*, 8: ἐν ᾠδῇ διεξῆλθε τὴν ἐλεγείαν, ἧς ἐστιν ἀρχή·

αὐτὸς κῆρυξ ἦλθον ἀφ' Ἱμερτῆς Σαλαμῖνος,
κόσμον ἐπέων ᾠδήν τ' ἀντ' ἀγορῆς θέμενος.

[2] Plato, *Timaeus*, 21 B.

[3] See p. 219

[4] Plutarch, *De Musica*, 28.

[5] Aristotle, *Rhet.* 3. 1. 9; *Poetics*, 4. 14.

[6] Athenaeus, xiv, 620 C.

[7] Plutarch, *De Musica*, 28; ἔτι δὲ τῶν ἰαμβείων, τὸ τὰ μὲν λέγεσθαι παρὰ τὴν κροῦσιν, τὰ δ' ᾄδεσθαι, Ἀρχίλοχόν φασι καταδεῖξαι.

[8] *Ibid.*, 4.—Glaucus of Rhegium supposed that Terpander was the earlier.

Archilochus take part in the same forward movement in art. Terpander, the poet-musician, and Archilochus, the musician-poet, are the founders of that more musical and elaborate form of lyric, which is known as *melic* poetry.

Besides being famous as a writer of iambic, trochaic, and elegiac verse, Archilochus was a love poet, who possessed the strong personal feeling and fiery passion characterizing the Lesbian singers, Alcaeus and Sappho. He also composed dithyrambic and epinikian hymns, of which the latter at least were choral. These poetical forms belong to melic verse. Yet it is the same Archilochus who was apparently the first to weaken the hold of music upon poetry by allowing iambic verse to be sung only in part, and who invented the mode of verse-delivery known as παρακαταλογή. In no case, however, did he give up an instrumental accompaniment, for we are told that he determined the accompaniments appropriate to his various rhythms, and also to his παρακαταλογή.[1]

The term παρακαταλογή has been the subject of much discussion. Westphal[2] supposes that it is a melodramatic delivery, mere declamation with instrumental accompaniment, while Gottfried Hermann and Christ take it to mean musical recitative. Certainly the term, taken literally, seems to imply *plain* or *prose* speech (καταλογάδην εἰρημένα) but it is evident from Zielinski's study[3] of the question, that in actual practice it was as often recitative as melodrama. The instrumental accompaniment would constantly tempt the voice into musical utterance,[4] and recitative was certainly employed very largely on the Greek stage.[5]

Before Archilochus, the presentation of poetry had been controlled by the limitations of the musical art. Now that the latter

[1] *Ibid.*, 28.

[2] *Griechische Metrik*, (Leipzig, 1887), pp. 53 ff.

[3] Zielinski, *Die Gliederung der altattischen Komödie*, (Leipzig, 1885), pp. 288-314.

[4] "The general temptation is, to let it (the voice) glide, insensibly, into some note sounded by the orchestra; in which case, the effect produced resembles that of a Recitative." (From the article on *Melodrama* in *A Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, ed. by Sir George Grove,—Macmillan, 1890.)

[5] Zielinski, *loc. cit.*; Haigh, *Attic Theatre*, 2nd ed., p. 301; Barnett, *The Greek Drama*, p. 81, (Macmillan, 1899). Aristotle's scanty treatment of vocal music in the *Poetics* applies only to μελοποιία.

had been greatly enriched and developed, new poetical forms arose, and the musical delivery tended to become more elaborate and complex. This would be suitable enough for choral poetry with its dance accompaniment, or for monodic poetry of an impassioned tone, but would seem less appropriate for more reflective verse, or for poetry of a narrative or didactic class. Hence the non-melic verse-forms did not—indeed, could not, without material change in form—keep pace with the advance made in music, but continued to use the simpler and more modest art. Their musical delivery, as long as this was preserved, stood halfway between declamation and melic song, and must therefore have closely resembled recitative. On the other hand, if declamation, aided by an instrumental accompaniment, tended to pass into musical utterance, we can see how these two modes of presentation would often meet on common ground, and yet be described in different terms, according to the writer's point of view.

In the rhapsodic delivery, then, we have a survival of the earlier musical art which existed before Terpander's day,—a delivery practically identical with the presentation on the stage of that large portion of a drama which was intermediate between the merely spoken dialogue and the sung lyrics.[1] Thus we can explain the frequent use of musical terms in connection with the arts of rhapsodist and actor, as in Plato's account of Ion's performances, or Lucian's satiric description of the tragedian who "at times struts about, singing iambics, and—the most unseemly feature of all—putting his misfortunes into melody, and making himself responsible for voice alone."[2] Thus it is that in Athenaeus[3] the three verbs *μελῳδεῖν*, *ῥαψῳδεῖν* and *ὑποκρίνεσθαι* are all found in one passage to describe the rhapsodist's mode of delivery. The first two are used in reference to the verses of Archilochus, while the first and third are both applied to the hexameters of Homer and Hesiod. The three terms are not synonymous. The first, *μελῳδεῖν*, shows that the music was the main feature of the performance, while *ὑποκρίνεσθαι* emphasizes the mimetic element.[4] The second verb, *ῥαψῳδεῖν*, used of the iambics

[1] See Zielinski, *loc. cit.*

[2] Lucian, *De Saltatione*, 27: *ἐνίοτε καὶ περιῴδων τὰ ἰαμβεῖα, καὶ τὸ δὴ αἰσχιστον μελῳδῶν τὰς συμφορὰς κ. ι. λ.*

[3] Athenaeus, xiv, 620. 12.

[4] Thus *bharata* means *actor* in Sanskrit, *singer* in Indian dialects.

of Simonides, the hexameters of Empedocles, and undefined verses of Archilochus, is the normal expression,[1] and as the name itself indicates, implies *musical* utterance.[2] Doubtless the character of the performance differed according to time, place, individual tastes and the skill of the performer, but nothing is more certain than that, so long as poetry was made public in Greece by oral delivery,—and this covers almost the whole creative period of the literature,—vocal music was considered a natural and regular, if not essential, element of the presentation. The music involved was either plain or artistic, simple or elaborate, recitative-chant or set melody, but it was music, and in all cases, distinct from simple speech. If it was not μελῳδία, it was at least ῥαψῳδία, a term which is never used of the formal reading or recital of prose, even in public gatherings, and however musical the delivery.[3]

Terpander's singing of Homer was doubtless an attempt to adapt the old song-material to the new music of his heptachord, but the adaptation could not be made with any permanent success. The non-strophic hexameters with their continuous flow (στοιχοτενῆ ἄσματα) could easily be rendered in simple chant-form, with slight modulations and few melodic phrases, but were unsuited to the variety of intervals and more definite melodies which resulted from the enlargement of the musical scale. For us, whose music is so elaborate, it is hard to find an analogous case in our own experience, but the difference for the Greeks between an Odyssean episode, as sung by the early rhapsodists and as sung by Terpander, might be compared to the contrast for us between the *Te Deum*, as chanted to a simple Gregorian melody, and the

[1] This verb is also used of Xenophanes' public rendition of his epic poem on nature (Diog. Laert. ix, 18).

[2] In Lucian's Symposium (431. 17) it is said that Histiaeus, the grammarian, *rhapsodized*, when at a banquet he combined into a single song (ᾠδή) verses from Pindar, Hesiod, and Anacreon, two of whom are distinctly melic poets. The term ῥαψῳδία is used of Chaeremon's *Centaur*, a poem composed of metres of all kinds (Aristotle, *Poet.* 1. 9.)

[3] I do not find it used even of the showy rhetoricians of late times, who sometimes possessed "the voice of a nightingale," whose "rhythms were more varied than those of the flute and the lyre," and whom Lucian derided for turning their speeches into songs and melodies. (Philostr. *Vit. Soph.* 2. 10. 3; Lucian, *Rhet. Praeceptor* 19: ἢν δέ ποτε καὶ ᾄσαι καιρὸς εἶναι δυκῇ, πάντα σοι ᾠδέσθω καὶ μέλος γιγνέσθω.)

same, as sung to an elaborate musical setting. Or again, since only our simplest poetry is ever married to music, we might fittingly compare a modern epic, composed in hexameters, viz. Klopstock's *Messias*, as merely read, and the same, as sung to the setting of Kapellmeister Graun, who, in composing music for certain portions, tried to preserve "das Mittel zwischen Recitativ und Arie, zum Versuch, wie die Griechen ihre Tragödien gesungen hätten."[1] Graun's success delighted the poet's friends, but we do not read that the experiment was ever repeated.

Even the Terpandrian music was simple enough in comparison with that which succeeded it. Phrynis and Timotheus represented two important stages in its further development, so that in time the music of Terpander came to be regarded as quite out of date: *τὴν γὰρ ὀλιγοχορδίαν καὶ τὴν ἁπλότητα καὶ σεμνότητα τῆς μουσικῆς παντελῶς ἀρχαϊκὴν εἶναι συμβέβηκεν.*[2] And Aristoxenus of Tarentum (*flor.* 300 B. C.) tells us how he and a few friends, believing the music of his day to be thoroughly debased, would gather together to contemplate the beauty of the older art.[3]

What the delivery of the Greek *ἀοιδός* or *ῥαψῳδός* was like may perhaps be learnt even to-day from certain countries where the minstrel's art preserves its primitive character. Thus, in Finland "epic and lyric runes are sung to a musical phrase, which is the same for every line; only the key is varied every second line, or in the epic runes at every repetition of the line by the second voice. The phrase is sweet, simple, without emphasis, with as many notes as there are syllables."[4] In certain parts of Russia epic songs are still sung, and collectors of these poems give us descriptions of the Russian rhapsodists, "with their fine voices and masterly diction," which enable us to appreciate the character of their performance. "The airs to which the songs are sung or chanted, are very simple, consisting of but few tones, yet extremely difficult to note down. Each singer has an air of his own (perhaps two), to which he sings all the songs in his repertory, modifying it according to the subject and sentiment with the greatest skill. Rybnikof and Hilferding often dropped their pens

[1] Hamel, *Klopstock-Studien*, zweites Heft, p. 113 (Werther, Rostock, 1880).

[2] Plutarch, *De Mus.* 12.

[3] Athenaeus, xiv, 632 a.

[4] Comparetti, *The Traditional Poetry of the Finns*, trans. by Anderton, p. 71.

and listened in amazement and admiration to the skill of these untutored minstrels."[1]

But the most interesting and instructive parallel is furnished by the Kirghiz, of Central and Western Asia, a people peculiarly rich in various kinds of folk-poetry. The songs of the Kirghiz-Kazaks, a wide-spread nomad race, are mainly lyric; those of the Kara- or Black Kirghiz, whose home is in the mountainous country on the Russo-Chinese frontier, are exclusively epic. Epic song, indeed, has absorbed all other kinds, and this is so extensive that the common *Volksgeist*—the whole life, spirit and aspirations of the people—is reflected in it, as in a mirror.[2] Dr. Radloff, who has collected many thousands of lines of this epic poetry, finds striking resemblances between such a remarkable body of verse and the great Homeric epics, and with good reason expresses the opinion that the poetry of the Kara-Kirghiz "will contribute not a little to the solution of the yet unsolved 'epic question'". The interesting information furnished by Radloff certainly throws a flood of light upon some dark places in early literary history, and the Homeric student, in particular, is under great obligations to this distinguished Russian investigator.

The character of the Kirghiz singing is thus described. "In the delivery the singer always employs two melodies, one rendered in more rapid *tempo*, for the narrative of facts, and the other, for speeches, delivered in slow *tempo* as solemn recitative. This variation of melody I have had occasion to observe in all singers of any skill whatever. Otherwise, the melodies of the various singers are almost absolutely the same. In respect to clearness of pronunciation, the Kara-Kirghiz singers excel those of every other branch, their musical presentation interfering so little with an understanding of the words, that it is easy for even a foreigner to follow the song."[3]

The Kara-Kirghiz singers have all the inspiration of the Homeric ἀοιδοί. "I can sing any song whatever," said one to Radloff, "for God has planted this gift in my heart. He puts the word upon my tongue, without my seeking it. I have learnt

[1] Hapgood, *The Epic Songs of Russia* (Scribner's, New York, 1886) p. 11.

[2] *Proben der Volkslitteratur der nördlichen türkischen Stämme, gesammelt und übersetzt* von Dr. W. Radloff. v. Theil: *Der Dialect der Kara-Kirgisen.* (St. Petersburg, 1885).

[3] *Ibid.*, p. xvi.

none of my songs; each wells up from my heart."[1] Only a genuine ἀοιδός, one who was himself full of the *Volksgeist* and had the native song-inspiration, could possibly, according to Radloff, combine the single songs into a unified epic, like the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, for such an epic must be "a compilation of that which is created and sung by the people," and in spite of its being, in an important sense, the work of an individual, "will contain contradictions and repetitions, even as do the episodes sung by the people themselves, which have originated at different times and under different circumstances."[2] Who can doubt that if such an architectonic poet should arise among the Kara-Kirghiz, he too, like Homer, would set forth his work in song?

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[1] *Ibid.*, p. xvii.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. xxv.

SOME STATISTICS ON THE ORDER OF WORDS IN GREEK.

The free order of words in ancient Greek authors is often emphasized and has even caused investigators to doubt the possibility of finding general rules.[1] At the present stage of our knowledge it is perhaps best to be satisfied with individual observations. However, some fundamental ideas seem sufficiently reliable to be used as guides in our search.

Henri Weil has taught us that sentences should be regarded as having an initial notion and a goal. He says:[2] "There is then a point of departure, an initial notion, which is equally present to him who speaks and to him who hears, which forms, as it were, the ground upon which the two intelligences meet; and another part of discourse which forms the statement (l'énonciation) properly so called." He then discusses the following examples: *Idem Romulus Romam condidit; Hanc urbem condidit Romulus* and *Condidit Romam Romulus*, and says: "The point of departure, the rallying point of the interlocutors, is Romulus the first time, Rome the second, and the third time the idea of founding." That is to say, these initial words were in each case familiar, and so were used as natural starting points, from which to proceed to the new idea, the goal of the sentence. In another passage he says:[3] "In general there is no syntactical part of the sentence, whatever may be its name, form, or extent, which may not have, in a given case, the initial notion of the thought."

On the other hand, Weil recognizes the fact that sometimes the goal comes first. This he calls the pathetic order.[4]

This twofold division of the sentence, based on the order of words, had before been taught by Chr. Karl Reisig.[5] Re-

[1] KZ. 33, 508.

[2] The Order of Words, transl. by C. W. Super, p. 29.

[3] l. c., p. 33.

[4] l. c., p. 43.

[5] Chr. K. Reisig, Vorlesungen über lat. Sprachw., III. Bd. neu bearb. v. Schmalz u. Landgraf, Berlin 1888, p. 845 ff.

ferring to him Weil says in a note:[1] "The two parts of the proposition which this scholar calls the 'logical object and the predicate' seem to me to coincide with what I have named the *initial notion* and the *goal* of the discourse."

Now, as regards emphasis, it seems evident that this should fall on the goal of the sentence, on the new idea to be conveyed, whereas the initial notion, though prominent by position, requires less stress of utterance when already familiar. Reisig says on this point: "Da nun in solchen Sätzen oft die Hauptbetonung auf dem Prädikat liegen musz, als dem Spezielleren, so folgt dass es keineswegs notwendig ist, den betonten Begriff voranzustellen; z. b. Gallia omnis divisa est in partes tris, wo das tris als das Speziellere mehr zu betonen ist. Cic. p. Quinct. c. 12. Quis sic dissolutus fuisset, ut fuit S. Naevius? Quum hominem nomino, satis mihi videor dicere, wo nomino betont ist." There are, however, various possibilities by which the initial notion may gain in stress, while the goal may lose.

When subject and predicate are accompanied by modifiers, it is often difficult to determine which word, or words, the writer intended to emphasize. An important principle that helps determine this, is the tendency to move a word forward in the sentence. B. Delbrück[2] says: "So lässt sich als ein durch alle indogermanischen Sprachen durchgehendes Grundgesetz der okkasionellen Wortstellung das aufstellen, dass das hervorzuhebende Wort nach vorne rückt."

To illustrate this principle, I present the results of an examination of the simple infinitive in Plato's Protagoras. It is easy to see that the infinitive regularly follows the word on which it depends, whether it be as subject, object or in other relations.

Excluding the occurrences of the articular infinitive and those of a fixed order, such as ὥστε, πρίν, etc., with the infinitive, I have counted 635 examples, of which 593 follow the word on which they depend and only 42 precede. That is to say, 93 per cent follow in the regular order, which is the reverse of the order in Sanskrit in the case of the auxiliary verb and infinitive.[3]

An examination of the 42 cases that precede will show that these infinitives are more or less emphatic, sometimes presenting

[1] l. c., p. 114.

[2] Grundr. Vergl. Gram., V, p. 38 ff.

[3] Delbrück, l. c., p. 63 ff.

the initial notion of the sentence. Take for examples the passages 340 d, 343 d, 344 a, 344 b, 344 e, where Socrates makes points on *γενέσθαι* and *εἶναι*, or 337 b-c, where Prodicus explains the difference between *εὐδοκιμεῖν* and *ἐπαινεῖσθαι*, *εὐφραίνεσθαι* and *ἥδεσθαι*.

Sometimes it is not the infinitive alone, but the infinitive joined to its adverb, object, or predicate, that is made prominent, the latter taking first place, as 313 a, *τὸ σῶμα ἐπιτρέπειν*, 337 a, *κοινῇ μὲν γὰρ ἀκοῦσαι*, 343 d, *ὅτι ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι χαλεπόν*, or following, as in 311 c, *τελεῖν τοῦτο τὸ ἀργύριον*. The last example shows that the infinitive may take the prominent first place in order to serve as a connecting link with the previous sentence, the chief emphasis coming later on the postponed interrogative *τίνι ὄντι*.

In 325 c, we find *οἴεσθαί γε χρή* which seems to be the usual order for this phrase. It occurs again in Crito 53 d, 54 b, Phaedo 68 b, Gorg. 522 a.

More complex than the arrangement of the infinitive and its governing word is that of the copulative verbs, mainly *εἶναι* and *γίγνεσθαι*, with their predicate adjectives or nouns. In the Gorgias I counted 604 cases of predicate before verb, and 84 cases of predicate after verb; in the Protagoras 381 of the former and 73 of the latter. That is to say, in the Gorgias 88 per cent of the predicates precede the copula and in the Protagoras 84 per cent. In his article on the Greek verbals in *-τεο* Professor C. E. Bishop[1] presents statistics for the relative position of verbal and copula, which agree closely with the above results. For Plato his figures show over 83 per cent of the order, verbal followed by copula, and nearly the same (84 per cent), when his detailed statements for the Orators, Xenophon, Thucydides and Herodotus are included.

As regards the effect of the order by which the predicate follows its copula, Professor Charles Short in his valuable essay, prefixed to Yonge's English-Greek Lexicon,[2] makes this questionable statement: "If the word in the predicate be somewhat emphatic, or have an adjunct following, it may stand after the verb." The fact is that, while the predicate may be emphatic when it follows the copula, it is equally or even more emphatic when it precedes. The explanation is that the copula with its predicate usually constitutes the goal of the sentence and as such is emphasized.

[1] Am. J. Ph., XX, p. 252 ff.

[2] Chap. X.

The change from the regular order should rather be explained with reference to the copula, which is put before the predicate in order to receive the emphasis: Protag. 343 d, *ὅτι οὔκ, ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μὲν χαλεπὸν ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν ἐστιν*, 344 a, *οὐ γὰρ εἶναι ἀλλὰ γενέσθαι μέν ἐστιν ἄνδρα ἀγαθὸν . . . χαλεπὸν ἀλαθέως.* (The emphasis clearly rests on the infinitives and not on the predicate *ἄνδρα ἀγαθόν.*) Protag. 345 b, *ὁ δὲ κακὸς ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἄν ποτε γένοιτο κακός· ἔστι γὰρ ἀεί.* 325 b, *ἐφ' οἷς οὐκ ἔστι θάνατος ἡ ζημία.* (Here punishment with death is already before the mind; the emphasis lies on the negative statement.) However, emphasis on the copula may easily and naturally be joined with emphasis on the predicate: Protag. 337 a, *ἔστι γὰρ οὐ ταὐτόν.* 316 d, *ἐγὼ δὲ τὴν σοφιστικὴν τέχνην φημὶ μὲν εἶναι παλαιάν.* 351 e, *ἐὰν . . . τὸ αὐτὸ φαίνηται ἡδύ τε καὶ ἀγαθόν.* Gorg. 463 b, *ὃ δοκεῖ μὲν εἶναι τέχνη, ὡς δὲ ὁ ἐμὸς λόγος, οὐκ ἔστιν τέχνη, ἀλλ' ἐμπειρία καὶ τριβή.*

Then again neither copula nor predicate are emphatic, as in Gorgias 463 a, *ὃ δ' ἐγὼ καλῶ τὴν ῥητορικήν, πράγματός τινός ἐστι μόριον οὐδενὸς τῶν καλῶν.* Protag. 321 b, *ἔστι δ' οἷς ἔδωκεν εἶναι τροφὴν ζῴων ἄλλων βοράν.*

If we turn to examples of the regular order, it will be easy to find emphatic predicates: Protag. 350 b, *οὐκοῦν οἱ θαρραλέοι οὗτοι καὶ ἀνδρεῖοί εἰσιν*; 315 a, *τούτων δὲ . . . τὸ μὲν πολὺ ξένοι ἐφαίνοντο.* This is regularly the case, as is recognized by Professor Short,[1] when the predicate is placed at the head of the sentence, either closely followed by the copula or separated from it; Protag. 325 b *σκέψαι ὡς θαυμάσιοι γίγνονται οἱ ἀγαθοί*, 325 d *διαμάχονται, ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται ὁ παῖς*, 331 a *σὸς οὗτος ὁ λόγος ἐστί*, 315 e *οὐκ ἂν θαυμάζοιμι, εἰ παιδικὰ Πανσανίου τυγχάνει ὤν*, 315 e *πάσσοφος γάρ μοι δοκεῖ ἀνὴρ εἶναι καὶ θεῖος*, 316 d *οὐ γὰρ σμικροὶ περὶ αὐτὰ φθόνοι τε γίγνονται.*

But the arrangement, predicate copula, may also stand without emphasis. Protag. 312 e, *τί δή ἐστι τοῦτο, περὶ οὗ αὐτός τε ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν ὁ σοφιστὴς καὶ τὸν μαθητὴν ποιεῖ*; here *ἐπιστήμων ἐστὶν* repeats the *ἐπίσταται* of the preceding sentence; 309 d *σοφωτάτῳ μὲν οὖν δήπου τῶν γε νῦν, εἴ σοι δοκεῖ σοφώτατος εἶναι* Πρωταγόρας, 327 b *οἴει ἄν τι, ἔφη, μᾶλλον, ὦ Σ., τῶν ἀγαθῶν αὐλητῶν ἀγαθοὺς αὐλητὰς τοὺς υἱεῖς γίγνεσθαι ἢ τῶν φαύλων.*

The regularity with which the predicate precedes the copula determines to a considerable extent the order of these parts of

[1] l. c., ch. X.

speech in connection with the subject. The following table presents a view of all the cases of copula and predicate adjective or noun in the Protagoras, both with and without subject. I have indicated where words intervene between predicate and verb by means of (W) and where particles, such as δέ, γάρ, ἄν, alone intervene by (part.)

PREDICATE PRECEDING COPULA.

Pred. Verb. Subj.	= 43	Pred. (W.) Vb. Subj.	= 9	Pred. (part.) Vb. Subj.	= 10	Total	= 62
Subj. Pred. Vb.	= 84	Subj. Pred. (W.) Vb.	= 10	Subj. Pred. (part.) Vb.	= 10	"	= 104
Pred. Subj. Vb.	= 20					"	= 20
Pred. Verb	= 154	Pred. (W.) Vb.	= 12	Pred. (part.) Vb.	= 19	"	= 185
				οἷός τε Vb.	= 10	"	= 10
							381

PREDICATE FOLLOWING COPULA.

Verb Pred. Subj.	= 3	Vb. (W.) Pred. Subj.	= 1	Vb. (part.) Pred. Subj.	= 1	Total	= 5
Verb Subj. Pred.	= 8	Vb. Subj. (W.) Pred.	= 5			"	= 13
Subj. Vb. Pred.	= 24	Subj. Vb. (W.) Pred.	= 8			"	= 32
Verb Pred.	= 11	Vb. (W.) Pred.	= 8	Vb. (part.) Pred.	= 4	"	= 23
							73

It will be noticed that although the copula frequently stands between the subject and predicate that this is not the most usual arrangement in the Protagoras.[1] The verb follows in 124 cases and precedes in 18, whereas it stands between the subject and the predicate 94 times in all.

Let us now turn to an examination of the order of subject, object and verb.

Professor G. Kaibel[2] writes of the six possible arrangements as follows: "Allgemein giltige Gesetze für die Wortfolge giebt es im Griechischen kaum: ein so einfacher Satz wie *οἱ δ' Ἀθηναῖοι τοὺς Λακεδαιμονίους ἐνίκησαν* läszt eine sechsfache Ordnung der drei Begriffe zu, eine jede wird unter dem Drucke des Gedankenganges die einzig richtige sein können. Der Gedanke ordnet die Worte, nicht ein Sprachgesetz, und je klarer der Gedanke desto klarer und einfacher nicht nur der Ausdruck sondern auch die Wortstellung." Professor Kaibel's insistence on the absolute freedom of arrangement of subject, object and verb raises the question whether or not there were conditions of thought or language that favored one order rather than another.

Professor Delbrück[3] sums up his conclusions on the order of

[1] Cf. Transactions Am. Ph. A., vol. XXI, p. 17.

[2] Stil u. Text der *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* des Aristoteles, Berlin, 1893, p. 96.

[3] Grundr. Vergl. Gram., V, p. 110 ff.

words in the Indo-European languages in part as follows: "Die Stellung der Wörter war entweder habituell oder okkasionell. Beide Stellungsarten sind beherrscht von dem Grundgesetz, dass das wichtigere Wort seinen Platz weiter vorn im Satze erhält. Ausserdem kann das rhythmische Gefühl, ohne Rücksicht auf den Sinn, die Stellung bestimmen. Das habituell wichtigste Wort war das Subjekt, dann folgten die übrigen nicht-verbalen Bestandtheile des Satzes, den Schluss machte das Verbum finitum."

In Greek this seems to be true of the subject, but less true of the verb. In referring to the verb, he says (p. 65): "Für das Griechische sind umfassende Sammlungen nicht vorhanden. Man hat im Allgemeinen den Eindruck, dass die Stellung frei ist." Again he says (p. 111): "Unter den im Satze vorkommenden Kasus hatte der Akkusativ die besondere Neigung, unmittelbar vor das Verbum zu treten." This also is true of Greek. Accordingly we find that the most usual order is: subject, object, verb, not subject, verb, object, as we might be led to believe from the following statement:[1] "When the finite verb has its subject expressed and a simple object, very commonly the subject stands first, then the verb, and the object last, . . . but if the object be emphatic it often stands before the verb." The fact is that both arrangements are very common, as we shall see; though, in Xenophon's Anabasis, which formed the basis of Professor Short's work, the figures appear to be nearly equal. The following table shows the number of occurrences of the above mentioned orders in the books named at the head of each column.

	Anabasis I.	Protagoras.	Gorgias.	Isocrates I II III IX
Subj. obj. vb.	45	62	74	73
Subj. vb. obj.	42	24	32	17

The predominance of the order S. O. V. is marked in Plato and Isocrates. The difference in the style of the Anabasis, indicated by the equality of the two arrangements will appear even greater if the above table is subjected to some analysis. In the next table, I have noted subject and object as noun or pronoun, including as nouns, adjectives and participles so used, and as pronouns, the pronominal adjectives πολύς and πᾶς. I have counted only sentences with simple objects and have included relatives.

[1] Preface Yonge's Eng.-Gk. Lex., Chap. VII.

				Anabasis I.	Protagoras.	Gorgias.	Isocrates I II III IX
S.	O.	V.					
Pron.	Pron.	Verb	....	17	30	45	9
S.	V.	O.					
Pron.	Verb	Pron.	....	3	5	9	2
S.	O.	V.					
Noun	Noun	Verb	....	14	15	12	14
S.	V.	O.					
Noun	Verb	Noun	....	26	4	5	1
S.	O.	V.					
Pron.	Noun	Verb	....	6	9	16	46
S.	V.	O.					
Pron.	Verb	Noun	....	4	10	13	13
S.	O.	V.					
Noun	Pron.	Verb	....	8	8	1	4
S.	V.	O.					
Noun	Verb	Pron.	....	9	5	5	1

Here it will be observed that, where subject and object are both pronouns, the order S. O. V. is about five times as frequent as the order S. V. O. and that the Anabasis shows the same ratio. But when we take the cases where subject and object are both indicated as nouns, we find that, whereas in Plato the order S. O. V. is somewhat more than three times as frequent as the order S. V. O. and the former occurs 14 times in Isocrates with only one instance of the latter, in the Anabasis, on the other hand, the relations are reversed, the order S. V. O. occurring 26 times with only 14 of the other. In the rest of the table I see nothing noteworthy, except it be the frequency of the order S. O. V. in Isocrates, in the third division.

I now present a complete view of all the cases of the six possible arrangements that I have counted in the above mentioned books.

	S. O. V.	S. V. O.	O. S. V.	O. V. S.	V. S. O.	V. O S.
Anabasis I....	45 (relatives 0)	42 (relat. 1)	21 (relat. 9)	11 (relat. 2)	9	12
Protagoras.....	62 (" 4)	24 (" 0)	36 (" 14)	9 (" 2)	13	10
Gorgias.....	74 (" 8)	32 (" 3)	55 (" 35)	18 (" 5)	8	14
Isocrates I II III IX	73 (" 11)	17 (" 3)	28 (" 4)	3 (" 2)	5	1

We see that the totals of the first two columns, in which the subject comes first, far outnumber the rest. The third column shows the frequency of the order O. S. V. The fact that in 62 of the 140 instances of this order the object is a relative pronoun, is an indication of the main reason for placing the object first, namely, to make connection with the preceding sentence. This is partially recognized by Professor Short,[1] when he says: "The

[1] l. c., ch. VII, i.

object is regularly put first if it be a demonstrative pronoun of previous reference, or a word modified by such pronoun." But his leading statement for the order in which the object precedes is: "When the object is very emphatic, it is put first, the subject and verb following, the more emphatic commonly last." This statement can hardly be said to characterize properly that class of sentences in which the object precedes. In the first book of the Anabasis there are, in all, 21 cases of the order O. S. V. Of these, 9 have relative objects, 7 demonstrative objects of previous reference, and the remaining five cases are: *ἐμοὶ γὰρ* 1, 3, 3, *στρουθὸν δὲ* 1, 5, 3, *στράτευμα* 1, 5, 6, *μετὰ ταῦτα οὔτε ζῶντα Ὀρόντην οὔτε τεθνηκότα* 1, 6, 11, *καὶ ἧς ὑμᾶς* 1, 7, 3.

An examination of these five passages will show that the *ὑμᾶς* in the last example, though prominent, is not very emphatic and that in the other four the objects are all more or less connective and familiar and so can also not be called very emphatic. Take, for example, the case of *στρουθὸν δέ*. Xenophon mentions (1, 5, 2) the various animals that were found in the Syrian desert and says: *ταῦτα δὲ τὰ θηρία οἱ ἱππεῖς ἐνίοτ' ἐδίωκον*. Then he speaks of each kind and begins *καὶ οἱ μὲν ὄνοι, ἐπεί τις διώκοι, προδραμόντες ἔστασαν· κ. τ. λ.* Next he refers to the ostrich and begins: *στρουθὸν δὲ οὐδεὶς ἔλαβεν· κ. τ. λ.*, and in a similar way to the bustards, *τὰς δὲ ὠτίδας ἄν τις ταχὺ ἀνιστῇ ἔστι λαμβάνειν*. These accusatives are, to my mind, no more emphatic than the nominative *οἱ ὄνοι*, presenting like it only the initial notion.

In the same way I find in Plato's Gorgias that, of the 55 examples of the order O. S. V., 35 have relatives as objects, and the rest are mainly connective, and, while prominent, cannot be regarded as especially emphatic. Thus in 512 e, *τὴν εἱμαρμένην οὐδ' ἂν εἷς ἐκφύγοι*, the idea of death being already before the mind, *τὴν εἱμαρμένην* is without especial emphasis, which clearly falls on the *οὐδ' ἂν εἷς*.

Similar results appear in the study of the Protagoras and the four orations of Isocrates. Accordingly, I consider that the usual reason for beginning with the object is, that the object in such sentences forms an easy connection with what has gone before or at least presents a natural initial notion for its sentence, and I am of the opinion that the stress which falls upon it, while variable in force, is usually less than that which we place on the goal of the sentence.

Professor Short, in the passage cited above, states that the subject and verb following the object are placed in such a way that the more emphatic commonly comes last. This cannot be true, if stated as a general rule, for when the verb comes last it is more likely that the subject receives the greater emphasis. If, however, the verb precedes, it may unite closely with the object, thus leaving the subject to stand out prominently as the goal. But in this case, too, the subject may be the indefinite τις and the stress fall on the preceding verb.

In regard to the last two methods of arrangement in which the verb precedes, Professor Short says: "When the verb is emphatic it often stands first, the subject and object following, the more emphatic last." In such cases the verb is put first largely for the sake of the initial notion and indeed chiefly to connect with what has gone before. The object or subject that follows is usually joined closely to the verb, thus allowing the third member to stand last and receive the emphasis that falls on the goal. Sometimes, however, in the order V. S. O. the subject is contrasted with the object.

In discussing the relative importance of the various positions we must of course bear in mind that some other word than subject, object or verb may receive the chief emphasis. One example may suffice. In οὐκ ἀμαχεὶ ταῦτ' ἐγὼ λήψομαι, Anab. 1. 7. 9, it is evident that the chief stress falls on ἀμαχεί.

In order to form a clearer conception of the arrangement of the verb and object on the one hand and the verb and subject on the other we must study them separately. In the Protagoras I have counted 601 cases where the object precedes the verb, relatives and interrogatives being excepted; and 363 cases where the object follows. These figures show that the statement[1]: "The simple object commonly follows the verb; but precedes if emphatic," cannot be correct. I should prefer to say that the tendency was to give the object the prominent position before the verb, even when not emphatic, but that frequently the object was made to follow. The following table presents a partial analysis of the above figures, showing in which words a considerable part of the difference in arrangement lies.

[1] Pref. Yonge's Eng.-Gk. Lex., Chap. VII, iii.

OBJECT PRECEDING VERB.		OBJECT FOLLOWING VERB.	
οὗτος	110	οὗτος	26
τοιοῦτος	10	τοιοῦτος	1
ἐκεῖνος	6	ἐκεῖνος	7
ὅδε	3	ὅδε	2
αὐτός	24	αὐτός	42
μοι ἔδοξε	34	ἔδοξέ μοι	17
Sbst. ποιεῖσθαι	8		
ἀληθῆ λέγειν	16	λέγει τὴν ἀλήθειαν	1
*[1] οἱ τὰ μαθήματα περιάγοντες	10	τὸν μὴ προσποιούμενον δικαιοσύνην.	1
* οὐδένα . . . βελτίω ἐποίησαν	8	* ποιήσει καὶ σὲ σοφόν	2
* σαυτὸν . . . σοφιστὴν παρέχων	13	* ποιεῖν ἀνδρας ἀγαθοὺς πολίτας	4
* μεῖζον τὸ νόσημα ποιῶ	5		
* ἄλλους οἷός τ' εἰ ποιεῖν ἀγαθούς	4	* ἀσαφῆ ἐποίει τὰ λεγόμενα	9

The prevalence of the order, object verb, in the case of οὗτος and τοιοῦτος is largely due to the desire to bring the pronoun into close connection with the word or words to which it refers and even when it follows, a similar reason can often be detected, such as a desire to bring the demonstrative close to a following relative or ὅτι clause. At the same time οὗτος before the verb may be emphatic while an unemphatic οὗτος of previous reference may follow. The preference of the oblique forms of αὐτός for the position after the verb is probably due to their enclitic nature.[2]

Turning now to the arrangement of the subject and verb, I find, omitting relatives, that in the Protagoras 65 per cent and in the first book of the Anabasis 66 per cent of the subjects precede their verbs.

The following table gives some idea of the distribution.

Subject verb.	Protag.	Anab.	Verb subject.	Protag.	Anab.
ἐγὼ	78	14	ἦν δ' ἐγώ	44 (vb. ἐγώ)	
ἐγὼ οἶμαι	2	..	ἔφην ἐγώ	31	..
			ἡγοῦμαι ἐγώ	2	..
ὡς ἐγῷμαι	8	..	δοκῶ ἐγώ	1	.
ὡς ἐγώ φημι	2	..	εἶπον οὖν ἐγώ	2	..
ἐγωγε verb	6	1	verb ἐγωγε	10	..
σὺ "	38	1	ἔφησθα οὖν σύ	1	..
σὺ (imperative)	4	..			
ὡς σὺ φῄς	2	..	ὡς φῂς σύ	2	..

[1] The examples marked with * are typical.

[2] Kühner-Blass, Gk. Gr., I, p. 339, A. 1.

Subject verb.	Protag.	Anab.
ἐγώ τε καὶ σὺ vb.	4	..
ἡμεῖς / ὑμεῖς } verb	15	5
αὐτὸς (imperative)	2	..
" verb	17	9
τὸ αὐτὸ verb	1	..
οὗτοι αὐτοὶ verb.....	3	..
οὗτος "	37	18
ἐκεῖνος "	2	..
ὅδε "	1	..
ὁ μὲν (δὲ) "	7	54
καὶ ὃς ἔφη "	4	1
τί (interrog.) verb.....	10	..
τίς (int. noun) "	2	..
τι (indef.) "	32	20
τις ἄλλος "	14	..
οἱ ἄλλοι "	1	1
πάντες "	14	9
ὀλίγοι "	1	1
πολλοὶ "	8	3
οὐδεὶς "	13	9
ἕκαστος "	2	1
ἓν μόνον "	1	1
ὁτιοῦν "	1	..
article participle verb.	8	..
τοιοῦτόν τε verb.....	2	..
sbst. "	183	186
several sbjs. "	10	..
ἀμφότεροι	..	1

Verb subject.	Protag.	Anab.
vb. ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ	1	..
ὥς φαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Π...	1	..
verb ἡμεῖς.....	1	..
verb αὐτός.....	3	2
vb. αὐτὸς αὐτῷ sbst. ...	3	..
" τὰ αὐτὰ μεγέθη	1	..
" ταὐτὰ ταῦτα	3	..
" οὗτος	10	8
" ἐκεῖνο	1	..
vb. τὸ μὲν sbst.	4	1
ἥ δ' ὅς	8	..
" τί (interrog.).....	1	
vb. τις (indef.)	13	9
vb. ἄλλοι ἄλλως	..	1
" πάντες.....	..	7
vb. πολλοί.....	1	1
" οὐδείς	..	3
" ἕκαστος	3	..
vb. art. part.....	3	..
" τοιοῦτόν τε	1	..
" sbst.	111	136
" several subjs.	18	..
" art. inf.	2	..
" τὰ ἕτερα	2	..

Total.	Protag.	Anab. I.
Subj. verb =	535	335

Total.	Protag.	Anab. I.
Verb subj. =	284	169

It may be noted especially that the personal pronouns regularly precede the verb. The chief exceptions are in the phrases ἔφην ἐγώ 32 times, ἦν δ' ἐγώ 44 times, which occur invariably in this order like the 8 cases of ἦ δ' ὅς. Plato's fondness for the phrase ἔφην ἐγώ is shown in 317 c, where the sentence begins with καὶ ἐγώ, and after a long parenthesis continues with τί οὖν, ἔφην ἐγώ. He might have used simply ἔφην as the sentence began with ἐγώ, especially as the solitary ἔφην occurs 8 times in the Protagoras.

Liddell and Scott (*s. v.* φημί) note that "in repeating dialogues,

the verb commonly goes before its subject." Besides the cases cited I counted *φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε* 2 times and 8 examples of *φάναι* with a proper noun as subject. Of the opposite order with *noun*-subjects preceding I found only 6 examples of *φάναι*, in all of which the subject has been made prominent, as in 317 e, *ἐπεὶ δὲ πάντες συνεκαθεζόμεθα, ὁ Πρωταγόρας, Νῦν δὴ ἂν, ἔφη, λέγοις, ὦ Σ.* Only one of them, 317 d, *ὁ Καλλίας ἔφη*, is a parenthetic phrase and here the new subject must be made prominent.

With *ὡς* and the verb *φάναι* also, the subject preferably follows: *ὥσπερ ἔφη Ὅμηρος*, 340 a; *ὡς φησι Πρόδικος ὅδε*, 340 c; *ὡς φῂς σύ*, 361 d; *ὡς φαμεν ἐγώ τε καὶ Πρ.*, 354 a; *ὡς φῂς σὺ καὶ ἐγὼ πείθομαι*, 316 a (the chiasmus here is easily made). Of the opposite order I have found only *ὡς ἐγώ φημι*, 338 d, and *ὡς σὺ φῂς· εἰκότως, ὡς ἐγώ φημι*, 322 e. Here the pronouns are decidedly emphatic.

With *ὡς* and other verbs, however, the order, subject-verb, seems the usual one; and as we might expect, the pronouns are here frequently used without especial emphasis, as in the 8 examples of *ὡς ἐγῷμαι*. The rest of the examples are: *ὡς ἐγὼ ἤκουσα*, 311 a; *ὥσπερ σὺ λέγεις*, 323 a; 344 c; 351 e; 352 c; *ὡς σὺ ἐρωτᾷς*, 351 d; *ὥσπερ Πρωταγόρας ἐπεχείρει λέγειν*, 361 b; *ὡς αὐτὸ δηλοῖ*, 329 b; *ὥσπερ σὺ ὑπολαμβάνεις*, 341 a; *ὡς σὺ σπεύδεις*, 361 b. I have only one example of the reverse order to oppose to the above citations, *οὐχ ὡς οἴεται Πρωταγόρας*, 340 c.

That the personal pronouns are not always emphatic is recognized by Professor Gildersleeve,[1] who calls attention to the frequency of *ἐγῷδα* and *ἐγῷμαι*. I think it is evident that the *ἐγώ* is unemphatic in the phrases *ἦν δ' ἐγώ* and *ἔφην ἐγώ* and in many other cases it seems better to read the pronouns without a special stress as in Protag. 360 d, *τί . . . οὔτε σὺ φῂς ἃ ἐρωτῶ οὔτε ἀπόφῃς*;

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[1] Syntax of Classical Greek, § 69.

THE ATHENS OF ARISTOPHANES.

That Aristophanes has been a frequent source of appeal to students of Athenian topography is evident from a casual inspection of Milchhoefer's "*Schriftquellen zur Topographie von Athen*," published with Curtius' "*Stadtgeschichte von Athen*" (Berlin, 1891), and of Miss Harrison's "*Mythology and Monuments of Ancient Athens*" (London, 1890). But to the topographer Aristophanes usually yields barren results; for the purpose of comedy did not call for any precise localizing of the places and objects he mentions—the chief aim of topographic study. Nor, on the other hand, do the local allusions in Aristophanes prove very suggestive to the student of literature, unless he brings to the perusal of the author the topographic knowledge acquired from a personal acquaintance with "the fruitful land of Pallas," and from a study of the sites and monuments of land and city as described in the *Attika* of Pausanias and in other sources. But, if we presuppose the knowledge thus acquired, references to places and monuments in the extant comedies and fragments of Aristophanes fill in most richly the wavering outlines, and give to our conception of Ancient Athens the touch of life. Hence, it is the object of this paper, not to consider what contributions Aristophanes may have made to Athenian topography, but to define the scope and nature of his allusions to places and monuments on Attic soil, and to sketch the Aristophanic picture of Athens and Attika.

Attika is to Aristophanes 'the illustrious soil of the august Pallas,'[1] 'the much loved country of Kekrops.'[2] Its inhabitants are alone rightly of noble birth and autochthonous.[3] It is the land of brave men, abounding in temples and statues and votive offerings to the celestial gods; in holy mystic rites and sacred processions and well-crowned sacrifices; and with the approach of spring is here celebrated the Dionysiac festival, when are heard the songs of melodious choruses and the loud-sounding

[1] Π 773. [2] Ν 299 ff. [3] Σ 1076.

music of flutes.[1] It is a sea-encircled land with all the diversity of climate and scenery, of fauna and flora, that mountain and plain and seacoast and islands produce.[2] It experiences the snows of winter, as well as the gentle breezes of spring. Hares and wild game abound in the woods, sheep and goats are tended in the pastures, and the bees feeding on the wild thyme of the mountain slope produce "the Attic honey."[3] The country districts delight in the vine, the fig tree, the olive, the stately oak and the plane tree; so too, in the arbutus, the myrtle and 'the violet bed beside the well.' The hooting of the owl, the shrill piping of the cicada, and the sweet notes of the lark and the nightingale are heard in the land.

About the mainland are the islands, which are regarded politically as an essential part of the territory of Attika,[4]—Aigina,[5] which the Lakedaimonians coveted, merely that they might dispossess the poet (who is known to have had an estate there); Salamis,[6] with its seafaring population, oft mentioned because of the naval engagement fought in its straits; and Euboia,[7] pointed out on the map by the Disciple of Sokrates to the docile Strepsiades, as stretching out a long way by the side of Attika, and which had been 'stretched' by Perikles.

Of the mountains of Attika, Parnes[8] plays the chief rôle in Aristophanes. It is from Mount Parnes whence the Chorus of the Clouds descends gently towards the theatre. Hither Lamachos had to journey in the depth of winter to guard the mountain passes from Boiotian robbers. Leipsydrion[9] was one of its strongholds. Phelleus,[10] where goats were pastured and wood was gathered, was probably one of the spurs of Parnes. Kykloboros,[11] generally considered to be a mountain torrent pouring down from Parnes' slopes, serves frequently as a simile to describe the thunderous voice of the loud-mouthed Kleon. 'Perky' Lykabettos[12] is twice mentioned in connection with Parnes, if in B. 1056 we read with certain of the editors *Παρνήθων* rather than *Παρνασσῶν*.

[1] N 299 ff. [2] Cf. A 990 ff., Et 580, 1127 ff., O 228 ff. *et al.*
[3] Θ 1192, Et 252. [4] I 170. [5] A 653, Σ 123, B 363.
[6] I 785, B 204, Λ 59, 411, Ek 38. [7] N 211, Σ 715.
[8] A 348, N 323, B 1056, fr. p. 509. The references of the fragments are to the edition of Dindorf, Oxford, 1835.
[9] Λ 665. [10] A 273, N 71. [11] A 381, I 137, fr. 275, 539. [12] B 1056, fr. 509.

No reference is made to the more famous Pentelikon and Hymettos, nor to the rivers Kephissos and Ilissos. Aristophanes cites places and monuments merely because the situation he is describing calls for mention of them, and the only conclusion we can legitimately draw from omissions, such as these, is that while occupying so prominent a place in literature and art these mountains and rivers were not so intimately associated with the daily life of the people as those more frequently mentioned. And we must reflect that Pausanias, whose business it was to describe what he saw, ignores the Pnyx and many monuments which must have stared him in the face.

Paralia,[1] or the seacoast, and Diakria,[2] the mountain region, are recognized as divisions of Attika. And many of its historic sites and characteristic demes are presented in suggestive passages. Sounion[3] is the Aegean headland, the promontory of Athens, sacred to Poseidon of the golden trident, who is here worshiped and who smites his own temple and the tall oaks. Laureion[4] is cited only for its owls. Eleusis,[5] is the spot, "where is reverence for sacred rites not to be divulged; where the house that receives the initiated is thrown open in holy mystic rites." Marathon,[6] with its lovely meads, where was set up the trophy of victory, is symbolical of that sturdiness of character nurtured by the Old Education, for the return of which the poet longed. Phyle[7] was still reminiscent of Thrasyboulos, when the Ploutos was composed; and to Phyle Lamachos was dispatched against his protest through the snow to guard the passes.

Of the demes of Attika, Acharnai,[8] the largest and the most important, has given its name to one of the extant comedies, a deme of charcoal-burners, selected no doubt by the poet because here he found that love of freedom and manly vigor characteristic of the older generation. About the play is the atmosphere of

[1] Λ 58. [2] Σ 1223.

[3] I 560 and N 441 corroborate fully the recently discovered inscription which proves that the beautiful temple hitherto called the temple of Athena was the temple of Poseidon (v. Berl. Phil. W., Sept. 2, 1899; Athen. Mitth. xxiv, 1899, p. 349). Cf. also O 869, B 665.

[4] O 1106. [5] N 302.

[6] A 181, 696, N 986, Σ 711, O 246, Θ 806, B 1296, Λ 285.

[7] A 1023, 1075, Π 1146.

[8] A 177, 180, 200, 203, 223, 329, 666 *et al.*, Λ 62, Θ 563.

vigorous country life. Its seniors are 'sturdy old fellows, tough as oak, inflexible, Marathon men, stout as maple.' Nor are the women of Acharnai less pronounced. Lysistrate counted on them first of all to join with her in her plot to restore peace to Hellas, and in the Thesmophoriazousai mention is made of the story of an Acharnian woman who once buried her father under the kitchen-boiler. Other demes are known from the characters attributed to them. Who does not recall Dikaiopolis of Cholleidai,[1] and Trygaios, the Athmonian,[2] and Strepsiades of Kikynna,[3] and Euelpides of Krios[4] and the less known Strymodoros of Konthyle,[5] 'best of fellow-dicasts,' and Chabes of Phlya,[6] his comrade, and Chairephon of Sphettos,[7] and "What's his name of the deme of Kothokidai?"[8] Other demes and places freerred to for various reasons are—Anagyrous,[9] Brauron,[10] Halimous,[11] Kephalai,[12] Kropidai,[13] Pergasai,[14] Skiron[15] and Skambonidai.[16]

Coming to Athens itself, we find it frequently cited by name. Athena[17] is guardian of the city and is supreme over this "most sacred spot, surpassing all others in war and in poets and in dominion."[18] For the city, Aristophanes has his favorite epithets—ancient (*ἀρχαῖαι*),[19] sacred (*ἱεραί*),[20] wondrous (*θαυμασταί*),[19] much-sung-of (*πολύυμνοι*),[19] sumptuous (*λιπαραί*),[21] violet-crowned (*ἰοστέφανοι*),[22] much-to-be-envied (*ἀριζήλωτοι*).[23] The epithets *λιπαραί* and *ἰοστέφανοι*, the latter being first used by Pindar, are made the subject of facetious parody in the parabasis of the Acharnians. The ambassadors from the cities, says the poet, made use of the term *ἰοστέφανοι* in order to cajole the Athenians; and he plays upon the double meaning of the word *λιπαρός* 'sumptuous' and 'sleek' or 'greasy,' alleging that if the envoys soft-sawdered them by speaking of *λιπαρὰς . . . Ἀθήνας*, they got whatever they wished, though merely imputing to the Athenians the glory of the anchovy.

Many of the important demes of the city are presented in characteristic passages,—Diomeia,[24] the site of the festival in honor of Herakles, whose rôle Xanthias in the Frogs was playing, and

[1] A 406. [2] E*ι* 195. [3] N 134, 210. [4] O 645. [5] Σ 233.
[6] Σ 234. [7] N 156. [8] Θ 620. [9] Λ 65. [10] E*ι* 874. [11] O 498.
[12] O 476. [13] I 79. [14] I 321. [15] E*κ* 16. [16] Σ 81.
[17] I 580, 763, N 602, Λ 345. [18] I 1327. [19] I 1327. [20] I 580, 1037, 1329.
[21] A 639, I 1329. [22] A 637, I 1324, 9. [23] I 1329. [24] B 651.

who sighs because it had not been for so long celebrated; Melite,[1] whence came the aforenamed Xanthias; Kolonos,[2] home of "Meton, whom Hellas and Kolonos knows"; and Kerameikos,[3] both the Inner, where near the gates the poor fellow at the Panathenaia got so sound a drubbing, and the Outer, often alluded to as the long home of the Athenian dead.

About the walls[4] of the city swarm numbers of the inevitable dicasts and beside the battlements during the siege Dikaiopolis suffered hardship amid surroundings not so agreeable as those of the ambassadors to the Persian Court. At the city's gates[5] were the cheaper markets, where sausages were sold made of rather unpalatable ingredients. The streets[6] of the city were narrow and muddy, for, according to the Chorus of the Wasps, the old fellows seek their way with the aid of lamps, and should the light by any chance become extinguished, there was danger that they would stir up the mud as they walked, like the snipes.

Demosthenes[7] promises the Sausage-Seller in the Knights, that when he demolishes Kleon, he shall become alone Lord of the Agora and of the Harbors and of the Pnyx. As these were the chief centers of Athenian life, they receive the most frequent mention in the comedies of Aristophanes. To notice first the harbors.

The Peiraieus[8] was a clever device of Themistokles, yet not so clever as the chiton which the Sausage-Seller presented to Demos; it was kneaded up by Themistokles for the city, while the latter was at breakfast;[9] one of its harbors was known as Kantharos;[10] its Deigma[11] or Exchange, points a witticism against the litigious propensities of the Athenians; its Tenderloin district[12] was observed by Trygaios as he mounts heavenward on his beetle; its marts and merchant ships[13] are pointed out to the Sausage-Seller as part of his possessions, when he overcomes his rival; its colonnades and dock-yards[14] are scenes of busy activity in times of war, when vessels are being launched, figure-heads are getting gilded, provisions are being measured out, colonnades are groaning with the press of business, and the dock-yards are filled "with spars getting cut into oars, wooden pins resounding,

[1] B 501. [2] 0 998. [3] B 129, 1093, 0 395, I 772.
[4] Σ 1107, A 72. [5] I 1246, 1398. [6] Σ 250 ff. [7] I 165.
[8] I 885. [9] I 815. [10] Et 145. [11] I 979. [12] Et 165. [13] I 171. [14] A 548 ff.

bottom oars getting furnished with thongs, and boatswains' flutes, fifes, whistlings." Phaleron,[1] on the other hand, has so sunk in the scale of importance, that it is noted only for its anchovies, which are frequently the subject of ludicrous mention.

The Pnyx is the subject of illuminating passages or forms the center of important scenes in various plays. Thus in the Acharnians[2] we are introduced to the Pnyx as the place of assembly. When Dikaiopolis arrives, he finds the Pnyx deserted and sees the members gossiping in the Agora, trying to avoid the vermilioned rope; but at the hour of noon they rush in pell-mell, every man scrambling for the first seat. Demos, in the Knights,[3] insists upon coming to the Pnyx to decide the contest between the Paphlagonian and the Sausage-Seller, for he cannot sit in comfort in any other place. Sosias, in the Wasps,[4] relates to Xanthias, his fellow slave, the vision that appeared to him in his dream—some sheep sitting together with staffs and cloaks, holding an assembly in the Pnyx, and addressed by a whale with the voice of a bloated sow—a parody on Kleon and the stupidity of the Athenians. And in the Peace[5] Hermes tells Trygaios how the goddess Eirene is anxious to know "who at present is master of the Bema in the Pnyx." The Thesmophoriazousai[6] doubtless settles conclusively the question that the Pnyx was the scene of the celebration of the Thesmophoria, and much of the fun of the piece centers round this fact. The Pnyx became for a few days annually, as we judge from the play, a sacred precinct under exclusive feminine control. The assembly, the female herald, the prayer, the debate, the resolution, show that in ancient times as in modern, feminine assemblies got their ideas of parliamentary practice from the sterner sex. And when Mnesilochos is discovered, they run round the whole Pnyx, and search the tents and the passages in the vain endeavor to find another masculine interloper. The strong-minded women of the Ekklesiazousai[7] desired to hold forever the possession of that Pnyx which the women of the Thesmophoriazousai held annually for a season. They disguised themselves as men, seized the best places in the Pnyx, overawed and out-voted the regular members of the assembly, and petticoat rule is established in Athens.

[1] A 901, Ω 76, fr. 422. [2] A 20 ff. [3] I 745 ff. [4] Σ 30 ff.
[5] Εἰ 680. [6] Θ 655 ff.; cf. 278, 879 etc. [7] Ἐκ 85 ff., 280 ff.

The neighboring hills—the Areiopagos, the Hill of the Nymphs and the Hill of the Muses, receive no mention, but Barathron,[1] just outside the walls, as a place of dire punishment, has become a term of execration, and to it various disagreeable persons are consigned by their angry antagonists.

The Agora or Market-Place, as the center of Athenian life, naturally constitutes the chief theatre of action for the characters of the Aristophanic plays, being referred to in all the extant comedies and in the fragments as well.[2] It is represented as the resort for lounging and gossip, for public and private business; it has its boundaries, its market-tolls, its market-clerks; its various commodities are often mentioned in detail; even its plane-trees, said to have been planted by Kimon, are referred to in a fragment. The κύκλοι, or sections of the Agora, devoted to specific lines of business, are familiar places of resort—the flour-market,[3] fish-market,[4] bird-market,[5] cheese-market,[6] vegetable-market,[7] bran-market,[8] lamp-market,[9] perfume-market,[10] myrtle-wreath-market,[11] pottery-market,[12] barber-shops,[13] chemists'-shops,[14] &c., &c.

Buildings and temples and statues, known from Pausanias and from other sources, to lie within the limits of the Agora or in its neighborhood, are mentioned amid associations that fix them forever in the memory.

Into the Bouleuterion[15] or Senate-House, the author was dragged by Kleon on account of his last comedy (the Babylonians), and calumniated and lied against. Hither rushed Kleon and the Sausage-Seller in their efforts to convince Demos of their respective merits and Kleon is carrying the day by the mere strength of his voice, when his opponent creates a diversion by announcing the reduced price of anchovies, whereupon the dignified Senators leap over the barriers and rush out to avail themselves of the change in the market. Possibly in the 'Basileia[16] of the Birds,' there is an allusion to Basileia the queen-mother of the neigh-

[1] I 1362, N 1450, B 574, Π 431, 1109, fr. 309.

[2] A 21, 533, 719, 896; I 147, 181, 293, 636, 1009, 1245, 1373, 1375; N 991, 1000, 1055; Σ 16, 492, 659, 1372; Εἰ 999; O 1000; Λ 558; Θ 457, 578; B 1350; Εκ 62, 681, 711, 728, 819; Π 787, 874; fr. 162, 3; 344, 3, 8; 391.

[3] Εκ 686. [4] B 1068, Σ 789. [5] O 14. [6] B 1068. [7] Λ 557. [8] I 254.
[9] N 1065. [10] I 1375. [11] Θ 448. [12] Λ 557. [13] Π 335. [14] N 767.
[15] A 379, I 395, 485. [16] O 1537 (v. Miss Harrison, Athens, p. 52).

boring Metroön. The Heliaia,[1] a comprehensive term for the various judicial courts, one of which was the New Court into which Philokleon, the old jurist of the Wasps, on one occasion rushed and began to adjudicate—naturally calls for frequent mention in an author who delights in satirizing the litigious propensities of the Athenians. Public maintenance in the Prytaneion,[2] outside the boundaries of the Agora, but in its neighborhood, the emolument of many public servants, worthy and unworthy, is oft-times the subject of the poet's sarcasm. Thither the King's Eye is invited; the Sausage-Seller is summoned by Demos to the Prytaneion, to the seat once occupied by Kleon, and even in Hades, the best poet was to receive maintenance in the Prytaneion. The Stoai[3] or Colonnades, used as regular resorts by the Athenians for business and gossip, are vividly brought to mind in suggestive passages. Thus in the Ekklesiazousai when Praxagora recounts the blessings of feminine supremacy, the law courts and the Stoai are to be devoted to the use of the men at the public tables. She will take her stand in the Agora and determine by lot whither the people are to go to dine,—some to the Stoa Basileios, some to the Colonnade next to this (probably the Stoa Eleutherios), and some to the flour-market. The Stoa Poikile[4] is not expressly mentioned, but the mounted Amazons of Mikon, one of the paintings with which it was adorned, served to point a moral for the Chorus of the conservative old men in the Lysistrate who are inveighing against the novel antics of the women. Of the temples, the shrine of Theseus[5] and the precinct of the Eumenides are places of refuge for the oppressed, whither the scandalized upper-class trireme of the Knights explains she will sail away and sit down as a suppliant rather than let the hated Hyperbolos board her.

Allusions in Aristophanes to the famous statues of Harmodios and Aristogeiton,[6] and to the popular skolion upon these heroes of democracy, are frequent. The old gentlemen of the Lysistrate, fearful of the encroachments of the women, swear that over them they shall not tyrannize, for henceforth they will wear their sword in a myrtle-bough and will lounge in arms in the market-place

[1] I 897, N 835, Σ 87, 121, Λ 383.
[2] A 125, I 167, 281, 709, 766, 1404, Εἰ 1084, B 764.
[3] Εκ 684, 685, 686, A 548. [4] Λ 678 f. [5] I 1312; fr. 477, z.
[6] Λ 633, Εκ 682, Σ 1225.

near the statue of Aristogeiton. In the Ekklesiazousai Praxagora gathers all the people beside the statue of Harmodios, and chooses them by lot, and sends them to the various syssitia. The statue of Pandion,[1] one of the Eponymoi, whose statues were set up in a group in the Agora, was used as a conspicuous place for posting public notices. Thus the poor conscript in the Peace had no individual warning and knew not he must go to war until standing by Pandion's statue, he saw his name on the list for service. The Aristophanic Sausage-Seller swears by the Hermes[2] of the Agora, a prominent bronze statue near the Stoa Poikile.

Allusions to the Hermai[3] erected in the streets and squares of the city and to the little chapels and statues of Hekate,[4] which every citizen had before his door, give valuable hints as to the private life of the Athenians.

Leaving the centers of political and commercial life and coming to those of education and physical training, we find that the schools, palaistrai and gymnasia[5] frequented by the young men of the town, figure largely in Aristophanes, particularly in the debate regarding the Old and the New Education carried on by the Δίκαιος and Ἄδικος Λόγος in the clouds. Here the Academy[6] is described as the resort *par excellence*, where the young men ran races "beneath the sacred olives along with some modest compeer crowned with white reeds, redolent of yew and careless ease, and of leaf-shedding white poplar, rejoicing in the season of spring when the plane tree whispers to the elm." The Lyceum[7] had its military as well as civic uses, alluded to by the citizen in the Peace, who complains of marching in and out of the Lyceum with shield and spear as one of the trials of war.

We pass finally to the Akropolis and its immediate neighborhood, and consider first, its southern slope, on which were situated the theatre of Dionysos and the precinct of Asklepios. As to the theatre[8] itself, it is clear from Aristophanes, that it was open to the sky, that the spectators still sat on wooden benches and that it was a special honor to be present at the festivities in splendid apparel beside the statue of Dionysos. Hard by the theatre was the Odeion of Perikles, mentioned as the seat of one of the

[1] Εἰ 1183. [2] I 297. [3] Λ 1094, O 1084, Εἰ 925. [4] Σ 805, Λ 63, B 364.
[5] N 179, 964, 972, 1002, 1050, Σ 1025, 1215, B 1070.
[6] N 1005. [7] Εἰ 355. [8] N 322, Θ 395, I 535, B 217.

courts frequented by the dicasts. We are inclined with Kock to locate the much disputed Λίμναι in the neighborhood of the theatre, for the Chorus of the Frogs in Hades recall 'the song once sung in Limnai round the Nysaian Dionysos, son of Zeus, when the crowd of worshippers rambling in drunken revelry on the sacred festival of the Chytroi marched through their domain.' Of the precinct of Asklepios[1] and the cult of the healing god, we have a lively picture given us in the Ploutos, wherein the blind god of wealth is led to the temple, and the method of his cure described in detail; we also recall that in the Wasps the old man Philokleon was seized and made to lie down by night in the precinct of Asklepios.

The action of the Lysistrate[2] centers round the Akropolis, which has been seized by the women of Hellas, who have adopted a novel method of bringing about peace between the belligerents. The Akropolis is to Aristophanes the μεγαλόπετρος ἄβατος ἀκρόπολις, ἱερὸν τέμενος and in reading the Lysistrate, its topographical features are brought vividly to mind,—the citadel, garrisoned by the women who have made fast the Propylaia with bolts and bars,—the Chorus of Old Men advancing slowly up the western slope to smoke out and to burn out the revolted women, and their discomfiture at the hands of their feminine antagonists,—the Temple of Demeter Chloe hard by the Propylaia outside the fortifications, near which the ardent husband of Myrrhine is first spied as he approaches,—and the Grotto of Pan and the Klepsydra connected with the bridal chamber incident of the young married lovers. Reference is made in the course of the play to 'the inexhaustible sum of money in the temple of the goddess,' to 'the sacred wooden image' and to 'the guardian serpent' whose abode, as generally accepted, was in the Erechtheion. Suggestive allusions occur also in other plays. The gold-and-ivory image of Athena Parthenos is suggested in the Knights,[3] where the Sausage-Seller brings to Demos spoon-shaped pieces of bread, which, says he, 'were scooped out by the goddess with her ivory hand,' and Demos exclaims 'What a huge finger then you have, O mistress!' Ploutos[4] after the restoration of his vision, is established with becoming dignity on the Akropolis, as 'guardian

[1] Π 411, 621, 636, 640, Σ 123.
[2] Cf. Λ 174, 260, 483, 759, 836, 911, *et al.*
[3] I 1169.
[4] Π 1193.

of the Opisthodomos of the goddess.' And like the Akropolis Nephelokokkygia of the Birds[1] has its Pelargikon. Finally, the picture in the Knights[2] of the redeemed Demos gains in strength and vitality from its association with the Akropolis, where he is represented seated enthroned on his sacred rock,—"He is dwelling in the violet-crowned, the ancient Athens, like as he was when he used to mess with Aristeides and Miltiades. Ye shall see him: for now there is the sound of the Propylaia swinging open. But shout aloud at the appearance of the ancient Athens, both wondrous and much sung of, where the illustrious Demos dwells."

The foregoing sketch has, perhaps, been sufficient to indicate that we have in Aristophanes abundant illustrative material for the study of Athens and Attika, and that his references to places and monuments are very comprehensive in their scope, embracing as they do, the islands, the principal sites and demes of the mainland, and of Greater Athens, the harbors, the Pnyx, the Agora and its monuments, and the Akropolis and its neighborhood. The most salient characteristic of the local allusions of Aristophanes is that in every instance the places and monuments are mentioned incidentally to the portrayal of life. The locality is inevitably associated with the living character created by the greatest of comic artists, and consequently receives a connotation which appeals to the sensibilities and the imagination. This has been happily expressed by Professor Gildersleeve:[3] "The wave of Aristophanes' torch often fixes an image such as no detailed drawing can yield." And it is because of this abiding human interest in his local allusions that Aristophanes is such an indispensable traveling companion to the Greek student on Attic soil. We cannot, it is true, dispense with the rather droll and arid Pausanias, for, as we have seen, it is his detailed descriptions which make it possible for us to realize the wealth of local colour in Aristophanes. Yet the point of view of the guide-book maker and antiquarian was altogether different from that of the portrayer of the comic side of Athenian life, and while we go to the former for facts, we go to the latter for inspiration. Whenever I seek to estimate the respective merits of Aristophanes and Pausanias, I am vividly

[1] 0 832. [2] I 1324 ff.

[3] My Sixty Days in Greece, III. My Travelling Companions, Atlantic Monthly, August, 1897.

reminded of the prophet Ezekiel's vision of the valley of dry bones. Pausanias mentions numberless places, and buildings, and temples, and statues, many of which are, as he says, *θέας ἄξιοι* but nevertheless, as he does not associate them with life, he sets us down 'in the midst of a valley full of bones, and lo! they are very dry.' Aristophanes, by the wave of his wand, supplies the sinews and the flesh and the breath of life, and makes the dry bones of topographical data become living realities to every student of Athens and Attika.

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ON THE THEORY OF THE IDEAL CONDITION IN LATIN.

In all the Latin grammars in use in this country, in the chapter on the Unreal Condition, we are warned that when the apodosis contains an idea of possibility, power, obligation or necessity, or the active or passive periphrastic or its equivalents, etc., the Indicative is used instead of the Subjunctive. The same is true of most of the foreign grammars.

Various suggestions are offered in explanation of this phenomenon, most of which involve the idea that in these sentences we have not genuine conditional sentences, but that the apodosis is stated absolutely. Some grammars go so far as to supply a conditional apodosis, as: he had the power to do so (and would have done so) if, etc.

In the third edition of Gildersleeve's Latin Grammar (1894) certain of the examples usually cited under this head were transferred to the 'Ideal from the Past Point of View'. But the subject has not been adequately discussed, and it has seemed to me desirable to indicate what appears to me to be the theory of the usage, so far as the narrow limits of this paper will admit. No attempt will be made at a thorough discussion of the literature of the subject, for which readers are referred to the articles cited below.

In an extensive article, in 1884,[1] Lilie endeavored to explain the usage. He drew attention to the fact that this use of the Indicative is not an isolated use, but is found with a Present Subjunctive protasis also; and maintained that in investigating the matter we should begin with the Present Subjunctive, rather than with any other tense,—a perfectly just contention.

In formulating the difference between a conditional sentence in which both members have the same mood, and one in which they have different moods, he says:

[1] Conjunctivischer Bedingungssatz bei indicativischem Hauptsatz im Lateinischen von Dr. C. Lilie. Berlin Pr. 1884.

'Während nämlich in den hypothetischen Perioden bei der Congruenz der Modi beide Glieder dieselbe Stellung zur Wirklichkeit haben, so beansprucht hier die Aussage des indicativischen Satzes entschiedene und durchgängige Giltigkeit auch für sich, wogegen die im Vorstellungsmodus erscheinende Annahme in suspenso bleibt; während in jenen zwei sachlich coordinierte Glieder durch Correlation mit einander verbunden sind, so dass sie zu einander stehen als Vordersatz und Nachsatz, nicht als Haupt- und Nebensatz, so ist hier einem Hauptsatz durch Subordination ein Nebensatz verbunden; während in jenen, wo aus einer Annahme eine Folge hergeleitet wird, der bedingende Satz den antecedierenden Gedanken enthält, so entsteht er hier erst hinter dem Gedanken des Hauptsatzes; er ist also ein posteriorischer Nebensatz im Sinne der neueren Grammatiker.'

Blase[1] takes issue with this distinction of Lilie, and maintains that the difference is rather one of period, showing by statistics that the form *est si sit* grows in Latin at the expense of the form *sit si sit*, and practically drives out the latter.[2] As happens so often in such discussion, both are at fault, Lilie in making all the *est si sit* forms cases of subordinate *si*, Blase in practically denying that any are.

That *si* has, to a certain extent, the effect of a subordinating particle, has long been recognized in the grammars, in the semi-interrogative constructions after verbs of Trial and Expectation. In the case of the former it is paralleled by the construction with *ut*, and in the latter case, *dum* and *ut* are also used. So that the subordinating character is evident.

In a short treatment of the subject in 1896,[3] Greenough tried to deduce the Unreal usage referred to above from the future outlook of the verbs employed, in my mind the only correct method, but he failed to develop any means of discrimination except the very doubtful one of emphasis in the Roman enunciation.

[1] Der Konjunktiv des Praesens im Bedingungssatze, Archiv IX, p. 17 ff.

[2] This article of Blase's furnishes an excellent illustration of the slight value of statistics, if not properly interpreted. Actual counting does show a large growth of the form *est si sit*. But I can see no attempt to discover the difference in the effects of the two types and a consequent investigation whether the Roman ceased to need the one type.

[3] Some Features of the Contrary-to-fact Condition. Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, VII, p. 13 ff.

In the discussion of the Unreal Condition in Latin, we are fortunate in not being able to refer to the Greek for assistance. In Greek, Unreality is a matter of tense in combination with particle (ἄν). In Latin it is a matter primarily of mood, fixed by opposing reality.

Consequently, in our discussion, we have to consider the mood, and then of course the tense. In considering the Subjunctive mood, the typical tense is the Present.

The Subjunctive Mood, Present Tense.

The investigations of recent years into the original forces of the moods have resulted in a practical agreement that the Subjunctive mood was future in force. Whether the Subjunctive is derived from the Future or the Future from the Subjunctive is of little importance. The important point is that the Subjunctive and the Future were inextricably combined as far back as we can reach. The Optative was also future in force. It is true that there was a Perfect Optative, but in this case the tense expressed kind of time, not sphere of time, as the ascertainment was always future.

Now the Latin Subjunctive, combining the functions of both the Subjunctive and the Optative, must of necessity at the outset have been future and only future in force.

How does this future force manifest itself in Latin? In independent sentences the Subjunctive is used mainly in the Potential and the Optative forms. In the case of the Potential, the narrator interprets the nature of the person or object under discussion as having a certain potentiality for action. This must of necessity be future from the point of view of the narrator, which is always present. The genuine wish is also always future, having regard either to action that is to be, or (more rarely) to ascertainment. The Will side of the Subjunctive is shown in the Imperative usage and in the Deliberative Question. Both of these are future from the point of view of the narrator.

In other words the present Subjunctive is prospective from the point of view of the narrator. In this lies the key to the whole matter.

The conception involved in the word prospective is very old. Every grammar that has used of the Subjunctive the word Design, Contingency, or Suspense, has used the word prospective thereby.

It has also always been present in Expectation. The term has however certain advantages, which the recent discussion as to its inventor has brought out; but these advantages are perhaps all present in the term suspense, which has also the additional advantage of showing the spirit as well as the attitude of the subject.

Now, the narrator may combine two future conceptions. So far as the Subjunctive is concerned a premiss in the form of a wish may be followed by a conclusion in the form of a potentiality (Subjunctive), a wish (Optative), a will (Imperative) or a prediction (Predictive Future). Both of these members would have the same relation to the narrator, and the result would be a normal conditional sentence, of the Ideal form. The important matter to bear in mind is that both these members are referable primarily to the narrator, and by his act to each other, but the one is not the complement of the other nor is it dependent upon the other. Lilie is right thus far, though he was, as is evident, wrong in restricting his combination to a 'Congruenz der Modi.'

Opposed to this normal form is what may be called the spurious form. The original prospective sentence introduced by *si* may have proceeded from one of many mental attitudes on the part of the narrator. When this attitude is actually spelled out in words, the force of the *si* clause is no whit modified, but the attitude of the subject is clearer. This is the form that has given all the trouble. If in a sentence *o si hoc verum sit*, we substitute for the *o* any form that looks forward, such as *I intend*, *I can*, *I must*, *I ought*, we have this spurious condition. If we substitute *I am waiting*, *I am trying*, the effect is the same. None of these forms has a genuine apodosis, which is already implied in the statement of attitude. But it is not on that account necessary to supply an apodosis. That would be a work of supererogation.

One very important thing needs emphasizing. The *si* clause now must be measured not from the point of view of the narrator, but from the point of view actually stated. So long as this is the point of view of the narrator, that is, so long as the narrator gives his own experiences, there is no difficulty, but just as soon as the narrator gives the mental attitude or interprets the potentiality of any one other than himself, we have the idea of Oratio Obliqua at once entering. As a result, it is almost impossible to exclude the idea of Oratio Obliqua from these spurious conditions. Inasmuch however as both points of view, the actual and the assigned,

are in the present, the conflict in personality escapes notice, though it is none the less present.

In his further discussion Lilie makes four categories, according as the *si* clause stands to the leading clause, as: 1, förderndes; 2, hinderndes; 3, Ausnahme; 4, aufhebendes. This division seems to me not to be vital. It is more important to divide according to the effect of the leading verb.

To mention only the more important categories, we find:

1. Verbs of Trial and Expectation. These are more frequently followed by a clause of design, verbs of Expectation also have *dum*. The *si* construction is merely the simplest way of indicating suspense.

2. Verbs of Possibility, Power, Obligation and Necessity. In cases like these the apodosis is usually involved in a following Infinitive, which is waiting for existence until it shall please the *si* clause to allow it.

3. The Active and Passive Periphrastic. The former expresses intention, the latter will. With the former the idea of Oratio Obliqua is very near at hand. To this category the Future indicative when volitive must be added, though such a usage is rare by reason of the use of the periphrastic.

4. Any word or phrase that looks toward the future. Such as, *There are two roads if you are going towards Rome. There is a store on the Appian Way if you are searching for pictures. We have strong hopes, if he can be gotten out of the city.* This is a broad category.

5. The Present tense when it indicates progress. For progress is often due to pressure and that involves will.

6. A number of usages like *longum est, par est, aequom est,* etc. The conception seems to be a little different here. I, the narrator, look forward rapidly in my mind over a prospective course of action. My judgment remarks: it is long, it is fair, it is beautiful, it is good. The prospective idea is none the less involved, though not so evident.

It will be seen that the conception of Repeated action can come very readily from more than one of the above categories; most easily from the fourth. It depends partly upon the character of the leading verb, partly upon the nature of the subject of the *si* clause.

It may also be added that the above list of categories may be

indefinitely increased, but as it seems to me, without corresponding advantage to the presentation.

The Imperfect.

The Imperfect is peculiar to the Latin. Formally, it is still obscure, and consequently we can obtain light only from the study of the function.

Delbrück,[1] from a study of the independent uses in Latin, namely the Unreal Wish, the Unreal Condition, the Potential of the Past, the Deliberative of the Past, comes to the following conclusion: 'Das eigentlich Bezeichnende für den sog. Konj. Impf. ist die Entferntheit von der Wirklichkeit, eine Anschauung von der die Versetzung in die Sphäre der Vergangenheit nur eine Unterabtheilung bildet. Der Name Konj. Imperfecti ist deshalb nicht geeignet. Man sollte Irrealis des Praesens sagen.' To my mind, the fact that this form does not always express unreality, but sometimes ideality, even if it is past, is sufficient to destroy the theory. To obtain unreality from ideality is easy, the reverse is logically almost impossible.

Hale, in his article on the Sequence of Tenses,[2] on the basis of a study of the behavior of this tense in subordination, claims that the Imperfect denotes time (past) and stage (incomplete). This, as it seems to me, introduces an idea into the Subjunctive which we are not justified in assuming, as I shall try to show.

We have seen that the Subjunctive is future in its effect, and that the subordinate clause holds primarily a future relation to the leading point of view, whether it be of the narrator, or of the subject introduced. Now, when the narrative shifts from the present into the past, there is no apparent reason why the relation to the leading subject should change. What is prospective from the present point of view, is none the less prospective when the subject is in the past.[3] The Roman felt this instinctively, as we

[1] Vergleichende Syntax, II, p. 398–404.

[2] A. J. P., VII, VIII.

[3] Here again we get no assistance from the Greek. The shift in Greek is one of Mood and rests upon the simple doctrine, set forth by Professor Gildersleeve, that what, from the point of view of the present or from the point of view of the narrator, is or may be *will*, must of necessity become *wish* when another personality enters; which is of course necessary when the sphere shifts to the past.

see at once from his large employment of Representation in his colloquial language—a device which did not escape the notice of the later artistic historian.

The Imperfect should accordingly be found in the same uses as the Present. Let us see. The Deliberative of the Past is not a question as to what under *present* conditions should have been done in the *past*, as would be a necessary inference from Hale's view, but a question as to what, under certain conditions, in the *past*, should have been done subsequently to those conditions. The same holds true of the Unfulfilled Duty. This duty was incumbent under certain past conditions. The Potential of the Past gives the potentiality from a past point. In fact the Imperfect is originally future to the past, not past to the present.

If this is true it involves a further consideration. In the case of the present the fact that the narrator and the second subject are in the same time obscures the idea of Oratio Obliqua. But in the case of the Imperfect we have an enforced separation of the two personalities, and consequently it is often very difficult to avoid the Oratio Obliqua conception.

Now, just as in the present sphere, we had the normal Ideal condition with both members referred to the narrator, so it is possible without any indication of Oratio Obliqua to transfer the same combination to the past. Then we have a genuine Ideal Condition from the past point of view, with both members in the Imperfect and no unreality indicated. Examples are naturally very rare but they do occur, and some are cited in Gildersleeve's grammar and by Greenough in the article above referred to.

Usually however the transfer affects these spurious conditional sentences which we have divided into categories above.

The categories will remain the same in the past sphere as in the present. Still some interesting facts may be observed. Livy uses the Future Participle in predicate combination with a verb so frequently that it is a distinct mannerism. This falls under the third group. Caesar has a number of cases of the Imperfect in conditions. They all fall under the fourth group. The Imperfect Indicative is much more readily adapted to indicate progress than the Present: hence, the Imperfect Subjunctive after an Imperfect Indicative is not a rarity.

In the case of the sixth group, we have no separation of the personalities. The Indicative clause gives the judgment of the

narrator: consequently, the tendency towards unreality is irresistible and the Imperfect after this Indicative is a rarity.

This leads to a consideration of unreality, which is wrapped up with the use of the Pluperfect.

The Perfect, Pluperfect and Unreality.

We have observed that with an Imperfect Subjunctive, the Potentiality, the Duty, the Command, the Question are all from the point of view of the expressed subject (Past). We also notice that every statement is made from the point of view of the narrator (Present).

As the Present is subsequent to the Past, it may easily be within the knowledge of the narrator whether the duty was fulfilled, the potentiality exercised, or not. If this knowledge is negative, unreality is the effect: otherwise the ideality remains unimpaired.

If the opposing reality is present, then the Imperfect Subjunctive seems to express an Unreality of the Present: if that opposing reality is itself past, then that same Imperfect seems to express an Unreality of the Past. This ambiguity of effect is natural and is frequent in the Early Latin, and occasional later.

It was natural that the Roman should try to avoid this ambiguity. The English was confronted with the same problem. 'What was he to do?' has as a rule an unreal effect, but not necessarily so. 'What should he have done?' always has the unreal effect.

It thus appears that the English has fixed the unreal effect by means of the addition of the idea of completion through the tense. The Roman did the same. Unreality of the past was shown by throwing the activity into the completed stage, leaving the uncompleted stage to serve for the Unreality of the Present.

Greenough thinks that the Unreal of the Past is nothing but the transfer to the past of a condition in the Perfect Subjunctive. This is unlikely for two reasons. The Perfect Subjunctive condition is very rare indeed, much too rare to have served for any transfer. Then, the expression of both present and past unreality originally by the same form, shows that a differentiation must have been made.

I do not mean to deny that occasionally there are conditions in which the reference is to a completed stage. In this case the transfer would bring the Perfect into the Pluperfect Subjunctive,

but with the Ideal, not the Unreal effect. We actually do find examples of just such transfers.

Conclusions.

Our conclusions are as follows:—

A. A normal Ideal Conditional sentence consists of two members usually both in the Subjunctive, and both referred independently to the narrator.

When a complete Conditional sentence contains both members in the Imperfect Subjunctive, it is an Unreal Conditional sentence of the Present or (rarely) of the Past; except as follows.

But it occasionally happens that an Ideal Conditional sentence which would have been naturally in the Present Subjunctive, is by transfer to the past point of view, put into the Imperfect Subjunctive without any indication of Oratio Obliqua except such as is involved in the transfer.

B. When a *si* clause follows a verb in the Indicative, the *si* clause may be either Ideal or Unreal, as follows:—

1. If the leading verb has a future outlook the *si* clause will be Ideal. This is always the case when it contains a Present or Perfect Subjunctive, regularly the case when it contains an Imperfect Subjunctive, and rarely so when it contains a Pluperfect Subjunctive.

2. When the future outlook is obscured by the intrusion of the point of view of the narrator, the *si* clause may be regarded as Unreal. This is regularly the case when the clause contains a Pluperfect Subjunctive (particularly if introduced by <*ni*>), and rarely true if any other tense is involved.

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ON THE CASE CONSTRUCTION OF VERBS OF SIGHT AND HEARING IN GREEK.

While the frequent association of verbs of sight and hearing under the same case-regimen in Greek invites a parallel treatment of the two senses, the study of their relations is interesting still more from the point of view of diversity than of similarity of case-construction.

A brief preliminary survey of the nature of the cases employed seems desirable. These cases are almost exclusively accusative and genitive. With verbs of hearing the dative also enters to a small extent, but the reading is often doubtful and, where it is not, in a large proportion of the instances the case is dependent on the prefix with which the simple verb is compounded rather than on the verb itself. Therefore anything more than a passing reference to this case must be excluded from a paper necessarily brief.

To consider first the accusative. Rumpel's view seems in the main to reflect the nature of the case best, and his notion that the accusative is joined to the verb '*ganz unmittelbar*,' prepares the way for the view that the relation of the case to the verb is not an enduring relation. Especially to be noted in this connection is the habit of forming what have been called by Professor Gildersleeve "temporary compounds"; e. g. κακὰ ποιεῖν beside κακοποιεῖν, the σχῆμα καθ' ὅλον καὶ μέρος, and, by way of illustration from another source, such expressions as "brow-beat a man". It is then but a step to the conviction that mobility as regards the action with which it is connected and the power of registering the action's ultimate effect are among the chief characteristics of the accusative.

This transitory quality of the accusative and its common function as the indicator of the result of an action lead easily to the conception of the case as peculiarly involved, in the general lines of its use, with the operation of the will, as the power that both calls into being and dismisses from being.

In order to illustrate this readiness of obedience to the will, two phenomena, everywhere present, will be observed. For the

manifestation in the one direction we have the principle of the anticipation of the subject of the subordinate clause, by which that subject is wrested from its ordinary grammatical setting and lifted into temporary prominence, for a special reason. On the other hand, as reflecting the power of dismissal, may be mentioned the so-called attraction of the relative to the case of its expressed or unexpressed antecedent.

At this point some help comes from our English speech. English is fond of dropping relatives, but only accusative relatives. The Greek does not drop his relatives, but disguises them. In both languages, under a different outward form, the same force is at work.

This seems at least partly accounted for by the consideration that the accusative represents work done. It makes way for that which contains more vitality. As serving to show with what facility the accusative form vanishes in response to a force in the immediate surroundings, and then recovers itself as the force fades with distance, may be cited Dem. [48], 45: *δίκην τῆς οἰκίας ἣς ἔφασκες μισθῶσαί μοι ὡς σαυτοῦ οὖσαν.*

In addition to the qualities mentioned, it is useful for present purposes to note the quality of contrariety, recoil, at least suggested in the case by the fact that the impersonals *ἐξόν*, etc., regularly denote a relation of opposition.

The genitive is a case of not simple but complex character, two cases in fact fused in one. The differentiation of the two functions is sometimes a matter of extreme difficulty. The local situation furnishes the solution in many instances. If we place Il. 1, 44: *βῆ δὲ κατ' Οὐλύμποιο καρήνων* beside 19, 39: *στάξε κατὰ ῥινῶν*, the distinction in case force is at once made by the meanings of the words involved and by the general surroundings.

One of the most widely extended and characteristic uses of the genitive is that which puts it on the same plane with the adjective. The two occur side by side both with nouns and with verbs in a way to show that they must have been felt as virtually if not absolutely equivalent. Thus in Od. 20, 265 we find *δήμιος* contrasted with *'Οδυσῆος* and in 18, 353 occurs the adjective *'Οδυσήιον*. Hdt. 5, 101: gives *καλάμιναι* beside *καλάμου* and in the same sense, while Plato, Protag. 313 B, matches *ἑσπέρας ἀκούσας* with *ὄρθριος ἥκων*. I have even ventured to compare Il. 9, 219:

αὐτὸς δ' ἀντίον ἷζεν Ὀδυσσῆος θείοιο
τοίχου τοῦ ἑτέροιο

with Eur. Androm. 266:

κάθησ' ἑδραία.

The passivity of the genitive is well illustrated by Aesch. Agam. 1359:

νεκρὸς δὲ τῆσδε δεξιᾶς χερὸς
ἔργον δικαίας τέκτονος.

Compare "my meat".

In addition to that phase of the affinity of the genitive and the participle in which the one form is used as the approximate representative of the other, a no less important and instructive usage in Homer may be mentioned, wherein the genitive and the participle ("the adjective in motion") manifest their attachment by association. The participle εἰδώς furnishes this illustration. The occurrences of the genitive with non-participial forms of this verb are few, only three or four, but sufficient, it would seem, to make it highly improbable that the participle in connecting itself with the genitive has lost the proper sense of the verb from which it is derived. That this form should show also the case-regimen of the other forms (i. e. the accusative) is not strange in view of the double nature of the participle, "that floater between noun and verb" (A. J. P. IX, 137). In the one construction the noun end of the combination is emphasized, in the other the verb end.

The range of words employed in the genitive in this connection is small, and their character is striking: τόξων, πολέμων (πολέμοιο), αἰχμῆς, πυγμαχίης, μάχης, χάρμης, θήρης, ἀλκῆς, τόκοιο, πόνων, οἰωνῶν, θεοπροπίων, ἀγοράων, τεκτοσυνάων. Whether it be the warrior, the seer, the artisan, or the citizen that is considered, we have in the word the atmosphere in which he who follows the calling moves, his vital breath; in this, the trailing end of the participle, to express it so, is conveyed the notion of intimate contact with details. The content of the noun appears to have much to do in bringing about the embrace.

When the verb side of εἰδώς is uppermost, a marked difference of character in the nouns employed is to be observed. Of the occurrences, about twenty-five in number, I quote a few: μήδεα, αἴσιμα, ὀλοφώια, παλαιά τε πολλά τε, ἀθεμίστια, ἤπια, κέρδεα, κεδνά, λυγρά. More than half are substantivized neuter adjectives, a form entirely absent from the other class. The line separating the two

usages seems clear. In the second we see no votary of a calling following up all the suggestions offered him in the open field of his profession; instead the exercise of power to produce a definite result. The note of sympathy is distinctly lacking.

The verbs of sight take everywhere and under all circumstances the accusative. In the single occurrence of ὀψείειν in Homer and in the Herodotean use of προορᾶν the faculty is complicated with other notions. Sight has been designated the 'king-sense'. So the Greeks regarded it not only in what they had to say about it, but in the way they treated it in case-construction. It stands for will enthroned; it recognizes no other side. Each visual act is a new creation or annihilation. The frequent assumption, particularly by ὁρᾶν, θεᾶσθαι, of the prefix κατά seems an intensification of the already present notion of headship. The not infrequent employment of the aorist participle with the object of the verb, whether of outward or inward vision, accentuates that impatience of any bar to immediate and final results which is always present in a verb of sight. Again, the notion of conscious control of the situation is made more pronounced by the expression, with great frequency in Homer and all the poets, not seldom in other writers, of ὄμμασι, ὀφθαλμοῖς. Plato is an exception. For him the full expression, if he wanted it, would be something like ψυχῇ δι' ὀφθαλμῶν ὁρᾶν.

The simplicity and directness in case-construction which characterizes verbs of sight as compared with verbs of hearing is very marked. While with the former class the accusative alone is admitted, with the latter the genitive also plays an important part. This diversified construction of verbs of hearing in contrast with verbs of sight corresponds to the broad distinction in character between the two senses from other points of view. Hearing is dependent on external conditions and influences, sight acknowledges no dependence; sight is active and aggressive, hearing is in large measure passive. This passivity is shown in the secondary sense of obedience which may appear at any time in a verb of hearing. This is well illustrated by the common Homeric verse: ὣς ἔφαθ', οἱ δ' ἄρα τοῦ μάλα μὲν κλύον ἠδ' ἐπίθοντο. It is further distinctly shown by the construction with ὑπό or other preposition as an ordinary passive form. The passive sense is sometimes emphasized by sharp contrast with the active, e. g. Aesch. Eum. 426:

κλύειν δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ πρᾶξαι θέλεις.

As a negative indication may count the rare expression of οὔασιν, ὠσί, with verbs of hearing, corresponding to ὀφθαλμοῖς, ὄμμασιν with verbs of sight. There is only one instance in Homer (Il. 12, 442), whereas this means of emphasizing the absolute control involved in verbs of sight is nowhere more clearly marked than in Homer.

Two metaphors in Sophocles are instructive in their bearing upon the Greek conception of the sense of hearing. In O. T. 1386 the blind Oedipus says: ἀλλ' εἰ τῆς ἀκουούσης ἔτ' ἦν πηγῆς δι' ὤτων φραγμός, distinctly implying that the φραγμός is beyond his control. Again, in Antig. 1214, Kreon is told that a cry has been heard from the direction of Antigone's tomb, and in an agony of dread lest it be his own child that has uttered it, he cries: παιδός με σαίνει φθόγγος, which strikingly illustrates the clinging, pliant character of continuous sounds. These are bold figures, but when taken in connection with other indications along the same line, they are not without value. The fanciful expressions are but the reflection of what is elsewhere indicated more definitely, namely, that one phase of the act of hearing is the awaiting of outside influences over which the actor has no control.

On the other hand, there is involved in the sense of hearing an element, if unstable, of activity. This is shown in a variety of ways. It is foreshadowed in the prefixes εἰς and ἐπί. Again, there is frequent association with verbs of sight, as in the familiar Homeric phrase, ὃς πάντ' ἐφορᾷ καὶ πάντ' ἐπακούει (Il. 3, 277), and the putting forth of power in hearing is sometimes suggested in the combination, as in Plato, Legg. 902 C. The construction with the accusative is everywhere common, but even while thus manifesting its active power, the verb of hearing not seldom shows its vacillating character by leaning at the same time to the passive construction, e. g. Ar. Eq. 820: ταυτὶ δεινὸν ἀκούειν ἐστίν μ' ὑπὸ τούτου. The dependent or. obl. acc. w. inf. is not rare. Here, as the resolution ἀκοῇ νομισάντων of Thuc. 4, 81 seems to show, the verb of hearing exhibits its composite nature, as reflecting the will of the actor tempered by external circumstances. So also in ἀκροᾶσθαι there is frequently present the notion of intention, as in Plato, Euthyd. 304 D, but this is easily supplanted by the close-lying sense of obedience, as in Thuc. 3, 37. This is true often also of the compounds ἐπακούειν, εἰσακούειν. So that we must be prepared

to see any verb of hearing show, according to requirements, either its active or its passive side, sometimes both together, as has been noticed.

And here it seems important to emphasize the adjective sense of the genitive. It is by no means contended that with verbs of hearing the genitive is always characterized by the notion of suspension which belongs to adjective and participle. There are various shades of color between the genitive of lightest touch and the coarsest ablative that requires some 'gnomon' to raise it. In this part of the genitive's territory, as in others, the context must in many instances be the surest guide.

To illustrate by the familiar double usage of ἔχεσθαι, what but the surroundings makes possible a distinction in case force between Il. 2, 97:

κήρυκες βοόωντες ἐρήτυον, εἴποτ' ἀυτῆς
σχοίατ', ἀκούσειαν δὲ διοτρεφέων βασιλήων

and Od. 5, 429:

τῆς ἔχετο στενάχων?

Krüger thinks that the genitive of the thing with verbs of hearing marks the "Wirkungskraft" of the object, while in the accusative "der bloss percipirte Inhalt" is expressed. He does not state whether his term Wirkungskraft imputes to the genitive in this connection a clear-cut ablative sense, or a general evolutionary movement, without the distinct notion of separation. If the latter idea be intended, then from the very meaning of the word in many instances Wirkungskraft is to be seen in the accusative also, but Wirkungskraft as a totality, not in detail.

Space does not permit a discussion here of the setting of the four occurrences of αὐδήν and the two of αὐδῆς with κλύειν in Homer nor of the one of κραυγήν and the two of κραυγῆς with ἀκούειν in Demosthenes, to select these as typical instances from many, but an examination of the connection will, it is believed, show that the accusative marks the absence of the responsive relation, the genitive its presence.

An examination of participial usage in this connection will show that when the noun end of the combination is emphasized, we have the genitive; when the verb end, the accusative. There are apparent exceptions to this in situations where the case and the meaning of the participle are not in harmony, and such instances give rise to other interpretations to escape the difficulty.

An example of this kind is Soph. Philoct. 426: *οἶν ἐγὼ ἥκιστ' ἂν ἠθέλησ' ὀλωλότοιν κλύειν*, in which the genitive has overbalanced the accusative, and the reason for this is found in the stress the speaker lays on the noun, as contrasted with the action which is connected with it. There are several instances (most of them in Homer) in which the genitive might not be expected in view of the meaning of the participle and in view, moreover, of the fact that the persons concerned are not within hearing distance of each other. These examples, which are collected by La Roche, have to do for the most part with the son's anxious search for his father, or the longing of the wife and servant for the absent husband and master, or of the mother for her son. It appears better here, for the reason given, to see in the rare construction a drift away from what might, on other grounds, seem the more natural accusative, than to follow Kühner and La Roche in giving the sense by 'de aliquo', as if *περί* were to be supplied, and this is what Jebb also seems to imply in Soph. O. T. 307, *κλύων σοῦ*. In Soph. Philoct. 615 we read

> *καὶ ταῦθ' ὅπως ἥκουσ' ὁ Λαέρτου τόκος*
> *τὸν μάντιν εἰπόντ'*,

where Kühner says the accusative is employed instead of the usual genitive, apparently meaning that the sense is the same. The words as they stand mean merely that Odysseus heard a statement; to say that the seer made it to him personally (which is what the genitive would mean) is an unwarranted liberty of interpretation.

It is important to notice, beside the double case-construction involving the participle, the double form of proleptic subject with verbs of hearing. Od. 3, 193:

> *Ἀτρείδην δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ ἀκούετε νόσφιν ἐόντες*
> *ὥς τ' ἦλθ'*,

and Dem. 19, 39: *ἀκούετ' ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι τῆς ἐπιστολῆς, ὡς καλὴ καὶ φιλάνθρωπος*. In the former instance the animate subject is hurried over in the eagerness to reach the more important predicate, whereas in the latter lively fancy reverses the process and elevates the inanimate subject into a living being.

If the foregoing view as to the difference in sense between the accusative and the genitive as subject of the participle and as proleptic subject of the clause dependent upon a verb of hearing is correct, we have in it a clue to the distinction everywhere

between these cases with such verbs. The words that occur in the genitive or the accusative with verbs of hearing may conveniently be divided into two main classes: 1, Substantives proper; 2, Substantivized neuter adjectives and participles.

The substantives are in all about two hundred and twenty-five in number and fall, according to case-usage, into three divisions: 1, those that occur in the accusative only, more than half of all; 2, those that occur only in the genitive, less than one-third; 3, those that occur in both the accusative and the genitive, less than one-fifth. The classes are distinguished from each other as regards the nature of the words only on broad lines. Yet on the whole the contrast is striking. In class 1 the presence of two kinds of words in particular is to be noticed: such as convey notions inherently disagreeable, as *ἀδικήματα, ἄλγος, ἄχος, νοσήματα* and many more, and those that denote a violent, noisy or unexpected sound. The class is largely composed of words that do not express sound, but suggest only action, and the absence of purely vocal utterances is particularly noticeable. A distinguishing feature of class 2 is the entire absence of what constituted so large an element in class 1, namely, sharp, explosive sounds and offensive notions like *ἀπειλάς, βδελυρίαν*. Sounds are plentiful, but they are vocal, musical, and the note of lamentation, a manifestation of the recognized melancholy of the Greeks, is not lacking. The play of fancy is present in the use of such words as *δαιτός, οἴακος*, and the comic *κριθῶν*. Throughout, the passivity of the situation is felt in the notion of suspension, subordination to an influence. Class 3 is interesting in that it is in some measure a meeting ground of the other two classes and illustrates the facility with which the Greek turns from the one construction to the other according as he sees in the word at the moment the notion of a mere fleeting action, or that of an unexplored territory which engages his attention. The class is of heterogeneous composition, as witness *νόμος* and *κτύπος*. The latter word occurs twice in Homer: Il. 10, 532, *Νέστωρ δὲ πρῶτος κτύπον ἄιε*, where there is no suggestion of preparation for the sound;[1] Od. 21, 237, *ἦν δέ τις ἦ*

[1] As serving to emphasize the sharp, clear-cut character of one of the words of sound in this list may be cited the striking transfer in Aesch. Sept. 101: *κτύπον δέδορκα*. *κτύπος* is probably related to *(γ)δοῦπος*, which expresses the same kind of sound in general and is used only in the accusative with a verb of hearing. No other word to which the sense of hearing only is properly applicable is found associated with a verb of sight.

στοναχῆς ἠὲ κτύπου ἔνδον ἀκούσῃ. The prospective attitude of the subject is foreshadowed in the case as in the setting. The employment of *νόμος* in the genitive with verbs of hearing to denote the relation of the governed subject or of the expectant hearer of its provisions is too frequent to require special illustration. Plato, Legg. 721 D marks the contrast to this in situation and in sense: *τοῦτον δὴ παρ' ἐκεῖνον τὸν νόμον ἀκούσαντα ἔξεστι περὶ ἑνὸς ἑκάστου διανοηθῆναι.* The legislator is spoken of, the cold critic that touches the law to create, not follow it. A striking instance of the reversed relation, involving the genitive with the participle is found in Legg. 839 B.

The second main division, which comprises substantivized neuter adjectives and participles, about seventy in number, shows almost invariably the accusative. Among the fifty different adjectives thus employed the only plural genitives are *τῶν ἀγαθῶν* and *τῶν ἐμῶν*, and the only singulars are *οὐδενός* and *μηδενός*, all of rare occurrence. The participles show four genitive forms, all plural and with the article, which commonly attends the adjectives also. This strong drift toward the accusative seems to reflect the affinity of the governing verb's action for the activity concealed under the noun form. Of neuter pronominal forms the great mass are accusative, but *τούτων*, *τῶνδε*, *ὧν*, and *αὐτῶν* are not uncommon. The only singulars are the interrogatives *τοῦ* and *τίνος*, once each in Ar. in reference to the future, and one of them in a situation of intense anxiety and suspense.

Among the substantives which stand always in the accusative is the word *ὄνομα*, which occurs several times in both numbers. Thus with reference to the verb of hearing, the person, or whatever endowed or conceived as endowed with life represents it, stands at the one pole; the name, compressing the personal relation within the narrowest possible limits, at the other. Plato, Protag. 311 E, shows the higher form reduced to the grade of the lower: *τί ὄνομα ἄλλο γε λεγόμενον περὶ Πρωταγόρου ἀκούομεν, ὥσπερ . . . περὶ Ὁμήρου ποιητήν;*

BELAIR ACADEMY. JAMES WILLIAM KERN.

THE SCENIC VALUE OF THE MINIATURES IN THE MANUSCRIPTS OF TERENCE.

For sources of information concerning the manners of the Roman stage, it has been usual to cite above all the literary record of Quint. (Inst. Or. xi, 3, 65 ff.) and certain scholia of the Donatus Commentary on Terence along with the testimony from ancient art, including notably the scenes of the Pompeian wall-pictures and the miniatures of the illustrated manuscripts of Terence. Accurate knowledge, however, concerning this interesting subject is in nowise commensurate with the variety and apparent richness of the material. The pictures that are placed at the beginning of each scene in the illustrated manuscripts,[1] represent the actors as they appear at some critical point in the action and the different series, unmistakably related, are all referred to an older original, which is supposed to approach in date the period of the Terentian presentation. Arguments for the antiquity of the tradition have been found in the possibility of identifying many of the gestures shown with those described by Quintilian (l. c.); in the general harmony between the pictures and certain situations assigned in the Donatus Commentary, in which the scholia touching stage direction are commonly thought to be excerpts older than the time of Donatus;[2] and in the close resemblance which they bear, in action and technique, to the Pompeian wall-scenes. Leo (l. c., p. 342), considering the last point to be of special importance, places the original after the appearance of the *Imagines* of Varro—Rome's oldest illustrated book (cf. Pliny, N. H., xxv, 2. 11) which was published about 39 before Christ—

[1] The group is represented by four MSS, CFPO, with approximately complete series of pictures, and by three unimportant fragments (cf. Leo, Rh. M. 38, p. 336, n. 2, and Sittl, Die Gebärd. der Griech. u. Röm. Leipz. 1890, p. 204). Following Hoeing (Codex Dunelmensis of Terence, Johns Hopk. Univ. Diss., 1898, p. 311, u. 3), I designate the Dunelmensis O (Oxoniensis), since it may not be called D for fear of confusion with the Victorianus.

[2] Sittl (l. c., p. 203) holds the contrary view.

and before the destruction of Pompeii. Pease ingeniously argues (Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc., 1887, p. 40) that the editor of the archetype of the P family must have taken his illustrations from a very old manuscript, which did not belong to the Calliopian recension, since the division into scenes is often different[1] and the order of plays has been changed, presumably to that of the ancient illustrated edition (And., Eun., Heaut., Ad., Hec., Phor.). Since the actors are shown with masks, the originals must in any case be assigned to the post-Terentian period (cf. Diomed. p. 489 and Cic. de Or. III, 221).[2]

By the same radical estimate which at once rejects the value of the Donatus "Gestenscholien" for the ancient stage and disputes the reliability of the tradition preserved in the illustrated manuscripts, Sittl (l. c., p. 205) eliminates from consideration two principal sources of information. Thus, in a treatise from which much might be expected, he is permitted to contribute but little upon the matter of comic gesture. While recognizing an older original for the miniatures and a measurable amount of accuracy in the reproduction of masks and costume, he considers them unauthoritative as far as the portrayal of ancient gesture is concerned, because the copyist is surmised to have introduced the customs of his own period.

"Die Bilder," he asserts, "gehören ihrer kunstgeschichtlichen Stellung nach nicht zu einer antiken Technik, sondern zu der im neunten Jahrhundert entwickelten Gattung der Federzeichnungen, welche gerade in den Bewegungen einen derben Realismus aufweisen. Daher ist in den Terenzbildern die antike Zeichentradition der Gebärden verlassen und das tägliche Leben (z. B., erwähnte italienische Gewohnheit, die Fingerspitzen zusammenzulegen) nachgebildet."

From the close relation of ancient comedy to the customs of real life it may be supposed that the system of gesticulation

[1] A. Mai, in an autograph prefixed to F, notes a picture at Heaut. 3. 3. 32, (reproduced in his M. Accii Plauti frag. inedita, etc., Med. 1815, p. 47), wanting in C, (neither is it in P), and on the other hand C has one at Heaut. 5. 2, omitted in both F and P. F leaves a space; P makes no provision for its insertion, merely indicating the rôles in red capitals. Were such devised by the copyist?

[2] Other opinions concerning the date are given in Wieseler, Theatergebäude u. Denkm. des Bühnenwes. bei den Griech. u. Röm., Gött. 1851, p. 63.

employed on the comic stage was lacking in a highly developed artificiality.[1]

The dilettante effort of Canon Andrea de Jorio (La mimica degli antichi investigata nel gestire napolitano, Napoli, 1832), who sought to interpret the gestures of ancient art and those described in writings, by the modern gesticulation of the Neapolitans, has, in addition, furnished some good evidence that the general system of gesture once prevailing in ancient Italy is substantially the same as now observed. Mr. Mallery[2] further, commenting on the similarity of the merely emotional gestures and attitudes of modern Italy to those of the classics, compares very aptly the attitude of a *pulcinella*, drawn from life in the streets of Naples, with the characteristic abandon in limb of the fawning, clownish *servus* of the Vatican Terence. A highly wrought realism, therefore, and the marks of later Italian life do not force the conclusion that these did not exist in the older period. It remains true, however, that the value of the pictures for critical purposes will depend not only upon their claims to an older original, but also upon the faithfulness with which this is represented in the later manuscript-drawings, and the opinion of Sittl is pertinent in suggesting the need of evidence for the latter.

With a stable basis of investigation, the method of Leo, who identified in the miniatures many of the gestures described by Quintilian, might be further employed with interesting results; but even apart from such identification, the variety and completeness of the situations portrayed,—with the constant possibility of interpretation by the accompanying text—must always insure for the collection a distinct and unique value in the estimate of scenic action.

Gesticulation as the accompaniment of speech is characteristic of the southern blood, and, among the Italians, the play of the fingers as a means of interpretation, is a matter of familiar observation. In the Terence miniatures the prominence given to the disposition

[1] Compare for example Quint. Inst. Or. II, 10. 13 Actores comici . . . neque ita prorsus, ut nos vulgo loquimur, pronuntiant, quod esset sine arte neque procul tamen a natura recedunt, quo vitio periret imitatio, sed morem communis huius sermonis decore quodam scaenico exornant. See also Donat. Comment. de Comoedia, p. 8 (Reiff.).

[2] Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology, 1879-80, Wash. 1881, p. 292, Fig. 73.

of the fingers is very striking, and it is probable that, after the introduction of masks upon the stage, the fingers were taxed to an unusual degree, but in accordance with a set system,[1] to make clear much that might otherwise have been disclosed by facial expression.[2] Since in all the manuscripts the general grouping, action and postures are sufficiently identical to establish the unmistakable relation of the different series, it is in these less obtrusive gestures that the marks conjectured by Sittl or the careless divergencies from a copy might be discovered. To this end a comparison of all the manuscripts which show most clearly the supposed ancient tradition in the smaller matters of the play of the fingers and the hands will be significant in determining the accuracy with which this tradition has actually been preserved. It therefore becomes necessary to speak in greater detail of the published forms in which the pictures have been available. Only those of the Vatican MS are accessible in complete series. These, imperfectly published, first by De Berger (Comment. de personis vulgo larvis seu mascheris, etc., Francof. et Lips. 1723), and later in two Italian editions (Fortiguerra, Urbini 1736, and Cocquelines, Rome 1767), are manifestly inaccurate. A marked difference in the representation of gestures is to be observed, and Cocquelines, the best of the three, where pictures are wanting for the division of scenes accepted by him, devises such as are considered fitting for the situation.[3]

[1] Cf. Quint. Inst. Or. xi, 3. 103 a peregrinis scholis tamen prope recepta tremula scaenica est.

[2] The school-rules elaborated by Quint. for the orator and the attention paid to the matter by other writers whose works are lost (e. g. Plotius and Nigidius, cf. Quint. xi, 3. 43), emphasize the importance with which it was regarded.

[3] Andr. 1. 3 is typical, with the note: "In codice Bibliothecae Vat. nulla his visitur actoris persona . . . nos vero . . . Davi personam insculpi, et ad servandam nostra in editione uniformitatem poni curavimus."

The Vatican picture of Mysis, and Davus with the child, v. 716 Dz., is inserted at v. 722 and the figure of Mysis supplied for the scene at v. 716. (P and C are alike; F lacks Andria.) In like manner elaborate pictures are devised for Andr. 5. 1 = v. 820, and for 5. 2 = v. 842. (In P spaces appear, but no picture.) At Andr. 5. 5 = v. 957 the figures of Pamphilus and Charinus are found (P adds Davus); at Ad. 3. 6 = v. 511 the figure of Hegio appears; at Ad. v. 882 the picture of Syrus and Demea is repeated from the preceding scene. Contrasting Fortiguerra and Coc-

Most accurate in technique, but giving only isolated pictures, are the facsimiles of D'Agincourt (Histoire de l'art par les monuments, Paris 1823, T. 5, Pl. 35 and 36).[1] These, with the photographs of the Phormio included in the Harvard edition of the play (Cambridge, 1894), supply the only reliable copies of C.

In the case of P, Madame Dacier has said much that is interesting, but Picart's execution of those pictures which her enthusiasm required for her translation of Terence (Amsterdam, 1724), depicts the actors performing in edifices of modern construction and may thus be duly estimated. Faithful reproductions are published by Chatelain (Paléog. des class. lat. pl. vii, Andr. 1. 5 and Ad. 3. 3) and by Champollion (Paléog. des class. lat. pl. iv, Eun. 2. 3).

F has had even less notice. A. Mai (M. Accii Plauti fragment. inedita, etc., Med. 1815) gives (pp. 51 and 61) the masks to the Ad. and Phor., and (p. 47) the picture at Heaut. 3. 3. 32 (= v. 592 Dz.), for which C makes no provision.[2] Chatelain's specimen page of the manuscript (l. c., pl. viii) shows the scene at Ad. 3. 4.

The last of the group, the Dunelmensis, shows unmistakable traces of mediaeval influence. The figures are larger and coarser than those of the general type, grotesque and clownish, with fingers disproportionately long and conspicuous, and inferior artistic ability is everywhere evident (cf. Hoeing, l. c., p. 313).

It thus appears that the Vatican apparatus is useless for a full grouping of typical gestures and that for the information which is desirable concerning F and P recourse must be had to the manuscripts themselves. The results therefore of a comparison which sought for detailed evidence of a copy common to both,

quelines, the *prologus* of the Phormio in the former does duty in the latter for the Hecyra. Similarly the *aediculae* of the Eunuchus and the Hecyra are exchanged. At Heaut. 4. 3 = v. 723, in a group of five figures, one shows the order, Bacchis, Clinia, Phrygia, Dromo, Syrus; in the other the order is Syrus, Dromo, Clinia, Bacchis, Phrygia. It will be observed that we have here not a mere matter of substituting designations of the figures. In one, the first figure is a female; in the other, a slave. Other similar matters might be noted.

[1] These show, besides a series of grotesque masks, the scenes at Andr. 1. 5; 4. 3; *Prologus* Phor.; Phor. 2. 4; Eun. 2. 1; 4. 7; Heaut. 1. 1 [all reproduced in Wieseler (l. c., Taf. v. and x.)].

[2] Reproduced in the edition of Giles (Lond. 1837) and in Wieseler (l. c., Taf. v. 29 and x. 9).

will be partially indicated below. The first example will illustrate both the correctness of the method suggested and the caution to be observed in the use of the pictures.

A common gesture among modern Italians for scoring points as they are successively presented in discourse, as it were the commas of speech, is that made by placing together the tips of the thumb and first finger, approximating a circle, the others being carelessly relaxed or elevated. This position seems indicated by Quint. xi, 3. 101 pollici proximus digitus mediumque, qua dexter est, unguem pollicis summo suo iungens, remissis ceteris, est et *approbantibus* et *narrantibus* et *distinguentibus* decorus. Jorio (l. c., p. 86) shows that this gesture was also a Neapolitan sign for inquiry, and he mentions another, which differs but a little in the disposition of the unemployed fingers, and which was used in the sense of "good!" (cf. Quint. l. c., "approbantibus"). Beda (De computo vel loquela digitorum, p. 256, § 1, ed. Sittl), quoting Hieronymus, gives evidence that in antiquity the elements of the same gesture made up the sign for marriage, "Triginta referuntur ad nuptias; nam et ipsa digitorum coniunctio quasi molli osculo se complectens et foederans, maritum pingit et coniugem." This practically is one of the few out of the large number of gestures described by Rabelais, the significance of which is explained. Nazdecabre (Pantagruel Bk. III, ch. xx) is described as having elevated his left hand,[1] the fingers retained 'fistways closed together', except the thumb and the forefinger the nails of which 'he softly joined and coupled to one another'. "I understand," quoth Pantagruel, "what he meaneth by that sign. It denotes marriage."[2] The position, formed however upon the right hand, seems indicated also by Apuleius (Met. IV, 28) where the adorers of Venus are shown "admoventes oribus suis dexteram primore digito in erectum pollicem residente."

With these literary notices of a gesture which is still perpetuated in Italian custom as a sign of love (Jorio, l. c., p. 46) and

[1] It should be noted that St. Jerome's symbol for thirty is made on the *left* hand. Cf. Beda (l. c. § 5), trecenta in dextera, quemadmodem triginta in laeva.

[2] J' entends, dist Pantagruel, ce qu'il praetend par cestuy signe. Il denote *mariage*; et d'abondant le nombre trentenaire, scelon la profession des Pythagoriens. Vous serez marié.

in the other significations noted, its frequent occurrence in the Terence miniatures is most interesting; but these miniatures are of but little use in determining its scenic value, when it is found from the collected instances as shown by the Vatican reproductions and F and P, that no strict uniformity is preserved in the dramatic situations to which the gesture is assigned. The prints of Cocquelines and De Berger differ much as F and P; out of 18 instances of the gesture in the latter, Cocquelines has only 14. F and P agree in giving it to Pythias (Eun. 4. 5 = v. 727); Thais (Eun. 4. 6 = v. 739); Parmeno (Eun. 5. 8 = v. 1031); Chremes (Heaut. 3. 3 = v. 562); Hegio (Ad. 3. 4 = v. 447); Demea (Ad. 5. 6 = v. 889); Laches (Hecy. 4. 2 = v. 577); Laches (Hecy. 4. 3 = v. 607); Demipho (F) = Chremes (P) (Ph. 4. 3 = v. 606).

In F the fingers are often shown merely tending together, and at Eun. 4. 5, the thumb and third finger, instead of the first, are involved; at Eun. 5. 8 (9), the second and the thumb are employed. P shows it, besides for Parmeno, for both Thraso and Gnatho, (Eun). 5. 8 (9); for Chaerea (Eun. 5. 10 = v. 1049), and for Philotis (Hecy. 1. 1 = v. 58). F alone has it for Gnatho (Eun. 4. 7 = v. 771); Bacchis (Heaut. 2. 4 = v. 381) whereas in P, she holds a small object between the fingers; Demea (Ad. 5. 4 = v. 855); and Geta (Ph. 2. 3 = v. 348).

By an examination of the situations in which the manuscripts show the gesture in common, the conclusion that it was characteristically a sign of interrogation or inquiry was drawn apart from other information concerning its significance. Some instances possibly exemplify the attitude described by Quintilian as that of an "approbans" or "distinguens."[1]

[1] Chaerea (Eun. 5. 10 = v. 1049) and Demea in the monologue (Ad. 5. 4 = vv. 855 to 881) are cited by Jorio (l. c., p. 49) as instances of the sign of "love". The MSS C F P, however, do not divide at v. 882, as do the published pictures which the canon used, so that in the manuscript picture, which shows both Demea and Syrus, a critical situation is portrayed in the longer passage of vv. 855 to 889, and the gesture may naturally be assigned to the excited inquiries of Demea v. 883. In the Eun. passage, Chaerea's part is a minor one; he is prominent only in the latter part of the scene, where his words show Quintilian's "approval". Cf. v. 1086, ac lubenter; v. 1087, placet. He is also shown as addressing Gnatho (cf. the text). Furthermore, one should expect the *left hand* to be used in the sign for love.

Reviewing the situations involved in the instances presented by F and P in common, the value of the gesture is, in most cases, clear.

At Eun. 4. 5 = v. 727, the two figures of Chremes and Pythias are shown. The youth enters from the left, uncertain in gait and speech after a drunken debauch, while Pythias propounds eager interrogatories, gesticulating with the right hand. Compare v. 733, An abiit iam a milite? v. 735, nil dixit, tu ut sequerere sese? v. 736, Eho, nonne id sat erat?

Eun. 4. 6 = v. 739. Pythias on the right, in pose of rest, supports a casket on the left arm. Thais appears from the opposite side inveighing against Thraso.

In v. 753 the girl has been dispatched for the casket of tokens, and since she now is seen with the box in hand, the grouping depicted evidently belongs in the latter part of the scene. The action of Chremes, too, who, on the point of exit, looks back over his shoulder at the *meretrix* is indicated at v. 763. Thais seems to use the gesture to punctuate a series of arguments that Chremes should bestir himself against Thraso for the possession of the girl in her charge. "Consider this further," says she (v. 759), "your rival is a foreigner, with less influence, fewer friends, is less known."

Eun. 5. 8 (9) = v. 1031. Chaerea, who, as he enters, exclaims joyfully at his good fortune, "O populares, ecquis me hodie vivit fortunatior?" is the object of interest. The three other figures Parmeno, Thraso and Gnatho, are evidently curious to know the cause of such extreme joy. Parmeno who is nearest the youth questions apart (v. 1034), "Quid hic laetus est?"[1]

The scene at Heaut. 3. 3 = v. 562, is marked by Chremes's rapid questioning, first of Clitipho then of Syrus, as to the latter's design hatched up for Menedemus. The dialogue is largely between Chremes and Syrus who is advancing towards him, and the attitudes of the two point to the latter part of the scene in which comes the chief contribution to the plot of the play as the slave reveals his plan. Chremes interrupts with inquiries at vv. 595 (twice), 596, 597, 598, 602, 605, 606, 607, 611, 612, 613.

Ad. 3. 4 = v. 447. Geta stands in the centre in an attitude of excitement, strained and comical, having disclosed to Hegio his

[1] De Berger gives the sign to all three; Cocquel. only to Thraso; F and P only to Parmeno.

family's woes consequent upon Aeschinus' desertion. The old man here employs the gesture, and with figure and eyes afire, bursts into the impassioned exclamation "Pro di immortales, facinus indignum, Geta, quod narras!" (vv. 447–48).

Ad. 5. 6 = v. 889. In a short scene between Demea and Geta,[1] the old man plays the affable, with complimentary expressions to the slave reinforced by the gesture. (Cf. Quintilian's "approval".) "Geta, hominem maximi preti te esse hodie iudicavi animo meo," etc. (vv. 891–97).

Hecy. 4. 2 = v. 577). Sostrata in a dialogue with Pamphilus reveals her resolution to retire into the country in order to remove the fancied obstacle to her son's happiness. Laches (unnamed in F), who takes no part in the dialogue, stands on one side overhearing it (cf. the next scene v. 607: Quem cum istoc sermonem habueris, *procul hinc stans*, accepi, uxor) and seems to indicate by the gesture his secret approval which is openly expressed in the following scene (cf. 4. 3, v. 610). In this F and P again show him with the gesture, while in the Vatican prints it is unfittingly transferred to Sostrata.

Ph. 4. 3 = v. 606. Geta and the third figure of the group, including besides the slave, Antipho and two old men, are the engaging figures. The fourth figure with the gesture under consideration, is called by F, Demipho, by C and P, Chremes, a variation which introduces difficulties in the proper use of the text. The threatening attitude, however, of the third figure seems to make it certain that this figure represents Demipho (so C and P), at the climax of the scene, where Geta reveals that he has promised to the parasite, with hardihood unwarranted, a sum of money for which his master is to be responsible (vv. 636 ff.). All are intent to hear the amount promised, and Chremes at this point urges (v. 642), Cedo quid postulat? (v. 643) *Quantum*? dic.

A further marked difference between the manuscripts is the characteristic substitution by P of the first and second fingers in those positions in which F shows the first alone extended, the thumb being usually apart. This occurs in the ordinary positions of pointing and in others where the fingers seem disposed for no special effect.[2] The type common in P is designated by Sittl (l. c., p. 286, 3) an ear-mark of post-classic art.

[1] F reverses the names in obvious error.

[2] Examples are numerous. For the act of pointing, I cite Eun. 4. 7

Again, an attitude in the miniatures that is typical in passages of soliloquy, usually monologues, is that of the hand directed toward the face while the head inclines downward as if to meet it. The fingers are variously disposed. In the movement of the hand may frequently be discovered the emotional value which Quintilian (xi. 3. 103, cf. 96) assigns to it: digitos cum summi coierunt, ad os referre, cur quibusdam displicuerit, nescio; nam id et leviter admirantes et interim subita indignatione velut pavescentes et deprecantes facimus. P and F, however, show no uniformity either in defining the position of the hand or in the disposition of the fingers. At Eun. 4. 2 = v. 629 and 4. 3 = v. 643 Phaedria is shown in P with the first finger extended, the hand tending upwards. In F the first finger rests above the eyebrow. At Eun. 5. 1 = v. 817, Thais appears in F, advancing with arm raised high and with hand compressed and touching her brow. The gesture suggests that of striking the forehead, while in P her clenched hand merely tends upwards and is removed from her face.

In Eun. 5. 5 = v. 971 Laches, in F, has the less pronounced gesture; in P, the forefinger extended rests upon the left cheek. The same positions are shown in reversed order for Clinia, Heaut. 2. 2 = v. 230. At Heaut. 2. 3 = v. 242 the figure named Clinia in P (Clitipho in F), with all fingers bent under and hand against cheek, seems to be supporting his head. In F he is shown with his arm sharply elevated, all his fingers extended, and his hand directed toward his face. At Phor. 1. 3 = v. 153 Antipho with his arm extended and his right hand uplifted rests his first and second fingers on his left brow (F). In P and C,[1] the first finger alone is extended and touches the left cheek. Similar differences appear in the pictures at Eun. v. 942 (Parmeno), Heaut. v. 874 (Chremes), Ad. v. 364 (Demea); Phor. v. 534 (Geta); v. 766 (Demipho).

(Sanga P = Thraso F); 5. 4 (Parmeno); Heaut. 1. 2 (Clitipho); 4. 1 (Syrus), pointing downwards; cf. Quint. (xi. 3. 94), versus in terram et quasi pronus urguet. For other positions cf. Eun. 5. 6 (Pythias); Heaut. 4. 4 (Phrygia F = Bacchis P); 4. 8 (Menedemus); 5. 3 (Sostrata); Ad. 1. 1 (Micio); 2. 1 (Aeschinus); 5. 2 (Dromo); Hecy. 3. 1 (Pamphilus); Phor. 2. 4 (Demipho); 4. 3 (Geta), et saepe.

The Harvard pictures for the Phor. are much like those of P.

[1] According to the Harvard photographs.

Another gesture, which appears not infrequently, viz. that of extended first finger, other fingers bent down, the thumb resting on the second, is so variously shown that the type for definite situations is destroyed. Thus at Eun. 4. 7 = v. 771 F and P show it in common for Chremes; at Eun. 5. 5 = v. 971, F gives it to Parmeno, while in P he is shown with open palms and fingers extended. Dromo has it in F at Heaut. 2. 3 = v. 242, while P, with the substitution noted above, modifies the gesture by showing the first and second fingers out, and the thumb on the third which is bent upon the palm. The form which appears here in P may be exemplified in both manuscripts at Hecy. 3. 4 = v. 415 (Sosia), 5. 3 = v. 799 (Bacchis), Phor. 4. 1 = 567 (Chremes); 5. 5 = v. 829 (Antipho). Other numerous instances in which it occurs in but one of the two manuscripts clearly define the type, but leave unsettled any opinion concerning the correctness of its claims. Where it is found in F, P often substitutes the open palm and extended fingers, e. g. Ad. v. 447 (Demea); Hecy. v. 336 (Pamphilus); v. 607 (id.); Phor. v. 348 (Phormio).

Thus far the examples cited have been of characteristic gestures selected from different plays; but before drawing a conclusion it will be well for the purpose in hand to include a comparison of F, P and C (using Cocquelines) at the strikingly comical scene of Eun. 4. 7 = v. 771 where the braggart soldier comes indignantly with his following to storm the house of Thais. This has often been reproduced from the Vatican with varying identification of the characters and conflicting explanations.[1] The representations of F and P differ markedly in both attitudes and gestures. The first figure on the left, Gnatho, is seen in C and P excitedly girding or ungirding a scarf about his waist. In F he lifts his right arm aloft, tending to form a circle with his thumb and first finger, his left hand being disengaged and all his fingers extended. Thraso, the third of the group, advancing with action, points with his first finger to the right (F and C). P adds also the second finger (cf. above). Donax, the fourth figure, in C and P, grasps in his right hand a club-like object (the "vectis" of v. 774), while the left seizes the scarf (*κοσύμβη*) about his shoulder. Named Simalio in F, the figure is shown

[1] Cf. Wieseler (l. c., Pl. x, Fig. 5; Baumeister (Denk. des kl. Alt. II, p. 38, Fig. 914); Schreiber (Atlas of Class. Antiq., Pl. III, Fig. 5); Leo (Rh. M. pp. 339–340).

with the arm lifted high over the head, and the next figure (Donax in F) assumes the "vectis". This figure, in P, is Simalio with arm elevated; in C, Syriscus bearing in the right hand a whisk (cf. Plaut. Men. vv. 77 and 391).[1]

On the right F shows a door between the advancing crowd and the *meretrix* and Chremes who are within. Syriscus (F and P), having reached this point, halts and turns to those behind. In P no door appears, but the figure which faces those that are advancing, grasps a gourd-like object the end of which is held by the figure preceding. C, omitting the door, designates here the figure Simalio and represents it much as F. Wieseler and Leo have made much of the attitude of Thais who stands in C and P as though in deep thought or perhaps careless and unconcerned, with her right hand supporting her cheek, the elbow resting on the other hand crossed about the waist. In F, however, she awaits the storm in pious supplication with hands crossed religiously over her breast.

Certain differences are further to be mentioned in the care bestowed upon the *aediculae* prefixed to the plays, P being much superior to F, and both evincing greater elaboration for the early plays of the manuscripts. F, after the Heaut., places the masks merely upon waving, rough-drawn lines of blue. At the Hec. the collection is wholly omitted. Nor is the number of masks represented with regularity, F having, for the Ad. and Phor., eight each, P, at these places, thirteen. In P some of the *aediculae* are ornamented with birds (so Ad. Hec. Phor.), a device popular in the Carolingian Renaissance, and thus in itself a mark of the later period.[2] At the Hec. one perches above each corner, and a pair is seen in the centre of the gable. That on the Adelphi holds a spray in its bill.

Stage entrances are shown in different forms of square openings draped or undraped, or with arched tops usually undraped. Some appear with lattice-work in the middle. P and F, again, are far from uniform both in the type chosen and in the frequency with which they are added to the pictures.

The footgear of the actor is shown by P and C to be quite uniformly the comedian's *soccus* laced across the instep and

[1] The text (v. 777) assigns to *Sanga* the *peniculus*.

[2] Cf. Sittl, l. c., p. 205, n. 3; Janitschek, Die Trierer Ada-Handschrift, Leipzig 1889, p. 69 f.

ankle. F, on the other hand, omitting detail, gives the somewhat odd effect of the modern sock. Ludicrous exceptions are to be noted. The *miles* at Eun. 4. 7 has bootlets; at Ph. 2. 3, Geta stands with his feet close together, as though in bonds adjusted about the ankles; so also at Ph. 4. 2 and at Ph. 2. 4, Cratinus' left foot is drawn with protruding toes.

In general, the pictures of F are not regular in execution, but, as types, exhibit more grace than those of C. All are shaded in light blue with ornamental effect. Some are drawn with full, round outlines, others are deficient in technique with disregard of proper proportions. Those of the Adelphi and Phormio are perhaps the best of the manuscript. The early scenes of the Eunuchus exhibit an unpracticed hand, while in the later portions and in the Heautontimorumenos, the next in order, more regularity may be observed. Those of P share the superiority of the manuscript, and, though lacking the blue ornamentation of the other, are outlined and shaded with good effect in the brownish ink of the manuscript.

The results of our investigation, which has been sufficiently illustrated by the matters presented, are such as to warrant, conservatively speaking, the conclusion that the pictures do not adhere to the supposed original as accurate copies of a fixed model, and that in the elaboration of a system of scenic gestures, they should deserve credence as representing the older tradition only in those particulars in which the testimony of the several manuscripts coincides. For depicting general situations and bearing, for the nature of the devices and the resources available for comic effect, for the characterization of stock rôles[1] and attitudes, and to a certain extent, for the costume, they are of undoubted value.

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[1] E. g. the "servus currens" is depicted with admirable conformity to our testimony as to the stock type of comedy, usually also in the short tunic, cf. Donat., De Com. p. 11 Reiff., servi comici amictu exiguo teguntur paupertatis antiquae gratia vel *quo expeditiores agant.* The type appears in Quint. (l. c. 112), *servi,* ancillulae, parasiti, piscatores, citatius moventur. Compare also Ter. Heaut. vv. 31, 124; Eun. 36, *et al.*; Donatus, scholia to Ad. vv. 299, 324; Phor. 179; Andr. 722; Hecy. 16, 443; similarly in Plautus, Acanthio (Merc. vv. 111–119); Leonida (Asin. vv. 290 ff.); Epidicus (Ep. vv. 185 ff.)

PUPULA DUPLEX.

A Comment on Ovid, Amores I, 8, 15.

In his Address to the *Lena*, a conventional theme of the elegiac poet, Ovid says of her:

> . . . oculis quoque pupula duplex
> fulminat et gemino lumen ab orbe venit.

This statement occurs in the usual list of magic feats which all *lenae* were supposed to perform; for everyone knows that the business of this indispensable adjunct of an antique love-affair included, as a matter of course, the brewing of love-potions and the practice of necromancy in all its branches.

Of course, it is Ovid's implication that his 'Dipsas,' as he expressively calls her, has the Evil Eye. But what would have been his definition of a *pupula duplex*, a double pupil? And why was this peculiarity, whatever it may be, esteemed a sign of the Evil Eye? Commentators have added nothing of any value to the solution of these questions since the time of Burmann.[1] Of the parallels cited by them Pliny, VII, 16 and a passage from Ptolemaios Chennos are all that have any bearing upon the point.

Pliny, VII, 2, 16, says that "In this same Africa, according to Isigonus and Nymphodorus, are certain families of people possessing the Evil Eye who cause cattle to die, trees to wither up, babies to perish, simply by commending them. Isigonus adds that persons of the same sort are found among the Triballi and Illyri. These, also, especially if they are angry, charm and kill by their gaze whomsoever they look upon for any length of time. Youths who have just reached maturity are most easily injured by them. More notable still, says Isigonus, is the fact that they have double pupils in each eye. According to Apollonides there are also women of this sort in Scythia. They are called Bitiae. Phylarchus says that in Pontus there is a race called Thibii and many

[1] The latest commentary on the *Amores* is by Martinon, Paris, Fontemoing, 1897.

others who have the same powers. As peculiarities of these people he notes that they have in one eye a double pupil, in the other the figure of a horse. Even when their garments are soaked through they cannot be made to sink in water.[1] Cicero also, among us, is authority for the statement that all women everywhere with double pupils possess the Evil Eye."

Pliny refers again to this passage at XI, 142, and Gellius, IX, 4, 7, gives the substance of it. No other references to the superstition are quoted from Roman authors. It may be observed too that, except Cicero, all the authorities cited by Pliny are Greek. The eldest, Phylarchos and Nymphodoros, belong to the early Alexandrian period. The time of Isigonos must have been later as is shown by his use of Nymphodoros. The most recent is Apollonides. He lived in the period of the Mithradatic Wars. All belong to that class of marvel-mongers familiar to everyone who has followed the romantic and novellistic literature of later Greece.[2] This type of popular historian and *paradoxographos* was much read throughout the entire Roman period, and perhaps may be said—at any rate in the case of Pliny, who lacked the training, not the temperament, of a scientist—to have taken the place of that which, under different circumstances, might have ripened into more profitable investigation.

The passage which Pliny quotes from Cicero is not to be found in any work of his now extant. But Baiter and Kayser (Cicero, Tauchnitz, Leipzig, 1869, vol. XI, p. 77) are undoubtedly right in ascribing it to the *Admiranda*. Pliny used the work, indeed, quotes it by name at XXXI, 12 and 51 for notices similar in character to this. The title of the *Admiranda* and, as far as we know them, its contents, are so suggestive of Ἄπιστα, Παράδοξα, Θαυμαστά and similar names given to the books of the Hellenistic romancers that we may well believe Cicero's work to have been based directly upon the sources used by Pliny. In fact, it is not impossible that, in this particular statement, Cicero merely generalized where Pliny, more accurate—or more painstaking—gave

[1] This detail is familiar to all who have studied the judicial side of sorcery in the Middle Ages. See Grimm, *D. M.*[4], p. 899; *Deutsche Rechtsalt.*, II, p. 923; Soldan-Heppe, *Gesch. der Hexenprozesse*, 1880, I, 394 f.; Remigius, *Daemonolatreia*, Cologne, 1596, III, 9 (p. 370).

[2] See, for example, Rohde-Schöll, *Der Griech. Roman und seine Vorläufer*, Leipzig, 1900, p. 188 f.

his authorities in detail. Finally, if we turn back to our passage from Ovid, reminding ourselves of his extraordinary acquaintance with the light literature of later Hellenism, we may suspect that he, too, drew from a source similar to that used by Pliny and Cicero.

It would be dangerous, however, to conclude that this superstition was not Italic, although with the Latin authors mentioned, it has all the air of being the result of reading rather than the personal observation of a commonplace superstition near home. It is true, moreover, that Pliny's Greek sources agree in placing all actual examples of the double pupil in a remote country. But just as the testimonial of a patent medicine seems to flourish best in a town remarkable for its distance or obscurity, so the Land of Marvels is generally well outside the limits of the known world. In both cases the suggestion is very likely to have originated in the home of the reporter. For our purpose, therefore, it is quite unnecessary to discuss the identity of the 'Thibii' and 'Bitiae' or why and how this idea of a double pupil became connected with the various remote and obscure peoples mentioned in Pliny's catalogue.

We should note, however, the curious statement of Phylarchos that his 'Thibii and many others in Pontus' have 'in altero oculo geminam pupillam in altero equi effigiem.' In his edition of Pliny, Lyons, 1587, Dalecamp suggested that Pliny had made the mistake of taking the word ἵππος, in its literal sense, whereas, in fact, it was the regular name given by Phylarchos to a peculiar disease of the eye, the most prominent symptom of which, as we are told by Hippokrates,[1] was a constant trembling and winking of the lids. Dalecamp's explanation was very reasonably questioned by later editors of Pliny, Hardouin in particular, but was again adopted, without reference to Dalecamp, by Otto Jahn.[2] But, as Hardouin saw, we could hardly expect Phylarchos to couple a simple everyday eye-disease on one side of the Thibian and Pontic nose with a miraculous double pupil on the other. Moreover, as Riess, A. J. P. XVIII, 195, has well observed, this theory, like Müller's mythological 'disease of language' in a

[1] Galen, 8, 604, F; 732, A. See *Thesaurus Steph.* s. v.

[2] Ueber den Aberglauben des bösen Blicks bei den Alten, 1855, p. 35, n. 26.

kindred field, really reverses the order of things. "The very name of the sickness proves that its presence was ascribed to a horse-shaped demon."[1] It is evident, therefore, that in his desire of making us quake again Phylarchos has followed a method not infrequently observed in writers of his class. He has furnished his 'Thibii and many others in Pontus' with a *double* share of horrific signs for the Evil Eye.

We may now turn to an interesting passage from Ptolemaios Chennos[2] who, according to Suidas, would be a younger contemporary of Pliny the Elder. His Καινὴ Ἱστορία, which consisted of seven books and is fortunately preserved for us in the abstract of Photios, at once stamps him as a mythographer of the semi-novellistic type.

In this work,[3] according to Photios, Chennos told "that the wife of Kandaules, whose name Herodotos does not mention, was called Nysia; that, according to report, she was δίκορος (i. e., had a double pupil), and extremely sharp of sight, being in possession of the stone δρακοντίτης,[4] and on this account perceived Gyges passing out of the door."

At first sight we might suspect that this passage is merely a piece of Alexandrian embroidery on the famous story of Herodotos, 1, 8–12. But in his life of Apollonios of Tyana,[5] Philostratos, during a long digression on Indian dragons, the manner of their capture, etc., observes that the wonderful stone in their heads (i. e., the δρακοντίτης) is "invincible even against the ring which, they say, was possessed by Gyges." This shows that in the version to which Chennos refers and which is that of neither Plato[6] nor Herodotos, Gyges was not put behind the door, as Herodotos tells the story, but, probably without the connivance

[1] For modern instances of the horse-demon as a sign of the Evil Eye, Professor Riess refers to an article by Tuchmann in *La Mélusine*, vol. IV. I have been unable to inspect a copy of this volume.

[2] Persistently quoted by his father's name of Hephaistion. The title of his work is Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Ἡφαιστίωνος περὶ τῆς εἰς πολυμαθίαν καινῆς ἱστορίας λόγ. ζ'.

[3] *Mythographi Graeci*, Westermann, p. 192.

[4] So Westermann. The word is not found in L. & S. (8th ed.). "Draconitis sive Dracontias" according to Pliny, XXXVII, 158. Compare Solin., XXX, 16, 17; Isidor, XIV, 14, 7; 14, 5, 15; Tzetz. *Hist.* 7, 656.

[5] III, 6 (vol. 1, p. 88, K.).

[6] *Repub.* II, 359, D.

of Kandaules, was depending upon his ring—as old Henslowe used to describe certain of his theatrical properties—"for to goo invisibell." But against the dragon-stone which, according to a world-wide superstition regarding serpents,[1] makes its possessor all-seeing and all-knowing, even this famous ring was as powerless as the hypnotism of the Hindoo juggler in the presence of the kodak.

Chennos is our only authority for the statement that Nysia, as he calls her, possessed a double pupil as well as the dragon-stone. Moreover, it is to be observed that he uses the idea of the double pupil in a new sense. The Evil Eye is not the point here, though it may be implied. Nysia derives the same power from her double pupil that she already derived from her dragon-stone in infinite measure — supernatural sharpness of vision. In other words Chennos, like Phylarchos, has doubled his signs of the same thing.

So far as I am acquainted with the commentators on this subject we have now reached the end of our resources. As we pause to review the situation it becomes clear that we are hardly wiser than when we started. The two questions proposed for solution are still unanswered. To show how far they have been from an answer, let me quote the only two persons who, to my knowledge, have ever expressed any opinion on a *pupula duplex*.

The first comes from no less a person than Cuvier. He was an associate editor of the Lemaire Pliny, Paris, 1827. At the passage already quoted he observes:[2] "Unde haec de pupula duplici pervagata opinio, equidem nescio; neque crediderim tales unquam in humanitate, etiam monstrosa, oculos visos."

The second comes from E. Müller, *Phil.* VII, the main object of whose article was to prove that Plato's story of Gyges and his Ring originated in a volcanic myth. Commenting on the word δίκορος in the passage from Chennos, Müller makes the naïve suggestion (p. 254, n. 40) that the wife of Kandaules "verschiedenartige, wie es scheint, nach ganz verschiedener richtung blickende

[1] Comp. p. 290, n. 4; Fafnir in the tale of the Volsungs; Bulukiya and the Queen of the Serpents, *Book of the Thousand Nights and a Night*, vol. V, p. 278 (Burton); etc., etc.

[2] Vol. III, p. 24.

pupillen gehabt habe." The old legend of Venus Paeta[1]—if one must turn to the books to settle a question like this—makes it clear that any Dream of Fair Women is incomplete unless it includes at least one with a cast in her eye. But "nach ganz verschiedener richtung blickende pupillen"! Add this touch of description, if you please, to that figure of gleaming white which, seen and yet unseen, stands amid the flickering, perfumed shadows of the doomed king's chamber. We have all gazed, with Gyges, upon its perilous beauty, we have all shared his mingled emotions of rage and fear, shame and delight.

But, to leave Müller's theory for the present, we have, at least, discovered that the Greek word for one possessing a *pupula duplex* is δίκορος. It is not found in Liddell and Scott, but the Thesaurus gives us three examples, none of which, curiously enough, seem to have ever been connected with the discussion of the double pupil.

In the *Scriptores Physiognomonici*, II, p. 225 (Foerster), a passage dealing with the color of the eyes as a sign of character, reads as follows: ὀφθαλμοὶ μέλανες ἀγαθοῦ σημεῖον εἰ μείζους εἰσίν. ὀφθαλμοὶ δίκοροι ἀστάτου γνώρισμα καὶ ἀνυποστάτου, εἰ μάλιστ' ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὀφθαλμῷ εἰσιν.

Suidas, s. v. Δίκορος, tells us that Ἀναστάσιος ὁ τῶν Ῥωμαίων βασιλεὺς Δίκορος ἐλέγετο. Zonaras, XIV, 3, p. 53 (cf. Joh. Mal., p. 392) adds that he was so named, ὅτι ἀνομοίας ἀλλήλαις εἶχε τὰς κόρας τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν· τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἦν τὸ χρῶμα μελάντερον, ἡ δὲ λαιὰ πρὸς τὸ γλαυκότερον ἐχρωμάτιστο.

Finally, an old *scholium* on Thamyris, the minstrel (Iliad, B, 595 f.), preserved in Eustathios, 298, 44, says, among other things: ἱστοροῦσι δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ δίκορον εἶναι, τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τὸν μὲν γλαυκὸν ἔχοντα, τὸν δὲ μέλανα.

These passages tell us that a δίκορος is a person whose eyes are of different colors. Sometimes the difference of colors may be found in one eye. More frequently, to judge by modern experience, one eye differs in color from the other. This new association for δίκορος, *pupula duplex*, lets in a flood of light. It removes it from that which, to one accustomed to deal with problems of folklore, might well seem a curiously contracted sphere, and takes it into the domain of a world-wide superstition—one might cite the

[1] Ovid, *A. A.* 2, 659; *Priap.* 36, 4; Varro, *Sat. Men.* 344 B.; Lucian, *Dial. Deor.* 20, 10; Petron. 68, Fried.

single example of Hereward, "last of the English"—according to which all persons who show a difference of color in the eyes are credited with the power of *fascinatio*.[1]

But what has *pupula duplex*, δίκορος, to do with color? How does it happen that two ideas, apparently quite foreign, should be associated? Finally, what is a *pupula duplex*? Before attempting to answer these questions it may be well to observe briefly some aspects of the primaeval and universal superstition with which they are connected.

The Evil Eye[2] may be the cause of every ill in mind, body or estate that flesh is heir to; briefly, of misfortunes which in modern times are covered by insurance, attributed to the weather or for which the remedy is sought by recourse to a lawyer, a physician or a gun, according to the temperament of the loser. Above all, the Evil Eye is responsible for those slow, wasting diseases and nervous or mental disorders for which the untutored mind can find no explanation in the circumstances of the person afflicted. Anyone may be blighted by it, babies in the cradle especially. The possessor of it simply has to cast a glance—*la gettatura*, as the Neapolitans expressively term it—upon his chosen victim at some unguarded moment. The etymology and historical usage of words like *invidere*, βασκαίνειν and their parallels in other languages show that, in the popular conception, envy was the principal motive for using the Evil Eye. Nevertheless there are some unfortunates born with the Evil Eye who involuntarily blast all that they look upon. This was the pathos of Gautier's well-known story. The ability to detect the Evil Eye is an acquisition of obvious value. There are many rules for it, and most of them are common to all folk-lore. Persons with a piercing eye who look at you steadily are to be avoided. Persons who are cross-eyed, 'wall-eyed,' one-eyed or have any other marked peculiarity of the eye have always been dreaded.

[1] My friend, Mr. Charles Stafford-Northcote, who lived for nine years in the highlands of Ceylon, tells me that the natives, one and all, have the utmost fear of anyone who possesses this peculiarity. The same is true elsewhere.

[2] The subject has attracted much attention, especially in its connection with Phallic worship. One of the best known and most important treatises upon it is the work of Otto Jahn, mentioned in note 2, p. 289. For ancient and mediaeval authorities, see note 2, p. 295.

Witches, werewolves, vampires—the three are often united in the same person—possess and use the Evil Eye as a matter of course. Indeed, it should be observed that the Evil Eye is very frequently accompanied by other powers of an uncanny nature.

An enquiry into the origin and philosophy of this widespread superstition, which was, of course, derived in the first instance from the primaeval explanation, whatever it was, of vision, may safely begin with the general axiom of folk-lore that the primitive man, whose beliefs survive in our superstitions, conceived of no manifestation of natural forces or organic life except as due to a personality. To him, the causes of all effects are never things or laws, but always persons. Those well-known lines of Pope,

> "Lo, the poor Indian whose untutored mind
> Sees God in clouds and hears him in the wind,"

are not only truer, but they must be taken in a more literal and homelier sense, than their author had ever supposed. Without pausing to mention many other ideas of a similar nature, the 'poor Indian' is one of those also who see in the eclipse a monster proceeding to gulp down quick the god of day, and is much relieved when his strenuous efforts in the way of shouting, beating of drums, archery practice and such like, have averted the threatened calamity. He also knows that the real cause of his chills and fever is a devil, that another one of a different sort gives him the small-pox. In short, after his own peculiar fashion he believes in microbes. Hence the medicine-man prescribes an allopathic dose of tom-toms over his patient's bed while the Chinese practitioner, more advanced, pierces the diseased member with needles. The object in both cases is to oust the demon.

The primitive man of all nations accounted for the phenomenon of sight and explained the functions of the eye after a similar fashion. Nor do we need to consult the lore of the modern savage here. Traces of it are clearly visible in the traditional discussion of optics found in the earliest Greek and Roman thinkers, the Church Fathers and various mediaeval doctors and theologians, from the dawn of Hellenic thought to the middle of the 17th century. A detailed review of this long discussion, interesting and curious as it is, would be unnecessary and, moreover, is impossible in the space at my disposal. A few points, however, may be noted.

We shall go far towards understanding the primitive theory of sight among the Greeks and Romans if we begin by giving a perfectly literal interpretation to the old saying that 'the eye is the window of the soul.' The expression has been traced to Herakleitos, but it is repeated or implied in all languages and all periods. The same thought, for example, is in the Νοῦς ὁρᾷ καὶ νοῦς ἀκούει· τἆλλα κωφὰ καὶ τυφλά, that famous verse of Epicharmos[1] which was the emphatic expression of a philosophical dogma and, for ages, the text of a philosophical dispute regarding the nature of vision.[2] It is evident moreover, that, in the strictly popular conception, the eye was more than the window, it was literally the door of the soul.[3]

Still another step back brings us face to face with the belief that the soul actually resides in the eye itself, 'profecto in oculis animus habitat,' to give a literal turn to Pliny's words (XI, 145), and may be seen there in the form of a mannikin. This view explains a number of superstitions. It becomes clear, too, that such designations of the pupil as κόρη, *pupa*, *pupula*, *pupilla*, i. e. the little lass, the mannikin, *das männlein*, though easily explained by a different theory in the wisdom of a later age,[4] undoubtedly go back to the time when they were applied in a literal sense to the soul which was seen in the man's eye.[5] I would suggest that this

[1] See Kaibel, *Com. Dor.*, 249 and references. Add Pliny, XI, 146 *animo autem videmus, animo cernimus.*

[2] See especially Lucretius III, 359 f. and the long list of references in Heinze's note. Frequently in connection with *fascinatio* itself. Comp., e. g., Plutarch, 680, C f.; Heliod. *Aethiopica* III, p. 86, B.; Alex. Aphrodis. *Problem.* Sect. I, 39, 68. 70; II, 53 (vol. I, Ideler), etc. Plentiful reference to the Church Fathers and a long line of mediaeval authorities may be found in the detailed discussion by M. Delrio, "de fascinatione," *Disquis. Magicae*, Mainz, 1624, Lib. III, Pars I, Quaest. IV, Sect. I. Add P. de l'Ancre, *L'Incredulité et Mescreance du Sortilege plainement convaincue*, Paris, 1622, pp. 70–113; Du Laurens, *De Opera Anatomica, quaes.* 16.

[3] See Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 22, n. 1 and p. 692, with ref. Add *Physiognom.* II, p. 17 (Foerster).

[4] See, for example, Plato, *Alkib.* I, 133, A.

[5] κόρη, meaning the pupil of the eye, is notably a favorite with Euripides. More than a score of examples are found in the extant plays. For the complete list see the *Index Graecus* of the Glasgow edit., 1829, vol. IX. Empedokles, 227, is the earliest example quoted. The word κόρη is still used by the modern Greeks in the same sense. On the traditional explanation of γλήνη in the ἔρρε, κακὴ γλήνη, of Iliad, Θ, 164, see Leaf's note.

Latin *pupilla* survives in Italian. Old French *pupille* has been replaced

theory is the origin, for example, of the old Norse superstition that the werewolf when in his bestial form may always be detected by his eyes. The eye is the one thing that remains unchanged.[1]

When one dies, the mannikin, i. e. the soul itself, leaves the eye.[2] Hence the origin of that immemorial custom of closing the open eyes of the dead, closing the door, as it were, upon the departed guest and insuring against the possible return of an occupant no longer welcome.

Conversely, though a man be never so ill, there is no immediate danger of death as long as the mannikin may be seen. 'Augurium ex homine ipso est non timendi mortem in aegritudine, quamdiu oculorum pupillae imaginem reddant' (Pliny, XXVIII, 64).

On the other hand, in the very midst of health and prosperity, the mannikin may disappear. This is a sure sign of impending doom. Capitolinus says of the unfortunate Pertinax (14, 2): "Et ea die, qua occisus est, negabant in oculis eius pupulas cum imaginibus, quas reddunt spectantibus, visas."

But, even before death and without being a premonition of it, the mannikin, in exceptional circumstances, may leave the eye

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by *prunelle* and survives only as a technical term. See Littré. Old Spanish *pupila* has been replaced, and the idea preserved, by New Span. *niña*. *Descansar la niña del ojo* is quoted as Cuban Spanish for 'Take a nap.' Eng. 'pupil' has the same history although quite lost upon the uneducated speaker.

Augapfel, augenstern, 'the apple of the eye' seems to be the figure in all the Teutonic languages. But the Germans say 'das männlein im auge' and everyone will be reminded of the 'babies' so often mentioned by the Elizabethan dramatists and other old English writers. Compare Beaumont and Fletcher's *Woman's Prize*, V, 1:

> "No more fool
> To look gay babies in your eyes, young Rowland,
> And hang about your pretty neck—"

The Macusi Indians of Guiana say that though the body decays the "man in our eyes" will not die but wander about. J. H. Bernau, *British Guiana*, p. 134 (quoted by Tylor).

[1] W. Hertz, in his famous monograph *Der Wehrwolf*, Stuttgart, 1862, p. 49, n. 2, refers to Maurer, *Bekehrung des Norwegischen Stamms*, Munich, 1855, II, p. 105, for examples of this superstition.

[2] Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 692 and Crusius, on Babrios, 95, 35, *Rhein. Mus.* XLVI, 319, show that this superstition was Greek as well as Latin. Examples from Scottish and Anglo-Saxon sources are given in Grimm's *Deutsche Mythol.*[4], p. 988.

and, return again. In this connection a story told by P'u Sung-Ling, a famous Chinese author and scholar of the 17th century, deserves our attention.

Fang-Tung was a good scholar but an unprincipled rake who followed up and spoke to every woman he saw. One time he caught sight of a beautiful girl going by in a carriage and followed it for a long distance, staring at her. Finally, the girl's maid, taking a handful of dust, threw it at him and blinded him.

Upon examination the doctor found on the pupils a small film which, in a few days, became as thick as a cash. On the right pupil there came a kind of spiral and no medicine was of any avail. Mr. Fang then betook himself to repentance and religious meditation. At the end of a year, being now in a state of perfect calm, he heard a small voice, about as loud as a fly's, calling out from his left eye: "It's horribly dark in here." To this he heard a reply from the right eye, saying, "Let us go out for a stroll, and cheer ourselves up a bit." Then he felt a wriggling in his nose—as if something was going out each of the nostrils; and after a while he felt it again, as if going the other way. Afterwards he heard a voice from one eye say, "I hadn't seen the garden for a long time," etc.

Mr. Fang related the matter to his wife and she concealed herself in the room. 'She then observed two tiny people, no bigger than a bean, come down from her husband's nose and run out of the door . . . In a little while they came back and flew up to his face . . . After some days Mr. Fang heard from the left eye, "This roundabout road is not at all convenient. It would be well for us to make a door." To this the right eye answered, "My wall is too thick; it wouldn't be at all an easy job." "I'll try and open mine," said the left eye, "and then it will do for both of us." Whereupon Mr. Fang felt a pain in his left eye as if something was being split, and in a moment he found he could see.' His wife examined his eye and 'discovered an opening in the film, through which she could see the black pupil shining out beneath, the eye-ball itself looking like a cracked pepper-corn. By next morning the film had disappeared and when his eye was closely examined it was observed to contain two pupils. The spiral on the right eye remained as before: and then they knew that the two pupils had taken up their abode in one eye. Further, although Mr. Fang was still blind of one eye, the sight of the other was better than that of the two together had formerly been.'

H. A. Giles, the translator ('Strange Stories from a Chinese Studio,' London, La Rue, 1880, vol. I, p. 8), adds in a note: "The belief that the human eye contains a tiny being of the human shape is universal in China . . . "

It will be seen that in this story the idea of the mannikin is further extended. It is itself the sight of the eye and has an entity separate from that of the man. We also have here an instance of the double pupil and the Chinese explanation of it. In the Occident, at least so far as we are now concerned, the absence or obscuration of the mannikin during a man's lifetime has a different meaning and is best taken up in another connection.

The soul, the real self, that dynamic part of every person which is of kin with the dangerous and unmeasured forces of the other world, dwells in the eye. Otherwise how could we see? Here, in fact, it may actually be observed by any one in the form of an homunculus. Naturally, then, any influence, at all events, any spiritual influence, exerted by the individual must necessarily come from the same source. Nor should we forget that this idea received ample support from the primaeval observation of certain natural phenomena, for example, the power of the serpent to charm its chosen victims, the hypnotic power of the human eye, etc., etc.

The light which this primitive theory of vision appears to shed upon the doctrine of *fascinatio* is in itself a strong proof that the two are closely connected. Once granted, for example, —and, certainly, such was the theory of primitive man—that the homunculus, the real personality, dwells in the eye, it was inevitable to suppose that the appearance of that dwelling should betray and reflect the character of its occupant.[1] This will explain why it is that among all nations every marked peculiarity or defect of the eyes is thought to be a proof of the Evil Eye.

Having reached this point we find ourselves face to face with the doctrine of possession. Any part of a man may be possessed, especially the part that aches, but if the real man, the director,

[1] Especially, in view of the undoubted fact that the eye actually does play an important part in the determination of character and temperament by the physiognomy. So too the universal idea that the body reflects in a visible form the character of its occupant is certainly responsible for the fact that in art, tradition and literature all demons and evil spirits have been misshapen and ugly since the world began.

has been possessed—or dispossessed—we must, of course, expect to find the evidence of it in the eye, if anywhere, because the eye is his abode. In such cases, the Evil Eye and the defect which marks it are both caused by the fact that the possessor is himself possessed. Thus we, at once, understand that large class of apparently anomalous cases in which the possessor of the Evil Eye inflicts damage quite against his will and, indeed, may even suffer from it himself as well as those about him.

The homunculus, except at death or the premonition of it, does not leave the eye unless driven out by the intrusion of a superior power which usually takes his place. Hence in German folk-lore (Grimm, *D. M.*[4], p. 898): "Ein mensch, in den holden gezaubert sind, ist erkennbar daran, dass man in seinen augen kein männlein oder kindlein (κόρη, pupa) sieht, oder nur ganz trübe." In other words the man himself is really absent or, at least, under a charm. So of Pliny's horse-demon and the frog's foot observed by Pierre de l'Ancre.[1] In short, any peculiarity of the eye may be traceable to the same cause.

The *pupula duplex* can now speak for itself. The δίκορος is a person who has two mannikins instead of one. In such cases, the demon-mannikin—and the case of Nysia shows that at least one of them was a demon—does not oust the legitimate occupant, but the two live side by side either in the same eye or in different eyes. The presence of the uncanny intruder is betrayed by the difference in color. If, therefore, δίκορος means two colors in the same pair of eyes it is only because the word contains what was originally the popular explanation of that peculiarity. Moreover, we can now explain why the δίκορος should have supernatural

[1] *Tableau de l'inconstance des mauvais Anges*, etc., Paris 1612, p. 184: "Une fille nous a dict (de l'Ancre, who was 'conseiller du Roy au Parlement de Bordeaux', was hunting witches at the time) qui faisoit semblant de cognoistre les sorciers et sorcieres au premier trait d'oeil qu'elle jettoit sur eux, que toutes celles de Biarrix estoient marquees en l'oeil gauche, d'une marque semblable a une patte de crapaud . . . ." Afterwards, he made use of this valuable discovery (p. 188): "Le 3 Septembre 1610 ils [la Grande Chambre] m'appellerent pour voir si ie recognoistrois la marque dans l'oeil a une ieune fille de dix-sept ans: ie la recognus des l'entree de la Chambre, et dy qu'elle l'avoit dans l'oeil gauche, le quel estoit aucunement louche et egaré et plus hagard que l'autre: on regarda audedans, on y trouva comme quelque petit nuage qui sembloit une patte de crapaud, etc." See also Grimm, *D. M.*[4], 903–4.

powers of vision. Gyges might, indeed, escape the notice of Nysia herself but no one would venture to assert that her demon-κόρη could be deceived by a ring of darkness. He, or—who knows—possibly she, could "perceive Gyges passing out of the door" and immediately reported the matter to headquarters.

Whether 'δικορία', if not too pronounced, is a blemish to beauty I leave to the more extensive experience of my readers. Certainly Ptolemaios Chennos never meant to imply it and, for one's own part, it is not unpleasant to feel that, whatever else they may have inherited, the Mermnadae were in no danger of inheriting eyes of "ganz verschiedene richtung" from one who is not only the central figure in a masterpiece of the great story-teller, but who, we are convinced, still deserves the place among those *tot milia formosarum* which has been given her by every reader of the tale of Kandaules.

Last of all, turning back to Ovid's lines quoted at the beginning of this paper, we may assert that the dictionaries are mistaken in telling us that his word *orbe* means the eye. It means the pupil. Moreover, if my explanation of δίκορος is correct, the indefiniteness of Ovid's *orbe* is of such a character, the Roman references to a double pupil are of such rarity and from a sphere so limited, literary, and foreign, as almost to make one suspect that their authors had simply translated δίκορος by *pupula duplex* and set it down as another wonder of the world, without knowing what the word really meant, and possibly without connecting it in any way with that familiar phenomenon which δίκορος itself in no way suggested but of which it had once been the explanation.

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INGENIUM IN THE ABLATIVE OF QUALITY AND THE GENITIVE OF QUALTIY.

Several conclusions reached in a recent investigation of the constructions of the Ablativus et Genitivus Qualitatis may receive notable illustration from the instances furnished by the use of the noun *ingenium*. From the nature of the quality which this noun expresses and from the antiquity, persistency and frequency of its occurrence arises the fact that almost no other illustration is so valuable.

That the list of instances available for citation in this discussion does not include all that occur in Latin literature is a matter for regret; especially when the entire works of some authors have been neglected. Yet the ground actually covered in the previous investigation may be fairly regarded as comprehensive enough, and the instances as of sufficient scope to yield some degree of security for the conclusions which were there drawn. The instances under observation include all the examples from the following authors: Plautus, Terence, Cato, Varro, Lucretius, Caesar, Cicero, Sallust, Vergil's Aeneid, Livy, Velleius Paterculus, Valerius Maximus, Seneca rhet., Seneca phil., Tacitus, Fronto, Justinus, Gellius, Apuleius, Firmicus Maternus, Palladius and the Scriptores Physiognomonici. Besides these there are many instances from Catullus, Horace, Tibullus, Propertius, Ovid, Curtius, Pliny the Elder, Phaedrus, Pomponius Mela, Petronius, Statius, Quintilian, Juvenal, Suetonius, Lactantius, Eutropius, Aurelius Victor, Scriptores Historiae Augustae, Ammianus Marcellinus, Prudentius and other writers.

Not all of the conclusions reached in my former investigation are shown in the usage of any single noun, but the instances of *ingenium* furnish the clearest illustration of the following points:

1. The frequently observed distinction between the genitive as the expression of the permanent characteristic and the ablative as the expression of the transient is not sufficiently fundamental to govern all the instances.

2. The distinction observed between internal and external qualities likewise fails to be established.

3. The distinction between actual and apparent qualities (cf. Krüger's Gen. "wie er ist," Abl. "wie er sich zeigt") is not sufficiently fundamental.

4. The distinction between the predicative and the appositional use is not sufficient to explain the usage.

5. In early Latin the ablative construction was as freely used as ever in its history, while the genitive was comparatively rare and did not reach its full development until after Livy.

6. By this early prevalence of the ablative its use in certain phrases became stereotyped, so that later when, after Livy, so many new expressions of quality were being put in the genitive, these particular phrases still appeared in their original ablative form alone.

7. In the consideration of these two expressions for quality the historical factor is of greater importance than has been anywhere recognized.

The instances of *ingenium* which illustrate these points are the following:

Ablatives: Plaut., Aul. 9 (ita avido i. fuit); Asin. 944 est tam i. duro; Bacch. 454 consimili i. est; 615 malevolente i. natus; 1086 eost i. natus; Merc. 969 sunt i. malo; Most. 206 mulierem lepidam et pudico i.; Poen. 1185 ingeniis quibus sumus; Pseud. 137 eo enim i. hi sunt; 1134 sunt alio i.; Stich. 116 quae i. est bono; Truc. 452 nimio i. sumus; 780 colubrino i. ambae estis; Pacuv., frag. trag. 37 (Ribb.[3]) feroci i.; 254 feroci i.; Ennius, frag. trag. 23 (Ribb.[3]) est tam firmo i.; 326 eo i. natus sum; Terence, Andr. 487 ipsest i. bono; Heaut. 151 i. te esse . . . leni; 420 i. egregio ad miserias natus sum; Eun. 880 inhumano i. sum; Phorm. 497 i. esse duro te atque inexorabili; Hec. 164 liberali esse i. decet; 489 fuisse erga me miro i.; Adel. 297 talem, tali i.;[1] Caec. Stat., com. frag. 137 (Ribb.[3]) habuissem i. si sto amatores mihi;[2] Afran. com. frag. 15 (Ribb.[3]) i. unico; Sall., Cat. 5, 1 fuit . . . malo pravoque i.; Jug. 7, 4 erat impigro atque acri i.; 20, 2 is . . . placido i.; 28, 5 acri i.; 46, 3 i. mobili esse; 66, 2 i. mobili erat; Cic., Tull. 33 singulari i. esse; Verr. 3, 170 homo summo i., summa prudentia, summa auctoritate praeditus; 4, 131 summo i. hominem; Leg. Agr. 3, 6 tardo i. esse; Muren. 36 Philippum summo i.; 61 summo i. vir; Arch. 31 hominem tanto i.; Flacc.

[1] Tali genere, *A cum rell.*, ingenio *Bentley*.

[2] Variants are, si ston, si isto, si istoc.

76 virum singulari i.; Har. Resp. 41 quo i.; 57 poeta praestanti i.; Cael. 1 adulescentem inlustri i.; 76 adulescentes magno i.; de Orat. 1, 95 pari fueris i.; 104 summo hominem i.; 191 hominem acutissimo omnium i.; 2, 162 acri i. esse videbatur; 351 non sum tanto ego, inquit, i. quanto Themistocles fuit.; 3, 124 acri vir i.; 230 (orator) i. peracri; de Rep. 2, 4 i. esse divino; 6, 18 (homines) praestantibus ingeniis; de Leg. 2, 46 qui modo i. possit moveri;[1] pro Ligar. 1 praestanti vir i.; Brut. 125 vir praestantissimo i.; 130 acuto i. fuit; 180 fuit . . . i. sane probabili; 212 summo i. fuisse; 237 Murena mediocri i.; 237 Turius parvo i.; Orat. 18 vir acerrimo i.; 109 poetas divino i.; Acad. 1, 34 fuit acri i.; 2, 117 sit i. divino; 125 paribus . . . esse . . . ingeniis; Fin. 1, 1 summis ingeniis . . . philosophi; 2, 51 praestantissimis ingeniis homines; 74 te isto . . . i.; 105 magno hic . . . i.; 4, 62 tantis ingeniis homines; Tusc. 1, 3 si qui magnis ingeniis . . . exstiterunt; 7 vir summo i.; 5, 45 fuerit . . . hebeti i. atque nullo; 68 i. eximio (is vir) sit; Nat. Deor. 2, 16 Chrysippus, quamquam est acerrimo i.; de Div. 1, 6 accessit acerrimo vir i. Chrysippus; 53 singulari vir i. Aristoteles et paene divino; Off. 1, 158 optimo quisque i.; 2, 59 magno vir i.; 3, 25 optimo quisque et splendidissimo i.; Phil. 2, 13 vir summo i.; 10, 17 hebeti enim i. est; 11, 11 ille summo i.; ad Fam. 4, 6, 1 summo i. . . . filium; 11, 22, 2 hominem . . . summo i.; ad Att. 13, 28, 3 discipulum summo i.; 14, 1, 1 ille tali i.; Curt. Ruf., 4, 6, 3 horridis ingeniis multumque abhorrentibus; Plin., N. H., 16, 233 testudo . . . portentosis ingeniis . . . inventum; 5, 62 memorabili i.; Tac., Ann. 5, 8, 11 Pomponius . . . i. inlustri; Hist. 2, 87 calonum . . . procacissimis ingeniis; Pomp. Mel., 1, 13, 3 specus singulari i.; Fronto, ad M. Caes. 4, 1 fuisse egregio i. . . . virum; ad Ant. 1, 2 sublimi i. extiterunt; 1, 2 ita egregio i. natus est; 2, 6 is . . . placido i.; 2, 6 acri i. (erat); ad Amic. 1, 1 vir est . . . i. libero ac liberali; 2, 7 homo i. . . . remisso et delicato; Gell., 1, 53 subagresti homo i. et infestivo; 2, 18, 3 fuit . . . i. liberali; 4, 15, 1 non mediocri i. viri; 6 (7), 3, 8 fuit i. homo eleganti; 12, 4, 1 quo i. . . . esse; 13, 25, 21 obtunso ingeniost; 13, 30, 3 feroci i. virum (quoting Pacuvius); 17, 15, 2 vir i. praestanti; 19, 8, 6 eo i. natus sum (quoting Ennius); 19, 9, 1 adulescens . . . facili i. ac lubenti; Script. Hist. Aug., Ant. Pius 2, 1 fuit vir . . . ingenio singulari, eloquentiae nitidae, litteraturae praecipuae; Firm. Mat., 3, 6, 1 divinis ingeniis; Script. Physiog., II, Anon., 78 (Foerst.) virili i.; total 115.

☞ Genitives: Plaut., Most. 814 esse existimo humani ingeni;[2] Cic., Q. Rosc. 48 est hoc principium improbi animi miseri ingenii nulli consilii; Caec. 5 summi ingenii causam esse; ad Att. 1, 20, 1 idque . . . ingenii summi ac sapientiae iudico; de Or. 2, 298

[1] Ingenio sit mediocri, *Davis, Halm, Baiter.*

[2] Humani ingenii *FZ*, humani ingenio *CD*, humani ingenio *B*.

Crassi quidem responsum excellentis cuiusdam est ingenii ac singularis; 2, 300 videsne quae vis in homine acerrimi i.; de Leg. 3, 45 vir magni i.;[1] Brut. 110 in quibusdam laudandi viri etiamsi maximi i. non essent; Orat. 90 est autem illud acrioris i., hoc maioris artis; Liv., 1, 46, 4 Tarquinium, mitis i. iuvenem; 2, 23, 15 Appius, vehementis i. vir; 7, 23, 6 gens ferox et i. avidi ad pugnam; 22, 29, 8 eum extremi i. esse; 22, 58, 8 Romani i. homo; 25, 37, 2 impiger iuvenis et i. . . . maioris; Val. Max., 1, 8, Ext. 18 in vate i. florentis; 8, 8, Ext. 2 i. caelestis vates; 9, 12, 7 illustris i. orator; 7, 2, Ext. 7 concitati i. iuvenes; Vell. Pat., 1, 7, 1 vir perelegantis i.; 2, 75, 1 magni vir animi doctissimique i.; Sen. rhet., Controv. 2, 2 (10), 12 summi i. viro; 2, Exc. 2 summi i.; 2, 4 (12), 8 fuit autem Messala exactissimi i.; 3, praef. 4 vir maioris i. quam studii; 7, 4 (19), 8 Euctemon homo exactissimi i.; 7, 5 (20), 11 Vinicius, exactissimi i.; 7, Exc. 5 Vinicius exactissimi i.; 9, 5 (28), 15 homo rarissimi etiam si non emendatissimi i.; Suas. 2, 15 Lesbocles magni nominis et nomini respondentis i.; 2, 17 Seneca fuit . . . i. confusi ac turbulenti; 2, 22 homo . . . quam infelicis i.; Sen. phil., Dial. 3, 20, 6 dicitur vir i. magni magis quam boni; 5, 7, 2 qui fervidi sit i. an frigidi atque humilis; 6, 16, 4 iuvenem inlustris i.; de Ben. 2, 27, 1 i. fuit sterilis; de Clem. 1, 9, 1 stolidi i. virum; 2, 7, 4 multos parum sani sed sanabilis i. servabit; Plin., N. H. 8, 6 est unum tardioris i.; 8, 55 vir tam artificis i. videbatur; 9, 39 Pollio . . . prodigi et sagacis ad luxuriae instrumenta i.; 36, 51 importuni i. fuit; Tac., Ann. 4, 42 celebris i. viro; 13, 11 iactandi i. voce principis; Suet., de Gram. 7 fuisse . . . i. magni; Gell., 1, 4, 1 fuit honesti atque amoeni i.; 1, 10, 4 excellentis i. ac prudentiae viro; 19, 8, 3 vir i. praecellentis; Justinus 18, 3, 13 servilis i.; Script. Phys., II, Pseud.-Pol., 6 (F. p. 152) pauci i. est; 12 (F. p. 155) praeceps est et pauci i.; total 51.

It takes but a glance at these totals, ablatives 115, genitives 51, to show the insufficiency of the principles mentioned in the first three of our conclusions above; for no one would venture to assert that *ingenium* denotes now a permanent, now a transient quality; now an internal, now an external one; now a quality "as it appears," now one "as it is."

A single glance, also, is sufficient to show, in illustration of the fourth proposition, that ablatives and genitives appear without distinction with or without *esse*.

To illustrate more clearly the truth of the remaining three propositions, a rearrangement of the instances is here made whereby they will appear in one table in chronological order,

[1] Magno *Davis*.

as far as practicable, the ablatives and the genitives being placed in separate columns and cited by the limiting adjectives only. Many phrases occur repeatedly. These will appear regularly in their chronological places, enclosed, after their first appearance, in parentheses. The fact of their repeated occurrence will be noted also at the place where the phrase first appears.

Phrases which appear in both ablative and genitive form will be put in italics.

Plautus	*avido*	
	duro, also in Terence	
	consimili	
	malevolente	
	eo, twice and also in Ennius and Gellius	
	malo, also in Sallust	
	pudico	
	quibus	
	alio	
	bono, also in Terence	
	nimio	
	colubrino	
		humani (humano?)
Pacuv.	feroci, twice and in Gellius	
Ennius	firmo	
	(eo)	
Terence	(*bono*)	
	leni	
	egregio, also in Fronto twice	
	inhumano	
	(duro)	
	inexorabili	
	liberali, also in Fronto and Gellius	
	miro	
	tali, also in Cicero	
Caecilius	(i)sto, also in Cicero	
Afranius	unico	
Sallust	(malo)	
	pravo	
	impigro	
	acri, twice; also in Cicero thrice; and in Fronto	
	placido, also in Fronto	
	mobili, twice	
Cicero		miseri (?)
	singulari, thrice, and in Pomp. Mela and S. H. A.	

	summo, eleven times	
		summi, twice, second time doubtful, and in Sen. rhet. twice
	tardo, twice	
	tanto	
	quo, also in Gellius	
	praestanti, twice and in Gellius	
	inlustri, also in Tacitus	
	magno, thrice	
	pari	
	acutissimo	
		excellentis (?)
		ac *singularis* (?)
		acerrimi (?)
	(acri), thrice	
	quanto	
	peracri	
	divino, four times	
	praestantibus	
	mediocri, twice and in Gellius	
		magni (magno?) also in Vell. Pat., Sen. phil., and Sueton.
		maximi (?)
	praestantissimo	
	(isto)	
	acuto	
	probabili	
	parvo	
	acerrimo, thrice	
		acrioris (?)
	paribus	
	summis	
	praestantissimis	
	tantis	
	magnis	
	hebeti, twice	
	nullo	
	eximio	
	optimo, twice	
	splendidissimo	
	(tali)	
Livy		mitis
		vehementis
		avidi ad pugnam
		extremi

		Romani
		maioris, also in Sen. rhet.
Val. Max.		
		florentis
		caelestis
		inlustris, also in Sen. phil.
		concitati
Vell. Paterc.		perelegantis
		(*magni*)
		doctissimi
Curtius Ruf.	horridis	
Seneca rhet.	abhorrentibus	
		(*summi*), twice
		exactissimi, four times
		(*maioris*)
		rarissimi
		emendatissimi
		nomini respondentis
		confusi
		ac turbulenti
		infelicis
Seneca phil.		(*magni*)
		boni
		fervidi
		frigidi
		humilis
		(*inlustris*)
		sterilis
		stolidi
		sani
		sanabilis
Pliny, elder		tardioris
		artificis
		prodigi
		sagacis
	portentosis	
		importuni
	memorabili	
Tacitus	procacissimis	
		celebris
	(inlustri)	
		iactandi
Pomp. Mela	(singulari)	
Suetonius		(*magni*)
Fronto	(egregio) twice	
	sublimi	

	(placido)	
	(acri)	
	libero	
	liberali	
	remisso	
	delicato	
Gellius		honesti
		amoeni
	subagresti	
	infestivo	
	(liberali)	
		excellentis
	(non mediocri)	
	eleganti	
	(quo)	
	obtunso	
	(feroci)	
	(praestanti)	
	(eo)	
		praecellentis
	facili	
	lubenti	
Scrip. Hist. Aug.		
Capitol.	(singulari)	
Justinus		servilis
Firm. Mat.	divinis	
Physiog., Anon.		
	virili (?)	
Physiog., Ps.-Pol.		pauci, twice

Again the conclusions follow from our first glance through the table. The ablative, very frequent in early and classical Latin, almost disappears from use in Livy and the writers of the Silver Age. After Tacitus it is seen again, frequently in phrases verbally identical with those of the earlier time. The genitive almost non-existent in early Latin, seems to be more frequently used by Cicero. After Livy it came to be used, for a time, to the almost total exclusion of the ablative, but lost this predominance, later beneath the tendency of Quintilian's school to return to earlier models.

As an illustration of the history of these ablative and genitive constructions the list just cited would be fairly representative of the whole situation. But this list of genitives can not be allowed to pass without material correction. It will be observed that in the table just given the genitives from Plautus and Cicero

have nearly all been marked doubtful. They have been cited for various reasons which will appear through the discussion of them in detail.

First, let us consider the example from Plautus, Most. 814 humani ingeni. The latest editors agree in reading Et bene monitum duco atque esse existimo humani ingeni. This reading makes the meter easy, for in the seventh foot of a trochaic septenarius a trochee |ĭngĕn|i is regular, whereas a dactyl ĭngĕnĭo would be extremely unusual. Earlier editors, however, have not reached the same agreement for the text. Guyet proposed atque humano ingenio te existumo; Ritschl, et te esse humano ingenio existumo; and besides these Bentley, Müller, Bergk, Langen and others have attempted emendations of this verse. The inconsistency of the manuscript readings tempts indeed to emendation, for C and D read *humani ingenio*, which seems not to make sense; F and Z (the inferior codex Lipsiensis and the editio princeps) read *humani ingenii*, while B has *humani ingenio*, with a correction by the second hand to *humano*. The correction of *humani* to *humano* is simple and easy, for the corrected vowel is in an elided syllable as the verse stands and is identical with the initial vowel of the following word. On the other hand the change of *ingeni* at the end of a line to *ingenio* would be difficult. It would seem, therefore, that the reading *humano ingenio* would be clearly superior except for its metrical irregularity. How great importance is to be attached to this metrical irregularity is difficult to determine. Granting that a parallel instance to ⏑ ∪ ∪ — at the close of a trochaic septenarius is hard to find, and that the synizesis ingenio͡, ⏑ ∪ —, does not occur elsewhere in Plautus, the fact remains that Plautus is in other places by no means metrically perfect, and that the manuscripts point to the ablative rather than the genitive as the true reading.

To settle this balance of arguments comes now the historical consideration that in early Latin such genitives of quality are extremely rare and that a genitive of quality *ingenii* is, except for this instance, totally unknown before Cicero, while the ablative of quality *ingenio* occurs before Cicero 28 times, Plautus alone furnishing 13 of these instances, not including the passage under discussion. Therefore, the texts which give us here a genitive of quality *ingeni* are at fault, and we should either read here with the best manuscripts *ingenio*, in spite of the meter, or emend by transposing *ingenio* to some other part of the line.

Second, let us consider the examples from Cicero, *miseri, summi, excellentis ac singularis, acerrimi, magni, maximi, acrioris ingenii.* Each of these expressions has been cited or translated as a genitive of quality by some authority and hence has been admitted, with or without attaching a sign of caution, to the list above. We shall see from a brief discussion how little some of these instances deserve a place among true genitives of quality.

One of the plainest of these instances is ad Att. 1, 20, 1 deinde te . . . moderatissimum fuisse vehementissime gaudeo, idque neque amoris mediocris et ingenii summi ac sapientiae iudico. Clearly the meaning here is "I regard this as a mark of no small affection and of the highest ability and rightmindedness," or in other phrase, "as the act belonging to, or pertaining to no small, etc." or "as due to no small, etc." This is not a genitive of quality but a possessive. To be a genitive of quality it should mean "a thing which possesses no small affection, etc."

Another instance plainly not belonging in our category is Orat. 90 est autem illud acrioris ingenii, hoc maioris artis. This does not mean "the former possesses the keener constitution, the latter the greater skill," which would be a genitive of quality, but it means "the former is a thing belonging to the sharper nature, the latter to the higher skill," or as Sandys translates, "while 'wit' is more a gift of nature arising from an inborn sprightliness of temper, 'humor' is rather the result of refined cultivation." Compare also Piderit's phrase "die *facetiae* sind mehr Sache der feinen Bildung," where the genitive is one of origin.

A third instance where the question is one of interpretation is de Or. 2, 298 Crassi quidem responsum excellentis cuiusdam est ingenii ac singularis; cui quidem . . . visum est. . . Some assert that the passage means, "The reply of Crassus is one of a noble and singular character," that is, possesses a noble and singular character, an interpretation which makes the construction a genitive of quality. It is better, however, to interpret it as a possessive, and so it is interpreted by many, for instance by Guthrie, who in his translation of 1808 will hardly be suspected of bias on the question of the genitive of quality. He renders: "As to the answer of Crassus it was the answer of a noble and elevated mind who looked upon it etc." It may be added, in support of this interpretation that a genitive of quality *singularis* would be

of itself extremely unusual, especially so for Cicero, as is shown in my dissertation, The Ablative of Quality and the Genitive of Quality, page 30.

A fourth instance of the same character is de Or. 2, 300 Videsne quae vis in homine acerrimi ingenii, quam potens et quanta mens fuerit? This sentence, appearing in Livy or Seneca, might well be interpreted by a genitive of quality but the great rarity of this genitive in Cicero, contrasted with the frequency of the ablative *ingenio*, gives strong support to those who interpret this genitive as a possessive with *vis* and translate, "Do you conceive what force and vigor of genius, how powerful and extensive a capacity there was in that great man?"

A fifth instance, Q. Rosc. 48 Est hoc principium[1] improbi animi miseri ingenii nulli consilii, has similar grounds for its exclusion from our category. Whether we read here *principium* with the manuscripts and earlier editors, or adopt Müller's conjecture *principio*, the interpretation of the genitive remains unaffected. As a genitive of quality the rendering would be, "This beginning, or plan, is characterized by a wicked spirit, a despicable nature, a lack of foresight." Much better seems the interpretation as a mere possessive: "This is the plan of a wicked, worthless, unwise individual (*animus, ingenium, consilium*)," and this interpretation has the authority of an unprejudiced scholar, Osenbrüggen, who translates, in Jahn's Archiv für Phil. u. Paed., vol. 11 (1845), p. 574, "so legt ein schlechtes Herz, ein elender Geist, ein unkluger Kopf einen Plan an." We have to do in this instance with what, if accepted, would be the earliest undenied example of *ingenii* as a genitive of quality; for the instance cited from Plautus must be denied that place. It is proper, therefore, to regard the innovation with the closest scrutiny and, other things being equal, to assume that it is the familiar and not the novel interpretation which is to be accepted. Many editors call attention in this passage to the archaic character of the genitive form *nulli*, which would indicate an early origin for the whole phrase. Osenbrüggen suggests that Cicero is quoting the words of some poet. The suggestion is not unreasonable and its acceptance, owing to the rarity of all such genitives of quality in the early times, would render still more unlikely an interpretation of these genitives as genitives of quality.

[1] *Principio* Müller.

A sixth instance presents an objection of a different sort: Brut. 110 in quibusdam laudandi viri, etiamsi maximi ingenii non essent, probabiles tamen industria. In this case the text is corrupt. Klotz, Orelli, Ellendt, Kayser, Jahn-Eberhard, Piderit, Stangl and others read as above, with all the manuscripts. On the other hand Peter, Madvig, Friedrich and others read "laudandis viris . . . probabilis etc." The manuscripts on which the text rests are all derived from the lost Laudensis, itself not a codex of perfect authority, and the difficulties of the passage are so great that editors have not stopped with brief conjectures, but Eberhard has rejected the clause "etiamsi . . . essent," and Bake discards as spurious the whole passage "in quibusdam . . . industria." It is but fair to say that our passage might derive some support for *maximi ingenii* as a genitive of quality from three considerations; first, the Brutus is one of Cicero's later works, so that *ingenii* here might have been used after the analogy of many of his other genitives of quality; second, the genitive of quality with the adjective *maximi* is one of the earliest and most frequent of the forms through which the genitive of quality attained its Ciceronian development; third, Cicero had probably once before used one genitive of quality, *ingenii*, though of a somewhat different type. Notwithstanding these circumstances the fact remains that *ingenii* here is opposed to Cicero's regular usage, is almost unexampled at the date of its supposed occurrence and appears in a difficult passage of much-doubted MS authority and in a phrase which some editors hold to be spurious.

Two more illustrations from Cicero must be cited. One of these, our seventh, is perhaps a true genitive of quality though of exceptional character. Caec. 5 video summi ingenii causam esse. "Qua in re," says Cicero, "si mihi esset unius A. Caecinae causa agenda, profiterer satis idoneum esse me defensorem . . . Sed quum de eo mihi iure dicendum sit quod pertineat ad omnes . . . video summi ingenii causam esse non ut id demonstretur quod . . . , sed ne omnes, etc." If the meaning here is, "I see that the case is one calling for the highest ability," then although not of the ordinary type, which would be, "a case having an ability of the highest order," yet it is to be distinguished from the mere possessives discussed above and is to be compared rather with those figurative expressions of early origin which have been assigned to this construction, as de Or. 1, 257 Multi sudoris res; ad Fam. 9, 24, 4 multi cibi hospitem, multi ioci.

The eighth and last instance is a puzzle: de Leg. 3, 45 vir magni ingenii summaque prudentia. The expression has been fully discussed in the writer's dissertation, The Ablative of Quality and the Genitive of Quality, pp. 54 and 55, where the conclusion is reached that, in spite of the agreement of all manuscripts, Cicero may have written, as some editors think, *magno ingenio.* Otherwise we should have here, as Stegmann remarks, "eine eigenthümliche Mischung."

Of all these supposed instances of the use of *ingenii* as a genitive of quality before Livy, nearly every one, then, has some ground to warrant its exclusion from our category, the exceptions being only one or two of those last cited.

With this reconstruction of the historical aspect of our genitive *ingenii* we are brought next to the sixth point of our discussion, namely, the preservative influence which the early prominence of the ablative *ingenio* exerted upon its later use.

Having reduced the number of Cicero's examples of *ingenii* to one or two, we find the proportion of genitives very small for this noun. Of all Cicero's ablatives of quality one in every twenty occurs with *ingenium;* of Cicero's genitives of quality not one in a hundred occurs with this noun. The ready inference is that the great frequency of *ingenio* helped to maintain its own use and to hinder the use of *ingenii,* on the principle that familiar ideas tend to recur to the mind in their familiar form.

A further consideration of the table will illustrate more widely the operation of this principle. Of the 28 adjectives used with the ablative *ingenio* before Cicero, 12 recur with *ingenio* in later writers; in all 17 times. Of the 24 instances of *ingenio* as an ablative of quality occurring after Suetonius, 11 are phrases dating from a period at least as far back as Cicero. On the other hand few of the conventional ablative phrases were ever changed to the genitive form. So of the 40 new genitive phrases with *ingenii* appearing after Cicero, only 3 show adjectives which have been used in corresponding ablative phrases, and two of these even seem to apologize for their form by the addition of qualifying phrases: with Plautus' *avido ingenio* compare Livy's *ingenii avidi ad pugnam,* and with Plautus' *bono ingenio* compare Livy's *ingenii magni magis quam boni.* Furthermore the transformation of an ablative phrase into a genitive phrase seems at times distinctly avoided by means

of a synonym; so with Terence's *ingenio leni* compare Livy's *mitis ingenii*; with Cicero's *ingeniis praestantibus*, *ingeniis praestantissimis*, *ingenio praestantissimo* and with Cicero's and Gellius' *ingenio praestanti* compare Gellius' *ingenii praecellentis*, *excellentis*, but never *praestantis*.

From the above discussion must appear the truth of the seventh of the propositions enumerated at the beginning of this paper, namely, that the historical factor is of very great importance for the understanding of our constructions. If the investigator were to stop with the writers preceding Livy, or with the philosopher Seneca, the evidence of the forces which were operating to control the usage would be incomplete. It is only by a more extended investigation that the operation upon these constructions of two forces, analogy and the desire for a change of style, is brought clearly to the surface.

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MAGIC IN THEOKRITOS AND VERGIL.[1]

No one who will read the Greek and Latin versions of the love-incantations given in the second idyl of Theokritos and the eighth eclogue of Vergil can fail to be impressed with the greater vigor and intensity of the Greek original. The reason, and a very cogent one, which drives Simaitha to magic rites is given in v. 36[2]

ὅς με τάλαιναν
ἀντὶ γυναικὸς ἔθηκε κακὰν καὶ ἀπάρθενον εἶμεν.

So in speaking of her lover (v. 3) she says *τὸν ἐμὸν βαρὺν εὖντα φίλον καταδήσομαι ἄνδρα*; she terms him *ἀνάρσιος* (v. 6) and speaks (v. 159) of the sorrow that he brings to her *αἰ δ' ἔτι καί με | λυπεῖ.*

Nor is her charm designed to have but a gentle effect upon Delphis; note v. 21 *πάσσ', ἅμα καὶ λέγε ταῦτα· 'τὰ Δέλφιδος ὄστια πάσσω'*, v. 26 *οὕτω τοι καὶ Δέλφις ἐνὶ φλογὶ σάρκ' ἀμαθύνοι*, v. 50 *καὶ ἐς τόδε δῶμα περάσαι | μαινομένῳ ἴκελος*, v. 61 *καὶ λέγ' ἐπιφθύζοισα· 'τὰ Δελφιδος ὄστια μάσσω'* (cf. v. 21), v. 159 *τὰν Ἀΐδαο πύλαν ναὶ Μοίρας ἀραξεῖ* which re-echoes v. 6 *οὐδὲ θύρας ἄραξεν ἀνάρσιος.*

Again we may note Simaitha's earnest protestations of passion and her remarks on the power of love in v. 23 *Δέλφις ἔμ' ἀνίασεν*, v. 35 *ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τήνῳ πᾶσα καταίθομαι·* cf. v. 6 and v. 55 ff.

In general, however, the incantation of Theokritos contains very little poetic digression.[3] The charm is described and carried out in a quick succession of actions through which these notes of anguish and anger keep ever recurring.

In turning to Vergil, a much less technical and a far milder treat-

[1] Owing to the untimely death of the author, Dr. Morris C. Sutphen, who was drowned in the Shrewsbury River on August 31, 1901, this article, which was left by him in manuscript, did not have the benefit of his final revision.

[2] The references are to Ahrens, Bucolicorum Graecorum Reliquiae, Lips. 1861.

[3] The exceptions are vv. 33-36, 45-6, 48-9, 55-6.

ment of the theme is at once noticeable. There is no prologue with magic invocation, no story of a maiden cruelly wronged. There is a lover, of course,—for so we must probably take the meaning of *coniugis* (v. 66)[1]—but faithless Daphnis is not faithless Delphis. There is also a certain softening of the details that were borrowed from Theokritos; for example v. 21 *πάσσ', ἅμα καὶ λέγε ταῦτα· 'τὰ Δέλφιδος ὄστια πάσσω'* appears in Vergil (v. 78) as necte, Amarylli, modo et 'Veneris' dic 'vincula necto.' In each poem mention is made of the barking of dogs; but in Theokritos (v. 30) Simaitha interprets the sound to indicate the approach of the dread Hekate, in Vergil (v. 107) it is apparently a favorable omen.

If we exclude the introductory lines in Theokritos the two poems are of almost exactly the same length, the actual incantation covering forty-four hexameters in Theokritos and forty-five in Vergil or if we further exclude the intercalary verse—thirty-five in one and thirty-six in the other, since the first intercalary in Theokritos (v. 17) and the re-echoing of the intercalary in Vergil (v. 109) are, I believe, not properly parts of these incantations. I have indicated that the purely poetic element in Theokritos is slight; in Vergil, on the other hand, there are two long digressions on the power of *carmina*—a hackneyed subject in later Latin poetry[2]—vv. 69-71 and 95-99, and five lines are used to imitate a simile which was borrowed from Varius (vv. 85-89)[3] to parallel two lines in Theokritos (vv. 45-6).

A still wider divergence is noted when we investigate the form of each incantation.

The recent publications of magic papyri, particularly those edited by C. Wessely in Denkschriften d. k. Akad. der Wiss. zu Wien, phil.-hist. Cl., vol. 36, II (1888) and 42 (1893), enable us to investigate each poem, but more especially the idyl of Theokritos, in a manner that before was impossible. The words of Theokritos

[1] So of one's betrothed: Verg. Aen. 3,330 (Forbiger); 9, 138 (Conington). Euphemistically: Prop. 2, 8, 29; Ovid, her. 8, 84; Verg. ecl. 8, 18; Aen. 7, 189 (but cp. Conington).

[2] Cf. Verg. Aen. 4, 489, Tibull. 1, 2, 43; 1, 8, 19; Propert. 4, 5, 9; Ovid am. 1, 8, 17; 2, 1, 23; rem. am. 253; her. 6, 85; met. 7, 199; med. fac. 35; Petron. 134, Sen. Herc. Oet. 454; Apul. met. 1, 3, Apoll. Rhod. Arg. 3, 532. See A. Zingerle, Ovidius und sein Verhältniss zu den Vorgängern, p. 75.

[3] Macrob. 6, 2, 20.

in the few lines that sketch the invocation show some strong points of agreement with these papyri.

Wessely[1] comments on verbal agreements. So Theokritos in v. 10 *νῦν δέ νιν ἐκ θυέων καταδήσομαι* uses two magical *termini technici*, *καταδέω* with which may be compared the general use of this verb and its accompanying noun *κατάδεσμος* in these papyri, and *θυέων*, with which Wessely compares pap. Par. 2575 *ἡ δεῖνά σοι θύει θεὰ δεινόν τι θυμίασμα*; further pap. Par. 2866 *σαρκοφάγε . . . ἐλθὲ ἐπ' ἐμαῖς θυσίαις*. Again the epithets in v. 11 *ἄσυχε*[2] *δαῖμον* and in v. 14 *χαῖρ' Ἑκάτα δασπλῆτι* are found together in pap. Par. 2856 *ἥσυχε καὶ δασπλῆτι*.[3] With v. 12 *τὰν καὶ σκύλακες τρομέοντι*, note the epithet of Hekate, pap. Par. 2722 *σκυλακάγεια* and Ps.-Origen. refut. omn. haeres. IV, 35 *χαίρουσα σκυλάκων ὑλακῇ τε καὶ αἵματι φοινῷ*.[4] A parallel with v. 13 *ἐρχομέναν νεκύων ἀνά τ' ἠρία καὶ μέλαν αἷμα* is found in pap. Par. 2856 *ἥσυχε καὶ δασπλῆτι τάφοις ἔνι δαῖτα ἔχουσα*[5] and the citation from Ps.-Origenes just quoted *χαίρουσα σκυλάκων ὑλακῇ τε καὶ αἵματι φοινῷ, | ἀν νέκυας στείχουσα κατ' ἠρία τεθνηώτων, . . . | ἔλθοις εὐάντητος ἐφ' ἡμετέρῃσι θυηλαῖς.*

Further attention may be directed to v. 11 *φαῖνε καλόν* with which compare pap. Par. 1045 *εἴσελθε καὶ φάνηθί*[6] *μοι ἱλαρὸς εὐμενὴς πραΰς*. The epic and tragic verb *ὀπάδει* (v. 14) is reflected in pap. Par. 948 *σθένος αὐτὸς ὀπάζοις*. With the epithet *χθονία* (v. 12) *τᾷ χθονίᾳ θ' Ἑκάτᾳ* compare pap. Par. 1443 *Ἑκάτη χθονία*, pap. Lond. (Anastasy) 335. Theokritos says (v. 40)

χὡς δινεῖθ' ὅδε ῥόμβος ὁ χάλκεος ἐξ Ἀφροδίτας
ὣς τῆνος δινοῖτο ποθ' ἁμετέρῃσι θύρῃσιν

a parallel to which occurs in pap. Par. 2782 *σπεῦδε τάχιστ'. ἦδη ἐπ' ἐμαῖσι θύραισι παρέστω*, 2757 *ἐπ' ἐμαῖσι θύραισι τάχιστα ληθομένη τοκέων*[7] *τε*

[1] Denkschriften d. k. Akad. der Wiss. zu Wien, 1888, II, p. 27.

[2] For the term *ἥσυχε* applied to the moon see pap. Par. 2544.

[3] These two epithets, apparently so contradictory, arise from the invocation to the moon as the kindly goddess Selene (cf. Roscher, Selene und Verwandtes, p. 75 ff.) and as Hekate the dread mistress of ghosts, see Dilthey, Rhein. Mus. 27, 390.

[4] Dilthey, Rhein. Mus. 27, 388.

[5] See A. Dieterich, Nekyia, Leipzig, 1893, p. 52 ff.

[6] The adjuration *φαῖνε* (*φάνηθι*) occurs frequently in the magic papyri, cf. pap. Par. 1002, 1007, 1015, 1019 etc.

[7] See Dilthey's conjecture, Rhein. Mus. 27, 405 and Abel, Orphica, p. 290, v. 29.

συνηθείης τε τέκνων <τε> καὶ στυγέουσα τὸ πᾶν ἀνδρῶν γένος ἠδὲ γυναικῶν ἐς τόδ' ἐμοῦ τοῦ δ(εῖνα) μόνον δ' ἔμ' ἔχουσα παρέστω ἐν φρεσὶ δαμναμένη κρατερῆς ὑπ' ἔρωτος ἀνάγκης. With this compare further Theokritos v. 45 *τύσσον ἔχοι λάθας* and v. 44 *εἴτε γυνὰ τήνῳ παρακέκλιται εἴτε καὶ ἀνήρ* and pap. Par. 2737 ff.[1]

μηδέποτε βλέφαρον βλεφάρῳ[2] *κυλλιστὸν* (*κολλητὸν*, Wessely) *ἐπέλθοι,*
τειρέσθω δ' ἐπ' ἐμαῖσι φιλαγρύπνοισι μερίμναις,
εἰ δέ τιν' ἄλλον ἔχοις ἐν κόλποις [*ὃς*] *κατάκειται,*
κεῖνον ἀπωσάσθω, ἐμὲ δ' ἐν φρεσὶν ἐγκαταθέσθω,
καὶ προλιποῦσα τάχιστ' ἐπ' ἐμοῖς προθύροισι παρέστω,
δαμναμένη ψυχὴ ἐπ' ἐμῇ φιλότητι καὶ εὐνῇ.

Verse 51 *καὶ ἐς τόδε δῶμα περάσαι*: note pap. Par. 2756 *μαινομένη ἤδη καὶ ἐπ' ἐμαῖσι θύραισι τάχιστα* and 2908 *ἄνασσ' ἱκετῶ ἄξον τὴν δεῖνα τάχιστα μολοῦσαν ἐλθεῖν ἐν προθύροισιν ἐμοῦ τοῦ δεῖνα φιλότητι καὶ εὐνῇ.*

In investigating the various magical properties we find the *ἄλφιτα* of v. 18 mentioned in pap. Par. 2583, 2586, 2647; the *ῥόμβος ὁ χάλκεος* (v. 40) in pap. Par. 2296 and 2336 *ῥόμβος σιδηροῦς*; *κηρός* (v. 38) frequently, pap. Par. 1878, 2359, 2378, 2945, 3114 etc.; *πίτυρα* (v. 28) in pap. Par. 2580.

Two facts are plainly evident; that the actual language of these incantations and the words of Theokritos are much alike, and that the magical properties employed are also mentioned, in great part, in the magic papyri.

In the eclogue of Vergil no sketch of an invocation is given and the amount of space taken up with the description of the magic rites is relatively so small, that little can be found suggestive of an incantation in the wording of the poem. However, even here, all editors note the internal rhyme of v. 80

Limus ut hic durescit, et haec ut cera liquescit

as a magical reminiscence. Many interesting examples of such rhyming syllables have been collected by R. Heim in Jahrb., Supplementband 19, p. 544 ff.[3] To these I would add a striking

[1] Dilthey, Rhein. Mus. 27, 398.

[2] Cf. Shakspere, Macbeth, 1, 3.

[3] See especially Marcell. 8, 191 and Varro, 1. r. 1, 2, 27; cf. also the remarks of Woelfflin, ALL. 1, 365 and 3, 454, and of Bücheler, Rhein. Mus. 34, 343.

instance in the Medea of Dracontius 398 (PLM. V, p. 206 Baehr.) where Medea is described addressing the moon:

> Ac *nocturnorum* triplex regina *polorum*
> Atque *tenebrarum* splendens patrona *nigrarum*

with which may also be compared pap. Lugd. 7, 30 ff.[1]

> οὗ τὸ ὄνομα (ου) ἡ γῆ ἀκούσασα
> ἐλίσσεται, ὁ ᾅδης ἀκούων ταράσσεται,
> ποταμοὶ θάλασσα λίμναι πηγαὶ ἀκούουσαι
> πήγνυνται, αἱ πέτραι ἀκούσασαι ῥήγνυνται.

But in Theokritos and Vergil we have a very strong magical reminiscence to which too little attention has been paid—the intercalary verse and the number of times that it is repeated.

The intercalary verse is of ancient origin—perhaps it is as old as poetry itself. Its artistic use was appreciated in bucolic poetry in Theokritos' idyls 1 and 2, in Bion's Ἐπιτάφιος Ἀδώνιδος and in the third idyl of Moschos.[2] In Latin literature it was used by Catullus,[3] by Vergil[4] in the eighth eclogue, Ovid her. 9, (vv. 146, 152, 158, 164), am. 1, 6, in the Pervigilium Veneris, incert. epist. Didonis (PLM. IV, p. 272 Baehr.) and in Ausonius ecl. VI, precatio p. 17 (Schenkl).

No intercalary appears in any of the shorter charms cited by Heim nor, as far as I can discover, in the magic papyri. An excellent parallel however exists in a Chaldean incantation given by Lenormant, La magie chez les Chaldéens, p. 75 (English translation).

> The evil, which is in my body, in my flesh, and in my bones,
> May (all that) be broken in pieces and plucked up
> As this twig.
> May the burning fire devour it this day,
> May the evil fate depart and I behold the light again,

* * * * *

[1] A. Dieterich, Jahrb., Suppl. 16, p. 808.

[2] R. Peiper, Jahrb. 87 (1864), 449 and 456; further literature in Susemihl, Gesch. d. gr. Litt. in der Alexandrinerzeit I, p. 216, n. 58.

[3] See Ziwsa, Wien. Stud. 3, 298.

[4] Brandt, p. 7, de re metrica qua usus est Vergilius in eclogis, Festsch., Salzwedel, 1882.

As this wool is rent, so also shall this spell be,
The burning fire shall devour it.
May the burning fire devour it this day,
May the evil fate depart and I behold the light again.

Other close parallels occur in Sanskrit[1] literature, especially in the sixth book of the Atharva-Veda which is concerned with charms for gaining the passionate love of a man or a woman. Here the intercalary is frequently employed; VI, 30, may yonder man burn after me;[2] cf. VI, 8; VI, 139.[3] Such incantations form very close parallels with the second idyl of Theokritos.

A matter of still greater importance is the number of the intercalaries. Lenormant[4] makes the suggestive remark that these are used not merely for metrical adornment, but have actual reference to magic procedure. There is no doubt that the number of intercalaries, if they are to have magic significance, should be three or a multiple of three.[5] The *locus classicus* for the religious and magic use of three and its multiples is Ausonius griph. 26, p. 129 (Schenkl); note especially v. 4

Iuris idem tribus est quod ter tribus, omnia in istis.

The number three occurs very often in Heim's collection,[6] twenty-seven seems to be next in frequency, closely followed by nine.[7] In both Theokritos and Vergil three is fairly well represented; Hekate is expected at the *third* turn of the iynx wheel (Theokr. II, 31) and Simaitha pours out her libation three times, v. 43. In Vergil note the three magic colors (v. 73), the triple circumambulation of the altar[8] (v. 74), and the binding of three love-knots (v. 77) each of three colors.

[1] Kaegi, Der Rig-Veda, n. 83, A.

[2] I cite from Bloomfield, The Atharva-Veda, 1899.

[3] So in charms to ward off disease, I, 25; II, 10; III, 31 etc.

[4] Rhein. Mus. 9, 376.

[5] Heim, notwithstanding the experience gained by the collection of about two hundred and fifty incantamenta, says (l. c., p. 511) 'fortasse etiam afferri carmen decies repetitum necesse est.' But ten, as a magic number, has hardly any significance; see further his remarks upon magic numbers, pp. 542-3.

[6] See nos. 49, 52, 69, 82, 84 etc; for twenty-seven, nos. 51, 94, 100, 118 etc; ninety-nine, no. 187; nine, nos. 38, 58, 184, 196, 226.

[7] See also Woelfflin, ALL. 9, 334 ff.

[8] Perhaps a prophylactic ceremony; cf. Verg. Aen. 11, 188 ter circum accensos cincti fulgentibus armis | decurrere rogos.

The number nine appears to be associated directly with the *θεοὶ χθόνιοι*;[1] compare Tibull. 1, 5, 15

> Ipse ego velatus filo tunicisque solutis
> Vota *novem* Triviae nocte silente dedi.

So Ovid, fast. 5, 439

> Hoc *novies* dicit, nec respicit.[2]

Since three and its multiples appear to possess magic significance we must assume that Theokritos chose nine[3] as the number best suited for his artistic purpose.

At once objection will be made that there are still *ten* repetitions of the intercalary in Theokritos. In reply to such objections, it may be said that the intercalary verse, in general, follows the colon to which it is attached and artistically separates it from the following colon. But this is not a necessary or invariable usage. At times we find an introductory verse afterwards repeated as an intercalary. This seems to be the case in the first idyl of Theokritos where *ἄρχετε βουκολικᾶς, Μοῖσαι φίλαι, ἄρχετ' ἀοιδᾶς* merely introduces the song of Thyrsis which follows. Again, in the *Ἐπιτάφιος Ἀδώνιδος* the first line starts with the words *αἴαζ' ὦ τὸν Ἄδωνιν* foreshadowing the intercalary which first appears in v. 6 *αἴαζ' ὦ τὸν Ἄδωνιν· ἐπαιάζουσιν Ἔρωτες.*

The same artistic plan has been followed, in my opinion, in the second idyl. To express this in musical terms, we have a prelude, vv. 1-16, followed by the intercalary verse (v. 17) which serves as the *motif*, expressing the ever-recurring thought and keeping the object of the incantation before the mind. Thus it forms an artistic separation between the invocation and the incantation. The latter

[1] See Lersch, Antiquitates Vergilianae, §70, p. 210 and Servius on Verg. Aen. VI, 426 and 565.

[2] See further Ovid met. 7, 261 and 7, 234.

[3] For further literature on the significance of the number nine see Jahn, Ueber den Aberglauben des bösen Blicks, p. 95, n. 277, Diels, Sibyll. Blätter, p. 41, n. 1. Compare Shakspere's Macbeth, act. 1, sc. 3:

> The weird sisters, hand in hand
> Posters of the sea and land
> Thus do go about, about.
> Thrice to thine and thrice to mine
> And thrice again to make up nine,
> Peace! the charm's wound up.

also—or to be more exact—the first and last cola end, if so I may term it, on the same note, *τὰ Δέλφιδος ὅστια πάσσω* (v. 21) and *τὰ Δέλφιδος ὅστια μάσσω* (v. 61).[1]

Again the use of *πρῶτον* (v. 18), *ἄλφιτά τοι πρῶτον πυρὶ τάκεται*, indicates that the actual rites of magic have just been started, while in v. 3 *βαρὺν ἐΰντα φίλον καταδήσομαι ἄνδρα* Simaitha speaks of them as future action. But if this is the case the first intercalary is merely used with artistic not magical intent.

Confidence in this theory may be strengthened by the fact that the incantation proper consists of just nine magic actions each accompanied by a subsidiary wish expressed, or suppressed for artistic reasons and separated by the turning of the iynx wheel, the whir of which is plainly heard in the intercalary. In the first colon comes the burning of the *ἄλφιτα* with the partially expressed wish (v. 21) *τὰ Δέλφιδος ὅστια πάσσω*. Then the *δάφνη* is thrown on the fire and the wish (v. 26) follows *οὕτω τοι καὶ Δέλφις ἐνὶ φλογὶ σάρκ' ἀμαθύνοι*.[2] In the third colon the *πίτυρα* are introduced but the wish is artistically suppressed through Simaitha's dread of the expected appearance of Hekate. The fourth colon contains neither magic rite nor wish but serves to break the monotony arising necessarily from the description of a close succession of technical actions. Note, however, that the fifth colon contains *two* actions, one of which properly belongs to the fourth division of the charm, each with its accompanying wish, v. 39 and v. 41. The libation (v. 43) and the wish with a slight poetic addition which again dispels monotony, fill out the sixth part. The seventh is perfectly regular with magic act (v. 48) and wish (vv. 50-1). A natural outburst of feeling[3] which takes the place of the formal expression of the wish, gives color to the eighth colon, while the ninth with its suggestion of a more powerful incantation brings the poem to a fitting close.

If this theory is true for Theokritos, it should also hold good for the imitation by Vergil in the eighth eclogue. Here if we

[1] See Bücheler, Rhein. Mus. 15, 451 and Ribbeck, Rhein. Mus. 17, 551.

[2] For the form of this wish see Kuhnert, Rhein. Mus. 49, 54 ff.

[3] It may be noted that *τᾶς χλαίνας τὸ κράσπεδον* is the only thing thrown into the magic fire which is personally as well as symbolically suggestive of the faithless lover.

follow the MS tradition and retain v. 76[1] we have again but nine intercalaries, since the last line of the poem

Parcite, ab urbe venit, iam parcite, carmina, Daphnis

is no true intercalary but a mere re-echoing of it, a parallel to v. 61 in the first half of the eclogue

Desine Maenalios, iam desine, tibia, versus,

itself a direct imitation of the change of the intercalary in Theokritos' first idyl. Each verse is used as a fitting and artistic close to its own poem.

Nor does the incantation in Vergil really end with the seventh intercalary (v. 94) though no following acts of magic are mentioned. Apparently the rest of the poem is taken up with preparations for a new incantation and a hint of the final happy *dénouement.* But we must not forget the iynx wheel or the art of Vergil. After asking for stronger herbs the enchantress repeats her charm (v. 100) for the eighth time. Then supposing that the magic fire is really dead—she terms it *cineres*—she bids Amaryllis cast the ashes over her head into running water, and with the despairing cry 'nihil ille deos, nil carmina curat' completes her charm by the final turn of the wheel. Note the instantaneous transition from despair to hope (v. 105);

Aspice: corripuit tremulis altaria flammis
Sponte sua, dum ferre m o r o r.

The maid[2] has seen a last red spark which brightens into life—with life there's hope—the dog barks—and lo! the faithless lover appears.

In retaining the intercalary at v. 76 we avoid Charybdis but we must sail uncomfortably close to Scylla. It is charged that its retention violently breaks the sense of the colon and shatters the strophic arrangement of the two parts of the poem. In answer to the first objection it may be said that we have two undoubtedly different acts of magic separated by v. 76. The winding (v. 74) is merely preliminary to the solemn circumambulation of the altar—the main magic act of the first half, while the actual tying

[1] This verse is retained by Ribbeck, Heyne-Wagner, Paldamus, Conington and Papillon, bracketed by Thilo, Kappes and Benoist, and omitted by Ladewig, Kolster, Forbiger, Walz and Hermes.

[2] I follow Ribbeck's arrangement of the dialogue.

of the *vincula Veneris*[1] is, in reality, a distinct step onward in the progress of the incantation.

To meet the objections of the metricians, we must consider the warrant that they have for the omission of v. 76. Of course no one will assert that metrical unity should be violated between the two halves of the poem by the retention of v. 76, unless we have a corresponding intercalary at v. 28, the only place, it may be noted, in the first half of the eclogue where, within a five-line colon, the grammatical sense would not be broken.[2] Ribbeck, following γ, retains the intercalary at v. 28 against the authority of M and P. This may seem daring, but if we believe that there is a cogent reason for the retention of the intercalary at v. 76, what appears daring is after all only right and reasonable.

One or two points connected with these magic incantations require a more extended treatment.

On terna . . . licia (ecl. viii, 73) Servius says: terna : tria : tria alba, tria rosea, et tria nigra; the schol. Bern. novem intelligimus . . . id est, alba, rosea, nigra omnia trinum numerum habentia. That Servius meant by *rosea* the color called *puniceus* is evident from his note on Aen. v, 269 puniceis ibant evincti temporibus: vittis roseis. Hence the magic colors were red, white and black.[3]

The color *red* in antiquity has been the subject of considerable investigation,[4] from which we reach the result that *purpureus* and *puniceus* correspond most closely to that color which we term red. This color in ancient superstition appears to possess a distinct prophylactic quality.[5] In anthol. Pal. 5, 205, 5 the iynx wheel is bound with it; in Theokritos II, 2 red fillets are twined

[1] See Heim, l. c., p. 484, n. 1.

[2] An examination of other five-line cola will show that it would be manifestly unfortunate to attempt the insertion of an intercalary at v. 39 or v. 54 in the first half and equally unfortunate at v. 87 or 97 in the second half.

[3] This triplicate of colors is directly associated with Hekate, the especial goddess of magic, by Eusebius praep. evan. 5, 14 *ἐστι δὲ σύμβολα μὲν τῆς Ἑκάτης κηρὸς τρίχρωμος, ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος καὶ ἐρυθροῦ συνεστώς, ἔχων τύπον Ἑκάτης.*

[4] Price, Am. Journ. Phil. 4, 15, Jordan, Jahrb. 113, 164, H. Blümner, ALL. 6, 401.

[5] Lobeck, Aglaoph. 1257 f.; Jahn, l. c., p. 42, n. 47; Propert. 5, 9, 51 (M.); Tertull. apol. 13; Aesch. Eumen. 1007.

about the altar. On the other hand, Artemidoros 1, 77 says *ἔχει γάρ τινα τὸ πορφυροῦν χρῶμα συμπάθειαν πρὸς τὸν θάνατον*; compare Aesch. Eumen. 1007.[1] Red has then evident magic qualities and associated with white and black we have the magic—or to be more exact—the moon-colors.[2]

In Apuleius met. 11, 2 Lucius invokes the moon: regina caeli, sive tu Ceres . . . seu tu caelestis Venus, . . . seu Phoebi soror . . . seu nocturnis ululatibus horrenda Proserpina triformi facie larvales impetus comprimens. The cult of all these divinities is associated with that of the moon-goddess.[3] The *caelestis Venus* is evidently Luna or Selene herself, a prominent figure in love-incantations.[3] Ceres is at times associated with the moon,[4] Artemis is the second one of the regular triad,[5] while Hekate, the third, is often confused with Persephone.[6] Such a four-fold lunar divinity appears in magic papyri, pap. Par. 2561 *τετραοδῖτι*, but *τριοδῖτι*, v. 2525.

When now the lunar divinity appears to Lucius she is described with the words: multicolor bysso tenui pertexta, nunc *albo* candore lucida, nunc *croceo* flore lutea, nunc *roseo* rubore flammida, et quae longe longeque etiam meum confutabat optutum, palla *nigerrima* splendescens atro nitore.[7]

Here evidently exists a color distinction for this manifold lunar divinity in her different manifestations.[8] That white is associated with Luna or Selene hardly requires proof. Her color is often likened to silver[9] or to swan's-down. With the remarks of Apuleius compare also Prudentius contr. Symmach. 1,365 denique cum luna est, sublustri splendet amictu; Euseb. praep. evan. III, 11, 32 *Ἑκάτη δὲ ἡ σελήνη πάλιν . . . διὸ τρίμορφος ἡ δύναμις, τῆς μὲν νουμηνίας φέρουσα τὴν λευχείμονα καὶ χρυσοσάνδαλον.*

Yellow was also frequently and persistently associated with Demeter-Ceres,[10] while black was appropriate and symbolic for

[1] See Jahrb. Archaeol. Instit. 1894, Anz. p. 81.

[2] For these magic colors in Sanskrit and German folk-lore see Kuhn, Zeitschrift für vergl. Sprachf. 13, 148.

[3] See Roscher, Selene, p. 83, n. 326 and Hildebrand on the passage in Apuleius.

[4] Roscher, l. c., p. 125, n. 531. [5] Ibid. p. 116. [6] Ibid. p. 119.

[7] See Dieterich, Abraxas, p. 103. [8] Ibid. p. 19.

[9] See Blümner, Farbenbezeichnungen bei den röm. Dichtern.

[10] Dieterich, Nekyia, pp. 26 and 38.

Hekate; cf. the epithets in magic papyri *νυχία, χθονία, μελανείμων.* But to connect the color red with Artemis-Diana is a matter of greater difficulty, though this color was strongly associated with Phoebus Apollo,[1] and it is but natural that it should also be indicative of the *Phoebi soror* (Apul. met. 11, 3).

It may be noted that Venus, appearing to Aeneas (Aen. 1,328), is taken for Diana

> O dea certe, | an Phoebi soror?

and she replies (v. 335)

> Virginibus Tyriis mos est gestare pharetram
> Purpureoque alte suras vincire cothurno.

Here the connection may appear too obvious with the famous Tyrian purple. But in ecl. VII, 32 where 'parvus Micon' dedicates the stag-horns to Diana, we read

> levi de marmore tota
> *puniceo* stabis suras evincta cothurno,

and Livius Andronicus, Ino 5, p. 5 (Ribb. 3) says

> hymnum quando chorus festo canit ore Triviae.
> 'set iam *purpureo* suras include cothurno.'

Hildebrand in his note on the passage from Apuleius (XI, 3) compares with it the remarks of Plutarch, Isis et Osiris, c. 77 *στολαὶ δ' αἱ μὲν Ἴσιδος*[2] *ποικίλαι ταῖς βαφαῖς.* He assumes that these colors are associated with the moon when most identified with magic—during eclipse. Of the four colors mentioned by Apuleius, the yellow is undoubtedly the least distinctive and could be most easily omitted from the color-triad naturally belonging to the *triformis dea.* During an eclipse the first change of color results in a pallid, dead-white hue; compare Ovid rem. am. 256 nec subito Phoebi pallidus orbis erit; cp. Lucan 6, 500. As the eclipse proceeds the color red becomes prominent, as Lucan shows in the passage just cited; Phoebe . . . palluit et nigris terrenisque ignibus arsit; Horace sat. 1, 8, 33 Lunam rubentem (with double significance); Seneca Hipp. 796 carmina sanguineae deducunt cornua lunae. Black is, of course, the color of total eclipse.

[1] Colors are often in Aegyptian mythology directly associated with certain divinities; cf. Plutarch, Isis et Osiris, c. 22.

[2] For the identification of Isis with the lunar divinity see Roscher, Selene, p. 14, n. 40.

On Theokritos II, 28 *νῦν θυσῶ τὰ πίτυρα* the scholiast says: *πίτυρα τὰ λεπτίσματα τοῦ σίτου καὶ τῆς κριθῆς.* But great doubt may be cast upon the scholiast's definition. That *πίτυρα* were possessed of magic or sacred significance is evident from Demosth. de Cor. §259 and pap. Par. 2579.

The latter passage reads *λεπτὰ πίτυρα τῶν μύρων.* This appears to be a better definition. Not only is it unnatural to suppose that *ἄλφιτα* would be used in one magic rite and *λεπτίσματα τοῦ σίτου καὶ τῆς κριθῆς* so closely following in a new act of magic significance, but also sweet-smelling herbs were frequently used in *incantamenta.*[1] The pap. Par., in particular, gives an incantation to be made with myrrh (1498 ff.) which in many points corresponds quite closely with the amorous character of the Theokritean idyl,[2] especially with such lines as

οὕτω τοι καὶ Δέλφις ἐνὶ φλογὶ σάρκ' ἀμαθύνοι.

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[1] Eusebius, praep. evan. 5, 12, quotes in reference to the making of a figure of Hekate *σμύρνης καὶ στύρακος λιβάνοιό τε μίγματα τρίψας . . . αὐτὸς ἐπευχόμενος τήνδ' εὐχήν.*

[2] See Kuhnert, Rhein. Mus. 49, p. 42.

THE INTERPRETATION OF EURIPIDES' ALCESTIS.

No play of Euripides has given rise to a wider discussion, or been interpreted in more widely divergent ways, than the Alcestis. A good summary of the question is given in the former of Bissinger's two papers,[1] with comments in the main judicious; but since that time the discussions of Bergk, (Literaturgeschichte, 3, p. 494 ff.), of Wilamowitz, (Isyllos, Philologische Untersuchungen, Neuntes Heft), of Verrall, (Euripides the Rationalist), of Schöne, (Ueber die Alkestis des Euripides, Kiel, 1895), and of Ebeling, (Transactions of the American Philological Assoc., 1898), and the editions of Weil, Earle, and Hayley have shown that the last word has not yet been said.

Measured as a great tragedy, every one must feel the Alcestis to be inadequate, whether one's conception of a great tragedy be drawn from Aeschylus and Sophocles, or from Shakespeare. It does not offer us the spectacle of a great and heroic soul struggling against Fate, or against an inherited burden of guilt that has gone on increasing from generation to generation; we see no noble nature brought, through witting or unwitting sin, into circumstances fraught with pity and terror; there is no grappling with great problems; no resolving of life's enigmas; no portrayal of passions and resulting actions.[2] It is simply an affecting picture of wifely devotion to a husband whom we feel to be unworthy of her, and of her restoration to him by Heracles. Yet, when one reflects, how stupendous the theme!—nothing less than Death and Resurrection. Moreover apart from this inadequacy in the treatment of the theme, we are told that in Admetus, Pheres, and Heracles, Euripides has given us characters wholly unworthy of tragedy. In particular, the intolerable baseness of the husband who accepts the wife's sacrifice, and the cold selfishness on the

[1] Ueber die Dichtungsgattung und den Grundgedanken der Alcestis des Euripides, Erlangen, 1869-1871.

[2] See Bissinger, 1, p. 9.

sides of both father and son in the odious scene between the two, are emphasized, and Heracles is stigmatized as a braggart and swash-buckler, who feasts like a sot and a glutton, and talks in maudlin, boisterous fashion in the house of his grief-stricken friend. As a result, some decry the play altogether, and while admitting, perhaps, the beauty of certain scenes, declare that it is preposterous to regard it as a work of art; while others, relying upon the notice of the didascalia that the play occupied the fourth place in the tetralogy, have considered it but as a substitute for a satyr-drama, and see in it, not perhaps an out-and-out comedy, but a nondescript play, in which, while the outward form of tragedy is retained, full scope is given to travesty, and the comic tone is purposely sought. This is plain, they say, in the characters of Admetus and Heracles, in the scene between Pheres and Admetus (which on their view was added solely for comic effect), in that between Apollo and Thanatos, and in that in which Alcestis is restored.

This last view may be said to represent one extreme; the other is that held by those who endeavor to save both play and poet by contending that the traditional view misinterprets entirely the character of Admetus: that, to the Greek, his action in accepting the sacrifice of Alcestis was not base and egoistic, but natural and proper. The purpose of this paper is to show that both of these views are untenable, and to point out a more reasonable interpretation.

In approaching the question we should endeavor to put ourselves in Euripides' position, and to understand his attitude toward his art, difficult as this unquestionably is in the case of an antique poet. A great dramatic artist, in the fullest sense of the word, he certainly was not; his plays are not perfect tragedies either of the ancient or the modern type. Powerful plays he could and did produce, distinctly great plays at times, displaying not only power but great art. Yet in most cases we feel something to be lacking, or are struck with the artificiality of the prologue or *dénouement*, or with triviality in detail. But with a decline in art, we note an astonishing advance in humanity, evinced, at times, in a fondness for dealing with situations which appeal to us by their very pathos; a phase of his work which is the more to be noted, because it gives rise to one of his most patent artistic defects—a tendency toward sensationalism, and to the elaboration

of certain scenes which attracted him strongly and which appeal to us strongly, at the expense of the effect of the whole. He is τραγικώτατος always, in season and out of season; and Aristotle's famous phrase is not wholly complimentary. For the same reason we must be prepared for many an incongruity; we have left the antique, and, while tending toward it, have not reached the modern. Keeping the background of the heroic age, he gives us varied pictures of life, in tone oftentimes neither heroic nor Hellenic, but almost, if not quite, modern. And many a scene, rich in promise for the future, shows that the despised Euripidean art contained in itself the germs, and the partial fruition, of much that was to make the art of the future deeper and richer, in some respects, even than that of Aeschylus and Sophocles.

Why then did he write an Alcestis, and why did not Sophocles? The answer is, I think, simple: the theme, looked at from any standpoint, offers inherent difficulties when regarded as a tragic theme. There is no conflict, nor, indeed, room for a conflict, unless it be between Heracles and Thanatos, and all will, I think, agree that Euripides chose the wiser and more artistic course, in limiting himself to the brief soliloquy in which the heroic resolve is taken, and the still briefer statement at the end. Or shall we say that Alcestis could have been made a genuinely tragic character, and a struggle on her part between love and duty to her husband and a clinging to life, be made the essential action? Or Admetus himself, perhaps, blinded by ἄτη, and led on to a weak acceptance of another's sacrifice? (The myth barely mentions a failure to sacrifice to Artemis,—a possible *motif*, in the Aeschylean sense.) And, frame it as you will, the fact remains that a genuinely tragic conclusion is unattainable; not Euripides' play alone, but the myth itself, εἰς χαρὰν καὶ ἡδονὴν καταστρέφει.

But Euripides does not demand of a theme that it, of itself, offer material for a great tragedy in the strictest sense, and many of his plays cannot adequately be understood, so long as one attempts to wrest them into this form. Nay, he often takes such a theme and makes something quite different out of it, (witness the Orestes). The theme before us offered him what he most desired —an opportunity to portray a beautiful character in a highly affecting situation. This he has wrought out with admirable art. It is to be noted, further, that the theme of vicarious suffering—or, if not vicarious, of suffering, or even death, voluntarily undergone

for the sake of others—seems to have been a favorite one with Euripides. In the extant plays we have many instances. That of Iphigenia may, perhaps, best be left out of the question, as it is not his peculiar property; although, with him, it is no mere incident but the theme of a whole play; but we think of young Menoeceus, in the Phoenissae; of Macaria, in the Heraclidae; of old Iolaus in the same play; of Andromache, leaving her place of safety at the altar, to save her child; and in the Iphigenia Taurica, we have first the generous rivalry between the two friends as to which shall die to save the other—a scene particularly suggestive because of the arguments by which Orestes prevails upon his friend to accept his sacrifice,—and then the sister's resolve to save them though it cost her life, and the brother's unwavering refusal to accept safety on these terms. So we may safely say that the strange legend of Alcestis was one strongly to attract Euripides, and that it attracted him because of its inherent human interest rather than as a subject upon which he could construct a drama which would satisfy all the requirements of Hellenic art.

These are, in my opinion, the principles in the light of which the Alcestis is to be interpreted; and to say, with Verrall, that it was written "to kill the legend," or with Schöne, that it is but a travesty of Phrynichus' Alcestis, seems to me preposterous, and itself a travesty of literary interpretation. And now of the characters of Admetus and Heracles.

That the former is one who has won the favor of a god, and that Apollo interests himself in his behalf, is a feature of the legend, and is told in the prologue; he is an ὅσιος ἀνήρ. Further, his boundless hospitality, under the most distressing circumstances, is a striking feature of the play. Yet, when all has been said, we still feel that he is lacking in the one thing needful,—that his acceptance of Alcestis' sacrifice is base.[1] But we are told that this is modern misinterpretation, that the Greek would not so read his character; and this view must be discussed.

It is put most pointedly by Way.[2] "Admetus," he says, "was

[1] For a survey of the various means by which modern poets have endeavored to avoid this feature of the story, see Ellinger, Alceste in der modernen Litteratur, Halle, 1885. But, after all, what one of the modern versions of the legend would one choose in preference to that of Euripides?

[2] In the appendix to the first volume of his Euripides in English Verse. See also Sittl, Geschichte der griechischen Literatur, 3, p. 334.

a noble character. 2. He was right in respect to the *motif* and incidents of the play. 3. He reaped the just reward of the good man." And, in connection with the first of these postulates, he maintains that hospitality was "the highest social virtue recognized by a Greek;" that, beside such a trait, "conjugal affection shrank into insignificance," and again says later on: "The especial pathos of the situation to the audience lay in this, that the sacrifice of a young and happy woman was forced upon her by the cowardly selfishness, not of her husband, but of a miserable old man: that Admetus should not have found a substitute at all would have seemed monstrous."

Now in all this there is just thus much of truth, that the act of Admetus might appear less base to the Greek than it does to us. That, however, Euripides did not mean to idealize his character, that, on the contrary, such an idealization entirely misinterprets the play, I hold most strongly, and for the following reasons:

(1) Such an assumption is unnatural. After making all allowance for the Greek glorification of youth as against age, and of manhood as against womanhood, it remains true that human nature is essentially the same in all ages, and that the Greek tragedians are strikingly faithful in their portrayal of human nature. Now that men love their wives is not a modern sentiment. It is eloquently voiced by the Homeric Achilles; it plays an important part in one of Euripides' romantic dramas. Further, Euripides offers us in the Tauric Iphigenia a situation that is closely parallel, and his treatment of it shows how far he was from feeling that it was the "duty" of a noble youth to allow a loving woman to die for him. (Iph. Taur. 1003–1011.)

(2) The character of Admetus was not thus understood by that Greek of the Greeks, Aristophanes; but, on the contrary, his parodies show that he read it as we do. In the Thesmophoriazusae, Euripides, not daring himself to plead his cause before the women, endeavors to induce Agathon to go in his place. The whole scene is paratragedic and the language strikingly Euripidean; Agathon's refusal is phrased as follows:

ΑΓ. Εὐριπίδη ΕΥΡ. *τί ἔστιν;* ΑΓ. *ἐποίησάς ποτε,*
χαίρεις ὁρῶν φῶς, πατέρα δ' οὐ χαίρειν δοκεῖς;
ΕΥΡ. *ἔγωγε.* ΑΓ. *μή νυν ἐλπίσῃς τὸ σὸν κακὸν*
ἡμᾶς ὑφέξειν. καὶ γὰρ ἂν μαινοίμεθ' ἄν.
ἀλλ' αὐτὸς ὅ γε σόν ἐστιν οἰκείως φέρε.

(Thesmo. 193–197.)

It is not that vs. 194 is quoted from the Alcestis that is the important thing, but that Aristophanes puts Euripides in a situation corresponding roughly to that of Admetus, and makes the one whom he approaches in the hope of finding a substitute, ridicule his claims. This same verse (Alc. 691) is used by Aristophanes again in a scene (Nub. 1415) where he appears to be travestying the wrangle between Admetus and Pheres, and the brutal parody of Alc. 367 f. in Acharn. 893 f. may perhaps be taken as an indication that the hollowness of Admetus' protestations of love for the woman whom he none the less allows to die for him, was not unfelt even in antiquity.

(3) This view seems to be absolutely untenable in the face of the scene with Pheres (vss. 614–738);[1] one who meant to idealize Admetus would not have gone out of his way to portray the baseness of his act so mercilessly.

(4) A sympathetic study of the earlier scenes of the play leads to the same conclusion. Alcestis is brought before us as she is about to bid farewell to life and life's joys, and not for a moment does she waver or appear to regret her choice. Yet, true to Greek conceptions and true to nature, she does not belittle the joys she is leaving, nor does she belittle her sacrifice. And, throughout it all, there is no word of passionate farewell to the husband who wept and "waxed importunate in prayer," who

[1] This scene has been interpreted in the most strikingly divergent ways. Hartung said long ago (Eur. Restitutus, 1, p. 225), "Vix credas fieri potuisse, ut risum movere voluisse Euripidem hanc patris filiique contentionem super probissimae mulieris funere institutam proponendo quisquam arbitraretur." So, too, Bissinger calls the scene "keineswegs lachenerregend." Weil, on the other hand, speaks of "la scène vraiment comique entre Admète et Phérès," and Haigh even says (Tragic Drama, p. 286): "In this well-known scene the unblushing egotism of father and son is depicted with humorous exaggeration," and a little further on, he speaks of the "humorous situation." Far truer are Schöne's words (Ueber die Alkestis, p. 8), "Wie man in dieser Szene etwas von humoristischem Tone hat finden können, begreift sich schwer. Wer dieses Drama ernst nimmt . . . wird weit eher geneigt sein, jenen Dialog vielmehr peinlich und brutal, als humoristisch anklingend zu finden." Schöne's inference seems to me, however, unsound. A great blot on the play the scene certainly is; but it has an important bearing on what follows, as Ebeling has pointed out. This fact, and Euripides' fondness for a pointed debate must be borne in mind in interpreting it; and Wieland's suggestion that Admetus is beside himself with grief is worth remembering.

pleads with her not to leave him, who cries out against the "fate" that robs him of a loving wife without whom life will be unendurable. Almost all that she says directly to him is the calm, reflective speech, uttered with all the solemnity of approaching death, in which she shows him the freedom of her choice, and bids him respect her children and never to give them a stepmother to oust them from their rights. There is no passionate outburst, no word of love for him in all that she says; she does not even ask that he do this for her sake. Would it not appear that even in the heroism of her sacrifice the iron has entered into her soul: he can let her die?[1]

(5) Euripides plainly means us to see a change in Admetus' character during the course of the play. I say "plainly," despite the fact that, in the face of much that has been written on the Alcestis, it may seem a strong statement, and it may be claimed that I am interpreting Browning, and not Euripides;[2] but, to me, the matter admits of no doubt. Were one to say that Admetus comes back from the tomb a changed and chastened nature, it might indeed be objected that a modern conception was being substituted for the antique view. Changed and chastened in the Christian sense he certainly is not; but he comes back realizing his loss, and realizing also that the fault is his own and not another's. In the earlier part of the play he protests his love, begs Alcestis not to leave him, and bewails the "fate" that makes this sacrifice necessary. This, and, if we add protestations that he will prove faithful to her memory and that life will be a blank without her, this alone. He speaks of himself and of her as "two souls fordone by woe, who have committed no sin against the gods that thou shouldst die" (vs. 246 f.). He will not marry again; he cares not for more children; he but prays the gods that he may have joy of those he has, *σοῦ γὰρ οὐκ ὠνήμεθα* (335); and this tone of indignant protest against his lot is strongly marked; it is a part of his egoistic nature.

[1] That this is not to be interpreted merely as an instance of antique reticence, is plain from other passages in Euripides; see, e. g., the fine outburst in Iph. Taur. 708–710.

[2] Ebeling has rightly emphasized this, and has shown that this fact helps us in understanding the Pheres-scene; but I should hardly go so far as to assume that Euripides' main purpose in writing the play was to criticise the conception of Admetus' character as seen in the epic version.

But when he comes back from the tomb his eyes are opened. The maid-servant had said of him (vs.145): *οὔπω τόδ' οἶδε δεσπότης, πρὶν ἂν πάθῃ*, and, when the chorus attempts to soothe him with the commonplace: *ὡς πᾶσιν ἡμῖν κατθανεῖν ὀφείλεται*, he answers:

ἐπίσταμαί γε κοὐκ ἄφνω κακὸν τόδε
προσέπτατ'· εἰδὼς δ' αὖτ' ἐτειρόμην πάλαι.

Yet, in a far different sense, he cries out in vs. 1068,

ὦ τλήμων ἐγώ,
ὡς ἄρτι πένθους τοῦδε γεύομαι πικροῦ.

See also vs. 940.

Now, instead of groaning at his "fate," he sees where the fault lies. The chorus says (929) *ἀλλ' ἔσωσας βίοτον καὶ ψυχάν*, but he answers:

φίλοι, γυναικὸς δαίμον' εὐτυχέστερον
τοὐμοῦ νομίζω, καίπερ οὐ δοκοῦνθ' ὅμως·
τῆς μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν ἄλγος ἁψεταί ποτε,
πολλῶν δὲ μόχθων εὐκλεὴς ἐπαύσατο.
ἐγὼ δ' ὃν οὐ χρῆν ζῆν, παρεὶς τὸ μόρσιμον,
λυπρὸν διάξω βίοτον· ἄρτι μανθάνω.

This is the new key, *ἐγὼ δ' ὃν οὐ χρῆν ζῆν*. Life now has no charms for him, it will be *λυπρός*; *now* he knows what his foes will say of him, and, with what good reason, *ἰδοῦ τὸν αἰσχρῶς ζῶντα* (955 ff.). Verily, Pheres' taunts have left an impression, and Admetus is in full earnest when he cries out (vss. 897 ff.):

τί μ' ἐκώλυσας ῥῖψαι τύμβου
τάφρον εἰς κοίλην καὶ μετ' ἐκείνης
τῆς μέγ' ἀρίστης κεῖσθαι φθίμενον;

(Compare the passage beginning *ζηλῶ φθιμένους*, vss. 866 ff.)

To call this last "ein lächerliches Gerede" is not sane criticism. At the same time it would be wholly wrong to assume that Euripides means us to see in the restoration of Alcestis a divine *amende* to a husband who is now worthy of her. Of this there is no suggestion. We are not even to think of her restoration as due to the nobility of her sacrifice, as though the gods themselves gave her back.[1] Heracles is but paying a debt to his friend, who had so generously entertained him, and had made nothing of his private grief. Thus there is a break in the action,

[1] Contrast Plato, Symposium 179 C, where a very different form of the myth is given.

as was indeed inevitable, and the *motif* in the first part of the play is different from that in the last part; a dramatic blemish, no doubt, but one that, in Euripides, need not surprise us; he offers many parallels.

These same considerations afford, it seems to me, the best answer to those who maintain that Admetus is a *comic* personage. These protestations of his in the first part of the play are not to be taken as a travesty of sincere affection. No, he is sincere and stricken with grief; but when the choice was made and the alternative had been put before him by Apollo, he, the prince, honored and beloved even by the god, and still in the glory of youth and strength, had chosen—well, he had chosen life rather than death; and he rendered all honor to her who had bought his life at the price of her own. It was still in the future, and it had the divine sanction; but now the time is at hand, she is being taken from him, and he can but cry out against his "fate."

And now of Heracles, "der ungezogene Herkules."[1] He is the central figure of the play as read by Browning; but, much as we admire the heroic figure of "the Helper," "the grand Benevolence," who does but "snatch repose" in the "interval 'twixt fight and fight again," and all for man's sake, we must admit that this is really *hineininterpretirt.* Euripides, in this play at least, has not a word of it all.[2] But when this has been said it remains true that the character is drawn from life. Heracles is the epitome of animal strength, somewhat slow of wit, but fearless in danger and shrinking from nothing. He makes little of what he has done, and talks lightly of the labor he is now on his way to perform. He honors his friend and is quick to make return for the entertainment given him at the cost of a struggle from which any other than Admetus would have shrunk. We see him in relaxation, or rather, in the first place, we are told of him by a servant; and it is to be noted that this servant is overwhelmed with grief at the loss of a loved mistress, whose kindness had been marked (vss. 193 ff.), and whom he would fain have followed to the tomb instead of serving this reveller (vss. 765 ff.). Is it to be expected that he will give a sympathetic picture of the feasting hero?[3]

[1] Wieland, Briefe über das neue Singspiel Alceste.

[2] See Verrall's vivacious travesty, Euripides the Rationalist, p. 19.

[3] In this Euripides appears as the artist rather than the man; for his own temper was, all tradition says, like that of the servant, and he was no lover

So, between the setting out of the funeral procession and the return of the now really grief-stricken husband, Euripides has inserted a scene of distinctly lighter tone. He has represented Heracles, who is soon to go forth to wrestle with Death himself, as feasting and drinking in the house of mourning, and bidding the gloomy servant join his revels. An instructive fact, surely, coming from Antiquity. The blending of the serious and the lighter tones has no extensive range on the Greek tragic stage; there are touches here and there, but that is all. In the Alcestis, for the first time, we see a whole scene so treated. Shall we with Shakespeare before us, say that this is inconsistent with tragic dignity? This very scene has, by French critics[1] been put side by side with that in Romeo and Juliet where Peter and the musicians jest with each other while Juliet lies dead, in semblance, in the adjacent chamber. They came for the wedding, they serve for the funeral; and meanwhile they jest and banter. Or shall one say that we have here not tragedy but tragi-comedy, a form alien to the spirit of Hellenic art? Yet that very phrase is Hellenic, it is Plato's, τῇ τοῦ βίου ξυμπάσῃ τραγῳδίᾳ καὶ κωμῳδίᾳ, Philebus, 50 B, and, apart from all false realism, Euripides gives us here a genuine reflection of human life.[2]

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of professional athletes. Yet he sketches the character sympathetically, and points it by the splendid soliloquy, vss. 837 ff. Those who will have it that Heracles gets drunk and so disfigures the play, must not disregard the fact that in such a scene Euripides has Aeschylus for a predecessor see Athenaeus, 10, 428 F. One must not forget the position of the play in the tetralogy, or that Ἡρακλῆς πεινῶν was a stock figure.

[1] See Patin, Euripide, 1, p. 216.

[2] In the same spirit the scene between Apollo and Thanatos should be interpreted, and the concluding scene as well. The "comic" tone some have found in these is to me unimaginable. Thanatos is grim, not "*plump*" (Wilamowitz), and the verbal duel between him and the god of light a fit prelude to the play. As for the silence of Alcestis, what was she to say? (Cf. Tennyson, In Memoriam, XXXI.) Heracles' testing of Admetus may perhaps be playful, but it is to be noted that it leads him to reiterate the very promises he had before made to Alcestis—and how much more they mean now!

CHIASMUS IN THE EPISTLES OF CICERO, SENECA, PLINY AND FRONTO.

Chiasmus occurs in the Epistles of Cicero, Seneca, Pliny and Fronto in about eight hundred and fifty passages. A more careful search might add further examples, but this number—for Cicero 300, Seneca 225, Pliny 260, Fronto 65[1]—is complete enough to represent fairly the usage of these writers. In another paper, I gave a systematic division of the examples of chiasmus in Sallust, Caesar, Tacitus and Justinus,[2] and in the following study, the divisions will correspond to those there used. That each citation will not show a conscious arrangement for the purpose of producing the chiasmus is altogether likely, especially in cases where intervening words may have somewhat weakened the impression made by placing together similar terms. The euphony resulting from different combinations must have had great influence in determining the arrangement. As, however, in the majority of my examples one member of the chiasmus immediately succeeds the other, without apparent violation of euphony, the changed order must, in such instances, be considered as a conscious use of the figure.

Freedom in the use of chiasmus seems to depend on a conscious rhetorical development in the style of the individual writer. In those epistles of Cicero which were most freely and rapidly written chiasmus does not often occur. The short compact sentences, written to convey facts and not to display rhetoric, practically preclude its use. The different works of Seneca, however, have all the same character, and to all may be applied the words of Quintilian 10, 1, 130 si rerum pondera minutissimis sententiis non fregisset. Any page will give examples of this style of his with its short clauses and excessive use of anaphora, e. g., Ep. 1, 1

[1] In the case of Cicero and of Fronto, some of the examples are found in the letters of their correspondents, and the few of these which have been quoted are enclosed in parentheses.

[2] Chiasmus in Sallust, Caesar, Tacitus and Justinus, J. H. U. Diss., Northfield, Minn., 1891.

quaedam tempora eripiuntur nobis, quaedam subducuntur, quaedam effluunt. turpissima tamen est iactura quae per neglegentiam fit.

The Panegyricus of Pliny is thoroughly rhetorical and contains more examples of chiasmus than his epistles. Fronto's style is somewhat like that of Seneca. His work opened at random (ad Amicos 1, 8, p. 180, Naber) shows this: Ama eum, oro te. Cum ipsius causa hoc peto, tum mea quoque. Nam me etiam magis amabis, si cum Pio familiarius egeris. Ep. ad amicos 1, 11 (p. 181, Naber) is similar in style: Figurae orationis sunt quae maxime orationem ornant. Duplex autem genus est figurarum: aut enim verborum figurae sunt aut sententiarum. In figuris verborum est tropos, metaphora. In contrast with this, observe the passage ad Aurel. Caes. I. (pp. 113–14) in which thirteen lines are made up of successive pairs of words, containing a few instances of chiasmus. So also in his Greek epistles, e. g. p. 247, 2 *ἔνθα οὔτε ὁ τόπος τῶν δικαστηρίων, οὔτε τῶν δικαζόντων ὁ ἀριθμός, οὔτε τάξις τῶν φάσεων καὶ κλήσεων, οὔτε τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ μέτρον.*

Cicero.

The few adverbs used in chiasmus are chiefly those of time; e. g. ad Att. 8, 1, 3 umquam, semper; 9, 6 a, 1 feci saepe, saepius facturus; 13, 30, 2 hodie, cras; ad Fam. 3, 12, 1 prius, deinde; 4, 6, 1 saepe, numquam; ad Quint. Frat. 1, 3, 3 aliquando, umquam. The Ep. ad Octavianum, formerly attributed to Cicero, furnishes two examples 'sui generis': 1 iam, deinde; 10 primo, post. The adverbs are made the extremes with but few exceptions, as ad Fam. 2, 7, 1 longe enim absum, audio sero.

Repetition of the same word and the use of contrasted terms seem to have been the dominating factors in the chiastic arrangement of nouns and adjectives: ad Att. 7, 7, 4 tranquilla, tranquillissimus; ad Brut. 1, 3 a, 1 consules duos, bonos quidem, sed dumtaxat bonos consules amisimus; ad Att. 5, 1, 4 lenius, asperius; ad Fam. 3, 11, 4 leviora, maiora; 5, 15, 4 perpetuam, exiguam; 11, 27, 2 mihi utile, nec inutile ipsi Caesari. Ad Fam. 1, 4, 1 acerbum Curionem, Bibulum multo iustiorem; but 1, 7, 2 Hortensium percupidum tui, studiosum Lucullum; 7, 23, 2 aptum bibliothecae studiisque nostris congruens.

The personal element in the epistles accounts for the large number of pronouns used in chiasmus: ad Att. 1, 16, 3 ex eventu

ab aliis, a me ex ipso initio; 3, 23, 4 tibi, aliis; 5, 10, 5 in te, in nos; 6, 3, 5 non in Pompeium prolixior per ipsum quam per me in Brutum; 12, 7, 1 liberalitate mea, sua libertate; 14, 20, 4 tibi, mihi; ad Fam. 10, 28, 3 illa ex aliis, a me pauca; 11, 27, 2 dilexi te, meque a te diligi iudicavi; 15, 4, 12 inimicum meum, tuum inimicum. Ad Att. 2, 1, 11 te expectat et indiget tui; ad Fam. 4, 5, 6 in te amor fuit pietasque in omnis suos.

In combining verbs with dependent nouns no preference in arrangement whether as means or as extremes seems to have been shown: ad Att. 9, 5, 3 cogito, cogito; 10, 8, 5 fugiamus, fugeremus; 13, 22, 3 aut obsoletum Bruto, aut Balbo inchoatum; ad Fam. 6, 6, 4 utebar familiarissime Caesare, Pompeium faciebam plurimi; 10, 8, 6 (confirmare salutem, periculum morari); ad Quint. Frat. 1, 3, 3 amabat ut fratrem, ut maiorem fratrem verebatur. Ad. Att. 7, 21, 1 Capua discessi et mansi Calibus; 9, 12, 3 nos vivimus, et stat urbs; ad Fam. 12, 7, 2 in senatu disserui, dixi in contione. Similar in arrangement are the passages in which there is a dependent clause or infinitive: ad Att. 2, 9, 3 male vehi malo alio gubernante quam tam ingratis vectoribus bene gubernare; 9, 2, 1 gaudere ais te mansisse me et scribis in sententia te manere; 9, 6, 5 proximae gaudere te ostendunt me remansisse; 12, 48, 1 te venturum scripsisti et addidisti te putare opus esse; 13, 20, 4 non possum non probare et tamen non curare pulchre possum; 13, 48, 2 cures velim, velim mittas; ad Fam. 5, 12, 4 et reprehendes ea, quae vituperanda duces, et, quae placebunt, . . . comprobabis; 6, 21, 1 aut interitum adlatura esset, si victus esses, aut, si vicisses, servitutem; 7, 27, 2 non enim ingrata mihi sunt, quae fecisti, sed, quae scripsisti, molesta; 7, 32, 2 derideri te putas; nunc demum intellego te sapere; Quint. Frat. 2, 14, 2 faceres, quod velles, ego ipse quid vellem, ostenderem.

Examples of chiasmus with pairs of nouns or adjectives which govern genitives are frequent: ad Att. 8, 6, 3 malo Tironis verecundiam in culpa esse quam inliberalitatem Curi; ad Fam. 8, 3, 2 (quod ad Philotimi officium et bona Milonis attinet); 15, 14, 3 cum pro rerum magnitudine, tum pro opportunitate temporis. Ad Fam. 5, 12, 7 ad laetitiam animi, ad memoriae dignitatem; 10, 10, 2 non invitamentum ad tempus, sed perpetuae virtutis est praemium.

Chiastic arrangement of successive pairs of nouns dependent on the same verb is rare: ad Att. 9, 10, 3 me meis civibus famem,

vastitatem inferre Italiae? 13, 52, 2 Puteolis se aiebat unum diem fore, alterum ad Baias; 4, 8, 1 hoc scito, Antium Buthrotum esse Romae, ut Corcyrae illud tuum *Antium*; 5, 1, 3 in Arcano Quintus . . . ego Aquini; ad Fam. 5, 12, 7 Timoleonti a Timaeo aut ab Herodoto Themistocli; Quint. Frat. 1, 3, 1 flens flentem, prosequentem proficiscens dimiseras.

In most instances prepositional phrases in chiasmus are placed together: ad Att. 3, 7, 3 accedemus in Epirum, per Candaviam ibimus; 6, 6, 2 largitio fuit in cives, sed in hospites liberalitas; 14, 12, 3 remotum a dialecticis, in arithmeticis satis exercitatum; ad Fam. 5, 12, 4 optabiles in experiendo, in legendo iucundae.

Successive pairs of words which form a chiasmus are comparatively common: ad Att. 1, 14, 1 non iucunda miseris, inanis improbis, beatis non grata; 1, 16, 9 manet . . . consensio, dolor accessit, virtus non imminuta; 5, 1, 5 mandata exhaurias, scribas ad me omnia, Pomptinum extrudas; ad Fam. 2, 8, 1 scribent alii, multi nuntiabunt, perferet multa etiam ipse rumor; 15, 4, 2 biduum Laodiciae fui, deinde Apameae quadriduum, triduum Synnadis, totidem dies Philomeli; ad Quint. Frat. 1, 1, 11, 32 esse abstinentem, continere omnis cupiditates, suos coercere, iuris aequabilem tenere rationem, facilem se . . . praebere.

A few instances are found with groups of three or more words: ad Att. 1, 19, 4 sentinam urbis exhauriri et Italiae solitudinem frequentari; 7, 21, 1 fugam ab urbe turpissimam, timidissimas in oppidis contiones, ignorationem adversarii; 11, 17 a, 3 ne profectum quidem illim quemquam post Idus Martias, nec post Idus Decembr. ab illo datas ullas litteras; ad Fam. 1, 1, 2 tuorum in se officiorum et amoris erga te sui; 3, 10, 6 alienum tempus est mihi tecum expostulandi, purgandi autem mei necessarium; 1, 7, 9 magna est hominum opinio de te, magna commendatio liberalitatis, magna memoria consulatus tui; ad Quint. Frat. 1, 1, 2, 7 exsistunt graves controversiae, multae nascuntur iniuriae, magnae contentiones consequuntur; 1, 1, 1, 5 nullas, ut opinor, insidias hostium, nullam proelii dimicationem, nullam defectionem sociorum, nullam inopiam stipendii aut rei frumentariae, nullam seditionem exercitus pertimescimus.

Seneca.

Chiasmus is not a very prominent feature in the style of Seneca. In adverbs it is found most frequently with primum, deinde,

Ep. 28, 10; 29, 5; prius, deinde, 44, 1; 65, 15; 116, 3 inbecillus est primo omnis adfectus, deinde ipse se concitat et vires . . . parat. Scattering examples with other adverbs also occur: Ep. 82, 13 Cato honestissime, turpissime Brutus; 104, 14 petierant cupidissime loca, cupidius deserunt; 114, 8 hominis interdum, interdum temporis. There are also a few instances in which the adverbs are arranged as the extremes; Ep. 14, 15 aliquando innocentes, nocentes saepius; 20, 3 se domi contrahunt, dilatant foris; 43, 3 non ut tutius vivamus, sed ut peccemus occultius; 95, 5 recte faciunt, nesciunt facere se recte; 99, 24 effusissime flere, meminisse parcissime.

Adjectives are often arranged chiastically, the nouns which they modify being generally placed together: Ep. 90, 16 tactu mollia et inpenetrabilia ventis; 116, 5 alteri emancipatam, vilem sibi; 116, 4 regredi facile, optimum progredi; 117, 18 si algor malum est, malum sit algere; 119, 11 corporibus electa, spectabilis cultu; 80, 3 solem ardentissimum in ferventissimo pulvere; 92, 7 bene homini, si palato bene; 97, 9 plurimum libidini, legibus minimum; 70, 14 unum introitum, exitus multos; 70, 27 varios accessus, finem eundem; 9, 7 fructuosior adulescentia, sed infantia dulcior. Note also Ep. 100, 12 sine commendatione partium singularum in universum magnificus.

The use of pronouns in chiasmus shows nothing remarkable: Ep. 23, 2 felicitatem suam in aliena potestate;[1] 70, 10 illo saeculo quisquam aut ipse ullo; 95, 56 discendum de ipsa est ut ipsa discatur; 121, 23 tutelam sui et eius peritiam; 37, 1 honestissimi huius et illius turpissimi; 108, 17 dissimilis utrique, utrique magnifica; 32, 1 inquiro in te et ab omnibus sciscitor; 54, 4 hoc erit post me, quod ante me fuit; 69, 6 illa ad nos, ad illam nos; 98, 1 illa ex nobis, non ex illis nos. In a few passages the pronouns form the extremes: 10, 2 de te sperem, spondeam mihi; 34, 4 inter se congruant ac respondeant sibi; 94, 31 altera in totum, particulatim altera; 109, 12 alienam virtutem exercendo, exerceat suam.

Very few instances occur in which a genitive forms one of the terms in the chiasmus: Ep. 11, 6 condicio nascendi et corporis temperatura; 55, 3 amicitiae Asinii Galli, Seiani odium; 84, 4 ros

[1] Compare Ep. 13, 5 suis viribus, inbecillitate nostra, and 47, 20 suarum virium et inbecillitatis alienae where *suus* is placed before its noun.

illius caeli aut ipsius arundinis humor; 95, 22 multa auxiliorum genera, periculorum paucissima; 74, 11 vitae odium, timor mortis; 81, 9 verborum proprietas, consuetudo sermonis; 82, 18 peiorum metu aut spe bonorum. Pairs of nouns dependent on the same verb, show a chiastic arrangement frequently: Ep. 117, 17 sapere sapientiae usus est, quomodo eloquentiae eloqui. Of the cases, the nominative and accusative occur most commonly: Ep. 16, 8 exiguum natura desiderat, opinio inmensum; 22, 11 paucos servitus, plures servitutem; 24, 5 ad occupanda pericula virtus, crudelitas ad inroganda; 80, 2 quam multi corpora exerceant, ingenia quam pauci; 94, 66 Marius exercitus, Marium ambitio; 105, 8 tutum aliqua, nulla securum. There are also a few scattered instances with other cases: 24, 5 Porsenna Mucio . . . sibi Mucius; 53, 11 ille beneficio naturae non timet, suo sapiens; 97, 16 multos poena, metu neminem; 98, 10 nihil firmum infirmo, nihil fragili aeternum; 108, 34 Ennium Homero, Ennio Vergilium.

About one-half of the instances of chiasmus with only two pairs of words, are formed by verbs and the nouns which they govern, the nouns being most frequently placed together: 90, 3 colere divina, humana diligere; 94, 33 expelle falsas, veras repone; 114, 7 pepercit gladio, sanguine abstinuit; 124, 16 conprendit praesentia, praeteritorum reminiscitur, but with the opposite arrangement 74, 12 praesentibus gaudet, concupiscit absentia. In some passages the verb is repeated: Ep. 68, 13 crediturі fuimus rationi, experientiae credimus; 71, 26 cadere in hominem, in se cecidisse; 74, 20 placeat homini, deo placuit. In such cases the verbs are generally placed together: 3, 3 committas, committere; 19, 8 accesserit, accedet; 51, 8 cessero, cedendum est; 52, 9 fiant faciantque; 105, 6 tacuerit, tacebit. In the remaining instances some of the verbs are contrasted: 49, 9 mors me sequitur, fugit vita; 120, 9 factum laudavimus, contempsimus virum; 24, 13 persona demenda et reddenda facies. The contrasted terms are sometimes arranged on the extremes: 71, 8 mala fortuna vincitur et ordinatur bona.

Infinitives or clauses frequently form chiasmus with the verbs on which they depend: Ep. 5, 7 desines timere, si sperare desieris; 14, 1 nego indulgendum, serviendum nego; 59, 5 loqueris quantum vis et plus significas quam loqueris; 94, 41 non deprehendes . . . prosit, profuisse deprehendes; 94, 45 prodest qui suadet, et qui monet proderit; 99, 4 quid doles amisisse, si habuisse non prodest;

48, 1 seducere me debeo et quid suadeam circumspicere; 81, 29 non quia concupiscenda laudantur, sed concupiscuntur quia laudata sunt; 114, 4 cupierit videri . . . latere noluerit; 111, 3 minus adparet longe intuentibus, cum accesseris manifestum fit; 61, 3 quicquid necesse futurum est repugnanti, volenti necessitas non est; 88, 22 dehiscentibus, quae cohaerebant, aut his, quae distabant, coeuntibus, aut his, quae eminebant, residentibus.

Prepositional phrases in chiasmus are arranged both as the extremes and as the means: Ep. 66, 24 amicitia in hominibus, in rebus adpetitio; 71, 20 haec de omnibus, de hac nulla; 78, 14 deploratus a meis, a medicis relictus; 89, 8 nec philosophia sine virtute nec sine philosophia virtus; 90, 35 civem extra patriam, extra mundum deos; 93, 1 multos inveni aequos adversus homines, adversus deos neminem. 19, 2 in freto viximus, moriamur in portu; 71, 17 in bonis numeres, numerabis in malis; 84, 1 de inventis iudicem, et cogitem de inveniendis; 87, 25 ex malo bonum . . . ficus ex olea; 91, 5 ex amico inimicus, hostis ex socio. Here also may be placed 66, 1 ad cetera contemnenda a contemptu sui.

Chiasmus with three or more successive pairs of words occurs more frequently in Seneca than in the other authors here examined: Ep. 11, 7 deiciunt enim vultum, verba summittunt, figunt in terram oculos; 15, 2 occupatio exercendi lacertos et dilatandi cervicem ac latera firmandi; 24, 8 minus sanguinis, minus virium, animi idem; 66, 8 nihil invenies rectius recto, verius vero, temperato temperatius; 68, 8 pedem turgidum, lividam manum, aridos nervos; 24, 26 diem nox premit, dies noctem, aestas in autumnum desinit, autumno hiemps instat; 41, 4 interritum periculis, intactum cupiditatibus, inter adversa felicem, in mediis tempestatibus placidum; 117, 31 incendium domus et periculum liberorum et obsidio patriae et bonorum direptio.

Groups of three or more words which form a chiasmus are also common in this author. One word has generally the same relative position as the corresponding word in the second group: Ep. 13, 5 alios inter flagella ridere, alios gemere sub colapho; 13, 12 nulla causa vitae, nullus miseriarum modus; 51, 5 Hannibalem hiberna solverunt . . . illum virum enervaverunt fomenta Campaniae; 74, 25 non facit adiectio amici sapientiorem, non facit stultiorem detractio; 94, 23 puta avaritiam relaxatam, puta adstrictam esse luxuriam; 104, 4 securior sui tutela, et vitae usus

animosior; 124, 22 effuderis more Parthorum vel Germanorum modo vinxeris. 8, 5 cibus famem sedet, potio sitim extinguat, vestis arceat frigus. 23, 4 hilariculo mortem contemnere? pauper-tati domum aperire? voluptates tenere sub freno? meditari dolorum patientiam? 29, 7 moveat ille mihi risum, ego fortasse illi lacrimas movebo. 66, 4 non deformitate corporis foedari animum, sed pulchritudine animi corpus ornari; 76, 35 alii diu patiendo levia faciunt, hic levia facit diu cogitando; 86, 21 ne quemadmodum Aegialus me sibi adversarium paravit, sic ego parem te mihi. 76, 14 ad secandum subtilis acies est et mucro munimentum omne rupturus.

Pliny the Younger.

The variety of feeling, ranging from the frank, unrhetorical statements in some epistles to the artificiality of others which were composed with greater care, makes Pliny's letters an excellent though a limited field for study. That the use of chiasmus was recognized by Pliny as a part of his rhetorical art is indicated by its frequency in the Panegyricus, which, with the two epistles to Tacitus, 6, 16 and 20, will be considered in detail, since all three were carefully prepared. Pliny himself states to Tacitus the object he had in writing Ep. 6, 16, indirectly quoting from Tacitus, quo verius tradere posteris possis. Again the quotation from Vergil at the beginning of Ep. 6, 20 seems to herald an attempt to emulate in prose and on a smaller scale an artistic recital of the Aeneid.

Adverbs, as is usual when the arrangement is chiastic, are placed together with but a single exception: P. 83 aut inconsultius uxor adsumpta aut retenta patientius. In a few instances the same adverb is repeated: 58 ita consules semper ut semper principes erant; 84 invicem, invicem; 91 simul, simul. With adverbs of time or place chiasmus is found at P. 11 lacrimis primum . . . mox templis; 88 optimi prius, deinde maximi; Ep. 6, 16, 6 interdum, interdum; 10 illuc, unde; 17 alibi, illic. In P. 29 a prepositional phrase is used in the second member of the chiasmus: quod genitum esset usquam, id apud omnes natum esse videretur.

There are some noticeable examples of the chiastic arrangement of adjectives: P. 28 gaudentibus gaudens, securusque securis; 37 tributum tolerabile et facile heredibus dumtaxat extraneis, domesticis grave; 56 aut beneficio sterile aut vacuum laude; 56 magnum est differre honorem, gloriam maius; 78 non nimium privatis quod principi satis est; 63 marcidi somno, cena redundantes. 6, 16, 17 faces multae variaque lumina.

The use of chiasmus to emphasize the personal or demonstrative element is fairly common, the pronouns being generally arranged together: P. 6 sollicitior tu, ille securior; 10 illud, illa; 20 aliis, tibi; 55 nos, tu; 57 aliis, in se; 72 nec magis sine te nos esse felices quam tu sine nobis potes. 74 alius fortasse alium, ipsum se nemo deceperit . . . . precati sumus ut sic te amarent dii quemadmodum tu nos. The arrangement of the pronouns as the extremes is far less frequent; P. 71 te mirer magis an improbem illos; 42 alienis mancipiis, civibus suis. 6, 16, 18 alios in fugam vertunt, excitant illum.

Possessive pronouns are frequently placed together, though with *suus*, *noster* and *tuus* the normal order may not be inverted: 6, 16, 2 perpetuitati eius scriptorum tuorum aeternitas; 12 timorem eius sua securitate; 6, 20, 10 tuus, tuus. P. 80 fortunis suis, tua existimatione; 80 utilitate nostra, tua laude.

At times in the chiastic arrangement of verbs with nouns, repetition occurs: P. 43, donavit . . . donasti; 66 deceptus est, decepit; 67 invita suscipiat, susceperit invita; 68 scis tibi ubique iurari, cum ipse iuraveris omnibus; 76 sequerentur omnes et omnes improbarent. In other instances the most strongly contrasted words are placed as the means in the chiasmus: 63 non consulatus detur sed abrogetur imperium. 53 neque enim satis amarit bonos principes qui malos satis non oderit; 68 ibi intemperantius amamus bonos principes, ubi liberius malos odimus; 74 dabat apud optimum principem quod apud malos detrahebat.

Nouns with dependent genitives are usually arranged as the extremes: P. 24 securitatem olim imperantis et incipientis pudorem; 70 nec poenis malorum sed bonorum praemiis; 56 urbis otio, sinu pacis. The chiastic arrangement is frequently used with pairs of words dependent on the same verb: 11 Tiberius Augustum . . . Claudium Nero . . . Vespasianum Titus, Domitianus Titum; 62 nemo omnes, neminem omnes fefellerunt; 6, 16, 16 et apud illum ratio rationem, apud alios timorem timor vicit; 70 magistratus magistratu, honore honor petitur; 10 tibi terras, te terris reliquit; 13 cum solacium fessis, aegris opem ferres; 89 alteri triumphalia, caelum alteri; 31 nos Aegypto, nobis Aegyptum; 10 imperator tu titulis et imaginibus et signis, ceterum modestia labore vigilantia dux et legatus et miles.

There are but few instances of the chiastic arrangement of dependent clauses or of infinitives: P. 9 successor, etiamsi nolis,

habendus est; non est habendus socius, nisi velis; 61 ut felicitatis est quantum velis posse, sic magnitudinis velle quantum possis. With prepositional phrases chiasmus is comparatively frequent: 5 adversa ex secundis, ex adversis secunda; 9 provincias ex provinciis, ex bellis bella; 13 a manibus ad oculos, ad voluptatem a labore; 43 scriberis ab amicis, ab ignotis praeteriris; 48 pallor in corpore, in ore inpudentia; 73 sanguinis in ore, in animo pudoris; 92 suffragator in curia, in campo declarator.

Where three or more pairs of words occur in succession the order of the words is sometimes varied: P. 9 principi civis, legatus imperatori, filius patri; 60 vis constare reverentiam magistratibus, legibus auctoritatem, modestiam postulantibus? 16 interfuso mari, fluminibus inmensis, praecipiti monte; 15 mores gentium, regionum situs, opportunitates locorum, aquarum temperiem; 81 lustrare saltus, excutere feras, superare iuga, gradum inferre; 25 negotiis aliquis, valetudine alius, hic mari, ille fluminibus; 25 terras . . . admovere, spatia contrahere, intercedere casibus, occursare fortunae, omni ope adniti; 6, 20, 14 audires ululatus feminarum, infantum quiritatus, clamores virorum: alii parentes, alii liberos, alii coniuges vocibus requirebant. Successive groups of three or more words do not always exhibit a parallel arrangement: 32 sive terris divinitas quaedam sive aliquis amnibus genius; 80 reconciliare aemulas civitates, tumentes populos . . . compescere, intercedere iniquitatibus magistratuum.

The straightforward, business-like tone of the epistles to Trajan is noticeable and in them there are but few instances of chiasmus: Ep. 8, 1 oratione pulcherrima et honestissimo exemplo; 43, 2 sumptus levaretur et impleretur officium; 73 de agnoscendis liberis et natalibus veris restituendis. Cf. 72 where the arrangement is anaphoric. Compare 81, 2 tuam statuam et corpora sepultorum, with 96, 6 imaginem tuam deorumque simulacra. 116, 1 qui virilem togam sumunt vel nuptias faciunt vel ineunt magistratum vel opus publicum dedicant.

In the other epistles, chiasmus occurs less frequently, and only a few of the instances will be quoted. Adverbs are usually placed side by side: rursus, mox Ep. 2, 17, 5; primum, mox 3, 3, 7; 8, 14, 21; primum or primo, deinde 4, 15, 4; 7, 19, 1; 7, 27, 5; rursus, rursus 3, 9, 36; acriter, fideliter 4, 9, 2; altissime, humillime 6, 24, 1. There are but few instances of adverbs as the extremes: Ep. 6, 5, 5 frequentius singulis, ambobus interdum; 8, 14, 8 num-

quam seria, tristia saepe; 8, 18, 8 diu vidua, mater olim; 9, 21, 4 iterum rogabo, impetrabo iterum.

In the arrangement of adjectives with nouns the words most strongly contrasted are placed together: Ep. 1, 6, 1 manus vacuas, plenas ceras; 2, 17, 10 grande, modica; 2, 13, 6 aut fidelius amico aut sodale iucundius. In a few instances the adjectives are repeated, Ep. 6, 25, 5 mira, mira; and an equivalent occurs 5, 3, 11 multis gloriosum, reprehensioni nemini. In Ep. 8, 22, 3 nobis inplacabiles simus, exorabiles istis, the strongly contrasted adjectives have forced the pronouns to the extremes, as in Ep. 9, 22, 3 ego non minus aeger animo quam corpore ille. Demonstrative and possessive pronouns with genitives are usually arranged in similar fashion: Ep. 2, 11, 14 audientium adsensu, sollicitudine mea; *hic* and *ille* are so placed 5, 6, 43 hic Aeneae, Achillis ille: cp. 9, 33, 7 and 2, 17, 7. A personal pronoun is usually placed in the emphatic position, e. g. 5, 18, 1 mihi, tibi; 8, 1, 3 ipse, nos; 9, 7, 2 tu, ego; 9, 12, 1 pater ille, tu filius; 9, 24, 1 iuvabit hoc te, me certe iuvat.

Emphasis determines the position of verbs with nouns though repeated terms are placed together: Ep. 8, 8, 6 praebent, praebent; 9, 6, 2 nunc favent panno, pannum amant; 8, 12, 1 colit studia, studiosos amat; 6, 6, 6 dicenti adsistit, adsidet recitanti; 6, 22, 8 neque enim tam iucundum est vindicari quam decipi miserum; 8, 10, 1 omittit, facit; 9, 13, 11 praesentibus confidis, incertus futurorum; 9, 13, 2 insectandi nocentes, miseros vindicandi. Here may be placed 9, 32, 1 scribere nolim, velim legere.

Nouns with dependent genitives are placed as in the Panegyricus, the genitives forming the means, e. g. Ep. 1, 12, 4 pretia vivendi mortis rationibus; 3, 4, 9 simplicitas dissentientis, comprobantis auctoritas; 9, 6, 2 velocitate equorum, hominum arte. Chiasmus with pairs of nouns in other cases is not frequent: Ep. 1, 23, 4 tribunum omnibus, paucis advocatum; 3, 20, 9 multi famam, conscientiam pauci verentur; 9, 13, 23 collega Certi consulatum, successorem Certus accepit.

Prepositional phrases chiastically arranged are common: Ep. 2, 14, 2 in foro pueros a centumviralibus causis auspicari ut ab Homero in scholis; 3, 9, 3 Priscus ex Baetica, ex Africa Classicus; 5, 6, 23; 5, 6, 37; 7, 5, 2 requies in labore, in miseria curisque solacium; 9, 13, 23 reddat praemium sub optimo principe, quod a pessimo accepit; 5, 21, 3 ex quaestura rediit, decessit in navi;

6, 24, 4 se cum marito ligavit, abiecitque in lacum; 8, 14, 18 cum secunda prima, secunda cum tertia; 9, 4, 2 in universitate longissimum, brevissimum in partibus; 9, 19, 4 tanta in praedicando verecundia quanta gloria ex facto.

Chiasmus is of comparatively frequent occurrence when there are several successive pairs of words: 3, 1, 11 obiit officia, gessit magistratus, provincias rexit, otium meruit; 4, 7, 4 imbecillum latus, os confusum, haesitans lingua, tardissima inventio, memoria nulla, nihil denique praeter ingenium insanum; 4, 25, 4 poposcit tabellam, stilum accepit, demisit caput, neminem veretur, se contemnit; 6, 11, 2 mira utrique probitas, constantia salva, decorus habitus, os Latinum, vox virilis, tenax memoria, magnum ingenium, iudicium aequale; 6, 33, 8 copia rerum et arguta divisione et narratiunculis pluribus et eloquendi varietate; 9, 20 2 decerpere uvam, torculum invisere, degustare mustum, obrepere urbanis.

Successive groups of three words present some variety in arrangement: Ep. 2, 11, 1 personae claritate famosum, severitate exempli salubre, rei magnitudine aeternum; 2, 17, 6 altera fenestra admittit orientem, occidentem altera retinet; 6, 5, 6 nam et Celsus Nepoti ex libello respondit et Celso Nepos ex pugillaribus; 8, 14, 7 cum suspecta virtus inertia in pretio, cum ducibus auctoritas nulla nulla militibus verecundia; 8, 18, 6 mira illius asperitas, mira felicitas horum. 9, 7, 4 haec unum sinum molli curvamine amplectitur, illa editissimo dorso duos dirimit. Here the first and last terms alone have the same relative position.

Fronto.

Adverbs in chiasmus have the position as means p. 6 habeas in promptu, quod facile respondeas, or as extremes p. 45 aeque accipit, habitatur aeque; p. 135 si umquam me amasti sive amaturus umquam es; p. 185 ut numquam venierit, veniat semper.

Adjectives are most often placed as the means in the chiasmus, e. g. p. 41 "puerulum audacem" aut "temerarium consultorem;"[1] p. 131 delinquere humanum est, et hominis maxime proprium ignoscere; p. 154 dulce esu, haustu iucundum; p. 155 parum eloquentiae, sapientiae nihil; p. 229 curruli strepitu et cum fremitu equestri.

[1] A quotation from the preceding letter to Fronto, temerarium consultorem sive audacem puerulum, but he has changed the order of the words thus causing chiasmus.

With the exception of p. 24 versus, quos mihi miseras, remisi tibi, pronouns are placed together: p. 12 cocco alii, alii luteo; p. 19 meam tua; p. 164 (mallem mehercule Gyaris cum illa quam sine illa in Palatio vivere). Where chiasmus occurs of verbs with nouns the latter are usually placed as the extremes: p. 74 ut frivolis finem faciam, et convertar ad serium; 188 praesens trepidaveris, trepidaverim absens. p. 170 cum dedisti procurationes, cum excusationes recepisti.

No preference is shown in the arrangement of nouns with dependent genitives: p. 28 (decus eloquentiae, amicorum gloria); p. 46 socium dignitatis gloriae bonorumque omnium participem; p. 71 (vitium corporis, animi studium); p. 215 diffidentia formae, diligentiae inlecebras. p. 7 Baiarum specus, fornaculas balnearum; 8 feminae consiliis, vaticinationibus Sibyllae; p. 143 Achillei pernicitatem, debilitatem Philoctetae; p. 146 Alexini verba, verbis Platonis. Pairs of nouns form chiasmus on p. 98 terra urbem illam, animos audientium tua oratio moverit.

Verbs with dependent infinitives in chiasmus occur on p. 4 (metuo quicquam dicere quod tu audire nolis), and chiastic prepositional phrases on p. 213 infrequentes a laudibus, verum in usu cultuque humano frequentissimos.

Three or more pairs of words in succession forming chiasmus are comparatively frequent: p. 61 (verbum absurdius, inconsultior sensus, infirmior littera); p. 154 Libero thyrsi, corona Sileno, nymphis redimicula; p. 157 caudam cycni, capillum Veneris, Furiae flagellum; p. 126 eloquentes ut oratoris, strenuae ut ducis, graves ut ad senatum, ut de re militari non redundantes; p. 106 vel graves ex orationibus, vel dulces ex poematis, vel ex historia splendidas, vel comes ex comedis (so MS), vel urbanas ex togatis, vel ex Atellanis lepidas; p. 114 saevit Cato, triumphat Cicero, tumultuatur Gracchus, Calvus rixatur; p. 113 quid si Parrhasium versicolora pingere iuberet, aut Apellen unicolora, aut Nealcen magnifica, aut Nician obscura, aut Dionysium inlustria, aut lascivia Euphranorem, aut Pausiam [p]*roe*[l]ia?

Groups of more than three words are occasionally found: p. 204 bella duo maxima a duobus maximis imperatoribus; p. 33 omnes meae fortunae et mea omnia gaudia; p. 14 (veram sensuum facultatem, elocutionis variam virtutem, inventionis aliquam novitatem, orationis dispositionem), is anaphoric excepting the position of *veram* in the first group; p. 8 ratio consiliorum prudentia

appellatur, vatum impetus divinatio nuncupatur; p. 177 quantum ex tua benivolentia Faustinianus ornamenti adsequetur, tantum tu voluptatis ex Faustiniani elegantia capies, in which the first and last terms are anaphoric, while the four intermediate terms form chiasmus in the order 1234 3412.

Summary.

As has been pointed out, the repetition of words and the use of words strongly contrasted, influence the chiastic arrangement. In the use of the different parts of speech some of the writers show a preference for a certain arrangement. Adverbs are regularly placed as the means in the chiasmus by all the four authors with the exception of Fronto who has but few examples. With pairs of nouns and adjectives, Cicero and Pliny show no choice, Seneca prefers to place the nouns together, Fronto the adjectives. With the exception of Seneca, all use pronouns freely in chiasmus and regularly place them as the means. Seneca rarely uses pairs of nouns with dependent genitives, and only Pliny shows a preference in arrangement with the genitives as means. When pairs of nouns with verbs form chiasmus, Seneca is inclined to place the nouns as means, Fronto as extremes. Seneca here shows the most extended usage as he also does with pairs of nouns dependent on the same verb. All four use chiasmus in the arrangement of dependent clauses, and all, except Seneca, prefer to place prepositional phrases together. As far as these authors are concerned, no difference due to personal preference is discernible in the arrangement of three or more successive pairs of words, nor in the case of groups of three or more words, unless we may say that Seneca seems to use the latter more freely than the others.

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ON CAUSES CONTRIBUTORY TO THE LOSS OF THE OPTATIVE ETC. IN LATER GREEK.

Hatzidakis, in the course of his convincing argument for the essential identity of the modern with the ancient Greek, calls attention (Neugriechische Grammatik, p. 13) to the part played in the disappearance of words and forms by phonetic changes blurring the distinctions in sounds.

An ingenious application of the combined effect of "itacism" and the loss of the *spiritus asper* is his explanation of the fact that the words ὗς and οἷς, already in the usage of the New Testament, had been replaced by χοῖρος and πρόβατον respectively because they had become indistinguishable in sound.

I do not know whether any one has ever made the obvious application of the principle here involved, in connection with the disappearance of the optative. Hatzidakis (l. c.) goes on to illustrate by the confusion, 'due to itacism,' of forms of ἡμεῖς and ὑμεῖς which resulted in the development of new forms ἐμεῖς, ἐσεῖς, etc.

In Lucian MSS, as elsewhere, the confusion between ἡμῶν and ὑμῶν is frequent and, as illustrative of this whole category of confusions, one may instance the v. l. in Lucian, Piscator 5. A, Ψ, B have ὁρᾶτε μὴ . . . ποιεῖτε while Ω, 𝔄, Γ, Urb. have ὁρᾶτε μὴ . . . ποιῆτε. Sommerbrodt prefers the subjunctive, by virtue perhaps of the somewhat superior MS authority, but the context would seem to point to the indicative as more vivid and, with 'itacism' to reckon with, one may safely choose on other grounds than the mere overplus of MS authority. The same may be urged in the case of other homophones of the decadent pronunciation, i. e. αι = ε; ι = ει = η = υ = οι[1]; ω = ο[2]; and ᾱ, ῑ, ῡ = ᾰ, ῐ, ῠ. Hence

[1] Cf. Winer–Schmiedel,[8] Gram. des neutestamentlichen Sprachidioms, §5, 16. This confusion of these five sounds "führte in den Handschriften zu den eingreifendsten Verwechselungen." For the whole discussion of "itacism" in the N. T. see pp. 43–47. E. g. εἰδῆ was even written for ἰδῆ, though more frequently ἴδου for εἶδον.

[2] On the confusion of ο and ω, of ε and η cf. Winer[8] §5, 19; e. g. ἤμην and ἦμεν. This was brought to an end when η became identical in sound with ι, while "der Wechsel zwischen ο und ω dauerte fort."

Hatzidakis (p. 306) says: "Es ist eine vollständig verlorene Mühe, wenn man statistisch nachzuweisen sucht, welche Orthographie für diese oder jene neue Form der späteren Zeiten üblich war." Examples follow illustrating the confusion of λέγεται = λέγετε, that of the fut. indic. and the subjunct. as in ἵνα πληρώσει, that of ο and ω as in ἵνα δέξονται etc.

On p. 13 Hatzidakis concludes: "Vor allem ist aber dieser wechselseitige Einfluss bei den verschiedenen Kasus, Deklinationen, Personen und Modi bemerkbar, z. B. . . . λέγεις, λέγει, λέγομεν—λέγῃς, λέγῃ, λέγωμεν."

This statement would seem to involve the similar confusion in sound between forms of the subjunctive and optative but he draws this conclusion neither here nor on page 218. At the latter point (p. 218) one might well have expected the explicit statement but, although speaking of the disappearance of the optative,[1] he contents himself with the general remark that the subjunctive completely supplanted the optative and then definitely attributes to the coincidence between ει and η—e. g. ποιήσεις and ποιήσῃς—the fact that the subjunctive has driven the future indicative out of use.

But why may we not make the application of this phonetic blurring as *contributory* to the disappearance of the optative? The points of contact, cited above from Hatzidakis, between the indicative and subjunctive present, are three,—two due to 'itacism,' one to the leveling of the ο and ω. In the paradigms of the active present subjunctive and optative there are *four* points of contact due to itacism, i. e., λέγῃς, λέγῃ, λέγητον λέγητε—λέγοις, λέγοι, λέγοιτον, λέγοιτε. The same confusion exists between the act. perfect subj. and optative, and while the forms of the aorist subjunctive and optative could only have been confused by way of the two-fold confusion,—η with ε, and then of ε = αι,—yet the coincidence in sound between the four forms of the paradigms of the aor. subj. and the fut. opt. and two of the fut. indic. may be reckoned in, perhaps, as contributory. In the middle voice there is little confusion, and that not as significant as if in the third person, i. e., λέγησθον λέγησθε—λέγοισθον, λέγοισθε; so the aor. pass. λεχθῆτον, λεχθῆτε—λεχθεῖτον, λεχθεῖτε. It may be remarked, however, that in

[1] "Der Optativ ist schon dem N. T. fast völlig fremd . . . und die Atticisten machen seltenen oder verkehrten Gebrauch von ihm, was nichts anderes als ein Schwinden desselben in der Sprache beweist."

the 2nd aor. act., e. g. λίπῃς λίπῃ λίπητον λίπητε—λίποις λίποι λίποιτον λίποιτε, the same confusion of four forms of the paradigm exists between the subjunctive and optative, while, from the nature of the augmented tense, no confusion whatever exists between the indic. and subjunctive. The same may be said also of the 2nd perf. λελοίπῃς etc. The optative, it is true, was doomed to disappearance anyhow, but it seems not unlikely that these coincidences in sound may have been contributory to the process.

It is a matter of surprise to find Lucian using, not infrequently, the optative for the subjunctive. Especially is this the case in final clauses after a primary tense—a case of 'verkehrter Gebrauch' (cf. Hatz., l. c.) on the part of an Atticist.[1] One would like to maintain that Lucian could not have committed so obvious a solecism while so faithfully reproducing other more intricate niceties of Attic syntax. It would be tempting to think of these optatives as due to itacizing scribes, but no such application is possible here. Lucian not only makes this blunder in his most carefully finished works (e. g. Piscator, Charon, etc.), but out of seven instances in the Charon, §§1–9, for example, three only could under any circumstances be claimed as due to phonetic confusion with the subjunctive—i. e. ἴδοις, κατίδοις, ἄρχοι—the other four optatives are in the first person. Such distinctions, it is clear, had been blurred long since and Lucian, in resurrecting Attic ghosts, ferried back in Charon's boat or let in with the ἀναβιοῦντες (cf. Piscator §§13, 15, 16, 44, 47) some very un-Attic optatives.

On p. 206 Hatzidakis mentions various synonyms where the later Greek, ignoring many finer distinctions in vocabulary as well as syntax, has contented itself with retaining one only of a group of two or more.

Mere poverty of imagination may in some cases have been the reason, but in others various causes, sometimes hard to guess, must have operated. That νέω (*swim*) should have been dis-

[1] For other deviations in the use of the opt. by Atticists in general see Schmid, Atticismus I, pp. 97–98; for Lucian see Schmid I, pp. 242–244, etc., and cf. Krüger 54, 8, 3 for the use of the optat. with ἵνα after primary tenses even in Attic authors where "im Haupttempus ein Präteritum mit zu denken ist oder aber rein Ideelles vorschwebt." This, it may be assumed, is the entering wedge and, like other deviations from the Attic standard, this too has its origin in a distortion or an extension of a legitimate usage.

placed by πλέω (*sail*) is hard to understand. One might rather have expected that νέω would have expanded to take in πλέω, but it is not unlikely that the number of meanings of νεῖ (i. e. *swims*; *spins*; *piles up*) may have made it convenient to discard at least one meaning when the chance offered. Itacizing homophones of νεῖ, like the particle νή or a form like νοῖ (νοῦς), present no points of contact.

In another pair (H. p. 206), ὗει—βρέχει, it might seem as if itacism may have co-operated, after the *spiritus asper* was lost, just as in the case of ὗς and οἷς, in supplanting ὗει by βρέχει. In fact, ὗει would be indistinguishable from the following verbal forms: viz. (from εἶμι)—ᾖ ει, ἴῃ, ἴοι; (from ἴημι)—εἶη and ἶει (*bis* i. e. imperf. and imperat.); (from εἰμί)—εἴη. While these verb forms have no contact in meaning with ὗει as in the case of ὗς and οἷς there are here enough homophones to suggest the feeling, when pronouncing ὗει (eé-ee), that 'it never rains but it pours.' Hatzidakis, however, does not appeal to itacism as co-operative here, although he suggests it (p. 207) in the case of the confusion between κάθισον and κάθησο, which even in Lucian's time (Pseudologista §11) "man nicht zu unterscheiden wusste."

One might perhaps add to his list the pair θέω and τρέχω. Of the former Veitch (s. v.) says: "In lexicons the usage is considerably understated." In the N. T. θέω is not used, but it would be far-fetched to assume that homophones from τίθημι, e. g. Subj. 2nd aor. θῇς, θῇ, θῆτον, θῆτε, contributed to crowd out the indic. of θέω—θεῖς, θεῖ, θεῖτον, θεῖτε.

Another interesting case of crowding out, dating at least from the time of Polybius (see Hatzidakis, p. 207, and for references cf. Winer-Schmiedel,[8] Gram. des neutestamentlichen Sprachidioms, II[ter] Th., §26, 5, note 8), is that of the indefinite τὶς which is supplanted by εἷς. Possibly foreign Hellenists, losing the feeling for the accent, found it increasingly hard to distinguish between τὶς and τίς. The interrogative τίς, indeed, confused in usage with ποῖος, was itself disappearing—"ist fast völlig aus der Volkssprache verschwunden" (H. p. 208). May not the shorter forms of τὶς, i. e. gen. and dat. του and τῳ, have co-operated through a confusion with the same forms of the article?

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THE ETYMOLOGY AND MEANING OF THE SANSKRIT ROOT ĪḌ.

In the Rig-Veda I. 1–2 we read as follows:

Agnim īḷe puróhitaṁ
yajñásya devám ṛtvíjaṁ
hótāraṁ ratnadhātamam

Agníḥ pūrvebhir ṛ́ṣibhir
ī́ḍyo nūtanāir utá
sá devāṁ́ éhá vakṣati.

These two stanzas are usually translated: "Agni I praise, the purohita, the divine ministrant of the sacrifice, the hotar, the greatest giver of riches. Agni, worthy of being praised by the rshis of old and by those of the present time, will bring the gods hither."

It is often no easy task to interpret a Vedic word restricted in its meaning and referring to a single deity. We have to search for the sphere in which it is used and to determine to what deity it refers. With but one exception, this has not been done in the various attempts at explaining the etymology and meaning of the root $\sqrt{īḍ}$. The root has been treated too much *in vacuo* and its frequent discussion has been due to phonetic reasons, viz. the treatment of the sonant sibilant in Sanskrit. Cf. Bechtel BB. X. 286; Bartholomae ibid. XII. 91; Arische Forschungen II. 78; Johansson IF. II. 47; Brugmann IF. I. 171 f. The last-named connects it with the root $\sqrt{yaj}$ (Greek ἅγ-ιο-ς) part. *iṣṭá*, evidently following out a suggestion made by Bezzenberger in Göttinger Nachrichten for 1878, p. 264 n.

But it seems to me that we cannot refer *īḍ*, either with Bechtel, Bezzenberger and others, to Greek αἰδέομαι, αἴδομαι, Lat. *aestimare* < *aezditumare*, and Goth. *áistan*, *ga-áistan* on phonetic grounds, or to $\sqrt{yaj}$ as Brugmann has done.

My reasons for not agreeing with the distinguished scholars mentioned will be seen later. A fairly complete literature on the subject can be found in SBE. XLVI. p. 4 to which may be added

the hints given by Benfey in the glossary to his edition of the Sāma-Veda.

As stated above, the cause of the frequent discussion of the word has been a phonetic one, viz. the treatment of the sonant sibilant in Sanskrit, a question which need not be entered into at this time. All these attempts must be regarded as unsatisfactory, because it has not been considered at all 1) to what divinity the word is applied, 2) to what sphere it belongs, and 3) with what other word or words it is correlated. The most recent explanation is that of Oldenberg in SBE. XLVI. p. 2 f. He translates it by "magnify," considering *īḍ* etymologically connected with *iṣ* "food," according to which its original meaning would be "to give sap, nourishment." But this is as improbable as the other derivations referred to above. Oldenberg rightly observes, however, that, although no god in the Vedic Pantheon is so highly and frequently praised by the poets of the Rig-Veda as Indra, with very few exceptions $\sqrt{\text{īḍ}}$ is avoided in speaking of this god.

The ninth *maṇḍala* is devoted to the praise of Soma. Yet throughout the entire book *īḍ* occurs but twice (5, 3; 66, 1), and of these one instance (5, 3) is contained in an *āprī* verse transferring to Soma such qualities as originally belong to Agni. On the other hand, in invocations addressed to Agni, this verb and its derivatives are most frequently used.

To show how *īḍ* and its derivatives had a connotation which qualified them to be used with Agni and not with Indra or Soma is difficult, if not impossible. It is probable that it may be due to the development of the myth, although it is hardly worth while to enter upon any discussion in regard to this matter.

We may now explain the form of *īḍ*.

The root $\sqrt{\text{īḍ}} < iz + d < iṣ + d$ with assimilation of the sibilant to the following sonant consonant, the *z* itself disappearing under the law of the existing language, which admits no sonant sibilant but causes a lengthening of the preceding vowel, if short, cf. Whitney § 222 c. This regularly occurs where Indo-Iran. *z* and *ẓ* follow a vowel; cf. Ascoli, Krit. St. 283 ff.; Hübschmann, KZ. 24, 405 ff.; Bloomfield, Non-diphthongal e and o in Sanskrit.[1]

[1] For a similar phenomenon in Germanic, cf. OE. *med*, "reward, pay," OS. *mēda*, OHG. *mēta*, *meata*, *miata*, *mieta*. The Goth. *mizdō* corresponds exactly to the OE. *ǎπ. λεγ. meord*. Cf. further Gr. *μισθός*, OB. *mĭzda*, Streitberg, UG. § 79, 2. But see Sievers, PBr B. XVIII. 409.

Wackernagel, in his Altindische Grammatik § 40, is uncertain whether to connect *īḍ* with √*yaj* or √*iṣ* "to wish, choose:" "*ī* aus *iž* in v. *īḍ*-„anflehen" zu *yaj*-„opfern" (oder zu *iṣ*-„*wünschen*")".[1] As additional examples may be cited *nīḍa* < **nizdó*, *pīḍ* < **piẓ-d* < *piṣ-d*; *mṛḍ* < *mṛẓ-d*; cf. Skt. *mṛḍīkám*: Av. *mərəzdikəm*; *mīḍhám* < Indo-Iran. *miẓdha* < Indo-Eur. *mig̑dha* < Indo-Eur. *mig̑hta*; *vīḍú* < *viẓ* + *du* < *viṣ*; *sídati* < *sizdeti* (*d* for *ḍ* by analogy, cf. Osthoff, Perf. 2 ff.); see further Wackernagel, Altind. Grammatik §§ 40 and 238; Jackson, Avesta Grammar § 183.

īḍ then is *iṣ* + a 'determinative' *d* through which the connection between *īḍ* and *iṣ* is effected and by which *īḍ* is differentiated from the simple *iṣ*. The original signification of this root-determinative *d* is uncertain; it may be, in some way, connected with the root √*dā*, to give.

The key to the whole problem, and we need not go outside of Sanskrit, is found in the fact that on one hand *vṛ* interchanges with *iṣ*, on the other with *īḍ*. The question is how far *iṣ* in *īḍ* has retained its original signification of wishing, choosing. It would be futile, of course, to deny that this word never has the meaning of honoring, praising, because what we wish we love, and what we love we honor. What we do claim is that the meaning of choosing is dominant in certain forms of *īḍ*, and that the same forms of *vṛ* are used in similar connections and applied, in most cases, to the same divinity.

We will now give a few examples, showing the interchange of √*vṛ* with √*iṣ* and √*īḍ*.

In the Kāuçika-Sūtra 94, 2 we read: *tatra rājā bhūmipatir vidvāñsaṁ brahmāṇam ichet* and in 126, 2 of the same work: *tatra rājā bhūmipatir vidvāñsaṁ brahmāṇaṁ vṛṇīyāt*. In the two passages cited above we have the very best evidence that √*iṣ* and √*vṛ* are used synonymously. The connection, too, is the same in both passages. Again in RV. VII. 93, 4:

gīrbhír víprāḥ prámatim ichámāna
íṭṭe rayíṁ yaçásam pūrvabhājam

[1] Max Müller SBE. XXXII. p. 354, is still more uncertain: "Whether √*īḍ* is distantly connected with √*iṣ* = to desire (Brugmann I. 591), or with *ard* = to strive, or with *ar* = to go, is a question which admits of many or of no answer."

where *ítṭe* clearly=*vṛṇīté*; this passage is of additional interest in that $\sqrt{\text{iḍ}}$ (*ítṭe*) is used side by side with $\sqrt{\text{iṣ}}$ (*ichámāna*). For further passages where $\sqrt{\text{iṣ}}=\sqrt{\text{vṛ}}$ cf. RV. III. 30, 1; IX. 112, 1.

But it is especially in the gerundive forms *īḍénya*, *váreṇya* that the relation of the two words is most clearly shown, and I need but to present a few instances where *īḍénya* and *váreṇya* occur to put, it seems to me, the question, as a whole, upon a firm basis.

In the ApÇ. 4, 5, 5 we have: *īḍenyakratur aham apo devīr upa bruve* with which we may compare Av. 6, 23, 1: *váreṇyakratur ahám apó devír úpa hvaye*[1]; here the two words *īḍenyakratur* and *váreṇyakratur* are synonymous.

In the Rig-Veda *īḍénya* is without exception used of Agni, the case in RV. IX. 5, 3 being, as above stated, but an apparent exception as the qualities belonging to Agni are transferred to Soma. Indeed, as Bergaigne has observed, *īḍénya* is as regularly used of Agni as *pavamāna* is of Soma; likewise *váreṇya* is generally used of Agni. Cf. Grassmann, Wörterbuch, s. v.

On the writing *īḷe*, *īḷénya* cf. von Bradke ZDMG. XL. 668 n. 1; Whitney, §54.

I have been purposely rather sparing with examples, as this is not a question of interpretation, and to adduce a large number of instances of the use of *váreṇya* I consider unnecessary as the meaning is quite clear. From $\sqrt{\text{iḍ}}$, *íḍya* is also employed with Agni, the exceptions out of thirty passages numbering but four or five.

A noticeable fact in connection with *váreṇya* is that instrumentals such as *girā́*, *suvṛktíbhir*, etc., are used with it, precisely as is the case with *íḍénya* (*íḍya*).

To sum up our remarks: $\sqrt{\text{iḍ}} < \sqrt{\text{iẓ}} + d < \sqrt{\text{iṣ}} + d$, this determinative *d* effecting a connection between $\sqrt{\text{iḍ}}$ and $\sqrt{\text{iṣ}}$ and differentiating $\sqrt{\text{iḍ}}$ from the simple $\sqrt{\text{iṣ}}$; $\sqrt{\text{iḍ}}$ and $\sqrt{\text{iṣ}}$ are frequently correlated with $\sqrt{\text{vṛ}}$; *īḍénya* is always, and *íḍya* and *váreṇya* are, with but few exceptions, used in invocations addressed to Agni; the $\sqrt{\text{iḍ}}$ is Vedic. I would, therefore, translate RV. I. 1-2 as follows: "Agni I choose as the purohita, the divine ministrant of the sacrifice, the hotar, the greatest giver of riches.

[1] For these two passages I am indebted to Dr. Bloomfield.

"Agni, fit to be chosen by the ṛshis of old and by those of the present time, will bring the gods hither."

If this account of $\sqrt{\bar{\imath}\dot{q}}$ holds good, the meaning of the word will be slightly modified in a few Vedic passages, but the interpretation of these passages will not be essentially changed, since the matter involved is not so much the sense of the word as its derivation and relation to $\sqrt{vṛ}$.

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THE TECHNIC OF SHAKSPERE'S SONNETS.

φῶς ἴδιον τοῦ νοῦ τὰ καλὰ ὀνόματα.

—LONGINUS.

It may be reckoned as the progress of the 20th century beyond the 19th, that it begins with a general confession of the futility of that criticism which has too long been exercised upon the sonnets of Shakspere. The biographical theory may frankly be said to have failed. The 'dark lady' whitens into a ghost. Students of the poet's life and achievement are not, it may be hoped, to be worried any longer by those fantastical legends of his personal weaknesses and abasements, which bad critical method so long sought to draw from his poems.

The gain is likely to be great. For, so soon as the world ceases to seek in the sonnets for morbid details of the poet's biography, and for the revelation of his adventures and intrigues, those poems assume their true value as works of art. And, if the stages of a poet's artistic development be in truth the vital facts of a poet's life, then the sonnets become of monumental worth, stages in the attainment of his perfect art, the training-school of his transcendent genius for poetic form. They are the abiding record of his studies in poetry. In them the young dramatist, with his mind set upon all that was best in the sonnet-literature of his time, trained himself by strenuous practice and through the most ingenious and varied experiments in style and poetic diction, to his final purpose, the dramatic rendering of human character.

In essence, therefore, the sonnets, as a long series of elaborate studies in the lyrical expression of thought and emotion, are as purely and intensely dramatic as the dramas themselves. There is, under the lyrical form, the same movement and process of the imagination. For, in each drama, each dramatic speech that the poet creates is the utterance, as conceived by the poet, of some imagined person as evoked by some imagined situation. If the speech fit the character and spring by force of nature from the situation, there is the true *μίμησις*, the full attainment of dramatic

life. And, in the sonnets, in like manner, for the creation of each sonnet, there is the situation that the poet imagines and the personality that he poses in the situation. Thus, in fitting dramatically the style, in all its details of language and versification, to the character and to the situation as he imagined them, he struck the deepest fountain of lyrical inspiration. Hence the infinite variety and impersonality of the sonnets themselves. Shakspere made of them, in the mighty studies of his youth, no trivial revelation of women that had kissed him nor of friends that had betrayed him, but the generalized utterance of human passion. The characters that he imagined were so placed in a series of imaginary situations, as to exhibit, in the widest possible range of emotion, the full play of the human soul.

And again, in thus combining character and situation, the poet, whose whole nature was dramatic, followed the same bent as in the dramas. The situations, instead of being drawn from his own life and personal experience, were, as it has been proved, almost without exception, taken from that sonnet-literature with which his youthful reading had made him so familiar. Thus, as in his plays, with his mind under the obsession of the assumed character, he sought in each poem to attain the final harmony of dramatic utterance. The thought, the sentiment, and the style were, as his final aim, in their emotional tone, to be fitted as closely as possible to the assumed situation. It is the full achievement of this purpose in the best of the sonnets that gives them, for students of poetry, such peerless charm. And if, as will be seen, in many of the sonnets this harmony is not fully attained, the striving and experimentation, even the failures, of so great a poet, have always a profound interest.

The steps by which Shakspere approached and attained his perfection of lyrical utterance are to be seen in the sonnets themselves. The study of them in their details is the study of Shakspere's technic in the management of words and sentences and versification. It involves all the means and processes of his poetical art, and the creation of his style. And, as the composition of the sonnets was the special work of his youthful years, it is plain that the labor spent upon the sonnets, in making each one in its concentrated brevity the dramatic expression of some phase of human passion, was his intellectual training for the dramas that were to come.

For Shakspere himself, as for all the great writers of his time, the chief problem of style, in the poetic handling of their English language, was the dainty choice of words. Each man's habit of mind and intellectual range of expression showed themselves in the preference that he gave either to the native words or to the borrowed words of contemporary speech. In the absence of dictionaries and elaborate works of reference, this choice, far more than in later ages, was the work of individual bent and personal taste. On the one hand, there was the charm of racy popular usage, in words so rich in natural poetry, inherited from the earlier time. On the other hand, there was the charm of literary usage and association, in words derived either from the Latin, through which men's education had been conducted, or from the French or the Italian or the Spanish, in which their reading chiefly lay. There was, as was natural, excess on both sides, much ugliness and endless affectation. In Shakspere, within the compass of the sonnets, the chief character to be noted is the wide range of his choice, the flexibility of his style. In all the sonnets taken together, there is the average of 16¾ per cent of foreign words to 83¼ per cent of native words. But in separate sonnets, and in groups of sonnets, there is large divergence from this normal average. The percentage of foreign words, at its lowest, falls to 7½ per cent, and at its highest rises to 26½ per cent. The sonnets that stand at each extreme show a special character that makes them noteworthy. Sonnet 73, for example,

> That time of year thou may'st in me behold,

with its low percentage of foreign words, represents the class in which the gem-like radiance of Shakspere's poetical diction is most keenly felt. On the other hand, sonnet 125,

> Were it aught to me, I bore the canopy,

with its high percentage of foreign words represents the class in which the movement of imagination is most impeded, the charm of poetry least felt. Such extremes mark the range of the young poet's experiment in poetic diction, and the movement of his mind toward purity and daintiness. The sonnets that show the largest excess of foreign diction are

107, 125, 15, 66, 85,
129, 127, 4, 8.

The sonnets in which the diction is purest are

43, 73, 22, 24, 42,
61, 9, 72, 92, 140.

Several in each class are supremely beautiful. They show with what skill the poet knew how to secure the tone of his emotion.[1] The charm of the Shaksperian word-choice is chiefly to be seen in those elaborate passages in which, for special emotional effect, he confines himself to one class of words. Thus, although in general, he blends native words with foreign, he gives in many of the greatest sonnets, series of verses that are composed altogether of native words. Such, for example, is the superb opening of the 73rd sonnet, made by three pure verses, or that exquisite passage, vv. 9–13, by which, in five pure verses, he leads the 80th sonnet to its close. These groups of pure verses represent the poet's highest attainment in poetic style; and the few sonnets that contain no pure verses, like sonnets 125 and 127, are of inferior workmanship. The poet loved, especially in closing the sonnet by the rhyming couplet, to reach his final effect by such a grouping of pure verses. See, for example of this manner, the powerful close of sonnets 136 and 137.[2] Such sequences of pure verses seem to render in Shakspere's art the highest emotional intensity.

In reckoning the poetical quality of words, next to their historical sense and emotional power, their length and syllabic quantity seem the most important condition of usage. The verse, as Shakspere came to conceive it, in its lovely interlacing of accents and quantities, is mainly dependent on the interchange of monosyllabic with dissyllabic words. A word of excessive length is almost fatal, from his point of view, to the poetical movement. It marks the lapse into prose. Only three times, for example, does he suffer a word of five syllables to intrude its unwieldy length into the sonnet-form.[3] Of words of four

[1] In his use of foreign words, Shakspere showed a strong preference for foreign nouns and an aversion for foreign adjectives. Of his foreign words the nouns are 54 per cent, the verbs are 31 per cent, the adjectives are 15 per cent. Sonnet 121 stands alone in its excess of foreign adjectives.

[2] The average of pure verses is slightly over three to the sonnet. The largest number is found in sonnets 43 and 73. There are only five sonnets that contain not a single pure verse, viz., 1, 4, 35, 125, 127.

[3] *Determination*, 13. 6, *imaginary*, 27. 9, *insufficiency*, 150. 2; of these only *imaginary* seems to have the true poetic quality.

syllables, there are in the sonnets only 80, and of words of three syllables only 517. Thus in the poetic diction of Shakspere as elaborated for the sonnet, over 97 per cent of his words are either monosyllabic or dissyllabic. But here, once more, as in the case of native and foreign words, a special character is given to separate sonnets by their wide divergence from his normal usage. Many of the most exquisite sonnets are formed altogether of short words. So, for example, sonnets 104 and 137. See also sonnets 17, 47, 69, 83, 130, 145. On the other hand, a few sonnets, like the beautiful 66th, owe their special charm to the skilful management of the many polysyllabic words. It is a marvellous triumph of technical skill, a startling experiment in poetic diction. But, in general, the excess of polysyllabic words, as in sonnets 125, 105, 124 and 135, gives a prosaic movement. Among the sonnets there are only 16 that show such faulty use of polysyllables—and there are 41 from which they are almost or altogether absent.

Shakspere's love for the short word, as leading to terseness of expression and concentrated energy of emotion, culminated in that superb use of the monosyllabic line which was a special mark of his poetic style. Such verses form in truth the special glory of English poetry; for, as they form themselves by the grouping of separate syllables, according to their vowel-quantity, under accentual law, they cannot arise save in our English language. Thus, by their condensation of meaning, they give to the poet that can use them such an overwhelming rapidity and fulness of imaginative force as no other poetry can parallel. In the sonnets it is remarkable that the distribution of the monosyllabic verses is strangely irregular. There are 36 sonnets that contain no such verses; and they are fewest in the early sonnets (1–31) and most numerous in the latest sonnets (128–154). It seems to indicate a chronological order as basis of the sonnet-groups. It is, as if the poet, pleased by the movement of such verses, came as the result of his experiment to use them more and more freely. It is, however, in sonnets 42, 43 and 44 that the use of the monosyllabic verse is carried to its highest point. They occur in unbroken sequence of three verses in sonnet 44, and they are used with splendid skill to make the closing couplet of 43.[1]

[1] Compare also the final couplet of sonnets 127, 134, 147, 149, 103, 115, 18, 26. It is chiefly condensation of thought that the poet here seeks and attains.

There was, however, in Shakspere's choice of words, still another, a third principle of selection. The leading words of each verse were chosen habitually for their delicate alliterative harmony with one another. In composing the sonnets, he became, as we shall see, almost infallible in the proper placing of the caesural pause. Thus, as the result of the caesura was to cut the verse into two halves, he felt, like the older poets, the need of linking the two parts by most ingenious harmonies of sound. In many cases, this could be done without formal alliteration, by the correspondence of his accented vowels. Apart from this means, and apart from those innumerable cases in which alliteration is used only to decorate a single half-verse, there is in the sonnets careful alliteration of verse-structure in 38 per cent of his verses. In general, Shakspere confines the process to the single verse; but in some sonnets he binds together by alliteration groups of verses, e. g. 82, vv. 10–11; 71, vv. 2–3; 135, vv. 1–2; 127, vv. 2–3–4; 109, vv. 6–7. Within the compass of the single verse, so used in each case, as to bind the two halves together, alliteration is either double, triple or four-fold, e. g.—

> From fairest *creatures*, we desire *increase*, 1. 1.
> Lean *penury* within that *pen* doth dwell, 84. 5.
> Poor *soul*, the *centre* of my *sinful* earth, 146. 1.
> *Like* a *lamb*, he doth his *looks* trans*late*, 96. 10.

The poet's preference for the various sounds of our language as bearers of alliteration is visible, according to scale, in the table:

S	alliteration	used	134	times.	
Vowel	"	"	118	"	
L	"	"	61	"	
B	"	"	53	"	
F	"	"	48	"	
H	"	"	46	"	
W	"	"	44	"	
P	"	"	43	"	
T	"	"	41	"	
M	"	"	41	"	&c., &c.

It is to be noted that, in general, alliteration is more frequent in the later sonnets. It rises to its highest use in sonnets 141–50

and sinks to its lowest in sonnets 41–50. There are ten sonnets altogether free from alliteration, and there are seven that rise above the rest in what may almost seem excess of alliterative art, viz.: 30, 85, 116, 129, 135, 146, 148.

In the sonnet, as the name denotes, the chief condition of excellence is the beauty of the words taken singly, each in its place, and the beauty of the verse-cadence by which they are united. Thus it has showed itself, in the development of the sonnet-form, that almost all poets have, in fixing their attention upon the sensuous element of poetry, been prone to neglect its intellectual side. In almost all sonnets there is lack of lucidity in syntax, lack of logical precision in the arrangement of sentences, either a too violent compression of the thought to be expressed or an excessive looseness and prolixity. It is here that the young Shakspere shows the supreme mastery of his art. For him, the perfect pose of his thought upon the 'sonnet's Procrustean bed' reveals neither cramping nor stretching. Except in two or three passages, where the text is doubtful, the syntax of the sonnets is faultless and even luminous. He has solved in his sonnet-composition not only the problem of choosing and grouping his words according to their sensuous rhythm, but also the problem of constructing and grouping his sentences according to their intellectual relations. Thus, in the best of the sonnets, above all in those in which he has revealed the fulness of his imaginative power, there is the attainment of the highest poetic harmony, the harmony of cadence with emotion and truth of thought.

If all the sonnets be taken together, the average length of Shakspere's sentences is twenty-five words. It is a sentence so moderate in length as to allow at once perfect freedom and perfect accuracy of formation. But here again, around this normal pattern, there is in the different sonnets an ample range of variation. In sonnet 15, for example, he arranges 112 words in one single sentence, and so lucid and easy is the arrangement as to make us unconscious of its unusual length. But in sonnet 40, he breaks his thought into 10 sentences with an average length of only 12 words. In these two extremes, he illustrates the two theories of perfect sentence-construction; and between these two extremes, there is each step of variation. The average length of his sentences is highest in

the early sonnets, especially in sonnets 12 to 31; and it is lowest in the later sonnets, lowest of all in sonnets 132-154.[1]

In the form of the sentence, there is visible the same freedom of variation. Among all forms, the complex sentence, in which the main statement is modified by one or by two subordinate clauses, is the form that Shakspere best loved. In all the sonnets taken together, such complex sentences make 45 per cent of all. The simple sentences make only 18 per cent, and the compound sentences only 13. The rest, 24 per cent of all, are the special glory of the poet's constructive skill. They are sentences that are at the same time both complex and compound. Notice, for example, how sonnet 15, composed on this pattern, develops the thought, through a long succession of graceful members, to the lovely epigram with which it closes. Such work as this shows the highest technical skill that was ever seen in our English poetical literature.

With exception of 99 and 126, poems that are not sonnets at all, the sonnets of Shakspere were planned upon the familiar sequence of seven rhymes.

ABÁB—CDĆD—FFÉF—GĠ.

He conceived the sonnet, not in the Italian fashion, as octave and sestet, but, in English fashion, as three quatrains and a couplet. It was, as many have felt, a false conception. By the prominence that this plan gives to the closing couplet, in which there is too often an epigrammatic flash of thought or sentiment out of harmony with the first quatrain, he has changed the natural movement of the sonnet, and lost its natural grace of easy subsidence. But, although the rhyming plan calls for seven rhymes, the full number is, in Shakspere's practice, often reduced. Thus, in sonnet 135 and in sonnet 3, the poet, by repeating one of his rhymes, reduces the number from seven to four. In both sonnets this novel arrangement is plainly calculated for a special purpose. And in 11 other sonnets, by the like repetition, the number of rhymes is reduced from 7 to 6. From this point of view, the group of sonnets, 133, 134, 135 and 136, is specially to be noted.

[1] The sonnets that have the highest average of length are 12, 15, 64, 75 and 29; those that have the lowest are 101, 100, 130, 40, 19, 87 and 96.

Much the same result as by reducing the number of rhymes is secured by the lavish use of assonance. It serves to bind together parts of the sonnet that would otherwise be disconnected. Notice, for example, in sonnet 96, the two sets of assonance:

queen—esteemed, seen—deemed vv. 5-8,
betray—translate, away—state vv. 9-13.

Shakspere loves the rich assonance in ī, ā and ē. It produces in his art almost the effect of rhyme, and, of the 154 sonnets, 63 are constructed on this plan of interlacing assonance with rhyme. In sonnet 64, not less than 10 of the 14 verses are those linked by assonance on ā; and, in sonnets 27 and 55, eight verses in each are linked by assonance on ī. In all these poems, the loveliness of verse-movement and the unity of the sonnet-form are by this expedient much enhanced.

The perfect rhyme, so much used by poets of the time, is but seldom used by Shakspere—e. g. *offence* and *defence*, 89. vv. 2-4. It occurs only six times in the sonnets. Cf. sonnets 10, 26, 69, 74 and 114.

As against this dislike of the perfect rhyme, there were two kinds of imperfect rhyme that Shakspere tolerated and even loved. His fondness for vowel-assonance has already been discussed. He lets it even take the place of the true rhyme and serve in its stead, e. g.—

open—broken, 61. 1-3,
remembered—tendered, 120. 9-11.

Here the charm of the unexpected combination is delicious. Less pleasing to modern ears is the other habit of Shakspere's rhyming to which we may give the name of consonantal assonance, e. g.—

field—held, 2. 2-41,
son—noon, 7. 13-14.

Rhymes founded upon the consonantal assonance, false rhymes to modern ears, are largely used in the sonnets, over 90 times in all, and many of them are so often repeated as to show that the poet loved them. It is, however, to be borne in mind, that in the shifting and breaking of vowel-sounds that have gone on since the 16th century, many rhymes that were good in Shakspere's time are now false.[1] Each case of apparent consonantal assonance would

[1] So, for example, the frequent rhyme of *parts* and *deserts* and of *one* and *alone*.

need a special discussion. The majority of cases involves the sound of ŏ and ō.

In the study of Shakspere's rhymes, it is the question of his feminine rhymes that has the highest technical interest. It is in using them largely and in refusing to use them at all, that he shows the most deliberate intention to experiment with their poetic value. If all the sonnets be taken together, the feminine rhymes make only eight per cent and the masculine rhymes make 92 per cent. But the distribution of the feminine rhymes is plainly not accidental nor according to any law of general average. From great masses of the sonnets, taken in large groups, the feminine rhyme is altogether absent.[1] On the other hand, sonnet 20, whose exquisite movement is a marvel of literature, is composed altogether on feminine rhymes; and sonnet 87, not so well done, shows the feminine rhyme in 12 out of 14 places. See also the large use in sonnets 26, 42, 119, 121 and 152. There is here always deliberate calculation, the purpose of securing a definite emotional effect. The use of feminine rhymes is at its lowest in the sonnet-groups 71-80 and 101-110, and at its highest in sonnet-groups 11-20, 81-90 and 111- 120. There are few examples of a sonnet in which masculine and feminine rhyme are used in fairly equal proportion. The poet saw that, for his effect, there must be in each sonnet, the strong predominance of the one or of the other, or the total exclusion of the one by the other.

Even more important, in Shakspere's eyes, than the management of the final rhyme, was the management of the caesural pause. In this respect, also, the sonnets reveal the wonderful progress of his verse-construction. Some verses are, indeed, to be found in which there is no recognition of any natural caesura, e. g.—

> Until Death's composition be secured, 45. 9.
> Against confounding Age's cruel knife, 63. 10.

Such inarticulate verses, of which there are 71 in all, occur most frequently in the sonnet-group 34-66, and most rarely in the sonnet-groups 23-33, and 100-111. They form less than three per cent of all the verses. In all the other verses, more than 97 per cent, the poet makes the caesural pause so coincide

[1] See, for example, the group of sonnets 95 to 110, with exception of one pair in sonnet 102.

with the structure and meaning of the verse itself as to be always clear and always beautiful. In this point, also, the sonnets mark the advance in his verse-construction from the verses of his youthful period to those of his mature manner.

If all the sonnets be taken together, there is a steady predominance of the masculine over the feminine caesura, 68 per cent against 32. But here again the actual distribution defies the general average. In many groups of sonnets, the one form or the other is almost exclusively employed. In a few sonnets, eight in all, there is an exact balance between the masculine and the feminine form, each occurring seven times—e. g. sonnets 97 and 98. In each the reader is conscious of the exquisite harmony that results. Among the other sonnets there are 58 marked by large predominance of masculine caesuras. It produces an effect that can best be felt in sonnets 28 and 42. And there are seven sonnets that are rendered remarkable by the predominance of feminine caesuras. Read, for example, sonnet 48. The proportion of feminine caesuras is largest in the group of sonnets 89-133. It is lowest in the groups 23-33 and 145-154.

In the construction of the separate sonnets, there is in general a free shifting of the caesural pause from verse to verse. The poet's purpose is, in the great majority of sonnets, to give variety. In 72 sonnets, one-half of all, each poem is arranged on the shifting movement of four different forms. Many have only three forms. But there are 41 sonnets that show five different forms of caesura, 17 that show six, and three that show seven varieties. The marvellous charm of such ample caesural variation is best seen in sonnet 116.

On the other hand, in order to attain some special emotional tone, the poet loves to construct a sequence of verses on the same caesural arrangement. Thus in the splendid 14th sonnet, there is a grandeur of movement in the monotony of the masculine caesura, opening with vv. 1, 2, 3 and 4, repeated in 8, 9 and 10, and closing with 13, 14 and 15. Contrasted with this in emotional tone, is the lovely monotony of the opening in sonnet 95, formed by a sequence of feminine caesuras. Of all unbroken sequences, the most remarkable is to be found in sonnet 30, vv. 6-14, all in one and the same masculine form.

The last and the highest point of view from which the poetical style of Shakspere is to be studied, so far as displayed in the

sonnets, is the extent to which his vocabulary is penetrated and colored by his imagination. For, according to the purpose to be attained, words are to be chosen either because they involve the figure and thus transfer the movement of the imagination, or because, being so far as possible freed of figure, they make their appeal only to the pure reason. It is, in making this choice of words between the limits thus given, that the style of Shakspere shows the infinite range of its emotional variation. There are in fact, within the group of sonnets, intermingled with each other, two sets of poems formed on principles of art that are fundamentally diverse. On the one hand, composed with the highest attainable splendor of imaginative diction, there are poems formed of verses that are made each to sparkle and corruscate with brilliant touches of natural poetry. On the other hand, composed in words from which all touch of figure is carefully withheld, there are poems in which the subtle play of pure thought, rising sometimes into ingenious conceit, is made to take the place of imaginative fervor. Whether a poem belongs to the one or to the other class, may be roughly tested by the presence or the absence of consciously suggested figure. Thus among the sonnets there are 45 that may be fairly described as purposely left bare of figure and of imaginative decoration. And there are 44 others in which the play of figure is, except upon close analysis, almost invisible. In these 89 poems, the poetic quality lies solely or almost solely in the melody of verse, in the refined and accurate choice of words and in the emotional interest of the psychological problem. The 42nd sonnet, for example, without introducing a single image of natural beauty, shows the dramatic poet dealing, in verses of lovely form and arrangement, with a dramatic situation of most curious dramatic interest. Intermingled with these 89 there are 21 others that are unsurpassed in human literature for their concentrated splendor of poetical imagery. In them the poet, instead of developing a curious thought, embodies an overwhelming emotion, in symbols and figures of natural beauty, drawn from all the sources of the poetical imagination. Watch, for example, the magical effect of sonnet 33, as, full-orbed in radiance, it falls into its place after the more subdued harmonies of 30, 31 and 32. And so, again, sonnet 73, with its incomparable fulness of sensuous charm, is set, like a precious gem, between the almost

unadorned movements of sonnets 72 and 74. Between the two extremes that have been defined and exhibited, there are 44 sonnets that partake, in ever shifting degrees, of both characters. They are poems, in which, while there is more or less development of natural figure, there is also the purely psychological delight in situation and dramatic movement.

The sources of imaginative figures are, as revealed in the sonnets, almost the same, in their nature and relative proportions, as revealed in the dramas. Those figures that involve the beauty of animal life are 52 in number. Those that involve the beauty of plant life are 70 in number, with rose, lily and violet as the most prominent. Figures drawn from the color,[1] form and movement of landscape are 74 in number. They deal by preference with the change of season as seen in English nature, with the change from day to night, and with the aspects of the seashore and the sea. It is in the vivid and intense beauty of these landscape effects, in the fewness of the words employed and the infinite variety of their suggestiveness, that the best of the sonnets reach their fullest poetical splendor. Such supreme sonnets as 33, 73 and 97, may in their power of using the beauty of physical nature as the symbol of human emotion, be accepted as the highest lyrical expression that English poetry has achieved.

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[1] Color, as element of physical beauty, is used in the sonnets 42 times. There are 13 colors employed, with great preponderance of gold, red and green.

THE ATTITUDE OF ALCUIN TOWARD VERGIL.

No attentive reader of Alcuin (Albinus Flaccus) will have failed to detect that this avowed enemy of the classics in general possesses a Latin style which, setting aside the mere matter of literal quotations, betrays an evident fondness for certain classical poets in particular. In his life of Alcuin, published at Halle in 1829, Lorenz was struck by this inconsistency between precept and practice and found it difficult to explain.[1] Nor does any adequate discussion of the matter seem to have fallen within the purpose or province of those writers[2] who, since the book of Lorenz was published, have been interested in the career of the famous teacher, minister, and friend of Charles the Great. The nearest approach to a discovery of the key to the situation is suggested by the words of Comparetti (Vergil in the Middle Ages, trans. Benecke, 1895, p. 83), who maintains that "if any one were to collect from the ecclesiastical writers all the passages in which they inveigh against the reading of pagan authors and the pursuit of profane studies generally, the collection would be a considerable one; but far greater would be a collection of the passages which prove that none the less the same writers occupied themselves with studies of this very kind."

It is proposed here to restate briefly the attitude of representative patristic writers prior to Alcuin, and by a collection of material from Alcuin, chiefly from his poems, to show that his inconsistency is merely a reflex of his age.

[1] "In a letter to Angilbert (Mon. Alc., Ep. 54, p. 282), who was then residing in Rome, and whom he requests to bring some relicts from that city, Alcuin quotes a verse from Ovid's Ars Amandi. Strange as it may seem, that a man who could quote a frivolous poem when speaking upon a subject so serious and sacred as relicts were to him, should prohibit the reading of the poets, still it was one of the inconsistencies of his character." —Slee's trans. of Lorenz, London, 1837, p. 284.

[2] The work of Lorenz has been partially superseded by Monnier, Alcuin et Charlemagne, Paris, 1863; Mullinger, The Schools of Charles the Great, London, 1877; Werner, Alcuin und sein Jahrhundert, Wien, 1881; West, Alcuin and the Rise of Christian Schools, New York, 1892.

The student of patristic Latin knows that two extremes in the attitude of Christian writers toward pagan literature are represented in the period which may be roughly fixed between the reigns of Constantine the Great and Charles the Great. During a large part of this period, as Comparetti in particular has shown (p. 96), references to Vergil are so numerous in expressions of hatred or love for the ancients that it may be assumed that he was to them "the chief representative of the classical traditions."[1] Their attitude toward Vergil, then, may very well illustrate the two extremes to which reference has been made. In the early part of this period, before the open rebellion against classical traditions, Vergil as "the poet of the Saints" is already a familiar figure. To the Christian feeling, doubtless, *mens sibi conscia recti* and *auri sacra fames* were as good as their own equivalents "a conscience void of offense" and "the love of money," or even better, because certain of the pagan poets had also said them; while such a line as Aen. V, 815 unum pro multis dabitur caput, seemed little short of actual inspiration.[2] Augustine quotes from the fourth Eclogue as if from sacred prophecy (e. g. C. D. X, 27; Ep. 137, 12, Migne XXXIII, col. 521), and this was the general interpretation of the early fathers, who were glad to welcome any testimony from this source; Jerome alone denied, and that, too, in no uncertain terms, that this Eclogue referred to the coming of Christ (Ep. LIII, 7, Migne XXII, col. 544). In this same passage Jerome also speaks disparagingly of the "Vergiliocentonas," but Proba's lengthy mosaic was only the first[3] of many productions of that sort. The extensive use made of Vergilian passages by many, as Cyprian, Lactantius, Ambrose, Jerome, Augustine and Minucius Felix, in proving Christian principles, was supported by the example of Moses, who gained wisdom from the Egyptians;[4] but numerous reminiscences and quotations in these same authors show passages used purely for ornamental effect. Thus Jerome found horror ubique animo, simul ipsa silentia terrent (Aen. II,

[1] Compare also Manitius, Gesch. d. christ.-lat. Poesie, Stuttgart, 1891, p. 57.

[2] See Peiper, Virgilius als Theolog u. Prophet d. Heidentums in d. Kirche, Evangel. Kalender, Berl. 1862, p. 49.

[3] Isidorus, de Vir. Ill. 22; Orig. I, 38, 25; Manitius, p. 124 f.

[4] Cassiod. Instit. Divin. Lit. ch. 28, Migne LXX, col. 1142.

755) most expressive of his feelings when surrounded by the gloom of the catacombs; cf. Comm. in Ezech. ch. 40 (Migne XXV, col. 375).

The frequency of these reminiscences was in a large measure due to the training of the schools; compare August., C. D. I, 3 apud Vergilium quem propterea parvuli legunt,[1] ut videlicet poeta magnus omniumque praeclarissimus atque optimus teneris ebibitus animis non facile oblivione possit aboleri. Augustine himself used to read half a book daily. By the sixth century the word "Virgilius" was synonymous with grammar,[2] and a would-be grammarian of the day appropriated the poet's full name.

Meantime a counter current was running toward the other extreme. Its beginning may be traced as far back as Tertullian; e. g. *de Idololat.*, ch. 10 quaerendum autem est etiam de ludimagistris sed et de ceteris professoribus litterarum. Immo non dubitandum affines illos esse multimodae idololatriae. Arnobius *adv. Nationes* III, 7 is glad to record that the pagans themselves desired the destruction of Cicero's *de Natura Deorum*, as a case of saving themselves from their friends. The two extremes referred to often met in the same writer. Augustine in middle life regrets the time wasted on Vergil (Conf. I, op. 153), yet shows abundant traces of such wasted time in the work of his old age. Jerome censures priests "who have Vergil always in their hands and make a sensual sin of that study which for children is a necessity,"[3] and asks with feeling, "What has Horace to do with the Psalter, or Vergil with the Gospels, or Cicero with the Apostles?"[4] Yet Vergil was still used in the school at Bethlehem and Jerome's inconsistency is criticised by Rufinus.[5] Julian with more consistency, even in his apostasy, ordered that grammar and rhetoric, i. e., pagan literature, should not be taught in the schools: *τῶν ἐθνικῶν βιβλίων πάντων ἀπέχου. . . . εἴτε γὰρ ἱστορικὰ θέλεις*

[1] See the statement of Paulin. of Pella, Corp. Eccl. XVI, p. 263 f.

[2] Compare e. g. Greg. Turon. IV, 47.

[3] Ep. XXI, 13 (Migne XXII, col. 386).

[4] Ep. XXII, 29 (Migne XXII, col. 416); cf. Praef. ad Comm. in Epist. ad Galat. III, 5 (Migne XXVI, col. 399).

[5] Apol. in S. Hieron. II, 8 (Migne XXI, col. 592); cf. also ibid. 7 si una eius operis pagina est, quae non eum iterum Ciceronianum pronuntiet, ubi non dicat: sed Tullius noster, sed Flaccus noster, sed Maro.

διέρχεσθαι, ἔχεις τὰς βασιλείους· . . . εἴτε ᾀσματικῶν ὀρέγῃ, ἔχεις τοὺς ψαλμούς· . . . πάντων οὖν τῶν ἀλλοτρίων καὶ διαβολικῶν ἰσχυρῶς ἀπόσχου, Apost. Const. I, 6. This work may not be canonical[1], but that some action was taken is evident from Amm. Marc. XXII, 10, 7 illud autem erat inclemens, obruendum perenni silentio, quod arcebat docere magistros rhetoricos et grammaticos ritus christiani cultores.

The matter, however, was not easily controlled, and later attempts at consistency, as in the case of Gregory of Tours, Isidorus and Beda, only made the inconsistency more conspicuous. Among the earlier Christians all had read Vergil, a few had reviled him; among the later Christians all read him, and but few did not revile him.[2] And yet, whatever the outward pose, those who attempted epics, without exception, imitated Vergil.[3]

Alcuin's inconsistencies merely reflect the inconsistencies of his age. According to the anonymous author of the *vita beati Alchuini Abbatis*, whose source was Sigulfus[4] (Vetulus), one of Alcuin's followers from England, Alcuin in his earlier years was *Virgilii amplius quam psalmorum amator* (ch. 1, Mon. Alc., p. 6). A characteristic story follows, according to which Alcuin, when 11 years old, was allowed to stay all night with a rustic for the sake of company; the latter by loud snoring next morning disturbed the service of worshipers near by, and, while he was being flogged by the brethren as a wholesome example, Alcuin, puer nobilis tremiscens, ne sibi eadem fierent, haec, ut ipse post testatus est, corde dicebat imo: *O domine Jesu, si me nunc istorum eruis manibus cruentis, et post hoc sollicitus erga ecclesiae tuae vigilias ministeriaque laudum non fuero, plusque ultra Virgilium quam psalmorum modulationem amavero; tunc tale sortiar castigationis flagellum. Tantum, obnixe precor, nunc Domine libera me.*

[1] Cf. Comparetti, p. 81, n. 12.

[2] John of Fulda has a poem on the respective merits of Vergil and Arator, to the great disparagement of the former:

vs. 13 Virgilius paleas, frumentum prebet Arator;
Hic mansura docet, ille caduca refert.

Poet. Lat. Aev. Carol. I, p. 392.

[3] Manit. p. 57 und zwar nicht nur in dieser frühen Zeit, sondern auch fast während des ganzen Mittelalters.

[4] Cf. Lorenz (Slee), p. 284.

Some consistency, therefore, as well as acerbity, he does show later in trying to prevent the young monks from reading the "lies of Vergil" (vita, ch. 10, Mon. Alc., p. 24): legerat isdem vir Domini libros iuvenis antiquorum philosophorum, Virgiliique mendacia, quae nolebat iam ipse nec audire, neque discipulos suos legere, *sufficiunt*, inquiens, *divini poetae vobis, nec egetis luxuriosa sermonis Virgilii vos pollui facundia.* Sigulfus attempted deception, but was detected and severely reprimanded.[1] Various expressions in the letters support the biographer's representation. A conspicuous case is the reproof of Richbodus, Archbishop of Trèves (Ep. 216, Mon. Alc. p. 713 f.): Flaccus (i. e. Alcuin) recessit, Virgilius accessit, et in loco magistri nidificat Maro? . . . Utinam euangelia quattuor, non Aeneades duodecim, pectus compleant tuum. Compare also Ep. 243, p. 783 haec (sc. sapientia) in Virgiliacis[2] non invenietur mendaciis, sed in euangelica affluenter reperietur veritate; Ep. 119, p. 485 quamvis magis nobis adtendendum sit euangelicis praceptis quam Virgiliacis[2] versibus; Ep. 239, p. 764 et (sc. ut) impleatur Virgiliacum[2] illud

Dat sine mente sonum

et non euangelicum. To Angilbertus (Ep. 252, p. 803), who has asked for the gender of *rubus*, Alcuin cites a line (Ecl. III, 89) from Vergilius, haud comtempnendae auctoritatis falsator. Similarly he speaks again of *falsi Maronis;* cf. the verses prefixed to his commentary on the Song of Solomon (Carm. LXXVIII, 5 ff., Mon. Germ. Hist. I, p. 299

Has, rogo, menti tuae, iuvenis, mandare memento :
Cantica sunt nimium falsi haec meliora Maronis.
Haec tibi vera canunt vitae praecepta perennis,
Auribus ille tuis male frivola falsa sonabit.

The expression *iuxta Virgilii vestri prophetiam*, Ep. 98, p. 410, in quoting Ecl. IX, 51 ff., is doubtless a playful allusion to Vergil's fame from the fourth Eclogue, since in Ep. 54, p. 282, a line from Ovid[3] is humorously applied as a prophecy to Angil-

[1] Cuius satisfactionem benigne pius pater post increpationem accepit, monens eum ne ultra tale aliquid ageret.

[2] No further occurrence of this formation has been noted. In Ep. 119 it follows *euangelicus* and may be due to the suggestion from that word, which, it will be noted, is in the context of the other two examples. *Virgilii mendacia* is the phrase of the vita, ch. 10.

[3] A. A. II, 280 si nihil attuleris, ibis, Homere, foras.

bertus, and Alcuin adds: hoc de te tuoque itinere prophetatum esse, quis dubitat? Si Christum Sibilla eiusque labores praedixit venturum, cur non Naso Homerum eiusque itinera praececinit?

Further references and quotations in the letters have been cursorily noted: Ep. 70, p. 324 quid enim auri insana cupido non subvertit boni? Aen. III, 57; cf. also Ep. 160, p. 597 sed quid non efficit auri sacra fames; Ep. 98, p. 408 tarditas aselli, Ge. I, 273; ibid. Entellus senior, Aen. V, 437 ff.; ibid. frigidus circa praecordia recaluit sanguis, Ge. II, 484; ibid. p. 410 iuxta Virgilii vestri prophetiam. Nam

> saepe ego longos
> Cantando puerum memini me condere soles.
> Nunc oblita mihi tot carmina; vox quoque Flaccum[1]
> Ipsa fugit,

Ecl. IX, 51–54; ibid. p. 413 et Virgilius Augusto scribens:

> tu sectaris apros, ego retia servo,

Ecl. III, 75; Ep. 116, p. 478 quid ad haec?

> sit Tityrus Orpheus,
> Orpheus (in silvis) inter delphinas Arion,

Ecl. VIII, 55 f.; ibid.

> Omnia vel medium fiant mare. Vivite, silvae,

dixit amans spernenti se. Idem in eodem poeta:

> Invenies alium, si te hic fastidit Alexis,

Ecl. II, 73; Ep. 119, p. 485 legitur quendam veterum dixisse poetarum, cum de laude imperatorum Romani regni, si rite recordor, cecinisset, quales esse debuissent, dicens:

> Parcere subiectis et debellare superbos,

Aen. VI, 854; Ep. 121, p. 491 lupus gallo[2] tulit vocem, Ecl. IX, 53 f.; Ep. 132, p. 520 fama per multorum ora volitans resonat, Ge. III, 9, Aen. XII, 235; ibid. p. 521 et more senis Entelli saltare . . . . et Daretem Hispanicum vincere, qui gloriatur in fortitudine iuvenilis aetatis, Aen. V, 369 ff.; Ep. 147, p. 559 en erit illa dies, ut liceat mihi etc., Ecl. VIII, 7 ff.; Ep. 194, p. 679 lacrimis dictavi obortis, Aen. III, 492, IV, 30, etc.; Ep. 216, p. 713 amor Maronis tulit memoriam mei? O si mihi nomen esset Virgilius, tunc semper ante oculos luderem tuos, et mea dicta tota

[1] With substitution of Alcuin's scholastic name, cf. e. g. Ep. 78; 216.
[2] Referring to Adalhardus to whom the letter is written.

pertractares intentione, et iuxta proverbium illius essem apud te

Tunc felix nimium, quo non felicior ullus,[1]

Aen. IV, 657, IX, 772; Ep. 252, p. 803

Mella fluant illi, ferat et rubus asper,

Ecl. III, 89; Ep. 293, p. 881 o si mihi vox ferrea esset et omnes pili verterentur in linguas, Ge. II, 43 f.

In his poems Alcuin does not try so often to point a moral with his Vergilian reminiscences; these are, therefore, more genuinely imitations for the sake of embellishment, due to study of Vergil as a model.[2] Ovid,[3] Horace, Propertius, Lucan, Persius and Calpurnius Siculus are also represented, but the Vergilian reminiscences number more than twice as many as all the rest combined. Compare the following: I,[4] 11 dona ferentes, Aen. II, 49; 46-49 est antiqua, potens bellis et corpore praestans, Germaniae populos gens inter et extera regna, Duritiam propter dicti cognomine Saxi. Hanc placuit ducibus regni conducere donis, Aen. I, 531 ff.; 76 iam nova . . . sceptra, Ecl. IV, 7; 84 peregrini cultor agelli, Mor. 3, (cf. Ecl. IX, 3); 98 verbisque adfatur amicis, Aen. II, 372; 99 quae te dura coquit, iuvenum fortissime, cura, Aen. VII, 345 (cf. Enn. Ann. X, 5. p. 51 Vahl.); 103 imperium latum tibi terminat undis, Aen. I, 287; 127 nec rapit arma furor, Aen. I, 150; 140 f. solis ceu lucifer ortum Praecurrens tetras tenebrarum discutit umbras, Ge. II, 357; 155 namque erit ille mihi solus deus omne per aevum, Ecl. I, 7; 243 bellorum vivida virtus, Aen. V, 754; 255 f. ut leo cum catulis crudelis ovilia vastat Et pecus omne ferus mactat manditque, trahitque, Aen. IX, 339 ff.; 258 per tela, per hostes, Aen. II, 527; 321 amoena virecta, Aen. VI, 638; 346 f. contigit ut subito flammis volitantibus altum Ignis edax culmen raperet, Aen. II, 758; 525 imbribus exundans torrens ceu montibus altis Sternit agros segetesque rapit silvasque recidit, Aen. II, 304 ff.; 655 dis-

[1] *Alter*, Vergil.

[2] Cf. Ebert, Allgem. Gesch. d. Lit. d. Mittelalters, Leipz. 1880, II, pp. 26, 36.

[3] Ovid leads in this list with about a dozen passages; one of these, A. A. III, 62 ff.

Eunt anni more fluentis aquae.
Nec quae praeteriit, iterum revocabitur unda.
Nec quae praeteriit, hora redire potest,

makes a good text some half dozen times: XLVIII, 26; LXII, 146; LXXVI, 20, etc.

[4] The numbering of Duemmler, Poetae Lat. Aev. Carol., Berl., 1881, is followed.

cutiens tenebras, Ge. II, 357; 896 vivo equidem, Aen. III, 315; 1253 dives opum terrae, Ge. II, 468; 1350 non hodie effugies, Ecl. III, 49; 1418 spes tanta parentum, Aen. II, 281; 1440 solis lunaeque labores, Ge. II, 478 (cf. Aen. I, 742); 1588 vitae spes maxima nostrae, (cf. Aen. XII, 168); 1590 te duce, Ecl. IV, 13; 1592 dum sol noxque sibi cedunt, dum quatuor annus Dividitur vicibus, crescunt dum germina terris; Sidera dum lucent, trudit dum nubila ventus, Semper honos nomenque tuum, laudesque manebunt, Aen. I, 607 ff., Ecl. V. 76ff.; III, 2, 20, 30 accipiens calicem pleno se et proluit ore, Aen. I, 739; 21, 1 est antiqua, potens muris et turribus ampla, Urbs Treveris, Aen. I, 531 f.; 30, 7 sperare salutem, Aen. II, 354; 31, 2 nervi vix ossibus haerent, Ecl. III, 102; 12 per membra cucurrit, Aen. XII, 447; IV, 19 tua laus mecum semper, dilecte, manebit, Ecl. V, 76; 23 puppis potiatur harena, Aen. I, 172; 28 ab orbe Britanno, Ecl. I, 67; 30 data copia verbi, Aen. I, 520; 61 f. nunc tamen hanc ederam circum sine timpora sacra Serpere, Ecl. VIII, 12 f.; 64 and 70 heia age . . . fuge, rumpe moras, Aen. IV, 569; VII, 21 o decus omne tuis, Ecl. V, 34; VIII, 12 sic male sacra fames, Aen. III, 57; IX, 5 per varios casus, Aen. I, 204; 45 quis teneat lacrimas, Aen. II, 8; 67 inclita bello, Aen. II, 241; 84 ignis edax rapuit, Aen. II, 758; 103 strato . . recubabat in ostro, Aen. I, 700; 105 oculos atra caligine claudit, Aen. XI, 876; 109 subito vox faucibus haesit, Aen. XII, 868; 113 vix ossibus haeret, Ecl. III, 102; 155 sic tandem vobis clipeus descendit ab alto (cf. Aen. VIII, 664); XIV, 1 pergite, Pierides, Ecl. VI, 13; XVIII, 19 Orpheus aut Linus, nec me Maro vincit in odis, Ecl. IV, 55; XXVI, 23 f. quid faciet tardus canuto vertice Drances Consilio validus, gelida est cui dextera bello, Aen. XI, 336 ff.; XXXII, 1 saevis ereptus ab undis, Aen. I, 596; 4 o Corydon, Corydon, Ecl. II, 69; 31 f. rusticus est Corydon, dixit hoc forte propheta[1] Virgilius quondam: "Rusticus es, Corydon," Ecl. II, 56; XL, 1 nix ruit e caelo, gelidus simul ingruit imber, Aen. XII, 284 (possibly a play on Aen. VIII, 369); 8 carmina non curat David, nec Delia curat, Ecl. II, 6, Ecl. VIII, 103; XLII, 1 roseis Aurora quadrigis, Aen. VI, 535; 19 sint patris Entelli memores iuvenisque Daretis, Aen. V, 368 ff.; XLIV, 45 omnia vincit amor, Ecl. X, 69; XLV, 67 erige subiectos et iam depone superbos, Aen. VI, 853; L, 33 velivoli pelagi, Aen. I, 224; LV, 3, 1 hos ergo versiculos (cf. "hos ego versicu-

[1] Compare Epp. 54 and 98.

los"); LVII, 1 Dafnin dulcissime, (cf. Ecll. V, VII, VIII); 2 rapuit saeva noverca, Ge. II, 128; 4 incipe tu senior, quaeso, Menalca prior, Ecl. V, 10; 29 en tondent nostri librorum prata iuvenci, Ge. I, 15 and 289, Ecl. VII, 11; 39 si non dura silex genuit te, Aen. VI, 471 (cf. IV, 366); LVIII,[1] 8 his certamen erat cuculi de carmine grande,[2] Ecl. VII, 16; 13 tum glacialis hiems, Aen. III, 285; 45 desine plura, Hiems, Ecl. V, 19 (cf. IX, 66); LIX,[3] 25 improbus ille puer, Ecl. VIII, 50; LXI, 21 vino somnoque sepultos, Aen. II, 265; LXV, 4 a, 13 haec erit, haec requies vestri iam certa laboris, Aen. III, 393; LXIX, 11 mens conscia recti, Aen. I, 604; LXXIV, 14 omnia vincit amor, nos quoque vincat amor, Ecl. X, 69; 19 f. iudice te nullum, si numquam fallit imago, Iam metuens fugiam, Ecl. II. 26 f.; LXXVI, 1, 25 accipite haec animis, Aen. III, 250; LXXXV, 1, 13 ad sidera tendit, Aen. V, 256; XCIII, 14 postquam Tondenti in gremium candida barba cadit, Ecl. I, 28; C, 3, 1 frigidus hiberno veniens de monte viator, Ecl. X, 20; CII, 11 incipit ille prior, Ecl. V, 10; CIV, 6, 1 urbibus egregiis, quarum nova culmina surgunt, Aen. I, 437.

In minor points of diction, too, Vergil's influence is seen: cf. navita I, 29 (de Orthograph.,[4] G. L. VII, 305, 17; Ge. I, 137; 372, etc.); *relliquias*, according to Duemmler's text, I, 361; 366; 483; 1317, etc. (Orthograph., p. 308, 31 reliquiae per unum l, licet Vergilius . . . , "relliquiae Danaum"); *vel=et* I, 1179 and frequently, is found in Vergil, though it is common in Ecclesiastical writers, cf. Georges s. v.; *altaria circum* IX, 201, cf. Ecl. VIII, 74 (Orthograph., p. 298, 24 circum in quibusdam post ponitur, ut Vergilius 'maria omnia circum'), certain archaisms, such as *ast*, *foret*, the infinitive in *-ier*, Alcuin may have justified by Vergil's usage.

Alcuin's use of Vergil, therefore, far exceeds his abuse, precisely as in the case of many of his predecessors; and it is not surprising to find him making the same defense of his borrowings though his

[1] The conception of this really good poem, Conflictus veris et hiemis, is in direct imitation of Vergil's amoebaean Eclogues, even a Palaemon settles the contest.

[2] Note the use of *grande* for Vergil's *magnum*; cf. Körting, Latein.-roman. Wörterb., s. v.

[3] Cf. vs. 11 fas idcirco, reor, comprendere plectra Maronis.

[4] Alcuin's intimate acquaintance with Vergil is an easy inference from his grammatical works alone; in the brief Orthographia out of 22 references to classical and preclassical authors, 17 are from Vergil.

apology does not cover the whole ground; cf. Ep. 147, p. 561 litterulas aliquas admonitionis vestrae scribere venerandae auctoritati temerarium duxi, nisi legerem, beato Hieronymo dicente, aurum in sterquilinio inventum lavandum esse et thesauro dominico inserendum. Nam beatus apostolus Paulus aurum sapientiae, in stercore poetarum inventum, in divitias ecclesiasticae transtulit prudentiae; sicut omnes sancti doctores, eius exemplo eruditi, fecerunt.

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NOTES ON LUCIAN'S SYRIAN GODDESS.

The authorship of the Ionic piece in the corpus of Lucian, De Dea Syria, has never been thoroughly established. The majority of scholars in the early part of the last century believed in its Lucianic composition. See Mees, De Luciani studiis et scriptis iuvenilibus, 1841; and Planck, Quaestiones Lucianeae, 1850. But such scholars as Bekker, Dindorf, Sommerbrodt oppose this view. Croiset, La Vie et les Oeuvres de Lucien, 1892, p. 63, says: "Quant au morceau *Sur la déesse syrienne*, je le considère comme une habile et plaisante contrefaçon d'Hérodote, dont l'écrivain imite non-seulement le langage, mais toutes les habitudes d'esprit jusque dans leurs moindres particularités. L'intention, dans ce cas, ne serait pas douteuse; sous une forme un peu plus dissimulée, l'objet de l'écrit est le même que celui de l'*Histoire vraie*, montrer combien il est aisé de rendre vraisemblables, par un air de sincérité, des choses qu'on tire de son imagination en les mêlant à quelques détails exacts. Ainsi compris, ce morceau ne me semble pas indigne de l'auteur de l'*Histoire vraie*, et il se relie naturellement à cette série de compositions satiriques que nous venons de passer en revue." The last writer I have noticed on the subject, Bolderman, Studia Lucianea, 1893, accepts it as Lucian's and answers Dindorf's arguments, the principal one being the dialect, the other its superstitious character. This latter point has been treated by Dr. Allinson in the American Journal of Philology, 7. 203 ff.: "In the d. d. S. the hand of Lucian is suggested for the following reasons: 1. There is suppressed satire running through the piece. 2. The imitation of Herodotus is in many places decided enough to imply an author as familiar with Herodotus as we know Lucian to have been." As Croiset finds the same general type of narration in the d. d. S. as in True Histories, so Dr. Allinson collects under his first point a number of illustrations which are decidedly Lucianic in character.

One of the most striking parallels between this work and parts of Lucian's accepted works is the class of stories which remind us

of accounts given in the Holy Scriptures. We are reminded of Jonah by Lucian's marvelous fish story in True Histories. The Syrian from Palestine who cast out evil spirits (v. Philopseudes 16) reminds us of Christ, and again we think of Christ's miracle in connection with the man who took up his bed and walked (v. Phil. 11). The same determined, satirical seriousness with which he tells these stories, the same spirit which leads him to begin one work by saying that he is going to tell as many and as big lies as possible, and another by asking why a man should lie deliberately when he is to gain no practical advantage, is manifest in the account of the deluge in the d. d. S., §§12, 13, where the grave statement occurs, that all the water from the deluge ran into a small hole, an account referred to by Dr. Allinson as a comic imitation of Hdt.

It is along the line of Herodotean imitation that I would study Lucian and the d. d. S. Dr. Allinson speaks of this point in general terms as follows: "Lucian's own expressions of contempt for those who affect Ionic, do not militate against the probability of his having tried to beat them at their own game, while at the same time he made good his opportunity for ridiculing the piety of the old historian as well as the superstitions of his own time. He has himself (Luc. XXI 1), apprised us of his admiration for Herodotus as a writer, and he certainly would have been as capable of imitating him as would any other writer of the second century A. D."

After citing a number of passages where imitation is clearly apparent, Allinson then gives a comparison of the Ionic forms and the deviations from the Ionism of Hdt. that appear in the d. d. S., the De Astrologia, and Arrian's Historia Indica. My contribution to the subject is a short study of particles and the structure of the period, also a few remarks about verborum ubertas and whether *ὀρθότης* or *πλαγιασμός* is preferred. I confine myself to the d. d. S.

Let us then begin with the understanding that the d. d. S. is an intentional imitation of Hdt. Prof. Gildersleeve (A. J. P. 1.47) says that Herodotos "is more or less closely imitated" in the d. d. S. and the De Astrologia. The point at issue is, can we detect the character of imitation here that has been established for Lucian? I shall use the method and follow the order of investigation employed in my study entitled "Herodotos in the Renascence."

It is in the direction of Herodotos' greatest perfection, his most

distinctive characteristics, that Lucian has imitated him, particularly in narrative passages. This perfection is designated by Aristotle as λέξις εἰρομένη. Parataxis is also used, not the parataxis of mere juxtaposition, but co-ordination by the use of co-ordinating particles and conjunctions, loose connections "with many phrases for the purpose of introducing, recapitulating, or repeating a subject," phrases characteristic of oral discourse. Even a casual reader of the d. d. S. would notice on the part of the author an effort to write paratactically by means of paratactic particles. The frequency of καί places polysyndeton very much in evidence. This effect is decidedly more marked in the d. d. S. than elsewhere in Lucian, but much less pleasing, as there is almost a total lack of that ease and variety exhibited in the narrative of Herodotos and present, though to a less degree, in other works of Lucian. Notwithstanding the frequency of τε-καί (72 occurrences in 22 pp.), the skill of Hdt. is not present, and καί is often written where Hdt. would have written τε. But the great abundance of these particles does not exclude μέν and δέ, nor even asyndetic parataxis. Let the following sentences illustrate these points. D. d. S. 24 (3. 471): μετὰ δὲ παρεόντων οἱ τῶν φίλων, οἳ καὶ τότε πεμπομένῳ τῷ Κομβάβῳ παρεγένοντο, παραγαγὼν ἐς μέσον κατηγορέειν ἄρχετο καί οἱ μοιχηίην τε καὶ ἀκολασίην προὔφερε· κάρτα δὲ δεινοπαθέων πίστιν τε καὶ φιλίην ἀνεκαλέετο λέγων τρισσὰ Κομβάβον ἀδικέειν μοιχόν τε ἐόντα καὶ ἐς πίστιν ὑβρίσαντα καὶ ἐς θεὸν ἀσεβέοντα, τῆς ἐν τῷ ἔργῳ τοιάδε ἔπρηξε; 25 (3. 472): μετὰ δὲ μεγάλη δωρεὴ ἀπίξεται χρυσός τε πολλὸς καὶ ἄργυρος ἄπλετος καὶ ἐσθῆτες Ἀσσύριαι καὶ ἵπποι βασιλήιοι; 17 (3. 464): ὁ δὲ τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἐσιόντων πάντων ἐν ἠρεμίῃ μεγάλῃ ἦν, ὡς δὲ ἡ μητρυιὴ ἀπίκετο, τήν τε χροιὴν ἠλλάξατο καὶ ἱδρώειν ἄρξατο καὶ τρόμῳ ἔχετο καὶ ἡ καρδίη ἀνεπάλλετο· τὰ δὲ γιγνόμενα ἐμφανέα τῷ ἰητρῷ τὸν ἔρωτα ἐποίεε; ib. 1 (3. 451): δοκέει δέ μοι, τόδε τὸ οὔνομα οὐκ ἅμα τῇ πόλι οἰκεομένῃ ἐγένετο . . . ib. 28 (3. 475): δοκέει δ' ὧν μοι, καὶ ὅδε ἐς ἐκείνου μίμησιν τοῦ ξυλίνου ἀνδρὸς ἀνέρχεται. With the last two passages, cf. Luc. Somn. 16 (1. 21): ταῦτα μέμνημαι ἰδὼν ἀντίπαις ἔτι ὤν, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, ἐκταραχθεὶς πρὸς τὸν τῶν πληγῶν φόβον. Sommerbrodt remarks upon this passage that ἐμοὶ δοκεῖν, ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, μοι δοκεῖν, μοι δοκεῖ are often used parenthetically in Lucian as here. See Lehmann on the same passage and cf. Charon, c. 11. The last two passages are rightly compared with Herodotean usage by the editors and the d. d. S. is cited, where these expressions abound. Cf. § 1 (3. 451), 8 (3. 456), 17 (3. 464), etc.

Kalinka, Dissertationes Philologae Vindobonenses, 2. 145, has

pointed out Herodotos' partiality for γάρ, which he, Grundmann, and others emphasize as a paratactic particle, when used as Hdt. has used it. I have called attention to the fact that Lucian in his narrative pieces makes frequent use of γάρ after the Herodotean fashion. The great number of polysyndetic particles in the d. d. S. has diminished the number of γάρ's. The proportion is slightly over one per page, this being less than half the average of Hdt. and Lucian's typical narrative. But even here, if we can add strength to our assumption that the d. d. S. is a conscious imitation of Hdt. by calling attention to the massing of particles in combination with γάρ, a practice of Hdt., we strengthen the relationship between the d. d. S. and Lucian, who on this point is very close to Hdt. The especial Herodotean combination γὰρ δή, which is also the most common combination in Lucian, occurs 5 times in d. d. S., and always in still greater combinations, e. g., καὶ γὰρ δή (16), γὰρ δὴ ὧν (6, 10, 56), καὶ γὰρ δὴ ὧν (33). This heaping of particles seems to indicate an exaggeration of Hdt., who has great numbers of καὶ γάρ, γὰρ δή, δὴ ὧν, and this exaggeration corresponds to the unusual abundance of καί's and τε's. Similarly the author of the d. d. S. is no less fond of καὶ γάρ, and οὐ (οὐδέ, οὔτε) γάρ, which are so frequent in Hdt. and Luc. The most striking instance of Herodotean influence on Lucian in the use of this particle is the important parenthetic γάρ. It occurs in the same way in d. d. S. Cf. 26 (3. 472) μετὰ δὲ αἰτησάμενος ἐκτελέσαι τὰ λείποντα τῷ νηῷ—ἀτελέα γάρ μιν ἀπολελοίπεεν—αὖτις ἐπέμπετο. With this compare other examples of γάρ very nearly related, 25 (3. 472): οὐ γάρ μοι ταύτης ἀπολογίης ἔδεεν, 27 (3. 473): συνενείχθη γάρ οἱ καὶ τάδε.

Δή is another Herodotean particle mentioned by Kalinka that demands attention. The same conditions as to the use of δή exist in the d. d. S. as in the narrative of Lucian, whose use of the particle I have attributed to the influence of Herodotos for reasons which need not be stated here. Suffice it to say that the combinations of δή with other particles, such as καί, γάρ, μέν, are strikingly analogous in the three works. Here again is exemplified the same tendency to heap up particles, a tendency due to conscious imitation, which does not exist in Lucian's natural narrative, where his familiarity with the prince of story-tellers comes out in unconscious imitation.

This is not the place to treat subordinate clauses, but one or two statements as to final particles will not be amiss. ἵνα, Herod-

otos' favorite particle, which is also fairly frequent in Lucian and largely with the subjunctive, as in Hdt., is entirely wanting both in Lucian's typical narrative, True Histories, and in the d. d. S. ὡς, which is such a favorite with Lucian, is wanting in his True Histories and also in the d. d. S.

The points made above concerning co-ordination and the use of co-ordinate particles are a most important factor in the study of periodic structure. We found that the constructions in the d. d. S. parallel those in Lucian's narrative, which conform to the Herodotean standard. In like manner, in both, the sentences are comparatively short and have the same general "rosary" or "strung-on" effect, without any approach to Isocratean periods and cola: e. g., d. d. S. 32 (3. 478): *τὸ δὲ δὴ μέζονος λόγου ἄξιον, τοῦτο ἀπηγήσομαι· λίθον ἐπὶ τῇ κεφαλῇ φορέει, λυχνὶς καλέεται, οὔνομα δέ οἱ τοῦ ἔργου ἡ συντυχίη. ἀπὸ τούτου ἐν νυκτὶ σέλας πολλὸν ἀπολάμπεται, ὑπὸ δέ οἱ ὁ νηὸς ἅπας οἷον ὑπὸ λύχνοισι φαείνεται· ἐν ἡμέρῃ δὲ τὸ μὲν φέγγος ἀσθενέει. ἰδέην δὲ ἔχει κάρτα πυρώδεα.* Such passages abound in the d. d. S. and, stripped of the dialect, might easily find a place in Lucian's ordinary narrative. The great abundance of co-ordinating particles in d. d. S. is really an over-abundance, and often at the expense of participles. Here is where the piece falls short of both Hdt. and Luc. At no place can it be called polymetochic or even eumetochic, though a few sentences can be cited like 27 (3. 473): *ξείνη γυνὴ ἐς πανήγυριν ἀπικομένη ἰδοῦσα καλόν τε ἐόντα καὶ ἐσθῆτα ἔτι ἀνδρηίην ἔχοντα ἔρωτι μεγάλῳ ἔσχετο, μετὰ δὲ μαθοῦσα ἀτελέα ἐόντα ἑωυτὴν διειργάσατο.* Sentences of this kind that do occur, however, are alternated with ametochic passages, just as they are in Hdt. and in Lucian's narrative. Such an arrangement is hardly accidental. When a man is imitating intentionally, especially if he is struggling with a dialect not his own, the tendency is to overdo the imitation, as has been done in the d. d. S. in the effort after Herodotean co-ordination. When Lucian is writing naturally, as in his narrative pieces, the narrator, whose works he has conned so thoroughly that they are almost entirely assimilated, leaves an undeniable yet all unconscious impress.

This greater ametochic effect in the d. d. S. would allow more opportunity for Gorgianic figures, but very little, if any, difference is perceptible. By the side of pure paronomasia we find some 15 examples of the *λόγον λέγειν* group. Cf. Hdt. 1. 14: *ἀνέθηκε ἀναθήματα.* Repetition is on a par with Hdt. and Luc.; also pari-

son. Paromoion is naturally a little more frequent, owing to the large number of co-ordinate finite verbs. The λόγον λέγειν group, another over-imitation in keeping with the general spirit of ridicule in the piece, may be taken as evidence bearing upon verborum ubertas. Add §29 (3. 475): εἰ δέ τις τόδε μὲν οὐκ ὄπωπεν, ὄπωπε δὲ φοινικοβατέοντας. Cf. Hdt. 1. 24: στάντα ἐν τοῖσι ἑδωλίοισι ἀείσαι· ἀείσας δὲ ὑπεδέκετο. Here should be mentioned a most interesting point of agreement between the d. d. S. and Lucian's narrative, a practice evidently Herodotean, viz., the summarizing of preceding facts with μέν and opposing the summary to something which follows introduced by δέ. Cf. 8 (3. 456): ὁ μέν μοι Βύβλιος τοσαῦτα ἀπηγέετο with Luc., Ver. Hist. 1. 36 (2. 99): τοιαύτη μὲν ἡ χώρα ἐστίν· ὑμᾶς δὲ χρὴ ὁρᾶν ὅπως . . . Add d. d. S. 12 (3. 459): τὰ μὲν Δευκαλίωνος πέρι Ἕλληνες ἱστορέουσι; 13 (3. 459): ὁ μὲν ὢν ἀρχαῖος αὐτοῖσι λόγος ἀμφὶ τοῦ ἱροῦ τοιόσδε ἐστί; 27 (3. 473): Κομβάβου μέν μοι πέρι τοσάδε εἰρήσθω; 17 (3. 465); 23 (3. 470).

As is to be supposed from the foregoing considerations, ὀρθότης is the type of periodic structure in the d. d. S. rather than πλαγιασμός. Almost every sentence from the beginning to the end is an illustration, and naturally, inasmuch as ὀρθότης and co-ordination are congenial associates.

The d. d. S. also shows a tendency to over-imitate Hdt. in the use of anastrophic πέρι, showing 15 examples of πέρι to 3 of περί. Lucian does not show this extreme tendency, but it is decidedly interesting to note that where he calls up Hdt. in the De Domo 20, he makes him talk Ionic and use πέρι.

In §§ 25, 31, 33, 50, 54 of the d. d. S. are examples of οὐδέ used after an affirmative sentence for καὶ οὔ, another Herodotean construction, used also by the poets. Krüger has already pointed out that later writers followed the same practice, and his statement is reinforced by du Mesnil, Grammatica quam Lucianus in scriptis suis secutus est ratio etc., Stolp, 1867, p. 48, so that the point would not amount to much for our purpose, if special mention were not made of Lucian, and if Lucian did not use it in passages decidedly Herodotean, such as Dial. Mar. 8. 1.

Finally, as Herodotos is careful to leave the impression that he must not be held responsible for all the statements he makes, so Lucian in the preface to his True Histories states that he is not going to utter one word of truth, and then, like Hdt., apologizes for remarkable stories. Similar expressions abound in the

d. d. S. Cf. 7 (3. 455); 11 (3. 457); 13 (3. 459): *ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τὸ χάσμα εἶδον, καὶ ἔστιν ὑπὸ τῷ νηῷ κάρτα μικρόν*: 28 (3. 474); 29 (3. 476); 39 (3. 484); 45 (3. 484); 48 (3. 485): *ἀλλ' ἐγὼ τουτέων πέρι σαφὲς οὐδὲν ἔχω εἰπεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἦλθον αὐτὸς οὐδὲ ἐπειρήθην ταύτης τῆς ὁδοιπορίης· τὰ δὲ ἐλθόντες ποιέουσιν, εἶδον καὶ ἀπηγήσομαι*; 60 (3. 490): *καὶ ὧδε ποιέουσι.* In fact, such expressions are too common. Here, as elsewhere, the feeling is that the imitation is overdone.

To further illustrate this principle of over-imitation in the d. d. S., one or two strong Herodotean peculiarities not common in Lucian's narrative may be mentioned. Note the extraordinary frequency of *ὅδε* in all of its forms, and of the article used as a relative in such expressions as *τῶν ἡμεῖς ἴδμεν*, 2 (3. 452). This is very much overdone. Then we find prepositions used independently or adverbially, especially *ἐν* and *μετά*. Cf. 38 (3. 482), 39 (3. 482), 49 (3. 485). Again *κάρτα* which is found to an appreciable extent only in Hdt. and tragedy abounds here. Cf. Luc. Calumn. 3 (3. 128). This fact, that there are in the d. d. S. instances of decided imitation which do not appear in Lucian's best narrative, has no weight in arguing against the Lucianic composition of the d. d. S., but rather tends in the other direction. It is far more natural that he should have emphasized by over-imitation Herodotean peculiarities, whether they represent the best Attic or not, rather than pass over those peculiarities for others which he has found most useful in his best narrative. In his Attic narrative Lucian has been influenced more or less unconsciously by Herodotos in those things which go to make the best, the most interesting and the most attractive narrative. In the d. d. S. Lucian has tried to give a literal imitation of Herodotos in every detail, in a spirit of ridicule, without much care or regard for general effect. In consequence he is natural in the one and unnatural in the other.

These considerations strengthen my own belief in the Lucianic composition of the d. d. S., whatever its defects may be both as a work of Lucian himself and as an imitation of Herodotos.

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THE GREETING IN THE LETTERS OF CICERO.[1]

In modern letter-writing there is a great variety of forms in use for the address and subscription of a letter, and each form represents more or less exactly a definite idea. We recognize instinctively the feeling which each expresses, and can classify the various forms into groups representing in a general way different degrees of intimacy between the correspondents. We are in the habit of employing different forms for our different correspondents, and of varying them as our relations change. The address and corresponding subscription are harmonious in spirit, and often form a safer basis for determining the feeling of the writer towards his correspondent than the contents of his letter. The letter may be a business one and colorless in tone, but the address and subscription will indicate the true or pretended feeling of the writer.

The greeting at the beginning of the Roman letter corresponds in meaning to the address and subscription of the modern letter, and exhibits an equally large variety of forms. It is the purpose of this paper to classify the forms of greeting in the letters of Cicero into certain groups, and determine the feeling that each group expresses.

Nearly all the letters in the collections ad Atticum and ad Brutum have a uniform greeting (Cicero Attico Sal. and Cicero Bruto Sal.), which suggests the possibility of later editing. Throwing out these and all instances due to conjecture in the edition of Baiter and Kayser we have the greeting in 374 letters to consider.

The greeting in each case consists of the name of the writer in the nominative, the name of the person addressed in the dative, and some form of salutation expressed or implied. Either name may be given in full with the three parts, praenomen, nomen and cognomen, or with only one or two parts. The form of the

[1] Babl, De Epistularum Latinarum Formulis, 1893, pp. 17–18, barely touches upon the subject of this paper. Peter's Der Brief in der röm. Lit., Teubner, 1901 I know only from the title given in the list of new books in a recent number of the Woch. f. Klass. Phil.

greeting may be varied by the addition of the father's name, by both the father's and grand-father's, and by a free use of titles. There is also equal variety in the form of the salutation; it may be omitted, or may be expressed by the abbreviations S., Sal., S. D., S. P. D., suo S. P. D., suo dulcissimo S., etc., or it may be written more or less in full.

The following is a series of representative forms of greeting:

Cicero Varroni.
Cicero Varroni Sal.
Cicero S. D. Paeto.
Cicero Cassio S.
Cicero Servio S.
Tullius S. D. Terentiae suae.
Tullius Terentiae suae Sal. Plurimam.
Tullius Tironi Sal.
Tullius Tironi suo Sal.
Marcus Quinto Fratri Salutem.
M. Cicero S. D. Curio.
M. Cicero S. D. C. Furnio.
M. Cicero S. D. D. Bruto Imp. Cos. Desig.
M. Cicero S. D. C. Antonio M. F. Imp.
M. Tullius M. F. Cicero S. D. Cn. Pompeio Cn. F. Magno Imperatori.
M. Tullius M. F. M. N. Cicero Imp. S. D. C. Caelio L. F. C. N. Caldo Quaest.

From this list of typical examples one can form some idea of the many possible varieties.

Comparing the relation of the names alone in the letters of Cicero, i. e., taking no account of the salutation, I have noted 39 different types. If then we consider the form of the salutation and its relation to the names, we shall find the number greatly increased. The various types, however, fall more or less distinctly into five or six groups. There are five different combinations which Cicero employs for his own name: Cicero, Marcus Cicero, Tullius, Marcus, Marcus Tullius Cicero, in the order of frequency. The nomen cognomen (Tullius Cicero) and the praenomen nomen (M. Tullius) never occur. For the name of the recipient he uses six forms, viz.: Cognomen, Nomen, Praenomen cognomen, Praenomen nomen, Praenomen, Praenomen nomen cognomen, and avoids the form Nomen cognomen. The form

Praenomen nomen (M. Tullius), which Cicero avoids in the case of his own name, but uses frequently for the name of his correspondents, is often necessary because of the lack of the cognomen, once the mark of nobility.

We have seen that there is a great variety of forms in the Roman greeting, and it is reasonable to suppose, from the analogy of modern letters, that they express an equally wide range of meanings. There is perhaps sufficient proof of this in the greetings themselves. In the first place there is an evident attempt to maintain a perfect balance between the forms of the two names which in itself suggests that each form has a certain significance or feeling. In a way the name of the sender corresponds to the subscription of the modern letter and the name of the recipient to the address of the modern letter. A glance at the lists of greetings will show that the harmony in the form of the two names in Latin is as marked as in the address and subscription of the modern letter. Furthermore, it may be noted that the greeting varies in a conspicuous way with different correspondents, and usually only slightly, if at all, in a series of letters to any one person; that in some of the few cases where there is a marked difference in the form of greeting to a particular person the change coincides with some known change in feeling. A third proof that the greeting is an essential part of the letter and indicative of the feeling existing between the correspondents is the fact that whenever Cicero encloses a copy of a letter in the one he is writing, whether his own or one he has received, he is always careful to preserve the greeting. There is also noticeable harmony between the form of the salutation in each greeting and the form of the names. The forms indicative of friendship or intimacy are found only with certain forms of the names which we may assume to be familiar forms, e. g. Tullius S. D. Terentiae Suae; Tullius et Cicero Tironi suo S. P. D. Again, the use of the father's name, grandfather's name, and titles, is found only with certain other forms of the name, and helps us to determine and grade the more formal types of greeting.

After recognizing that each form of greeting expresses some definite feeling or degree of intimacy, we can classify the various forms into certain natural groups, and ascertain the meaning of the characteristic forms in each group from our knowledge of the intimacy existing between Cicero and the well-known correspond-

ents, and from incidental hints in the literature. This I have attempted to do for the letters of Cicero, but space will permit the consideration of only certain typical cases and the statement of the results.

Cicero uses his praenomen (Marcus), which corresponds to our Christian name, only in addressing his brother Quintus. Marcus and Quintus were the familiar names of their boyhood, and it is but natural that they should retain them in their correspondence of later years—always, however, with the term "frater" added, thus "Marcus Quinto Fratri Salutem." The only other correspondents whom Cicero addresses by the first name are Servius Sulpicius Rufus and Appius. In the 17 letters of Sulpicius, 11 have only the praenomen "Servius." We know him to be one of Cicero's dearest friends. They were both of equestrian rank, of about the same age, and had been playmates and school-fellows together. They continued their studies abroad together and remained firm friends throughout life. Sulpicius' beautiful letter of condolence to Cicero on the death of Tullia is evidence of their lasting friendship. It is not strange that Cicero should continue to address Sulpicius by the name of his boyhood. The only other use of the praenomen is the brief, colorless letter ad Fam. X. 29, with the greeting "Cicero Appio S.", and it is said to refer to some other Appius than Appius Claudius, the elder brother of the notorious Clodia. We can safely say that if the principle which this paper seeks to establish is true, there was no Appius of the Claudian family whom Cicero would think of addressing by his praenomen. Some late MSS read "Ampio" here, and there was a Titus Ampius Balbus whom Cicero in ad Fam. VI. 12 addresses thus: "Cicero Ampio S. P.", employing the same greeting as here, if we change Appio, the praenomen, to Ampio the nomen. Good evidence can be brought forward in favor of this change.

Cicero uses his nomen "Tullius" only in addressing the members of his family, and Tiro his freedman. In his 24 letters to Terentia and his children, 23 begin with Tullius, and one has no nominative, the greeting being simply "suis S. D." This use of "Tullius"[1] corresponding in form with Terentia and Tullia

[1] Among the letters of Cicero's correspondents there are four cases in which the author uses his nomen. In three of these the author has no cognomen, so far as we know; Curius (M.) Ciceroni Suo Sal., Fam. 7. 29;

seems clearly familiar, and an appropriate form for expressing the intimacy of the family and for those for whom the praenomen would be inappropriate. To Tiro also, who was always regarded a member of his family and as dear as his own son, Cicero used this form in 20 out of 21 instances. Cicero's son writing to Tiro addresses him Cicero Filius Tironi suo dulcissimo S.

The use of the nomen in the dative was often used by Cicero in connection with the cognomen in nominative. This combination is more familiar than cognomen and cognomen. Yet it is in some cases necessary when addressing those who have no cognomen. This use of the nomen (i. e. cognomen and nomen) is found in the 17 letters to Trebatius, Cicero's young friend and protégé, the brilliant young lawyer whom Cicero twits on his cowardice in battle, but in whose company he delights to discuss knotty problems in law over his wine cups. Of the fifteen other correspondents whom Cicero addresses with the nomen in the dative 11 had no cognomen, so far as we know. Five of his 7 letters to Q. Cornificius were thus addressed. He was a good friend of Cicero, and his colleague in the college of Augurs. Cicero dedicated one of his rhetorical works to him. M'. Curius, to whom three letters were addressed with this form, was very intimate with Cicero, as is known from the many references to him, and from the fact that in his will he left Cicero considerable property. Two of the three letters to C. Memmius are of the same form, and there are several passages in which Cicero speaks of him in friendly words of praise. There are two letters to Ligarius with this form, the man whom Cicero defended so vigorously in the extant speech. In the same way we find Cicero addressing Cn. Domitius Ahenobarbus, the son of that haughty aristocrat, who aided Cicero so successfully in his canvass for the consulship. The letter is a sympathetic appeal for Domitius to yield to the will of Caesar and to accept pardon after the utter defeat of the Pompeian party. The other letters with this form of greeting are for the most part also to those whom we know to have been intimate with Cicero.

The use of the cognomen for the name of the writer is by far

Trebonius Ciceroni Sal., Fam. 12. 16; Matius Ciceroni Sal., Fam. 11. 28; the fourth is Caelius Ciceroni Sal., Fam. 8. 1–17. They are all intimate friends of Cicero, but in no case do they address him by his nomen.

the most frequent form, occurring 181 times; and the combination cognomen and cognomen is also the commonest formula, occurring 93 times. It represents a friendly relation between the correspondents, and is used in social letters and in letters between friends doing business with one another. This form of address is used in the 5 letters to M. Brutus in the collection ad Fam. (also in the collection ad Brut.); in the 12 to his good friend Paetus; in 15 of the 17 to Plancus, the friend of his adversity, whom he afterward befriended; in 6 of his 7 to his son-in-law, Dolabella; in the one to his would-be son-in-law, Crassipes; in 7 of the 8 to the great scholar, Varro; and so on in the letters of his less famous friends.

The formula praenomen cognomen is second to the simple cognomen in point of frequency, occurring 129 times in the first part of the address and 60 times in the second. The number is smaller in the second part because of the lack of the cognomen in many names, praenomen nomen often taking the place. The formula praenomen cognomen and praenomen cognomen has a business tone and is found in 11 of the 12 to Appius Claudius, in the three letters to Cato, in the 14 letters to D. Brutus, in the letters to Metellus Nepos, in 2 of his three letters to Pompey, in 1 of the 7 letters to Dolabella, in one of the letters to Plancus, his friend, and so on with a large number of his political associates.

The use of the praenomen nomen in the second part is more familiar, or else due to lack of cognomen. It occurs in such letters as the 4 to Marius, 6 of the 17 to Servius Sulpicius, 2 of the 3 to Trebonius, in the 9 to Caelius. The full name praenomen nomen cognomen in both parts was decidedly formal and official, and in all but three cases was supplemented with the name of the father (sometimes the grandfather also), or with titles, or both. Cicero sometimes used the praenomen cognomen for his own name and the full name in the second part, thus making the whole slightly less formal and paying the compliment to his correspondent.

Three hundred and fifty-five of the 374 greetings may be reduced to the following five general classes,[1] which with the

[1] The feeling of these five classes may be represented in a general way by the following English forms of address: 1. My dear Charles. 2. My dear Walker. 3. My dear Mr. Walker. 4. Mr. Charles H. Walker, Dear Sir. 5. Hon. Charles Hadley Walker, Superintendent of Public Works, Dear Sir.

intermediate ones are arranged in order according to the degrees of familiarity they represent. The number of occurrences is given for each in parenthesis:

1.	Praen. & Praen. (20) (*a*) Nom. & Praen. (20)	Close friendship, of long standing, perhaps from boyhood.
2.	Nom. & Nom. (24) (*a*) Cogn. & Nom. (55)	The intimacy of the family, or the friendship of maturer years.
3.	Cogn. & Cogn. (93) (*a*) Cogn. & Praen. Nom. (7) (*b*) Cogn. & Praen. Cogn. (11)	Cordial and friendly, but not personally intimate.
4.	(*a*) Praen. Cogn. & Praen. Nom. (54) Praen. Cogn. & Praen. Cogn. (50) (*b*) Praen. Cogn. & Praen. Nom. Cogn. (4)	Merely business or political acquaintance.
5.	Praen. Nom. Cogn. & Praen. Nom. Cogn. (5)	Very formal and official.

The familiar forms may be made more cordial by the use of plurimam, or suo, or some adjective; and the more reserved ones may be made more formal by the addition of titles, father's name, etc. The remaining 19 instances are somewhat irregular and fail to give a proper balance to the two names. They are represented by the three forms:

Cogn. & Praen. Nom. Cogn. (2)
Praen. Cogn. & Nom. (10)
Praen. Cogn. & Cogn. (7)

One of the places to which we may apply the principles of this paper is in the greeting of the letters to Atticus. The form Cognomen & Cognomen (Cicero Attico Sal.) is the most common of all, and the one an editor would be likely to use if he sought uniformity; but inasmuch as the greeting is indicative of feeling, Atticus himself would probably be the only editor who would venture to change the original forms, or desire to reduce all to a common level; and of course there are good reasons for believing that he prepared the collection for publication. This friendly but somewhat business-like formula is not the one that we should

expect to find occurring so frequently in Cicero's letters to Atticus, certainly not so uniformly; especially when we consider that a continued correspondence in the case of others usually shows some variety, and that in the body of the letters to Atticus Cicero shows variety in the form of address, using in order of frequency the forms Atticus, Pomponius, Titus, and Titus Pomponius. The one exception of moment to the standard formula is the playful address in III. 20 (Cicero S. D. Q. Caecilio Q. F. Pomponiano Attico, quod quidem ita etc.), which is an essential part of the letter and could not be changed by the editor.[1]

[1] Since this paper was read by title before the American Philological Association July, 1895, an interesting article has appeared in the Classical Review, 1898, p. 438 ff. by Cora M. Porterfield, in which the author would prove the traditional greeting, Cicero Attico Sal., genuine. Against the charge of uniformity she cites as instances of variety the form in III. 20, six omissions of Sal., 3 occurrences of S. D., one of Sal. Dic., and one of Salutem Dicit, and refers to instances of approximate uniformity in the letters to certain other correspondents.

Unfortunately Miss Porterfield proves too much. The variations S., Sal., Salutem, etc., are unessential and none of the editors are careful to follow the MSS. Even Mendelssohn is careless in this particular. Among the instances cited as examples of uniformity she fails to notice that only two of the ten greetings in the letters to Lentulus are genuine, and that they are not uniform in the MSS, that only 7 of the 14 cases for Cornificius are genuine and they also differ, that in the case of the other authors cited the number of variants from the standard type is larger than is supposed, as no account is taken of letters to the same correspondents to be found in other books than the ones mentioned. This part of the argument breaks down completely on a careful examination of all the cases. The numbers cited for the various lists differ materially from mine, but the only one that I have attempted to test is in the statement concerning the letters to Tiro where it should be stated that one and not nine of the 26 greetings correspond to the type in the letters to Atticus. On second thought one would see that there is little point in citing the name of Tiro, for Cicero could hardly employ any other name for his freedman.

The arguments from the use of the forms of address in the letters (Tite, 1, Pomponi, 8, and Attice, 19) may be turned about and used in support of the theory of later editing. If I may trust my own index of proper names for the letters ad Atticum there are 33 instances of the form Atticus (including the vocative and other cases), 7 of Pomponius (usually with mi expressing marked intimacy), 3 of T. Pomponius, and 2 of Titus. The other arguments are also equally forceful in support of variety in the original greetings and of later editing.

There is a somewhat important question of interpretation in Latin which we are now in a position to consider. Here and there throughout the literature names are used in the vocative of address, and there is no agreement among scholars as to the meaning suggested by the different forms. One may notice the various views held on such passages as Hor. Sat. 2. 5. 32, "Quinte," puta, aut "Publi" (gaudent praenomine molles Auriculae), "*the praenomen tickles the sensitive ear*"; Hor. Sat. 2. 6. 37, Pers. V. 79, Cic. Fam. VII. 32, and many others. For example, Orelli on the first passage in Horace maintains that the praenomen belongs to freemen, and is used among relatives and friends. Gildersleeve on Pers. V. 74 also says that only freemen were entitled to the praenomen. Tyrrell on Cic. Fam. VII. 32 takes exception to the view of Orelli and affirms that it was the *omission* of the praenomen that was a mark of intimacy in the time of Cicero, and quotes the following from the beginning of the letter:

Quod sine praenomine familiariter, ut debebas, ad me epistolam misisti, primum addubitavi num a Volumnio senatore esset, quocum mihi est magnus usus, deinde εὐτραπελία litterarum fecit, ut intellegerem tuas esse.

Reid on this same passage differs with both in holding that the address *by one name* only was the familiar style. Any one who has read thus far in this paper can see how there is some truth in each of these views, and how no one fully expresses the principle. A study of the greetings makes the subject perfectly clear. But to turn to this passage from Cicero again, which has never been properly interpreted, it is probable that the letter to which Cicero refers was addressed on the outside simply M. Tullio (cf. M'. Curio, ad. Att. VIII. 5. 2, and M. Lucretio, on a Pompeian wall painting), and that the greeting read, Volumnius S. D. Tullio, a form expressive of close intimacy[1] (sine praenomine familiariter). Cicero in order to introduce a delicate compliment says that with the praenomen omitted he was in doubt whether the letter was from him, P. Volumnius, or the Senator L. Volumnius, with whom he was on intimate terms, until the spicy style of the letter itself revealed the writer. He then assures Volumnius that this form of address was much more acceptable than a formal one, meaning perhaps P. Eutrapelus M. Tullio S. D.

[1] See class 2, page 401 above.

Space will not permit me to do more than mention other questions to which the principles of this paper may be made to apply. They may be used in testing the large number of greetings that have been introduced by conjecture, in determining the value of various emendations that have been made in others, in correcting certain errors in the tradition of the MSS, and with the aid of complete indexes of proper names in establishing the text of the letters in regard to proper names, and in distinguishing men of the same name. We are also in a position to form some idea of the relative esteem in which Cicero held many of his acquaintances, and in some instances where almost nothing is known of a correspondent we can learn something of Cicero's feeling for him from the greeting alone.

LELAND STANFORD JR. UNIVERSITY. E. M. PEASE.

ORATION XI OF DIO CHRYSOSTOMUS.

A Study in Sources.

Dio Chrysostomus' Oration XI, *Τρωϊκὸς ὑπὲρ τοῦ Ἴλιον μὴ ἁλῶναι*, is the centre of his sophistic studies upon Homer. It is the sole surviving treatise which preserves, in organic sequence, traces of the adverse Homeric criticism of preceding centuries. The fact that modern scholars have differed widely as to its real purpose and date[1] should not be allowed to obscure its undeniably sophistic character.[2] It is not necessary, however, to assign it to Dio's distinctively rhetorical, that is, pre-exilic, period. It is very probable that he wrote it even in the midst of the sober efforts of his philosophical period, as a burlesque upon the methods of the Sophists, the professional truth-teachers, and with the express purpose of so treating a preposterous theme as to beat them on their own ground. Its tone, therefore, is much the same as that of Isocrates' *Βούσιρις* and *Ἑλένης ἐγκώμιον*.[3] The abuse which the oration heaps upon the Sophists and their methods is manifestly Isocratean[4] in tone, though in language it is an imitation of Plato.[5]

The framework of Oration XI is the application of Aristotle's theory of *τὸ εἰκός* and *τὸ ἀναγκαῖον*, as laid down in the Rhetoric, Bk. I, ch. 2, §§ 14, 15. Dio, however, has done exactly what Aristotle forbids, and has applied the theory to the events of an artistic creation. He rejects the limiting dictum of the Poetics, ch. IX, §1, 1451 a 38: *οὐ τὸ τὰ γενόμενα λέγειν, τοῦτο ποιητοῦ ἔργον ἐστίν, ἀλλ' οἷα ἂν γένοιτο καὶ τὰ δυνατὰ κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἢ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον.*

[1] See Hagen, Quaestiones Dioneae, Kiel, 1887, pp. 42 f., for résumé of opinions of Casaubon, Burckhardt, Dümmler, von Wilamowitz-Möllendorff.

[2] See von Arnim, Leben und Werke des Dio von Prusa, Berlin, 1898, pp. 166–169.

[3] Cf. Jebb, Attic Orators, Vol. II, pp. 93 ff.

[4] Cf. Or. XI, §§ 11, 16, 18, 19, 23, with the Helen, §§ 2–13, and with the *κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν*, §§ 1, 2.

[5] Cf. the Republic, Bk. X, 595 B, C.

Cf. also ch. XXIV, §10: *προαιρεῖσθαί τε δεῖ ἀδύνατα εἰκότα μᾶλλον ἢ δυνατὰ ἀπίθανα.* Cf. also ch. XXV, §17, 1461 b 10–13: *ὅλως δὲ τὸ ἀδύνατον μὲν ἢ πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν ἢ πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ πρὸς τὴν δόξαν δεῖ ἀνάγειν. πρός τε γὰρ τὴν ποίησιν αἱρετώτερον πιθανὸν ἀδύνατον ἢ ἀπίθανον καὶ δυνατόν. . . . πρὸς <δ'> ἃ φασιν, τἄλογα. οὕτω τε καὶ ὅτι ποτὲ οὐκ ἄλογόν ἐστιν· εἰκὸς γὰρ καὶ παρὰ τὸ εἰκὸς γίνεσθαι.* Similarly, each step in the argument of Oration XI is a perversion of some Aristotelian principle of Homeric criticism.

These principles of Aristotelian and Peripatetic criticism upon Homer are, as is well known, represented only in the Scholia upon Homer, and chiefly in those which bear the name of Porphyry. The adverse side of this criticism represents the labors of the *ἐνστατικοί*, from Zoilos down; the explanatory and defensive, those of the *λυτικοί*. It is the purpose of this paper to show, from close parallelisms between these Scholia and Oration XI, that Dio's sources were Porphyry's as well, and consequently to indicate Aristotelian sources and influence for Oration XI.

Dio sets it as his task to show in what points Homer has misrepresented the story of Troy, and to refute him from his own poems,—a manifest perversion of the Aristarchean maxim, *Ὅμηρον ἐξ Ὁμήρου σαφηνίζειν.*

1. According to the universally accepted tradition, Homer was a beggar. It is not probable that beggars in his day were more trustworthy than they are at present. Nor do even his admirers maintain that he was free from falsehood. This is Aristotelian; cf. Poetics, ch. XXIV, §§8, 9: *τὸ δὲ θαυμαστὸν ἡδύ· σημεῖον δέ· πάντες γὰρ προστιθέντες ἀπαγγέλλουσιν ὡς χαριζόμενοι. δεδίδαχεν δὲ μάλιστα Ὅμηρος καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ψευδῆ λέγειν ὡς δεῖ.* In spirit this point is Platonic; cf. the Republic, Bk. II, 334 B.

2. Dio dismisses as commonplaces Homer's false and scandalous representations of the gods,[1] and maintains that even on minor points Homer is a liar. Homer reports scenes and conversations among the gods of which it was impossible that he should have knowledge. He even pretends to know the language of the gods,—a manifest absurdity.[2] But not even

[1] The language is a close imitation of Plato, Rep. Bk. II, 378 D; III, 386 A, B.

[2] Cf. for the language, the Cratylus, 391 D. For Dio's *a priori* argument, cf. Isocrates, *κατὰ τῶν σοφιστῶν*, § 2, *οὐ τὴν ἐκείνων (τῶν θεῶν) γνώμην εἰδώς, ἀλλ' ἡμῖν ἐνδείξασθαι βουλόμενος ὅτι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐν τοῦτο τῶν ἀδυνάτων ἐστίν.*

Homer, with all his effrontery, dares vouch for these stories, but resorts to the device of putting them in the mouths of his characters.[1]

3. Homer's starting-point and conclusion seem chosen utterly at random.[2]

4. The Homeric account of Helen's abduction is totally false. It is unreasonable that Alexander should have become enamored of a woman whom he had never seen, and that she, in turn, should have been persuaded to leave all that was dear to her, in order to follow a man of alien race. It was because of this *ἀλογία*, and in order to aid Homer in his embarrassment, that men had to fashion the myth of Aphrodite's assisting Alexander in return for his decision in favor of her beauty.[3] Every circumstance points to Helen's having been given in legal marriage by her father, who had power[4] to bestow her as he pleased. Even if Alexander himself had wished to pursue such a course as Homer ascribes to him, it is not probable that his discreet brother Hector would have allowed it at first, or, having allowed it, would later have

[1] Such is Dio's perversion of the well-known *λύσις ἐκ τοῦ προσώπου*. Cf. also the Poetics, ch. XXIV, § 7: *Ὅμηρος ... ἄξιος ἐπαινεῖσθαι, ... ὅτι μόνος τῶν ποιητῶν οὐκ ἀγνοεῖ ὃ δεῖ ποιεῖν αὐτόν. αὐτὸν γὰρ δεῖ τὸν ποιητὴν ἐλάχιστα λέγειν, οὐ γάρ ἐστι κατὰ ταῦτα μιμητής. ... ὁ δὲ ὀλίγα φροιμιασάμενος, εὐθὺς εἰσάγει ἄνδρα ἢ γυναῖκα ἢ ἄλλο τι, καὶ οὐδὲν ἀηθες, ἀλλ' ἔχοντα ἦθη.*

[2] Cf. Porphyry, Schol. to A 1: *διὰ τί ἀπὸ τῶν τελευταίων ἤρξατο, καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ τῶν πρώτων ὁ ποιητής*; and further, on the poet's beginning with the unlucky word *μῆνις*: *ἐπιλύουσι δὲ αὐτὸ οἱ περὶ Ζηνόδοτον οὕτως ὅτι πρέπον ἐστὶ τῇ ποιήσει τὸ προοίμιον, τὸν νοῦν τῶν ἀκροατῶν διεγεῖρον καὶ προσεχεστέρους ποιοῦν, εἰ μέλλει πολέμους καὶ θανάτους διηγεῖσθαι.* Cf. also Porphyry on M 127: *καὶ γὰρ οὗτος εἰς τρόπος ἑρμηνείας, ἐκ τῶν ὕστερον ἀρξάμενον ἀναδραμεῖν εἰς τὰ πρῶτα καὶ πάλιν συνάψαι ταῦτα τοῖς ὑστέροις. ... οὕτως γὰρ (ὁ ποιητὴς) εὐθὺς κατ' ἀρχὰς τὴν μῆνιν εἰπὼν κεφαλαιωδῶς, ὅσων κακῶν αἰτία γέγονε τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ὕστερον ἐπὶ τὰ αἴτια ἀνατρέχει ταύτης καὶ ἐπεξεργάζεται δι' ὅλης τῆς ποιήσεως τὰ κατ' αὐτήν.* Aristotle is the ultimate source; cf. Poetics, ch. VII, 3; XXIII, 3.

[3] Cf. Porphyry on Δ 51, where the defence of Hera, Athena, and Aphrodite is set forth: *εὐπρεπῆ βουλόμενος περιθεῖναι αὐτῇ (Ἥρᾳ) τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὀργῆς ὁ ποιητὴς καὶ οὐχ ἦν ὁ μῦθος ἀναπλάττει κτλ.*

[4] For the same word, *κύριος*, cf. Arist. Rhet. II, ch. 24, 1401 b 35: *ἄλλος (τόπος) παρὰ τὴν ἔλλειψιν τοῦ πότε καὶ πῶς, οἷον ὅτι δικαίως Ἀλέξανδρος ἔλαβε τὴν Ἑλένην· αἵρεσις γὰρ αὕτη ἐδόθη παρὰ τοῦ πατρός. ... οὐ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἴσως, ἀλλὰ τὸ πρῶτον. καὶ γὰρ ὁ πατὴρ μέχρι τούτου κύριος.* Aristotle may have had reference to an *Ἀλεξάνδρου ἐγκώμιον* that was probably composed by Polycrates, Isocrates' rival.

reviled him for this very reason.[1] Further, it is improbable that Alexander could have managed the abduction in so leisurely a manner, as to carry off not only Helen, but many household goods, and, strangest of all, Helen's handmaid, the aged and infirm Aethra, the mother of her former abductor, Theseus.[2]

Most conclusive of all, Helen's father and brothers, alone of the Achaean chieftains, took no part in the expedition. It was for the purpose of anticipating criticism on this point that Homer represented Helen as wondering where her brothers were.[3] Even granting that they had originally accompanied the expedition, why did they delay ten years[4] in making preparations for it?

Agamemnon's ambition and power placed him at the head of the expedition.[5] He was incited by Menelaus' reproaches for having allowed Alexander to win Helen's hand; and he, in turn, used as arguments to the other chieftains the rich booty to be obtained in Asia, and the aid his Asiatic kinsmen would render the expedition.[6] A formal demand was made upon Priam for the

[1] Porphyry on Γ 16–49 shows that the justice of the abusive terms had been extensively discussed: *λοιδόρου γὰρ πάθος τὸ μετὰ ἐννέα ἔτη εἰς τοιαύτας λοιδορίας ἐκπίπτειν. . . . νῦν δὲ διὰ τί ταῦτα προφέρει; οὐ γὰρ δὴ ὥσπερ Ὅμηρος πρώτην μάχην ταύτην ὑφίσταται ἐν ποιήσει, καὶ ταῖς ἀληθείαις πρώτη ἦν, ἵνα λόγον ἔχῃ ὁ τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὀνειδισμός, εἰ μὴ λοίδορον ἄρα ἐπιδεῖξαι βούλεται καὶ ὀργίλον ἄλλως τὸν Ἕκτορα.* Further on in Oration XI, Dio, using Aristotle's *λύσις ἐκ τοῦ καιροῦ*, accepts the scene as an actual occurrence.

[2] This also was a fruitful theme for disputation. Cf. Porphyry on Γ 144: *ἀδύνατόν φασι τὴν Αἴθραν ἔτι ζῆν καὶ ἀμφιπόλου τάξιν ἔχειν κτλ.*

[3] Porphyry's long note on Γ 236 shows this point to have provoked probably a greater amount of discussion than any other single one: *διὰ τί τὴν Ἑλένην πεποίηκεν ἀγνοοῦσαν περὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ὅτι οὐ παρῆσαν, δεκαετοῦς τοῦ πολέμου ὄντος καὶ αἰχμαλώτων πολλῶν γενομένων; ἄλογον γάρ. ἔτι δὲ καὶ εἰ ἠγνόει, ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦν ἀναγκαῖον μνησθῆναι τούτων, οὐκὲ ρωτηθεῖσαν . . . περὶ αὐτῶν· οὐδὲ γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ποίησιν πρὸ ἔργου ἦν ἡ τούτων μνήμη.* Several *λύσεις* are ascribed to Aristotle . . . *λέγει δὲ Ἡρακλείδης ὅτι ἄλογον ἦν ὄντως τοῦτο εἰ διατελεσάντων ἐν τῇ Τροίᾳ πάντων Ἑλλήνων ἐννέα ἔτη μηδὲν περὶ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἔσχεν Ἑλένη λέγειν. . . . δῆλον οὖν ὅτι προοικονομεῖ ὁ ποιητὴς βουλόμενος εἰπεῖν τὴν ἀφάνειαν αὐτῶν.*

[4] Cf. Porphyry on Helen's *ἐεικοστὸν ἔτος* (Ω 765). It was made the basis of a legend, entirely unknown to Homer, of a former expedition of the Greeks against Troy, when they landed by mistake in Mysia, and had to return to Greece to re-assemble their forces.

[5] Cf. Thucydides, Bk. I, ch. 9: *Ἀγαμέμνων τέ μοι δοκεῖ τῶν τότε δυνάμει προύχων καὶ οὐ τοσοῦτον τοῖς Τυνδάρεω ὅρκοις κατειλημμένους τοὺς Ἑλένης μνηστῆρας ἀγων τὸν στόλον ἀγεῖραι.*

[6] For the Asiatic origin of the Atridae, cf. Thucydides, Book I, ch. 9.

surrender of Helen—a demand which the Trojans, conscious of innocence in obtaining her, indignantly refused. Otherwise, who of them would have submitted to the woes thus imminent, when they could have saved the city and themselves by surrendering Helen?[1]

5. The Achaeans were repulsed on their first attempt to land. Homer admits that Protesilaus was killed, and his ship burned;[2] but the losses of the Achaeans were far more serious than this. They returned under cover of night, and, constructing a camp at the ships, fortified it with a wall.[3] They occupied no territory besides their camp, as is proved by two facts, which Homer mentions: Troilus, a mere boy, was in the habit of running for exercise so far from the city as to be ambushed by Achilles; and the Achaeans cultivated the Chersonese, and brought wine from Lemnos.[4] Their situation grew more desperate, day by day,—a fact which not even Homer could conceal. The successes of the Trojans at this period are set forth with much truth, though unwillingly. It is when Homer comes to flatter[5] the Achaeans that he is plainly guilty of falsehood. The *ἀριστεῖαι* of the Achaeans are all fruitless, and are full of the most absurd and even impious inventions.

6. It was thenceforth impossible that men so decisively beaten

[1] Both argument and language are Herodotean; cf. Bk. II, ch. 120.

[2] Cf. Porphyry, Schol. to O 701 ff.: *ἐζήτηται διὰ ποίαν αἰτίαν μόνην τὴν Πρωτεσιλάου παρέδωκε ναῦν καιομένην. ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι ᾔδέσθη ὁ Ὅμηρος εἰπεῖν ἐμπρῆσαί τινα τῶν ζώντων, μήπως ἀνανδρίαν αὐτοῦ τις δόξῃ καταγινώσκειν. . . . εὐπρεπῶς ἐπὶ τὴν τοιαύτην ναῦν ἤγαγε τὸν Ἕκτορα, ἧς οὔτε τὸν ἡγεμόνα μέμψασθαι ἐνῆν μὴ κωλύσαντα τὴν οἰκείαν ναῦν ἐμπιπραμένην.*

[3] Cf. for this tradition that the wall was made necessary by defeat, Thucydides, Bk. I, ch. 11. Cf. also Porphyry on M 10 and 25, whose general idea is identical with Aristotle's (see Strabo, 13, 1, 36), viz. that this wall was a pure invention of Homer. Cf. also Porphyry on K 194, where is set forth Aristotle's *ἀπορία* as to why the Achaean council was not held inside the wall,—if any such wall existed.

[4] Cf. Thucydides, Bk. I, ch. 11.

[5] For this as a principle of composition, cf. Porphyry on A 1: *ζητοῦσι διὰ τί ἀπὸ τῆς μήνιδος ἤρξατο κτλ. . . . ἵνα τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν Ἑλλήνων πιθανώτερα ποιήσῃ. ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔμελλε νικῶντας ἀποφαίνειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, εἰκότως οὐ κατατρέχει, ἀξιοπιστότερον ἐκ τοῦ μὴ πάντα χαρίζεσθαι τῷ ἐκείνων ἐπαίνῳ.* So everywhere throughout the *ἀριστεῖαι*. Cf. Porphyry on E 7 and 20, where Zoilos is quoted as chiding Homer for having portrayed certain details *λίαν γελοίως*.

should turn back the tide of fortune.[1] The strength of the Myrmidons alone—granting them to have hitherto held aloof from war—was not adequate to accomplish this, and it is incredible that the mere shouting of the single individual Achilles should have done so.[2] Often must he have engaged in the fight before—else how could he have had any renown at all?—and yet nothing remarkable is recorded of him. The true story of his combat with Hector is exactly the reverse of the Homeric version. How could Achilles have been so *ἀνόητος* as to send Patroclus forth to fight, bidding him to avoid Hector, as if one could choose his adversary in a battle?[3] Yet it was to this one, known to be Hector's inferior, that Achilles entrusted his armor and steeds. How is it possible that Patroclus could have worn the armor, and yet been unable to wield the spear?[4] Furthermore, Achilles himself does not go, as Homer is careful to emphasize, because of a certain prophecy to the effect that he would fall. This is nothing less than a direct accusation of cowardice. The prophecy is deficient, also, in that, though coming through his mother,[5] it told him nothing of the fate which awaited Patroclus. And yet Homer says he loved Patroclus as himself, and on his death, no longer cared to live. In a word, this whole account of Patroclus is full of inconsistencies. Patroclus is manifestly a supposititious[6]

[1] Cf. Porphyry on O 56–77: . . . *παραμυθεῖται τὸν ἀκροατὴν . . . ὅτι οἱ τὰ τοιαῦτα πράξαντες (οἱ Τρῶες) κρατηθήσονταί ποτε.*

[2] Cf. Porphyry on Σ 230: *ἀπίθανόν φασι καὶ ἄμετρον τὸ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς.* Cf. also Porphyry on X 205: *πῶς γὰρ (φησὶ Μεγακλείδης) τοσαύτας μυριάδας νεύματι Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀπέστρεφεν;* Cf. also Schol. A (Dindorf) to Σ 217.

[3] Cf. Porphyry on Σ 22 (Achilles' grief at the tidings of Patroclus' death): . . . *Ζωίλος δέ φησιν ἄτοπον νῦν εἰδέναι τὸν Ἀχιλλέα· προειδέναι τε γὰρ ἐχρῆν ὅτι κοινοὶ οἱ πολεμικοὶ κίνδυνοι, τόν τε θάνατον οὐκ ἐχρῆν δεινὸν ὑπολαμβάνειν.*

[4] Cf. Porphyry on Π 140: *διὰ τί οὖν μόνον τὸ Πηλιωτικὸν αὐτῷ ἀναρμοστεῖ δόρυ, τῶν ἄλλων ἁρμοσάντων ὅπλων; Μεγακλείδης ἐν δευτέρῳ περὶ Ὁμήρου προοικονομεῖσθαί φησιν Ὅμηρον τὴν ὁπλοποιίαν, κτλ.*

[5] Cf. Schol. A (Dindorf) to Σ 10, 11: *πῶς δὲ, φασὶ, τοῦτο πεπυσμένος παρὰ τῆς μητρὸς ἐπεμπε τὸν Πάτροκλον εἰς τὸν πόλεμον;*

[6] While it is nowhere distinctly enunciated, there are adumbrations of this in the immense mass of adverse criticism which is known to have been directed against Σ and X. In the scholia on these books the names of Megaclides and Crates are especially prominent. Cf. Porphyry on Γ 154: *ὅτι δὲ ἐκ τῶν ὅπλων ἐνῆν πλανηθῆναι τοὺς ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων σημαινομένους ἕκαστον, δηλοῖ τὰ ἐπὶ τοῦ Πατρόκλου, ὃς ἐνδύσασθαι τὰ Ἀχιλλέως ὅπλα ἐδεήθη, κτλ. οὕτως οὐκ ἦν τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν ὅπλων τινὰ δοξάζοντα ἤδη καὶ ὄντως γινώσκειν αὐτόν.* Cf.

personage—ὑπόβλητος—invented by Homer merely to rob Hector of the glory of having slain the mighty Achilles himself.

7. The details of the combat, as given by Homer, are incredible. Achilles, single-handed, checks the Trojans, while all the rest of the Achaeans look on, as if at a theatrical performance.[1] Now he fights with the river, and though well-nigh exhausted,[2] is not conquered; now he impiously threatens Apollo, and pursues him[3] in order to punish him for favoring the Trojans. Though called the swiftest of mortals, he yet cannot overtake Hector,[4] who, in turn, acts most unreasonably, refusing to heed his parents' prayers that he should enter the city, and then, stricken with panic fear, fleeing around it.[5] Athena comes forth from the wall in the likeness of Deiphobus, deceives Hector, and steals his spear.[6] In short the entire narrative is like that of absurd dreams.[7]

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also Porphyry on Λ 611: *διὰ τί τὸν Πάτροκλον ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς πέμπει; ῥητέον οὖν ὅτι κατ' οἰκονομίαν. . . . ὥστε προῳκονόμησε τοῦτο ὁ ποιητὴς οὗτως, ἵνα Ἀχιλλέα δείξῃ μετ' εὐλόγου προφάσεως εἰς τὸν πόλεμον ἐξάγοντα τὸν Πάτροκλον.* Cf. Porphyry on O 56–77 (prophecy of Zeus athetized by Zenodotus): *φασὶ δὲ καὶ ὅτι ὁ* [Μαλλώτης] Ζ. *τὰ ἐκ τοῦ Πάτροκλον . . . Ἕκτωρ . . . ἕως τοῦ λισσομένη . . . Ἀχιλλέα Εὐριπιδείῳ λέγει ἐοικέναι προλόγῳ, ἀφελῶς προαχθέντα καὶ εἰς οὐδὲν δέον ἀφηγηματικῶς.* Cf. Porphyry on Σ 192: *ζητεῖται διὰ τί τὰ Πατρόκλου (ὅπλα) οὐ λαμβάνει, εἰ καὶ τὰ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνῳ ἥρμοσεν. τινὲς, ἡνίοχον λέγοντες εἶναι τὸν Πάτροκλον, φασὶ μὴ ἔχειν αὐτὸν ὅπλα. . . .* Κράτης, *ὅτι τὰ Πατρόκλου Αὐτομέδων εἶχεν, ὅπως ἰσωθῇ τὸ εἶδος καὶ δόξωσιν εἶναι ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεὺς ὁ δὲ Πάτροκλος.*

[1] Cf. Porphyry on X 36: *ἄξιον ζητήσεως, πῶς ἀπόντος Ἀχιλλέως μηδεὶς πολεμεῖ Ἕκτορι . . .* Μεγακλείδης *δέ φησι ταῦτα πάντα πλάσματα εἶναι.* Cf. also Schol. B (Dindorf) to Φ 269: *ὅλον τὸ πεδίον πέλαγος γεγενημένον ὑπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ἔδειξεν ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ὤμους ἐπικλύζειν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως· καὶ πρὸς μὲν ἀλήθειαν ταῦτα οὐ πιθανά—τί γὰρ ἐπράττετο περὶ τοὺς ἄλλους στρατιώτας; ἀπίθανον γὰρ μόνον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ὑπὸ τοῦ ποταμοῦ ταῦτα πάσχειν—ὡς δὲ ἐν ποιήσει παράδεκτα.*

[2] Cf. Porphyry on X 165: *καί φασιν οἱ μὲν ἐπίτηδες αὐτὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ ποιητοῦ καταπεπονῆσθαι πολλῷ πόνῳ πρότερον, ἵν' ὥσπερ ἐν θεάτρῳ νῦν μείζονα κινήσῃ πάθη κτλ.*

[3] Thought and language are close imitations of Plato; cf. the Republic, III, 391 A.

[4] Cf. Porphyry on X 165: *πῶς δὲ, φασὶν, ὁ ποδωκίστατος πάντων οὐ καταλαμβάνει τὸν Ἕκτορα; . . . πρόχειρον μὲν οὖν τὸ λέγειν ὅτι ὁ μὲν Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀριστός ἐστι, πλὴν κέκμηκεν ὑπὸ Ξάνθου, κτλ.*

[5] Cf. Scholium A (Dindorf) to X 141, where (anonymous) dissatisfaction is expressed at the inconsistency of his heroic firmness in vss. 92–97 with his thought of surrender and final flight.

[6] Cf. Porphyry on X 231: *ἀτοπόν φασι θεὸν οὖσαν πλανᾶν τὸν Ἕκτορα.*

[7] These *ἀπορήματα* all go back ultimately to Aristotle's distinction between the canons of artistic construction for epic and those for dramatic

Achilles could not have conquered Hector, because, by Homer's own showing, he could have had none of the virtues claimed for him. Besides being senseless (*ἀνόητος*), impious (*ἀσεβής*), and even without his boasted speed of foot—as has already been shown—he was also inconsistent (*ἀνώμαλος*)[1] in his excessive grief; irascible (*ὀργίλος*);[2] and even cowardly (*δειλός*).[3]

A brief portion of Oration XI is concerned with extra-Homeric events. As this portion is beyond the scope of this paper, it is sufficient to say that Dio concludes that these also prove the failure of the Trojan expedition. The Achaeans selected the winter season for their return voyage; they returned singly, or in small groups; and almost every one encountered either unfaithfulness in wife or disloyalty in subjects. The Trojans, on the contrary, were able to send forth the well-known expeditions of Aeneas and Helenus,—a sure sign of increase in numbers and wealth.

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poetry. Cf. the Poetics, ch. XXIV, 1460 a 14 ff.: *μᾶλλον δ' ἐνδέχεται ἐν τῇ ἐποποιίᾳ τὸ ἄλογον . . . διὰ τὸ μὴ ὁρᾶν εἰς τὸν πράττοντα. ἐπεὶ τὰ περὶ τὴν Ἕκτορος δίωξιν, ἐπὶ σκηνῆς ὄντα, γελοῖα ἂν φανείη· οἱ μέν, ἑστῶτες καὶ οὐ διώκοντες, ὁ δέ, ἀνανεύων.* Cf. also ch. XXV, 1460 b 26 ff. The criticisms of the combat on the side of the supernatural are probably from Megaclides, the pupil of Aristotle and elaborator of some of his principles of criticism.

[1] Cf. Porphyry on Σ 98.

[2] Cf. Arist. Rhet. Bk. II, 3, 1380 b, 94. Cf. also the Poetics, ch. XV, 8, 1454 b, 12–15, where Achilles, as delineated by Homer, is taken as the type.

[3] For the view that his inactivity was due to cowardice, cf. Porphyry on A 1 and H 229; and see Schol. B (Dind.) on H 228. Cf. especially Schol. A (Dind.) on X 188: *σημειῶδες ὅτι μόνος Ὁμήρός φησι μονομαχῆσαι τὸν Ἕκτορα, οἱ δὲ λοιποὶ πάντες ἐνεδρευθῆναι ὑπὸ Ἀχιλλέως.*

Doubt as to Achilles' pre-eminence is as old as Xenophanes. Plato, Zoilos, Antisthenes, Crates, and Persaeus (cf. Porphyry on A 62) especially contributed to it. Aristotle, in Bks. II and III of the Rhetoric, has many references to Achilles that sound as if taken from sophistical *ψόγοι*.

THE USE OF ATQUE AND AC IN SILVER LATIN.

As early as 1563, Gabrielle Faerno,[1] in a note to Cic. pro Flacc. 3, commented upon the difference in the use of *atque* and *ac*. Two centuries later Burmann and Drakenborch again took up the discussion, and from that time to the present, treatise after treatise has appeared. It is now generally agreed that *ac* is only a shortened form of *atque*,[2] and that the *a* of *ac* is short.[3]

As *ac* is a shortened form of *atque*, it follows, of course, that *atque* is the older form, and that it was only by degrees that *ac* secured a firm foot-hold in the language. The usage of Plautus and of Terence shows its growth: Plaut. (Goetz and Schoell) in four plays, containing 5000 lines, uses *atque* 211 times (Amph., 51, Capt., 37, M. gl., 51, Ps., 72), while *ac* is used only seven times (Am. 443, 755; Capt. 636; M. gl. 619, 997, 1252; Ps. 558); Ter., on the other hand, uses *atque* 210 times and *ac* 66 times.[4] From this starting-point *ac* became more and more widely used, until, during the Silver Age, it occurs nearly twice as often as *atque* (cf. p. 414,1). In the classic period the use of *ac*, as is well known, was restricted.[5]

A number of instances of *ac* before a vowel are to be found in some of the Christian writers.[6] In Elegiac poetry the use of *ac* was restricted to certain formulae, as *simul ac*.[7] Landgraf (l. c.) says that Cicero uses *ac* before *c* in five passages (all before the syl-

[1] Cf. Zumpt, Lat. Gram.[9] p. 263 (Schmidt's transl.).

[2] Cf. Stolz, Formenlehre,[3] §§ 46 and 49; Lindsay, Lat. Lang. p. 598, Chap. 10, § 2; Georges, Lex. d. lat. Wortf., s. v.

[3] Luc. Mueller, De Re Metr.[2] p. 426, however, regards the *a* as long.

[4] Cf. Elmer, Am. Journ. Phil., VIII, p. 459.

[5] Landgraf, note 408 to Reisig's Vorles. über lat. Spr., cites but five examples of *ac* before a vowel; moreover, two of these are extremely doubtful. In Plin. N. H. XVI, 266 Mayhoff reads *aut alio*; in Gell. 16, 8, 16 Hertz has *atque*. Georges, Lex. d. lat. Wortf., cites Liv. 21, 24, 8 and 42, 13, 3—both incorrectly for 41, 24, 18 and 42, 10, 3—but even here the latest editions eliminate *ac*.

[6] Cf. Luc. Mueller, De Re Metr.[2] pp. 426 and 502.

[7] Cf. Haupt, Observ. Crit. p. 355 and Schulze, Röm. Eleg.[3] p. 283.

lable *con-*) and once before *g*. C. F. W. Mueller, vol. II, 1, p. cii, however, says: "Ciceronem *ac* ante *c*, *g*, *q* posuisse non credo." Caesar, according to Kraner and Doberenz (note on B. G. 1, 44, 3), uses *ac* before *c* only three times, before *g* but once.

The object of the present investigation is to determine the exact use, range, and sphere of these two particles in Silver Latin, and, with this object in view, nine of the leading writers of prose and nine of poetry were examined, the latest Teubner text being used in each case and the text variants noted.[1]

The general usage of prose as contrasted with that of poetry may be seen from the following table:

PROSE.	Atque.	Ac.	POETRY.	Atque.	Ac.
Vell. Paterc.....	58	122	Phaedrus	10	2
Val. Max.	155	302	Seneca	46	109
Seneca	119	728	Persius	9	6
Petronius	61	67	Lucan	82	57
Plin. mai.....	529	932	Val. Flacc.	145	79
Quintilian	322	421	Sil. Ital.....	403	315
Tacitus	312	893	Statius	222	107
Plin. min.	74	172	Martial	59	1
Suetonius	217	627	Juvenal	156	59
Total	1847	4264	Total.....	1132	735

In the Silver Age *atque* occurs 2979 times = 37.3%; *ac*, 4999 times = 62.7%.

1. The figures just given show that during the Silver Age *ac* occurs about twice as often as *atque*.

2. *Atque*, however, is the favorite form in poetry (60.6%), a fact which is possibly due to metrical convenience, since it shows the obvious gain of a short syllable. On the other hand, the wider use of *ac* by the writers of prose (69.8%) may have been influenced by the greater frequency, in writers of this age, of *nec*, the corresponding form of *neque*. The preponderance of *ac* in prose is all the more striking in view of the fact that, while *atque* may be used before either vowels or consonants, *ac* is not found before vowels or gutturals.

Seneca is the only poet that shows a smaller number of occurrences of *atque* (29.7%) than of *ac* (70.3%). This is doubtless to be

[1] It is unfortunate that a complete *apparatus criticus* for every writer of the Silver Age is not available. In an investigation of this sort, the knowledge of all variations in text tradition is an obvious necessity.

explained by his large employment of iambic rhythm, which is closely allied to prose.

3. Several prose writers show a marked preference for the use of *ac*.[1] No prose writer of this period shows more examples of *atque* than of *ac*.

4. The two earliest prose writers in Silver Latin, Velleius and Valerius Maximus show about the same percentage for these two particles, but in Seneca the break occurs with the use of *atque* 14% to *ac* 86%.

5. Of all the writers of poetry, Martial was most fond of *atque*, using *ac* only once (9, 22, 15), *atque* 59 times. In the other eight poets investigated, the opposite extreme occurs in Seneca, *ac* 70.3%, followed by Silius Italicus, *ac* 43.9%, and Lucan, *ac* 41%.[2]

Prose usage presents some interesting contrasts from the point of view of the letter which follows. Thus *atque* occurs before *b* twice, *g* 6, *o* 77, *c* 85, *p* 70, *d* 45, *a* 239, *e* 269, and *i* 548 times. In poetry *atque* occurs before *g* twice (Stat. and Mart.), *i* (cons.) twice (Mart.), *b* 4 times (Stat. Mart. Juv. twice), *n* 6 (Val. Flacc. Sil. Stat. Mart. Juv. twice), *u* 91 times and *e* 96 times. Phaedrus does not use *atque* before *e* and *u*, nor Persius before *i* and *o*. Of the consonants, *atque* is most frequently found before *s* (25 times), *m* (20), *d* (13), of the vowels, before *i* (284), *a* (254), and *o* (133 times).

In prose *ac* occurs least often before *g* (4 times), *c* (49 times; Plin. mai. alone has 30–35 examples, cf. p. 422 f.).[3] *Ac* is found most frequently before *p* (698), *s* (685), *m* (443), *n* (413), and *d* (409 times).

In poetry *ac* occurs least often before *g* (once), *c* (3), *b* (3 times), and most frequently before *s* (121), *p* (112), *t* (84), and *m* (83 times). The usage of poetry shows a practical agreement with that of prose in that *ac* is most frequently used before the same three consonants *p*, *s* and *m*.

The attitude of the writers of the Silver Age toward *atque* before vowels and consonants may be seen from the fact that

[1] *Ac* ranges from 86% in Seneca, 74.3% in Suetonius, 74.1% in Tacitus, to 56.7% in Quintilian and 52.3% in Petronius.

[2] Sen., *atque* 46, *ac* 109; Sil. Ital., *atque* 403, *ac* 315; Lucan, *atque* 82, *ac* 57; Persius, *atque* 9, *ac* 6; Val. Flacc., *atque* 145, *ac* 79; Stat., *atque* 222, *ac* 107; Juv., *atque* 156, *ac* 59; Phaedr., *atque* 10, *ac* 2.

[3] For its use before vowels, cf. p. 421, b.

they use *atque* 2319 times before vowels and only 662 times before consonants. In other words, they used *atque* about three and one-half times as often before a vowel as before a consonant. The prose usage should also be contrasted with the usage of poetry: in prose, *atque* before consonants occurs 498 times (27%), before vowels (including *h*) 1349 times (73%);[1] in poetry, on the other hand, *atque* before consonants is found 164 times (14%), before vowels (including *h*) 970 times (86%). Hence *atque* is used before consonants twice as often in prose as in poetry.

The following is a tabular exhibit of the frequency of *atque* before vowels as compared with its use before consonants:

PROSE.	Vowels.	Consonants.	POETRY.	Vowels.	Consonants.
Velleius Paterculus	51	7	Phaedrus	10	0
Valerius Maximus.	130	25	Seneca	38	8
Seneca	111	8	Persius.....	8	1
Petronius.....	54	7	Lucan	74	8
Plinius maior	300	229	Valerius Flaccus..	118	27
Quintilian	225	97	Silius Italicus.....	389	12
Tacitus.....	246	66	Statius	202	20
Plinius minor	72	2	Martial	31	28
Suetonius.....	160	57	Juvenal	100	60

Total: vowels, 2319; consonants, 662.

From this table it will be seen that in prose *atque* occurs least frequently before consonants in Plin. min. (2.7%), Seneca (6.7%), and Petronius (11.5%), and most often in Plin. mai. (43.3%), Quintilian (30.1%), and Suetonius (26.3%); in poetry, *atque* before consonants varies from no occurrence in Phaedrus, 3% in Silius Italicus and 9% in Statius to 18.6% in Valerius Flaccus, 37.5% in Juvenal, and 47.5% in Martial.

The detailed usage of *atque* and *ac* before the various letters is as follows:[2]

A. *Atque* and *ac* before consonants:

[1] This is a marked departure from the usage of Sallust, who uses *atque* 184 times before consonants and 186 times before vowels. Cf. Alfred Kunze's Sallustiana, 1892, a summary of which is found in Archiv f. lat. Lex. VIII, p. 152.

[2] For the usage of Cicero, Caesar, Sallust and Livy cf. P. Stamm, *Ac und atque vor consonanten*, Jahrb. f. phil. u. paed. 137 (1888), pp. 171 ff. and for Curtius, ibid. pp. 711 f.

b: prose, *atque* 2, *ac* 63; poetry, *atque* 4, *ac* 3 times. Several writers never use *atque*:[1] Velleius (1), Valerius Maximus (5), Seneca, prose (18), Petronius (1), Quintilian (6), Suetonius (5), while Plinius mai. uses *atque* once, *ac* 12 times, Tacitus *atque* 1, *ac* 15 times. *Atque* does not occur in poetry before Statius (1); elsewhere, Martial (1) and Juvenal (2); *ac* only in Seneca, Lucan and Silius Italicus, once in each author.

c: prose, *atque* 85, *ac* 49; poetry, *atque* 15, *ac* 3 times. Plinius mai. takes a conspicuous position among all Latin authors from the large number of times that he uses *ac* before *c* (cf. p. 422 f.). Quintilian uses *ac* before *c* twice, *atque* 19 times, the former usage, as in Cicero, occurring before the syllable *con-* (cf. p. 422, a).

d: Here the contrast is marked; prose, *atque* 45, *ac* 409; poetry, *atque* 13, *ac* 51 times. Valerius Maximus, Seneca (prose and poetry), Petronius, Plinius mai., Phaedrus and Persius never use *atque*.

f: prose, *atque* 39, *ac* 273; poetry, *atque* 12, *ac* 45 times. Velleius uses *ac* 12 times, Plinius min. twice, Seneca (poetry) 7 times, never *atque*. Seneca in his prose uses *atque* once, *ac* 12 times; Quintilian, *atque* 3, *ac* 28 times, and Tacitus *atque* 7, *ac* 53 times.

g: prose, *atque* 6, *ac* 4; poetry, *atque* 2, *ac* once.[2]

i (conson.): prose, *atque* 11 (15%), *ac* 62 (85%); poetry, *atque* 2 (8%), *ac* 23 (92%). *Atque* before *i* (conson.) occurs only in Martial. Tacitus uses *atque* once, *ac* 16 times; Seneca (prose) and Suetonius each use *ac* 10 times, *atque* never; Quintilian uses *atque* before *ieiunam*, 1, 4, 5, *ieiuni*, 2, 25, 1, *ieiunum*, 2, 8, 9, but has *ac ieiuni*, 10, 2, 17.

l: prose, *atque* 36 (11.3%), *ac* 281 (88.7%); poetry, *atque* 16 (25.8%), *ac* 46 (74.2%). In prose, then, *ac* before *l* is far more common than *atque*; *atque*, on the other hand, is used more than twice as often in poetry as in prose. The following authors never use *atque*:[3] Velleius (6), Plinius min. (6), Lucan (3), Silius

[1] The number of occurrences of *ac* is placed in parentheses after the name of each author.

[2] Neue, Formenlehre[3], II, p. 955, cites 7 passages from Cicero and 4 from Caesar. For occurrences in the Silver Age, see p. 423.

[3] The same plan of placing the number of occurrences of *ac* in parentheses after the name of each author is followed in the discussion of each letter.

Italicus (28). Seneca (prose) uses *atque* only once, *ac* 51 times, in his poetry *atque* but once, *ac* 7 times. Tacitus' preference is no less clearly marked: *atque* but 3 times, *ac* 74 times. Juvenal and Martial, however, use *atque* before *l* more frequently than *ac*: Juvenal, *atque* 8 times, *ac* twice, Martial, *atque* 4 times, *ac* never. In Petronius we find *atque* used 3 times, *ac* twice. The ratio in Plinius mai. is as 19:71, in Quintilian, 5:28, in Suetonius, 3:28, and in Persius, 1:7.

m: prose, *atque* 31 (6.5%), *ac* 443 (93.5%); poetry, *atque* 20 (19%), *ac* 83 (81%). In poetry *atque* is used about three times as often as in prose. The following authors never use *atque*: Velleius (8), Petronius (18), Plinius min. (10), and Silius Italicus (32). Seneca (prose) shows a marked fondness for *ac* before *m*, using it 90 times, while we find *atque* only 3 times. This is also true in the case of Tacitus who uses *ac* 103 times, *atque* but twice. Plinius mai. uses *atque* 15 times, *ac* 96 times; in Quintilian the figures are 8:36, in Suetonius, 2:61, in Valerius Flaccus, 7:9, in Statius, 3:13, and in Juvenal, 4:11.

n: prose, *atque* 37 (8.2%), *ac* 413 (91.8%); poetry, *atque* 6 (8.7%), *ac* 63 (91.3%). The usage of poetry and that of prose nearly balance each other. The following authors never use *atque*: Velleius (7), Petronius (15), Plinius min. (32), Suetonius (97), Seneca, in poetry (7), Persius (1), Lucan (9); the following use it but once: Seneca, in prose (31), Tacitus (79), Valerius Flaccus (9), Silius Italicus (31). The fact that Quintilian uses *atque* 4 times, *ac* 29 times, Tacitus *atque* once, *ac* 79 times, and Suetonius *atque* never, *ac* 97 times, indicates the marked preference for the use of *ac* before *n* which is noticeable in all the writers of the Silver Age.

p: Here the contrast is again marked: prose, *atque* 70 (9.1%), *ac* 698 (90.9%); poetry, *atque* 8 (6.7%), *ac* 112 (93.3%). Both prose and poetry decidedly prefer the use of *ac* before *p*. This preference is further emphasized by the fact that the following authors never use *atque*, while they employ *ac* with great frequency as the figures in parentheses indicate: Valerius Maximus (47), Seneca, in prose (100), in poetry (12), Petronius (9), Plinius min. (39), and Silius Italicus (47). The ratio of *atque* to *ac* in Plinius mai. is 36:144, in Quintilian, 15:63, in Tacitus, 6:156, in Suetonius, 9:119, in Lucan, 1:5, in Valerius Flaccus, 2:11, in Statius, 1:27, in Martial, 1:0 and in Juvenal, 3:10.

r: prose, *atque* 17 (6.6%), *ac* 240 (93.4%); poetry, *atque* 14 (30.4%), *ac* 32 (69.6%). In prose therefore, *ac* is preferred before *r*. The following writers use only *ac*, the figures in parentheses showing the number of occurrences: Velleius (7), Valerius Maximus (14), Seneca, in prose, (43), Plinius min. (9), and Lucan (3). Plinius mai. uses *atque* 5 times and *ac* 73 times, Quintilian, *atque* 8, *ac* 31, Tacitus, *atque* once, *ac* 33, and Silius Italicus, *atque* 3, *ac* 15 times. The preference for *ac* is marked in every writer of this age except Valerius Flaccus, *atque* twice, *ac* twice, Statius, *ac* once, *atque* once, and Juvenal, who reverses the usage, employing *atque* 6 times and *ac* 4 times.

s: A similar preference for *ac* occurs with this letter, the excess being even greater than with *r*; prose, *atque* 35 (4.9%), *ac* 685 (95.1%); poetry, *atque* 25 (17%), *ac* 121 (83%). Prose writers prefer *ac* to *atque* before *s* in the ratio of 95 : 5. *Atque* is never used[1] by Velleius (18), Seneca, in prose (117), in poetry (15), Petronius (6), Plinius min. (45), and Persius (2). Valerius Maximus uses *atque* but once, *ac* 31 times; in Plinius mai. the ratio is 15 : 144, in Quintilian, 11 : 76, in Tacitus, 1 : 132, in Suetonius, 7 : 116, in Lucan, 1 : 8, in Valerius Flaccus, 4 : 18, in Silius Italicus, 2 : 58, and in Statius, 3 : 16. Martial and Juvenal are the only exceptions to this rule, the former using *atque* 7 times, *ac* but once, and the latter *atque* 8 times, *ac* 3 times.

t: prose, *atque* 41 (11.3%), *ac* 322 (88.7%); poetry, *atque* 12 (12.5%), *ac* 84 (87.5%). As with *n* and *r* the usage of prose and that of poetry almost balance each other, each showing a preference for *ac* before *t*. *Atque* was never used by the following writers: Velleius (8), Valerius Maximus (32), Seneca, in prose (60), in poetry (15), Petronius (6), Persius (1), Lucan (11), Silius Italicus (26). Plinius min. uses *atque* once, *ac* 13 times, Suetonius, *atque* once, *ac* 39 times, and Statius, *atque* once, *ac* 12 times. *Atque* before *t* does not appear in prose before Plinius mai. who uses it 17 times, *ac* 58 times. Following Plinius, Quintilian uses *atque* 5 times, *ac* 25 times, Tacitus *atque* 17 times, *ac* 80 times. *Atque* in poetry appears as early as Seneca who uses it twice, *ac* 20 times, and reappears in Valerius Flaccus who uses it 3 times, *ac* 8 times. Here, again, Martial and Juvenal depart from the prevailing usage, the former using only *atque*, and but once,

[1] The figures for *ac* are given in parentheses.

while in the latter author the two almost balance, *atque* being used 5 times, *ac* 6 times.

v: prose, *atque* 33 (9.1%), *ac* 328 (90.9%); poetry, *atque* 11 (14.3%), *ac* 66 (85.7). The preference for *ac* before *v* is more decided in prose than in poetry. *Atque* was never used by Valerius Maximus (23), Petronius (4), Phaedrus (2), Statius (12), and only once by Velleius (11), Seneca, in prose (56), in poetry (11), and Valerius Flaccus (10). Plinius mai. uses *atque* 9 times, *ac* 70 times; for Quintilian the proportion is 9:44, for Tacitus, 4:76, for Plinius min., 3:9, for Suetonius, 6:35, for Silius Italicus, 2:19 and for Juvenal, 3:7. Martial alone uses *atque* more frequently than *ac*, though he uses *atque* only twice and does not employ *ac*.

What was the factor that determined whether *atque* or *ac* should be used? Was it an inherent difference in the signification of these two forms or did the consonant which followed settle the question? It need hardly be said that the usage of prose alone should be considered and this speaks in no uncertain tones. The exact usage of the leading stylists of this age may be gathered from the following statements:

Seneca (prose) never uses *atque* before the following consonants:[1] before *b* (18), *d* (89), *p* (100), *r* (43), *s* (117), *t* (60).[2] Tacitus, before *b*, has *atque* once, *ac* 15 times, before *m*, *atque* twice, *ac* 103 times, before *n*, *atque* once, *ac* 79 times, before *p*, *atque* 6, *ac* 156 times, before *r*, *atque* once, *ac* 33 times, before *s*, *atque* once, *ac* 132 times. Plinius min. never uses *atque* before *d* (12), *n* (32), *p* (39) and *s* (45). Velleius before *s* has only *ac*, 18 times. Valerius Maximus never uses *atque* before *d* (44), *p* (47), *t* (32), *v* (23). Suetonius never has *atque* before consonantal *i* (10), or *n* (97). In view of these results and the additional fact that in the prose of this period *atque* is used 45 times before *d*, *ac* 409 times, 36 times before *l*, *ac* 281 times, and that before *n*, *atque* occurs in 8.7% of the cases, before *p*, in 9.1%, before *r*, in 6.6%, and before *s*, in only 4.9%, the conclusion seems to be sufficiently clear that the choice of *atque* or *ac* was determined by the consonant which followed. In the case, however, of monosyllabic conjunctions, adverbs, and prepositions, *ac* alone was used. *Atque non* is found first in Plinius mai.;[3] *atque si* occurs in Sen. Ep. 102, 12 (245).

[1] The number of occurrences of *ac* is given in parentheses.

[2] Before *f* he uses *ac* 62 times, *atque* once.

[3] Cf. Schmalz, Lat. synt.[3] p. 340.

B. a) *Atque* before vowels:

1. *Atque* in prose was used most frequently before the vowel *i* (548 times); before *e* it occurs 269 times, before *a*, 239 times, before *u*, 130 times and before *o*, 77 times.

2. In poetry also *atque* was used most frequently before the vowel *i* (284), then before *a* (254), *o* (133), *e* (96) and *u* (91).

3. *Atque* was used by Plinius mai. 59 times before *e*, 37 of the cases occurring before *etiam*.

4. In prose, *atque* occurs before *h* 85 times, in poetry, 112 times.[1]

5. In every prose writer except Plinius min. *atque* was used most frequently before *i*. In this writer *e* leads with 31 instances, followed by *i* with 21.

6. Plinius min. is the only prose writer who does not use *atque* before *o*, Persius the only poet.[2]

b) *Ac* before vowels:

Here but one certain example occurs in Silver Latin: Plinius mai. II, § 174 has *ac ardua* with no variants. In XVI, § 226, Detlefsen reads *ac in*, but Mayhoff writes *aut* with D.[2] In XXIX, § 50 again, Detlefsen reads *ac una*, Mayhoff *denarii una*. In Seneca two bracketed passages occur, N. Q. 2, 31, 1 *ac inlaesis* and Dial. 7, 22, 2 *ac amisso*. Neue, Formenlehre, II,[3] p. 956, cites Quint. 12, 10, 77 *ac oratorem*. This is the reading of Spalding, but Halm reads *nec* and Meister, following Haupt, omits the conjunction.

C. Special consideration of *ac* before *c*, *g* and *q*:

The writers of the Silver Age used *ac* before gutturals much more frequently than the writers of the best period,[3] but as early as Livy we find exceptions to the classical rule. H. J. Mueller[4] says that Livy in the first decade uses *ac* before gutturals 43

[1] *Atque* occurs only once each in Phaedrus, Persius, and Martial.

[2] As *i* and *e* are both palatal vowels and the *e* of *atque* short, and as Quintilian IX, 4, 34, in speaking of the "vocalium concursus" says, "minima est in duabus brevibus offensio," one would expect *atque* to be used more frequently before *i* and *e* than before the guttural vowels *o* and *u*. The results of my investigation substantiate this theory, for in prose and poetry *atque* was used 832 times before *i*, 365 times before *e*, in all 1197 times, on the other hand 210 times before *o* and 221 times before *u*, in all 431 times or approximately one-third as often.

[3] Cf. p. 413.

[4] Cf. H. J. Mueller, Z. f. d. GW. 1888, XIV, 102 ff.

times, of which 19 are before the syllable *con*, and in the other books 5 times, all with the same syllable.[1]

1. *Ac* before *c*.

Lucian Mueller, De Re Metr.[2] p. 502, cites *ac cevet* in Juvenal 9, 40, but Friedlaender, Jahn-Buecheler and Weidner all read *et cevet*. Seneca has but one example, Dial. 8, 3, 1 *ac con-*; Quintilian two, 5, 14, 31[3] and 10, 1, 48, each before *con-*; Tacitus five, Agr. 10, 6 *ac caelo*, 31, 6 *ac con-*, 40, 11 *ac com-*, Hist. 4, 18, 23[3] *ac caeco*, Ann. 12, 47, 12; Suetonius (Roth) five, Caes. 49 *ac Curio*, Aug. 40 *ac comitiis*, Cal. 17 *ac conchylii*, ib. 50 *ac circa*, Claud. 11 *ac centurionibus*.[4]

Plinius mai. is conspicuous among all writers of Latin literature in the number of times that he uses *ac* before a word beginning with *c*. His works show 17 certain, 13 probable and 5 doubtful examples.

a. The 17 certain examples (without variants) are: II. 101 ac Castori; VII. 168 ac ciborum; XI. 220 ac ciborum; XII. 4, 3 ac cypiro; XV. 77 ac comitio; XVI. 60 ac colore; 71 ac Cytoriis; 76 ac candida; XVII. 253 ac cinere; XVIII. 59 ac cicer; XIX. 42 ac contumacem; XX. 15 ac coxendicum; XXX. 117 ac celerius; XXXV. 5 ac circumferunt; 80 ac curare; XXXVI. 79 ac cepas; XXXVII. 4 ac colore.

[1] In the 3rd decade, however, Livy uses *ac* before *con-* 3 times, 22, 30, 4; 38, 11; 47, 3; before *gl-* 22, 12 4; before *gr-* 27, 17, 10 (M. M.); 28, 42, 19; before *cel-* 26, 27, 16.

[2] Omitted by Neue, Formenlehre, II[3], p. 956.

[3] In Hist. 4, 81, 23 Halm[2] reads *ac caeco*, but in his 4th edition he has changed this to *at caeco*, which is the reading of Meiser in the Baiter-Orelli edition. In the two other uncertain passages, Ann. 1, 8, 10 Nipperdey reads *ac cohortes*, Halm[4] *aut cohortes*, Ann. 11, 4, 3 Nipperdey *ac causa*, Halm[4] *at causa*.

[4] As is well known the text of Suetonius is in a deplorable condition. Through the kindness of Professors Smith and Howard, of Harvard University, I am able to give a conspectus of the readings in the above passages: Caes. 49 *ac* V[0] V[1] V[4] Par. 5801, *ad* A, *at* Par. 6116, *a* Par. 5801; Cal. 17 *ac* V[0] Par. 6116, Par. 5801, *at* A, Par. 5802; Cal. 50 *ac* V[0] Par. 5801, *ad* A, *at* Par. 6116, Par. 5802; Claud. 11 *ac* V[0] A Par. 6116, Par. 5801, Par. 5802. (Here A=Par. 6115 (Memmianus) saec. IX Extr., Par. 6116 saec. XII, Par. 5801 saec. ?, Par. 5802 saec. XIV; V[0]=Vat. Lat. 1860 saec. XIV in.; V[1]=Vat. Lat. 7310 saec. XIV in.; V[4]=Vat. Lat. 1904 saec. XI-XII, but extending only to p. 120, 14 of Roth's edition.)

b. The probable examples (read by both Detlefsen and Mayhoff) are: VIII. 223 ac conchylia; X. 120 ac cibis; XI. 231 ac cetera; XIV. 45 ac Corinthum; XV. 10 ac cellis; XVIII. 305 ac Cerinthi; XXV. 119 ac ceteris; 141 ac contrahit; XXX, 55 ac cute; XXXIV. 128 ac Cadmeae; 160 ac compescit; XXXV. 111 ac concinnus; XXXVII. 173 ac contra.

c. Read by Detlefsen alone: II. 219 ac circumcisura, Ac D[2], *a*, r v.; XI. 222 ac cervorum D[2], ad MR, at Mayhoff; XVI. 103 ac coactae ED, hae Mayhoff; XXVIII. 187 ac Cinere V, Mayhoff omits connective; XXXII. 24 ac calcularum BS, *et* Mayhoff.

In Plinius min. Pan. 30, Keil in ed. min. reads *ac* clementi, but in ed. mai. changed the reading to *ac* detinenti.

In poetry there are but three examples, all with text variants: Seneca Troad. 850 ac carens (*ac* Both., *au* ω), Valerius Flaccus 4, 411 ac caeci (Saevi V), Statius Theb. 12, 33 ac ceteri (ac P, *at* ω). In each case *ac* is read in the latest Teubner text.

Summary: *ac* before *c* in prose: Seneca once, Quintilian twice, Tacitus 5 times, Plinius mai. 30–35 times, Suetonius 5 times; in poetry: Seneca once, Valerius Flaccus once, and Statius once; prose 43–48 times, poetry 3 (?) times.

2. *Ac* before *g*.[1]

This occurs 4 times in prose, once in poetry: Seneca Ep. 13. 3. 9 (ac gr-), Plinius mai. II. 135 (ac gelida), XXXIV. 114 (ac genarum, Detlefsen, Mayhoff *et* with C), Tacitus Ann. 12, 64, 13 (ac Gnaei), and Silius Italicus 10, 363 (ac gelidis).

3. *Ac* before *q*.[2]

Plinius mai. has 4 examples with no text variants, II. 200 (ac quinquagies), 206 (ac quicquid), X. 157 (ac quaedam), XXXIII. 29 (ac quod); in XXV. 31 Detlefsen reads *ac* quale, but Mayhoff *aut* with NC.[3] One example occurs in poetry, Valerius Flaccus 7, 267 (ac quem).

D. The usage of Tacitus shows some noteworthy phenomena:

1) *Atque* before consonants.[4]

While Tacitus uses *atque* most frequently in the Annales (41

Harper's Lat. Dct. says: "Before *g*, *ac* does not occur."

[2] "Before *q*, *ac* does not occur," is quoted from Harper's Lat. Dict.

[3] Plinius mai. uses *atque* also before *q* in II. 38, XXII. 95, XXXIII. 46, XXXVI. 8. These, with Martial 11, 71, 3, form the only citations of the usage from Silver Latin.

[4] Gerber and Greef lex. Tac., omit Ann. 3, 16, 4 (before *d*) and 4, 10, 5.

times out of 180), in the Historiae he uses it but once 5, 12, 8, and in his minor works only 3 times, Agr. 16, 1 in the formula "his atque talibus," Dial. 15, 3 and 18, 25. In the following table, the preponderance of *ac* (76%) is noteworthy:

	atque	ac
Annales	180	389
Historiae	62	300
Germania	7	48
Agricola	27	102
Dialogus	15	54

Total: *atque* 291, *ac* 893.

2) *Atque* before vowels occurs before *i*, 129 times (Ann. 81, Hist. 31, Germ. 3, Agr. 7, Dial. 7), before *a*, 50 times (Ann. 23, Hist. 16, Germ. 1, Agr. 6, Dial. 4), before *o*, strange to say, 24 times (Ann. 13, Hist. 5, Germ. 1, Agr. 5), before *e*, 21 times (Ann. 10, Hist. 6, Germ. 2, Agr. 2, Dial. 1), before *u*, 11 times (Ann. 7, Hist. 2, Agr. 2) and before *h*, 11 times (Ann. 5, Hist. 1, Agr. 4, Dial. 1).

3) *Ac* occurs most frequently before *p*, 156 times (Ann. 74, Hist. 54, Germ. 9, Agr. 13, Dial. 6), before *s*, 138 times (Ann. 57, Hist. 44, Germ. 6, Agr. 21, Dial. 10), and before *m*, 102 times (Ann. 50, Hist. 26, Germ. 4, Agr. 17, Dial. 5). It is found least often before *g*, only once (Ann.), before *c*, 5 times (Ann. 1, Hist. 1, Agr. 3), and before *b*, 14 times (Ann. 5, Hist. 4, Germ. 3, Dial. 2).

4) *Ac* occurs most frequently in the Annales, Historiae, and Germania before *p* and *s*, in the Agricola before *s* (21) and *m* (17), and in the Dialogus before *s* (10) and *v* (10), *p* being third with 6 occurrences.

5) Gerber and Greef say of *ac*: "longe frequentissima est particula ante liquidas et litteras *s*, *v*." A more exact statement is that *ac* occurs most frequently before *p* (156 times), before *s* (132), before *m* (103), before *t* (80), before *n* (79), before *v* (76) and before *l* (74).

SUMMARY:

1) In the Silver Age, *atque* : *ac* :: 37.4 : 62.6.

2) *Atque* in prose: *atque* in poetry :: 62 : 38.

3) In Seneca (prose) *ac* comprises 86%, in Tacitus 74.1%, in Suetonius 74.3%, in Plinius mai. 63.8%, in Plinius min. 69.9%, in Quintilian 56.7%, in Petronius 52.3%, in Velleius 67.8%, and in Valerius Maximus 66.1%.

4) In Martial *ac* is used but once, 9, 22, 15, and in Phaedrus *ac* comprises 16.7%, in Juvenal, 27.4%, in Statius, 32.5%, in Valerius Flaccus, 35.3%, in Persius, 40%, in Lucan, 41%, in Silius Italicus, 43.9%, and in Seneca, 70.3%.

5) In prose *ac* occurs most frequently before *p* (698), *s* (685), and *m* (443); in poetry, before *s* (121), *p* (112), *t* (84), and *m* (83).

6) *Ac* before *c*: a) in prose: Seneca once, Quintilian twice, Tacitus 5 times, Suetonius 5 times, while Plinius mai. shows the extraordinarily large number of 30–35[1]; b) in poetry: Seneca, Valerius Flaccus and Statius once each.

7) *Ac* before *g*: Seneca (epist.), Tacitus and Silius Italicus once each, Plinius mai. once or twice.

8) *Ac* before *q*: Plinius mai. 4 times, Valerius Flaccus once.

9) Of *ac* before a vowel there is but one certain example (Plin. mai. II. 174), though Detlefsen writes it in two other passages of Pliny.

10) *Atque* was used three and one-half times as often before vowels as before consonants.

11) *Atque* was used most frequently before *i* (548) and *e* (269) in prose, and before *i* (284) and *a* (254) in poetry.

12) The choice of *atque* or *ac* before consonants was determined by the character of the consonant which followed.

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[1] See p. 422 f.

INDICATIVE QUESTIONS WITH μή AND ἆρα μή.[1]

The first half of section 1603 of Goodwin's grammar reads as follows: "The principal direct interrogative particles are ἆρα and (chiefly poetic) ἦ. These imply nothing as to the answer expected; but ἆρα οὐ implies an affirmative answer and ἆρα μή a negative answer." The form of these statements leads one to believe that ἆρα μή is a common prose construction, and, consequently, that the number of examples of ἆρα μή in classical prose exceeds the number of ἦ's, whereas just the reverse is true. In section 1015 of Hadley-Allen the sentence ἆρα μὴ διαβάλλεσθαι δόξεις; is cited without a hint as to the extent of the use of ἆρα μή either in prose or poetry. Kühner, 587, 11, speaks only of μή and has only three words on this: "erst seit Aeschylus," though to be sure, in 587, 14, he says that ἆρα occurs "erst in der nachhomerischen Sprache." All other grammars, both German and English, are as silent on this subject as Kühner. The lexicons either furnish little information or are misleading. (Cf. Amer. Journ. of Philol. III, 515 and XIX, 233.) Commentaries show as little sense of proportion in respect to the usage of these interrogative particles as the grammarians.

Dyer on Apology 25 A remarks that "questions with μή take a neg. answer for granted," and on Crito 44 E "ἆρα μή looks for a neg. answer, but it may also convey an insinuation that in spite of the expected denial the facts really would justify an affirmative answer." There is no intimation of the limitations of both μή and ἆρα μή. On ἆρα μή in Memorabilia II, 6, 34 Winans has nothing to say; on IV, 2, 10 he refers to the grammars of Goodwin and Hadley; and on μή in IV, 2, 12 to Goodwin's Moods and Tenses 46 n. 4,

[1] My attention was first directed to this subject by Dr. C. W. E. Miller, who pointed out to me the rare use of μή (ἆρα μή) as an interrogative particle in Classical Greek, and told me that as the result of observations in this direction he felt certain that, with the exception of perhaps a solitary example in Demosthenes, the construction was not found in the Attic orators, and that Plato was about the only prose writer that employed it to any noteworthy extent.—J. E. H.

where, he remarks, "another interpretation is given, however, reading *δύναμαι* with Kühn. and several MSS." But Goodwin reads *δύνωμαι* in the edition of 1890 (268).

With the exception of three examples in Xenophon, *ἆρα μή* does not occur in prose outside of Plato; and in the 2442 pages of the extant works of this author (Teubner text) only ten examples of the construction are found, two of these being in spurious dialogues (Anterastae and De Virtute). The Phaedo contains three of the remainder; two of these may be counted as one—64 C, where *ἆρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ* is used and then repeated in toto in resuming the question; the third is found in 103 C. The remaining five are distributed as follows: Crito 44 E, Parmenides 163 C, Charmides 174 A, Lysis 213 D, Republic 405 A. The indicative is used in all the examples except the second one of Phaedo 64 C, which has the subjunctive, like the examples of simple *μή* in cautious questions.[1]

The frequency of occurrence of the interrogative particle *ἆρα*, alone and combined with *οὐ*, *γε*, *οὖν* and *μή*, in the dialogues of Plato may be seen from the following conspectus:

	ἆρα	*ἆρά γε*	*ἆρ' οὖν*	*ἆρ' οὐ*	Total.	*ἆρα μή*
Euthyphro[2] .	7	1	3	4	14	. .
Apology .	2	. .	1	. .	3	. .
Crito . .	3	1	1	1	6	1
Phaedo . .	13	. .	9	13	33	3
Cratylus .	11	2	12	19	41	. .
Theaetetus .	25	. .	11	11	44	. .
Sophistes. .	15	. .	6	29	48	. .
Politicus . .	13	1	8	17	38	. .
Parmenides.	13	2	20	26	55	1
Philebus . .	18	. .	21	28	65	. .
Symposium .	5	1	3	. .	9	. .
Phaedrus. .	1	1	6	9	13	. .
Alcibiades I .	17	. .	13	6	34	. .
Alcibiades II .	2	3	7	5	16	. .

[1] Goodwin (M T 268) and Weber cite all the examples except Cratylus 429 C *μὴ γὰρ οὐδὲ τοῦτο αὖ ᾖ, τὸ τοῦτον φάναι Ἑρμογένη εἶναι, εἰ μὴ ἔστιν;*

[2] *ἆρ' οὖν οὐ* (14 D) is counted twice. Hence the apparent mistake in the total column. So also in Leges and De Virtute.

	ἆρα	ἆρά γε	ἆρ' οὖν	ἆρ' οὐ	Total.	ἆρα μή
Hipparchus .	4	. .	2	. .	6	. .
Anterastae .	1	. .	3	1	5	1
Theages . .	2	2	. .	4	8	. .
Charmides .	5	1	3	2	11	1
Laches . .	4	. .	. .	1	5	. .
Lysis . .	9	1	10	2	21	1
Euthydemus .	13	2	13	2	30	. .
Protagoras .	11	. .	7	8	26	. .
Gorgias . .	27	. .	22	1	50	. .
Meno . .	11	. .	5	6	21	. .
Hippias Maior.	4	. .	8	6	16	. .
Hippias Minor.	2	. .	2	2	5	. .
Ion . .	2	. .	. .	. .	2	. .
Republic .	42	4	95	81	190	1
Timaeus .	1	. .	3	3	6	. .
Minos . .	1	. .	2	2	5	. .
Leges . .	29	4	33	59	113	. .
Epinomis .	1	. .	. .	3	4	. .
Epistolae .	2	1	1	. .	4	. .
De Iustitia .	1	1	. .	6	8	. .
De Virtute .	3	. .	3	1	6	1
Demodocus .	1	. .	1	. .	2	. .
Sisyphus .	3	3	3	2	11	. .
Alcyon .	. .	1	. .	. .	1	. .
Eryxias .	10	4	5	. .	19	. .
	334	36	342	360	994	10

It will be seen from the table that ἆρα, ἆρ' οὖν and ἆρ' οὐ nearly balance each other; there are nearly twice as many examples of ἆρα as of ἆρ' οὐ, and only one out of every hundred of the ἆρα's is followed by μή.

There are 104 examples of ἆρα in the orators (including both genuine and spurious speeches). Of these 22 are followed by οὐ. Ἀρά γε appears 17 times and ἆρ' οὖν 23. Demosthenes has a greater number of ἆρα's than all the others together (64); half of them are found in orations XVIII–XXIV; and ten are followed by οὐ. There is little variation in the figures for the rest of the orators (except Antiphon, in whom the particle does not occur),

Andocides having two examples (both without οὐ), Lysias seven (one negative), Isocrates five (one neg.), Isaeus five (one neg.), Lycurgus six (three negatives), Aeschines five (one neg.), Hyperides four (all neg.), Dinarchus four (no negatives).

In the historians ἄρα hardly makes its appearance—twice in Herodotus (ἄρα III, 50; ἆρ' οὐ IX, 27) and only once in Thucydides (I, 75, 1, where ἄρα = ἆρ' οὐ, as in Sophocles, O. C. 753, 780, Aristophanes, Birds 797).

Xenophon has 90 examples of ἄρα [36 of simple ἄρα, 15 of ἆρ' οὐ, 2 of ἄρα μή, 26 of ἆρ' οὖν (including one ἆρ' οὖν . . . μή), and 11 of ἆρά γε]. More than half of these (48) occur in the Memorabilia. The rest appear as follows: Anab. 4, Cyropaed. 18, Hellen. 1, minor works 19. Of the 15 examples of ἆρ' οὐ, eight belong to the Memorabilia, three to the Anabasis, one to the Cyropaedia and three to the minor works. Ten examples of the combination ἆρ' ἄν (followed by the optative) are found in the Cyropaedia alone. The references for the three instances of ἄρα μή are Mem. II, 6, 34; IV, 2, 10; and Anab. VII, 6, 5.

Interrogative μή occurs neither in the orators[1] nor in the historians. Even μῶν, which is commoner in Plato than μή and must be regarded as differing from μὴ οὖν (μῶν μή, μῶν οὐ and μῶν οὖν are not rare), does not appear in the orators, historians or Xenophon.

There are twenty-four examples of μή interrogative in Plato. Of these the greatest number is in the Republic (6); the Protagoras comes next with five; two each are found in Euthydemus, Gorgias, Meno, and Apology; one each in Phaedo and Hippias Major, and three in the Theaetetus (not counting the repetition in 146 E). In Meno 89 C (μὴ τοῦτο οὐ καλῶς ὡμολογήσαμεν;) οὐ and καλῶς coalesce, as does οὐ and τοιαύτην in Protagoras 312 A μὴ οὐ τοιαύτην ὑπολαμβάνεις σου τὴν μάθησιν ἔσεσθαι; (which, however, Goodwin considers declarative). Over against these 24 examples of μή there are 83 instances of μῶν, which include 28 occurrences of μῶν οὐ, 5 of μῶν μή, and 18 of μῶν οὖν, this last embracing 8 instances of μῶν οὖν οὐ.

[1] There is an example of μή with the past indic. in Dem. XX, 160 (τί; μὴ καὶ τὰ μέλλοντ' ᾔδεις;), but the passage is possibly corrupt. The form of the rhetorical ὑποφορά immediately following indicates that the preceding question was not put as it appears in our MSS. Many readings suggest themselves, e. g. τί δεῖ καὶ τὰ μέλλοντ' ἤδη;

All the questions introduced by *μή* in Xenophon occur in Memorabilia IV, 2, 10 (except one in III, 11, 4 *μὴ χειροτέχναι τινές;*), and the four found here are merely a continuation of Socrates' question *Ἆρα μὴ ἰατρός* (sc. *βούλει*, or *ἐπιθυμεῖς, γενέσθαι*);[1] *μῶν*, as has been stated above, does not occur in Xenophon.

So much for the classical prose writers. Let us now direct our attention to the poets. Though *ἆρα μή* is, as we have seen, rare in prose, it is still rarer in poetry, there being only three examples in the whole range of epic, lyric and dramatic literature. No instance can be cited from Homer; none from the melic poets; none from Aristophanes. It appears twice in Sophocles (El. 446, Ant. 632) and once in Aeschylus (Septem 208). As for *ἆρ' οὐ*, Aeschylus has not a single example, Sophocles but three, Euripides five, whereas Plato has 360. Simple *ἆρα* occurs ten times in Aeschylus; there are 38 examples in Sophocles and 52 in Euripides—just 100 in all. There are 48 *ἆρα*'s (seven of these followed by *οὐ*) in Aristophanes, but, as has been stated, not a single *ἆρα μή*.

Simple *μή* (without a preceding interrogative particle) is not found before Aeschylus, and in all the tragic poets occurs but six times, four of these being in Aeschylus (P. V. 247, 959, Pers. 344, Suppl. 295), one in Sophocles (Trach. 316),[2] one in Euripides (Hipp. 799). In Aristophanes there is but one example, and that is found in the brogue of the Scythian archer (Thesm. 1114 *σκέψαι τὸ κύστο· μή τι μικτὸν παίνεται;*). The compound *μῶν*, on the other hand, (used only by the Attic writers), can not be classed with *μή*, for, although it is not employed by any prose writer except Plato, the particle occurs frequently in comedy (27 examples in Aristophanes) as well as in tragedy (41 examples). The fact that *μῶν* occurs 33 times in Euripides and only five and three times in Sophocles and Aeschylus respectively (together with its use in comedy and its absence from the orators and historians) seems to indicate that it belongs to the *sermo familiaris*.

[1] There is another example in the Oeconomicus (XII, 1 *μή σε κατακωλύω ἀπιέναι ἤδη βουλόμενον;*). This may, however, be taken as a hortatory subjunctive, and so Holden explains (although in his text the sentence is interrogative), translating "let me not detain you," and referring to Goodwin 253 (1344). Kühner and Dindorf regard the sentence as a question. In Mem. IV, 2, 12 *μὴ οὖν . . . οὐ δύνωμαι κτέ.* the mood is the subjunctive.

[2] The verb in this passage is unexpressed.

Μῶν οὖν is found twice in Aeschylus and once in Euripides; μῶν οὐ occurs but twice in the tragic poets (Eur. Med. 733, Troad. 714), μῶν μή not at all.

The interrogative ἦ occurs, of course, much more frequently in the tragic poets than in prose (25 times in Aeschylus, 61 times in Sophocles, and 74 times in Euripides). Aristophanes again comes near the prose norm with hardly a dozen examples.

If I can trust to a rapid reading of Aristotle, neither μή nor ἆρα μή appears in his writings. The same may be said of Callimachus, Apollonius Rhodius, Lycophron, Theocritus, Bion, Moschus, Polybius, and Diodorus Siculus (2043 Teubner pages).[1]

In Theophrastus ἆρα μή does not occur at all and μή is found but once, and that in one of the Characters (Περὶ Λογοποιίας), where the author is giving a sample of ordinary small talk, and puts in the mouth of his character the words μὴ λέγεται καινότερον; Immediately thereafter Foss would read μὴ ἀγαθά γέ ἐστι τὰ λεγόμενα; but the MSS have καὶ μὴν instead of μή.

Yet in spite of the fact that in the whole domain of Greek literature, from Homer down to the time of Christ, a period of one thousand years, ἆρα μή appears but three times in poetry and 11 (13) times in prose, a celebrated scholar (Blaydes) desires to emend a perfectly intelligible sentence in Sophocles ἆρά μου μέμνησθε; (O. T. 1401) so as to read ἆρα μὴ μέμνησθε;

When we come to the New Testament we have a different story to tell: μή in questions is common—eight times in Matthew, four in Mark, six in Luke, twenty-one in John, four in James, eight in Romans, fourteen in I Corinthians and four in II Corinthians. All of these are with the indicative. The sum total, then, of questions with μή in the New Testament is sixty-nine, a greater number than in all the prose and poetry of the ten centuries preceding.

All the examples of μή in the New Testament are found in eight books, the four gospels containing more than half of the whole number (39). About one-third of the number (21) are in John alone. In about one-half of the cases (32) the verb is one of the

[1]Not unlike the behavior of ἆρα μή is that of ἄλλο τι and ἄλλο τι ἤ. These phrases do not appear to any extent outside of Plato. There is not a single example in the orators except Lysias (two instances only, one of these in a genuine speech and supporting the thesis that the phrase belongs to the language of everyday life, the other in a spurious speech) and the unrhetorical orator, Andocides.

three that are most common in the speech of everyday life (*be, can, have*). An even dozen of the μή's appear in the form of μή τι. The double negative μὴ οὐ is found in Romans x, 18. The negative οὐχί is very frequently the introductory word of a sentence; and ἆρά γε is found in Acts viii, 30.

The behavior of the particles in later Greek is similar to their conduct in the pre-Christian period. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, who sought to revive a true standard of Attic prose, has not a single example of either. In Plutarch (3670 pages in the Teubner text) ἆρα μή does not occur (though ἆρα alone does), μή only once, Alexander XXVIII μή τι σὺ τοιοῦτον ὁ τοῦ Διός;

In the sophist Dio Chrysostomus we find two examples of ἆρα μή and six of μή: XXXII (683 R) ἆρά γε μὴ Λακεδαιμονίους μιμεῖσθε; LVII (296 R) ἆρα μὴ ἀλαζόνα πεποίηκε τὸν Νέστορα; IX (294 R) μὴ οὖν θαυμάζουσιν αὐτόν; X (306 R) μὴ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος ἔλυσε τὸ αἴνιγμα; XIV (438 R) μὴ οὖν σὺ φῂς ἐλεύθερον εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα τοῦτον; XXX (548 R) ἀλλὰ μή τι ὑμᾶς ἐλύπει; XXXII (676 R) μὴ τὰ ὦτα ἐπαλήλιπται τῶν ἐκεῖ; LVIII (301 R) μὴ οὖν αὐτός γε αἱρεῖ;[1]

Even Lucian, in spite of the fact that he wrote the best Attic prose that had been written for four hundred years, is not faultless. He uses μή for οὐ; but this should not surprise us, as he was a man free from affectation and would naturally use the language as it was spoken, so far as he could without being rude.[2] But Lucian is not fonder of the μή construction in questions than Dio Chrysostomus, and in the 1301 pages of the Teubner edition not a single example of ἆρα μή can be found. μή occurs only eight (really seven) times, as follows: μὴ ὀνείρων ὑποκριτάς τινας ἡμᾶς ὑπείληφεν; (Ἐνύπνιον I, 22 R.), Ἀλλὰ μὴ ὄνειρος καὶ ταῦτά ἐστιν; (Ὄνειρος II, 706), σὺ δὲ μὴ καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην αὐτὸν καὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα εἶδες ἐν τοῖς νεκροῖς; (Φιλοψευδής III, 52), Ἀλλὰ μὴ Ἑρμαφρόδιτος εἶ; . . . μὴ οὖν καὶ σὺ τοιοῦτόν τι πέπονθας; (Ἑταιρικοὶ Λόγοι III, 291), μή τι τὸν παιδοτρίβην Διότιμον λέγεις; (Ibid. 305), μή τι διήμαρτες βαλών; (Ψευδοσοφιστής III, 571), and one in the Pseudo-Lucianic dialogue Φιλοπατρίς (III, 597), μὴ τὴν τετρακτὺν φῂς τὴν Πυθαγόρου; The particles μῶν, ἆρα and ἆρ' οὖν are found occasionally.

[1] Dindorf brackets the passage in which ἆρα μή with the subjunctive occurs (XXVI, 524 R). Dio does not write as good Attic as Niebuhr would have us believe. See Amer. Journ. of Philol. I, 48, 50, 53, 57.

[2] See A. J. P. I, 47.

Of the writers of the third century A. D. I selected Plotinus and Philostratus for investigation. The chief representative of Neo-Platonism uses ἆρα, ἆρά γε and ἆρ' οὐ, but never μή or ἆρα μή. In Philostratus are found μῶν, ἆρα, ἆρ' οὐ and ἦ; and two examples of μή: Ap. V, 33 μὴ μεῖζόν τι τούτων; V, 34 μή τι τοῖς εἰρημένοις προστίθης; In the thirty-ninth epistle another question (Μηδὲ γράφειν φυγάδα ἀνέξῃ;) might be added to the number.

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RIME-PARALLELISM IN OLD HIGH GERMAN VERSE.

As is indicated in the first part of the title, Old High German verse here means rimed verse, embracing in addition to Otfrid the following minor monuments: Ludwigslied, Georgslied, Petruslied, Christus und die Samariterin, Psalm 138 and De Heinrico. The date of composition of most of these minor poems is less certain than that of Otfrid's Evangelienbuch. They probably, however, all follow the latter in point of time, ranging from the Ludwigslied of 881–882 to the De Heinrico of perhaps 984 (Koegel). In regard to length also the shorter poems are at a considerable disadvantage as compared with Otfrid, the latter, inclusive of the acrostics, numbering 7416 lines,[1] whereas the longest of the minor poems, the Ludwigslied, has only 59 lines, and the shortest, the Petruslied, barely nine lines.

By rime-parallelism is meant the joining in rime of words that are from a morphological point of view, more especially in respect to endings of declension and conjugation, parallel forms. Adverbs in *-o*, while strictly speaking not falling under this rubric, have also been included. To illustrate the nature of this parallelism I cite[2] a passage from Otfrid, III, 25, 15–26.

„So quement Romani ouh ubar thaz, nement thaz lant allaz
joh ouh thes giflizent, iz italaz lazent;
Mit wafanu unsih thuingent, oba sies biginnent;
mit kreftigera henti duent unsih elilenti.
Wanent sie bi notin, thaz wir then urheiz datin,
joh wir thes biginnen, thaz widar in ringen."
Gab einer tho girati thuruh thaz heroti,
bihiaz sih ther thes wares, ther biscof was thes jares.
„Ni bithenket," quad, „in wara unserero allo zala,
joh ir ouh wiht thes ni ahtot ouh drof es ni bidrahtot,
Thaz baz ist, man biwerbe, thaz ein man bi unsih sterbe,
joh einer bi unsih dowe, ther liut sih thes gifrowe."

[1] The figures of Wilmanns, ZfdA. xvi, 117 are not altogether correct.
[2] Quotations from Otfrid are from Erdmann's large edition.

This is evidently rime in a most rudimentary state. In relation to rime proper—be it stem- or suffix-rime—it is a veritable *pons asinorum.* Did the poet realize this and did he attempt to counteract the effect by including in the rime the root-syllables of the words in question, in addition to the suffix-syllables? This could only be determined by computing the proportion that parallel rimes in which the rime embraces more than one syllable bear to such as are non-parallel.[1] There is, however, no likelihood that there was such an effort on the part of the poet: the frequency of the phenomenon would in itself seem to preclude such a view. While, therefore, the underlying principle is to a certain extent the same as that on which the use of identical rime in classical Middle High German poetry is based, there are yet decided differences: 1. In the case of rime-parallelism complete identity of sound does not necessarily, or even customarily, follow. 2. It is not a mere makeshift, but is characteristic of the verse.

Granted that parallel suffix-rime represents rime in a rudimentary state of development, and that is characteristic of Otfrid's verse

[1] If additional evidence that rime-parallelism is a real factor in the make-up of Otfrid's verse is demanded, it may be gathered from an examination of individual rime-groups. Rimes in *-it* afford an example. There are 324 such rimes (162 rime-pairs) in Otfrid. Of these, forms of the third person singular constitute the larger part: 219 altogether. Now 172 of these latter are found joined in parallel rime, and in the case of two other rime-pairs we find a third person singular linked with *quît*, which on account of the difference in quantity has, as noted below, not been classed as parallel rime. In other words, of 219 forms of the third person singular, there are only 43 rimes that are each joined in rime with one of the remaining 105 forms in *-it.* Similarly in the case of the weak uninflected past participles. We find 70 of these in rime position, 32 being linked in parallel rime, 38 riming each with one of the remaining 254 forms. An examination of rimes in *-an* yields similar results. There are 422 such rimes, made up in part of 124 infinitives (exclusive of *mi*-verbs), 80 past participles and 67 accusatives singular. Of the infinitives 74 are parallel, of the past participles 46, and of the accusatives 40, leaving 50 infinitives, 34 past participles and 27 accusatives, with rime facilities respectively of 298, 342 and 355. For the completeness of these statistics I rely upon Ingenbleek's Reimlexikon zu Otfrid, QuF. xxxvii.

It is also interesting to note that parallel rimes otherwise uncommon, when once occurring, are apt to be 'bunched'—an evidence of the psychological element involved in the phenomenon. For examples see Otfrid I, 4, 68 ff.; II, 4, 62 and 64; II, 4, 92 and 96; IV, 18, 27 ff.; V, 6, 36 ff.

in so far as the latter is suffix- and not stem-rime, some light would seem to be thrown on the much mooted question of the origin of rime in German. If end-rime in German is, in respect to its origin, as ancient as alliterative rime, and if at the time of Otfrid it had passed through centuries of growth and cultivation, how is this primitive condition to be explained?

There are a number of difficulties encountered in determining just what constitutes parallelism of rime. If our theory as to its nature be correct, then such parallelism is to be assumed wherever in the mind of the poet the forms were regarded as parallel. This involves, however, practically a reconstruction of the declensional and conjugational groups of Old High German Grammar, a reconstruction in which the psychological element must needs play an important part. In addition, the question of rimes between short and long vowels is of some consequence. Whether e. g. such forms as *zellen* and *farên* are to be considered parallel when linked in rime, depends upon whether we believe with Zarncke and Koegel that quantity plays no part in Otfrid's rimes, or with Wilmanns, Paul and Zwierzina that long and short vowels are in the Evangelienbuch not joined in rime indiscriminately. I am of the latter opinion and I should therefore not regard *zellen* and *farên* as constituting parallel rimes.[1]

Two kinds of parallelism may be distinguished. In the first of these the riming words conform merely from a morphological

[1] The grouping adopted in determining what is parallel in the doubtful noun-classes is as follows: a) Masculine -a, -ja and -wa stems; masculine -i stems (sing.), neuter -a and -wa stems. b) Masculine -ja stems and neuter -ja stems. c) Feminine -ô and -jô stems.

Masculine and neuter nouns have consistently been kept apart from feminine nouns. Neuter -o stems and -jo stems have also not been classed as parallel. Personal pronouns (1, 2, 3 person and reflexive), in view of the identity of stem and ending in a majority of the forms, have likewise been ruled out. As indicated above, forms known to differ in quantity have in no case been accounted parallel. Different cases (nom. and acc. pl., etc.) and different persons (1 and 3 person, singular and plural) have been kept separate. Adjectives (possessive pronouns, demonstrative pronouns, participles) have been regarded as parallel with nouns of identical case, case-ending and number. This does not include such forms as *mîn*, *thîn*, etc., but only those that clearly show a case-ending. Where the endings of adjective and noun essentially differed, the forms have not been classed as parallel, even though the final vowel was the same.

point of view, in the second there is syntactical as well as morphological agreement. The former of these is by far the more common. Where syntactical correspondence exists, it is, of course, possible that a distinct stylistic effect has been aimed at, and at times this does seem to be actually the case, although the instances are comparatively rare.[1] There is some ground, I think, for finding a connection between the principle of variation as observed in alliterative verse and this latter form of syntactical rime-parallelism.[2]

It is natural to inquire whether a study of parallel rime in Otfrid throws any light upon the order in which the different portions of the work were composed. The complete statistic, giving the percentage of the parallel rimes to the total number of lines in each chapter, is as follows:

L, 21.9; S, 22.9; H, 23.8.

I, 1, 33.3; 2, 27.6; 3, 24; 4, 32.6; 5, 31.9; 6, 33.3; 7, 17.9; 8, 32.1; 9, 22.5; 10, 25; 11, 37.1; 12, 17.6; 13, 45.8; 14, 25; 15, 30; 16, 35.7; 17, 26.9; 18, 17.4; 19, 28.6; 20, 38.9; 21, 18.75; 22, 24.2; 23, 35.9; 24, 30; 25, 16.7; 26, 21.4; 27, 34.3; 28, 15. Average, 29.1.

II, 1, 42; 2, 28.9; 3, 22.2; 4, 28.7; 5, 32.1; 6, 34.5; 7, 38.2; 8, 26.8; 9, 29.6; 10, 50; 11, 32.4; 12, 41.7; 13, 42.5; 14, 26.2; 15, 25; 16, 32.5; 17, 29.2; 18, 33.3; 19, 17.9; 20, 35.7; 21, 29.5; 22, 35.7; 23, 16.7; 24, 26.1. Average, 31.4.

III, 1, 36.4; 2, 28.9; 3, 28.6; 4, 39.6; 5, 13.6; 6, 32.1; 7, 31.1; 8, 32; 9, 30; 10, 21.7; 11, 43.75; 12, 38.6; 13, 29.3; 14, 37.5; 15, 36.5; 16, 33.8; 17, 32.9; 18, 31.1; 19, 23.7; 20, 28.5; 21, 30.6; 22, 32.4; 23, 30; 24, 28.6; 25, 45; 26, 32.9. Average, 32.

IV, 1, 35.2; 2, 41.2; 3, 12.5; 4, 38.2; 5, 33.3; 6, 42.9; 7, 30.4; 8, 35.7; 9, 38.2; 10, 37.5; 11, 19.2; 12, 20.3; 13, 25.9; 14, 27.8; 15, 23.4; 16, 33.9; 17, 43.75; 18, 19; 19, 31.6; 20, 32.5; 21, 19.4; 22, 20.6; 23, 13.6; 24, 18.4; 25, 35.7; 26, 32.7; 27, 30; 28, 37.5; 29, 32.8; 30, 19.4; 31, 13.9; 32, 33.3; 33, 30; 34, 19.2; 35, 43.2; 36, 45.8; 37, 32.6. Average, 29.7.

V, 1, 35.4; 2, 16.7; 3, 40; 4, 28.1; 5, 13.6; 6, 30.6; 7, 28.8; 8, 20.7; 9, 32.1; 10, 33.3; 11, 42; 12, 23; 13, 33.3; 14, 16.7;

[1] See the refrains, Otfrid II, 1, 16, ff., and V, 15, 9; 21; 35.

[2] For the connection between parallelism of expression in Otfrid and variation in alliterative poetry see P. Schütze, Beiträge zur Poetik Otfrids, Kiel, 1887.

15, 26.1; 16, 30.4; 17, 30; 18, 18.75; 19, 15.2; 20, 33.6; 21, 19.2; 22, 18.75; 23, 31.2; 24, 18.2; 25, 30.8. Average, 28.5.

Average for the whole Evangelienbuch, exclusive of the acrostics, 30.2.

It will be seen that taking each book as a whole the differences in percentage are very slight. Individual chapters show considerable variation, the range being from 12.5 in IV, 3 to 50 in II, 10. There are twenty-five chapters with a ratio below twenty, and fourteen with a ratio of forty and over. It is to be observed, however, that nearly all the chapters that show an abnormally low percentage are extremely short, only four out of twenty-five containing forty lines or over.[1] This observation does not, in the same degree at least, apply to the chapters showing a high ratio: seven out of fourteen contain forty lines or over.

In view of these facts, it is manifestly impossible to base on this single criterion a new theory as to the order in which Otfrid's work was produced. Nor can the test be made use of to corroborate, to any extent, the results arrived at by others. To take, for example, the theory expounded by Erdmann on pages lxv–vi of his Introduction. He there distinguishes four groups:

A. Früheste Versuche (noch ohne merkliche Beziehung auf das Gesammtwerk).

B. Allmählich durchgeführte Ausarbeitung des Evangelienbuchs.

C. Selbständige Stücke ... zur Abrundung und Ausfüllung in das Werk aufgenommen.

D. Letzte, bei der Schlussredaction hinzugefügte Stücke und Anhänge.

Without attempting to distinguish B and C from each other or from A and D, we should at any rate expect to find a difference in ratio of parallel rimes between groups A and D. Such is not, however, the case. In the nine (entire) chapters which Erdmann groups under A, the range is from 17.9 to 35.7, in the twelve (entire) chapters under D, from 18.2 to 42.9.

I do not believe, therefore, that any theory of order of composition can be based on this statistic, any more than on that of Wilmanns, ZfdA., XVI, 117, for stem-rime. Wilmanns there computes for the different books the proportion of rimes in which

[1] The average length of a chapter is about fifty-one lines.

at least one rime-word is a root-syllable to the total number of couplets and finds it varying from 20.4 in Book I to 30.3 in Book III. His percentages are as follows: I, 20.4; II, 29.8; III, 30.3; IV, 28.9; V, 26.8. From this Wilmanns concludes that Books I and V were composed first. It would seem, however, that first of all no importance can be attached to the slight difference in percentage between Books IV and V, 26.8 (more correctly 26.9) and 28.9, when none is attached by Wilmanns himself to that between the 28.9 of Book IV and the 30.3 of Book III. Furthermore, the whole argument begs the question whether books or chapters constituted the unit of composition. Erdmann, as we have seen, practically assumes the latter, and this would seem to be the only sound method of procedure, as long as the opposite has not been proved. In the third place, it does not appear why rimes extending over more than one syllable should be classified as suffix-rime rather than as stem-rime. As Wilmanns gives only the sum-total of his figures there is no way in which his grouping can be altered. The subject of stem-rime and suffix-rime will again be touched upon below.

How do the results for Otfrid compare with the technic of the minor poems? The poem entitled De Heinrico does not come in for consideration on account of its mixture of German and Latin. Nor is any importance to be attached to the extremely short Petruslied, consisting as it does—exclusive of the refrain—of some six lines. The tabulated results are as follows:

Otfrid	30.2
Ludwigslied	22
Georgslied[1]	42.1
Petruslied	16.7
Christus u. d. S. . . .	12.9
Psalm 138	5.7

The arrangement is a chronological one. To do away with a possible element of subjectiveness, Koegel's conclusions as

[1] In judging the result for the Georgslied the presence of a refrain (selbo: Gorio), which in slightly varying forms occurs four times (6, 11, 48, 55), must perhaps be borne in mind. Not counting these the ratio would be 35.1. The poem has, however, also numerous refrains without parallelism (16, 21, 26–8, 33–5, 41–3), so that after all it can perhaps not be considered a factor that affects the result.

regards dating have been followed. The general trend is unmistakable: a gradual decrease in the use of parallel rimes. The Ludwigslied and the Georgslied are grouped by the side of the Evangelienbuch as opposed to Christus u. d. S. and the Psalm. This difference may be brought out still more forcibly by an examination of the passage in Otfrid's work (II, 14, 1–60) which treats the same theme as Christus u. d. S. We find that Otfrid here uses 33.3 per cent of parallel rimes, whereas the other poet, treating the identical subject, uses but 12.9 per cent.

It is interesting to notice that this decrease in the use of rime-parallelism is accompanied by, and finds a partial explanation in, an increased use of stem-rime. For Otfrid I am here dependent upon the statistic of Wilmanns. As indicated above, in the sense that Wilmanns attaches to the term, stem-rime includes the rime of root-syllable with root-syllable, as well as of root-syllable with inflectional syllable. It does not include rimes extending over two syllables. While I do not believe this classification to be the best that could be made, I have yet followed it in the case of the minor poems, in order to make a comparison with Otfrid possible. The figures are:

	Stem-rime.	Suffix-rime.	[Parallel rimes.]
Otfrid,	27.5	72.5	[30.2
Ludwigslied,	45.8	54.2	22
Georgslied,	41.1	58.9	42.1
Petruslied,	50	50	16.7
Christus u. d. S.,	51.6	48.4	12.9
Psalm 138,	60	40	5.7]

What is important to notice here, is that rime-parallelism decreases far more rapidly than suffix-rime, and that the former is therefore not absolutely conditioned by the latter. While in Otfrid, the Ludwigslied, and the Georgslied the ratio of parallel rimes to suffix-rimes ranges from 1.4 to 2.5, the ratio in Christus u. d. S. is 3.8 and in the Psalm 7.

One other matter remains to be touched upon: the relative frequency of the various grammatical categories in parallel rime. In the subjoined statistic the term adjective is to be understood in the wider sense, including inflected participles, demonstrative pronouns, etc.

	Inf.	Finite forms	Past Part. Strong	Past Part. Weak	Pr. Ptc. (uninflected)	Pr. Ptc.: *-jo* adj.	Adj.	Noun	Noun: Adj.	Adv. in *-o*
Otfrid I,	11	159	2	4	11	1	74	54	25	20
II,	20	220	2	8	0	0	37	61	20	23
III,	27	272	3	1	3	0	71	96	17	14
IV,	24	263	6	3	1	0	43	86	22	19
V,	20	195	12	4	2	0	42	109	22	14
LSH,	0	18	0	1	0	0	3	37	9	4
Ludwigslied,	0	5	1	1	0	0	2	3	1	0
Georgslied,	8	2	0	0	0	0	5	4	5	0
Petruslied,	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Chr. u. d. S.,	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
Psalm,	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0

What is striking in this statistic is the relatively large number of present participles found in Otfrid I, about twice that found in the other four books together. In view of the other stylistic peculiarities found in this book,[1] which are usually explained as due to an earlier date of composition, this feature may perhaps be held to further strengthen this position. Nearly half (5) of these rimes occur in a chapter (I, 4) which Erdmann classes under A, and in which Koegel discovers four alliterative lines. The numerous infinitives in the Georgslied are also noteworthy, there being one in every seven lines as compared with one in every seventy-three lines in Otfrid. That the acrostics should be abnormal in the ratio that the nominal forms bear to the verbal forms is explained by the fact that the former have a greater variety of endings and are therefore better adapted to this artificial kind of verse.

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[1] More especially rimeless verses and the use of alliteration. See Koegel, Deutsche Litteraturgeschichte, I, 2, 23 and 40, and PG.[2] II, 116.

DID EURIPIDES WRITE *σκύμνων* HIPP. 1276?

Investigations in the Kynegetikos ascribed to Xenophon have for some years led the present writer to observe with attention the position of the dog in various periods of Greek life, and in various departments of Greek letters. The following paper has been prompted by the Tragic Dog.

There are two curious tales that have come down to us, perhaps the mere symbolic expression of a passing fancy, perhaps suggested by an actual tradition. Of Sophokles it is said (Diog. Laert. 4, 20), *κατὰ τὸν κωμικὸν τὰ ποιήματα αὐτῷ κύων τις ἐδόκει συμποιεῖν Μολοττικός*; while of Euripides Haigh (Tragic Drama of the Greeks) quotes among others Sotades (Stob. Flor. 98, 9), *κύνες οἱ κατὰ Θρᾴκην Εὐριπίδην ἔτρωγον.*

Euripides, if any poet, challenges close investigation; his syntax has the precision of a foreigner; point after point is made by strict attention to his language; he himself was an unflinching critic of minutiae (Ar. Ran. 801 *ὁ γὰρ Εὐριπίδης | κατ' ἔπος βασανιεῖν φησι τὰς τραγῳδίας*· cf. 826 sqq.). One may claim pardon then for going into details; but—to avert the omen—we shall take up only two plays, the Hippolytos and the Bakchai, the other plays containing for the most part only unimportant passages bearing on the case, or points of negative value such as the impression created by isolated expressions (*θηρεύειν* etc.) combined with the absence of sustained allusion.

The Hippolytos (B. C. 428) one might reasonably expect to show signs of interest in the chase more striking than those of a landscape painter, for *εἰσορῶ* (52–3)

> *στείχοντα θήρας μόχθον ἐκλελοιπότα*
> *Ἱππόλυτον.*

κῶμος λέλακεν (vs. 55) is expressive enough of a troop of huntsmen, λ. being used of Skylla and her voice *ὅση σκύλακος νεογιλῆς* (cf. hymn. in Herm. 145 *οὐδὲ κύνες λελάκοντο*). Eur. also uses the verb (it is a specialty with him) in Alk. 345 sqq. *οὐ γάρ ποτ' οὔτ' ἂν βαρβίτου θίγοιμ' ἔτι | οὔτ' ἂν φρέν' ἐξαίροιμι πρὸς Λίβυν λακεῖν | αὐλόν.*

Perhaps in thus belittling his attempts at music Admetos but shows a reversion to type when the social hand of his model wife was no more in evidence.

Vs. 109 *τερπνὸν ἐκ κυναγίας | τράπεζα πλήρης* (cf. Bakch. 339, Soph. Ai. 37) is a truism needing as little poetic imagination as experience.

v. 215. Phaidra. *πέμπετέ μ' εἰς ὄρος· εἶμι πρὸς ὕλαν*
καὶ παρὰ πεύκας, ἵνα θηροφόνοι
στείβουσι κύνες
βαλιαῖς ἐλάφοις ἐγχριμπτόμεναι·
πρὸς θεῶν, ἐραμαι κυσὶ θωύξαι
καὶ παρὰ χαίταν ξανθὰν ῥῖψαι
Θεσσαλὸν ὄρπακ', ἐπίλογχον ἔχουσ'
ἐν χειρὶ βέλος.
Nurse. *τί ποτ', ὦ τέκνον, τάδε κηραίνεις;*
τί κυνηγεσίων καί σοι μελέτη; . . .

ἐγχριμπτόμεναι is not particularly appropriate. *θωύσσω* is more applicable to the voice of the dogs. Sophokles (Ai. 308) uses it in Tekmessa's description of Aias in his woe, *παίσας κάρα 'θώυξεν*, but cf. O. C. 1623 *φθέγμα δ' ἐξαίφνης τινὸς | θώυξεν αὐτόν, ὥστε πάντας ὀρθίας | στῆσαι φόβῳ δείσαντας ἐξαίφνης τρίχας*, and doubtless *θωύσσω* might convey the impression of *Jägerlatein* on the stage. At any rate the speaker was not a *sporting* character, and the last line of the quotation will not be insisted on. The *ὄρπηξ* apparently formed a handy instrument for relieving the feelings upon an ox (Hes. Op. 468), nor dare we press the hand that holds the *ἐπίλογχον βέλος* without caution. *κυνηγέσιον* is frequent in Xen. Kyn. and a fellow-demesman of Xenophon uses the word in a passage that recalls at once the preamble to the Kynegetikos and its versatile author (Isok. vii, 45).

v. 1127. *ὦ ὀρυμὸς ὀρέος, ὅθι κυνῶν*
ὠκυπόδων μέτα θῆρας ἐναιρεν
Δίκτυννα ἀμφὶ σεμνάν,

reminds one of Φ 485 sqq., where Hera addresses Artemis with the words: *ἦ τοι βέλτερόν ἐστι κατ' οὔρεα θῆρας ἐναίρειν | ἀγροτέρας τ' ἐλάφους ἠὲ κρείσσοσιν ἶφι μάχεσθαι*—q. v. and cf. Bakch. 984 with Σ 488.

Now it may be subjective criticism, but to our mind none of these passages strike the genuine note of the opening of Soph. Aias; they are artistically appropriate in a play like the Hip-

polytos, they are a literary necessity, perhaps, but they bear the stamp of a *tour de force.*

v. 1274. *θέλγει δ' ἔρως, ᾧ μαινομένᾳ κραδίᾳ*
πτανὸς ἐφορμάσῃ χρυσοφαής, φύσιν τ'
ὀρεσκόων σκύμνων πελαγίων θ' ὅσα τε γᾶ τρέφει,
τὰν αἰθόμενος ἅλιος δέρκεται,
ἄνδρας τε.

The reading is that of v. Wilamowitz for MS *σκυλάκων.* But just as one would think twice about attempting *solvere phaselon* with Euripides to show him how, so I doubt if Euripides knew enough as a dog-man or cared enough as a *littérateur* to distinguish the two.

Euripides (cf. Jebb, Soph. Ai. 591) is apt to echo contemporaries—a frequent occurrence among Greeks and Grecians, and useful as a foundation upon which to build a superstructure of dates although the experiment is dangerous. He sometimes impregnates himself with predecessors (cf. Aisch. P. V. and Eur. Bakch.) He is essentially literary. Given sufficient materials and leisure one might show instance after instance of borrowing or acceptance of suggestion. Many of his hunting metaphors have a prototype in Homer or Aischylos—but often to his own detriment just as Euripides' Cyclops has not the other side to his character as had the author of ε 447.

Eur. I. T. 284 *καὶ βοᾷ κυναγὸς ὡς,* | *Πυλάδη, δέδορκας τήνδε*; etc., is obscured, to say the least, by what follows, yet it reminds one somehow of the poet's friend Sokrates. Plato has many queer hunting expressions, but then Sokrates is whimsical and is not above bewildering the object of his cross-examination by talking about dogs with which Glaukon was intimate, and meaning the while something transcendental (Rep. 459 A *γάμοις τε καὶ παιδοποιίαις*; *τὸ ποῖον, ἔφη*;). Plato moreover reproduces the man who would not venture beyond the city walls—the opening of the Parmenides (126 E-127 C) shows a return to more vigorous pursuits.

A few scattered instances of metaphor and simile occur in Med. 1374 (see Verrall *βάξιν*), Hek. 1172, 1265, and in I. T. I. A. confines itself practically to 959 *ἢ τῶν γάμων ἕκατι μυρίαι κόραι* | *θηρῶσι λέκτρον τοὐμόν*, 1162 *σπάνιον δὲ θήρευμ' ἀνδρὶ τοιαύτην λαβεῖν* | *δάμαρτα*, reminding one of Hel. 63 *θηρᾷ γαμεῖν με*, Hel. 314, 545, where the occurrence of *θηρᾶν*, etc. (in isolated instances) shows perhaps the 'dominant note' of Theoklymenos.

On the other hand the Bakchai, written in Macedonia at the close of the poet's life and exhibited in Athens about 406, is full enough of reminiscences of the chase.

Whatever critical sentiments we may have as to the authorship of the Kynegetikos, this much may be said: the nature of the dog as the product of the fancier, with a fancy price and a fancy utility, compels the writer on the subject, if it be congenial to him, if he be a sympathetic writer, to adopt a peculiar style that will strike the uninitiated of any age as sophistic. This is all the sophistry that there is in the Kynegetikos. The author knew his subject at first hand even if as an amateur he is at fault at times (probably in the time a bitch carries her puppies) and passes on a story that would grace a *Förster's* hut, yet the list of appropriate names (7, 5) does not touch on literature or mythology, although both might suggest good, sharp names for a hound. As to the age at which the author wrote it—suppose the author of the Kynegetikos to have become acquainted with Sokrates at 15, he would feel decidedly old at 30 and would take pains to dedicate his treatise to the young; still on the other hand an old man with a hobby may write as youthfully as an Indian officer retired on half-pay and golf-links. If Attica was depleted of hares during the Peloponnesian war, Macedonia (Kyn. 11) afforded plenty of game not so far beyond its borders (5th century), the main difficulty being to find a man (*ἀρκυωρός*) who spoke Greek (Kyn. 2, 3) and not a wretched patois. The point of view in *τὸν Κιττὸν τὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς Μακεδονίας* (11, 1) is interesting as a date—

Bakch. 337. *ὁρᾷς τὸν Ἀκταίωνος ἄθλιον μόρον,*
ὃν ὠμόσιτοι σκύλακες ἃς ἐθρέψατο
διεσπάσαντο κρείσσον' ἐν κυναγίαις
Ἀρτέμιδος εἶναι κομπάσαντ' ἐν ὀργάσιν

are verses which prepare for the dominant note in the play in its connection with mythology, with the theatre of action, with possibly ever so slight a touch of real *εἰρωνεία*, and *ὀργάσιν* sounds the keynote to Kyn. 9, 2. *σκύλακες* has its sporting gender.

Passing over 434, 435 *ἄκρανθ' ὡρμήσαμεν* would be interesting if one could banish from mind Aisch. Cho. 882 *ἄκραντα βάζω*, where *βάζω* is the language of the dog but *ἄκραντα* not necessarily (cf. *θήρ* for *θηρίον*). 732 *ἔπεσθέ μοι* is all right if *μοι* is ethic (Kyn. 6, 19). 848 *εἰς βόλον καθίσταται* perhaps echoes literary antecedents.

v. 862 (cf. El. 859). ἆρ' ἐν παννυχίοις χοροῖς
θήσω ποτὲ λευκὸν
πόδ' ἀναβακχεύουσα, δέραν
εἰς αἰθέρα δροσερὸν
ῥίπτουσ', ὡς νεβρὸς χλοεραῖς
ἐμπαίζουσα λείμακος ἡδοναῖς,
ἡνίκ' ἂν φοβερὰν φύγῃ
†θήραν ἔξω φυλακᾶς
εὐπλέκτων ὑπὲρ ἀρκύων,
θωύσσων δὲ κυναγέτας
συντείνῃ δρόμημα κυνῶν·
μόχθοις τ' ὠκυδρόμοις ἀελ-
λὰς θρώσκει πεδίον [or ἀέλλαις]
παραποτάμιον, ἡδομένα
βροτῶν ἐρημίαις
σκιαροκόμου τ' ἐν ἔρνεσιν ὕλας.

The picture is good and very complete. If we turn to Kyn. 9, we may see in ἅμα τῇ ἡμέρᾳ (3) the reason for δροσερόν, and λείμακος suggests ὀργάδες (2) and λειμῶνες (11). On the other hand "Der Gegensatz von" ἡδοναῖς ... μόχθοις ... ἡδομένα "allein würde genügen, um Aristipp als den bekämpften Gegner zu erkennen" (cf. Hermes 25, 584), but apparently it doesn't. πεδίον παραποτάμιον: cf. Kyn. 9, 11, περὶ τοὺς λειμῶνας καὶ τὰ ῥεῖθρα, where ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις also suggests βροτῶν ἐρημίαις. But the peculiarly Euripidean trait comes out in ὑπὲρ ἀρκύων, for they did not use nets to catch νεβρούς nor ἐλάφους either, although the presence of the ἀρκυωρός (9, 6) possibly misled Euripides—in a passage that is an artist's translation of the chapter into verse.

Of course one has to be cautious in advancing any theories, or rather hypotheses; and if one insists on reading weighty philosophic and eristic matter into the Kynegetikos, one must decide against rhetoricians and Arrian, and not allow Xenophon or even a contemporary to have exhibited this somewhat naïve side (sed quam nulla consequi affectatio possit) to his character. But where earthquakes are expected true caution is shown in building lightly.

Pentheus is discovered couchant on the limb of a tree; so it is decided, v. 1142, that he must be a lion; that was enough to exasperate the most long-suffering of dogs—

"εἰσόκε δὴ δαίμων Εὐριπίδῃ εὗρετ' ὄλεθρον
Ἀμφιβίου στυγνῶν ἀντιάσαντι κυνῶν."

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THE PARTICIPLE IN APOLLONIUS RHODIUS.

In the introduction to his *Grammatische Studien zu Apollonius Rhodius, Wien, 1878*, Rzach, after speaking of the value of Merkel's *Prolegomena* for our knowledge of the vocabulary of Apollonius, called attention to the lack of a systematic presentation of the grammar of this foremost representative of the Alexandrian Epos. In these Studies the questions relating to phonology and morphology received such a treatment at Rzach's hands, but even at the present time a similar presentation of the syntax is still wanting, although such a work would prove of value not only for the text, interpretation and literary appreciation of the poet, but also as a contribution to the Historical Syntax of the Greek language. In addition to this it may be hoped that it would occasionally, at least, afford glimpses of the state of the Homeric text before Aristarchus and of the syntactical views of his predecessors,—though from the nature of the problems the results in this line, and in the line of textual criticism, cannot be expected to prove as numerous and as valuable as those obtained from the study of the poet's morphology.

Even for detailed treatment of single chapters of Apollonius' syntax, I am able to cite only Wåhlin, *De usu modorum apud Apollonium Rhodium, Lundae, 1891*, and *Apollonius Rhodius, His Figures, Syntax, and Vocabulary, Johns Hopkins Dissertation, Baltimore, 1891*, by Chas. J. Goodwin, in which the syntax of the final, conditional and temporal sentences receives such consideration. The results are of interest as showing a general faithfulness to Homeric usage combined with "a tendency to develop the more unusual forms," and the occasional intrusion of later usages, sometimes, as in the case of ὄφρα with the past tenses of the indicative, with incongruous results. The parallelism of this and the similar results that will be obtained in the syntax of the participle with the poet's morphological usage will be noted and I hope to show also cases of imitation of isolated syntactical phenomena that may be compared with Rzach's observation, *Studien*, pp. 9 *f.*, in regard to ἐργομένην and εἴργε, so that the con-

clusion is, I believe, justifiable, that Apollonius' knowledge and imitation of Homeric syntax was in general not inferior to his knowledge of Homeric morphology. In connection with his method of work two other questions may be raised, whether he did not sometimes, when conveniently possible, avoid constructions not infrequent in Homer because they happened to coincide with later prose usage, and whether, on the other hand, he did not sometimes employ constructions borrowed from lyric or tragic poetry. Apparent examples of both of these phenomena will be cited below, though the passing of final judgment on their cause must be reserved until we have a complete syntax of Apollonius' work.

In comparing the usage of the participle in Apollonius with that of Homer we may begin with the consideration of the frequency of its occurrence as indicative of its stylistic effect. The facts for Apollonius are shown in the following table:

	No. of Lines.			No. of Part.			Part. per 100 Lines.		
	Narr.	Speech.	Total.	Narr.	Speech.	Total.	Narr.	Speech.	Total.
I.	1100	262	1362	422	68	490	38.3+	22.1+	35.9+
II.	867	421	1288	339	116	455	39.1+	27.5+	35.3+
III.	863	542	1405	341	159	500	39.5+	29.3+	35.7+
IV.	1323	456	1779	513	126	639	38.7+	27.6+	35.9
	4153	1681	5834	1615	469	2084	38.8+	27.8	35.7+

A comparison of this table with that given for the Iliad in my dissertation, *The Participle in Hesiod, Washington, 1897, Reprinted from the Catholic University Bulletin, Vol. III, pp. 421-471*, will show that in this respect Apollonius has varied but little from his great model. That this variation should be a gain in quantity is not surprising, for the use of the participle as the abridgment of a temporal, causal, or conditional clause, has increased in Apollonius. The typical difference, however, between the speech and narrative is still retained, and still more noteworthy is the uniformity of the usage throughout the whole of the Argonautica. In the Iliad this is not the case—the books with the highest and lowest percentage differing by nearly 25 per cent in the narrative and 15 per cent in the speeches. In contrast with this the striking uniformity revealed by these statistics for the different books of the Argonautica is the indication in one element of the *aequalis mediocritas* of his style of which Quintilian, X, 1, 54, speaks.

The difference between the Homeric and the Attic use of the participle may be stated in general by saying that the use of the participle as the conscious abridgment of a finite clause is still undeveloped in Homeric times, that the use of the genitive absolute is neither so frequent nor so free as in Attic Greek, and that the constructions of the supplementary and the adjectival participle are not so widely extended. A consequence and at the same time an indication of the non-development of the participle as the equivalent of the finite verb is seen in the difficulty of its combination with the negatives οὐ and μή. This state of affairs is on the whole reflected by Apollonius with considerable faithfulness—with how much consciousness it is difficult to determine. That it is not altogether the unconscious result of an effort to reproduce Homeric modes of thought and expression is shown most clearly by the treatment of the future participle which is confined within limits considerably narrower than those of Homeric usage. The image is, however, somewhat disturbed by Apollonius' lack of appreciation of quantitative differences—note especially the Genitive Absolute—and by the intrusion of constructions of later development that had the merit of convenience.

The facts upon which these statements are based are presented in the following sections. The order followed is that of the dissertation already cited, to which I must refer for the details of Homeric usage. Apollonius has been cited by Merkel's Teubner edition of 1897, in addition to which I have employed his large edition of 1854, and that of Lehrs, the Didot edition of 1862.

Adversative Participle.

The examples of the adversative participle in which no particle is added either to the participle or to the main verb are as follows: I 140, 445, 602, 1037, II 73, 247, III 54, 682, 1069, IV 491, 791, 800, 1006, 1558, 1650. The adversative relation is then merely an inference from a contrast suggested by the context, and the examples are not always especially cogent.

In the following examples the adversative relation is indicated by a περ that emphasizes the participle itself or one of its modifiers: I 99, 299, 896, 1199, 1340, II 27, 252, 260, 541, 1112, III 92, 408, 428, 584, 661, 782, 948, 1343, IV 813, 1146, 1166, 1527, 1647, 1674, 1734. Similar examples with καί are III 719, IV 31, 443, 834, 1252, 1456. καὶ . . . περ occurs I 484, 950, IV 65; καί περ only III 525; οὐδέ περ III 520.

In the following examples the particles that indicate the adversative relation qualify the main verb:[1] καὶ ὥς III 790; ἔμπης I 314, IV 797; ἔμπα I 792. In some of the examples cited above a double strengthening both of participle and main verb is found. So I 299 τῶν μοῖραν κατα θυμὸν ἀνιάζουσά περ ἔμπης | τλῆθι φέρειν (cf. III 782) and IV 65 τέτλαθι δ' ἔμπης | καὶ πινυτή περ ἐοῦσα (cf. I 484). In IV 1146 is found ἴσχε δ' ἑκάστην | αἰδὼς ἱεμένην περ ὅμως ἐπι χεῖρα βαλέσθαι, where G has ὁμῶς, and so in III 948 μελπομένης περ ὅμως, where L has ὁμῶς.

Comparing these examples with the Homeric usage we find that the construction does not occur quite so frequently in Apollonius as in Homer in proportion to the bulk of the poems, nor is the relative distribution between speech and narrative the same. In Apollonius the two nearly balance—26 of the examples occurring in the speeches and 29 in the narrative—while in the Iliad about two-thirds of the examples and in the Odyssey five-sixths are furnished by the speeches. This is partly due to the fact that speeches do not constitute as large a proportion of the bulk of the Argonautica, but in part also it is stylistic, indicating a greater amount of tameness in Apollonius' speeches.

In the more frequent employment of the particles we find a significant agreement with the Epic as against the Attic usage, the proportion being but little different from that found in the Odyssey. Of the different particles περ has about the same large predominance that is found in Homer, but καὶ . . . περ instead of being equal to καί is only half as frequent. The single example of καί περ in imitation of the isolated Homeric example η 224 is a syntactical phenomenon in line with Rzach's remarks on ἐργομένην and εἶργε, l. c., pp. 9 f.

The examples of ὅμως can hardly be employed to strengthen the reading of that particle in λ 565 as the order of words serves rather to recall Hesiod, Op. 20 ἥ τε καὶ ἀπάλαμόν περ ὅμως ἐπὶ ἔργον ἐγείρει—an example, to be sure, that contains no participle. Noteworthy also is the post-Homeric ἔμπα that our poet has borrowed from a lyric or a tragic source.

As in Homer the present (43) and the perfect (7) largely predominate. The aorists are such as approach the perfect in

[1] References, however, in all cases are to the line containing the participle in question.

meaning (see Gildersleeve, *Syntax* § 248), the examples being θανόντι II 260, and its synonyms φθιμένῃ III 790, καταφθιμένοιο III 782, ἀποφθίμενος IV 1527, and in addition ἀνιηθείς I 1340—all of which conforms closely to the Homeric usage.

The Temporal Participle.

In a few cases the stress on the element of time that is apt to be present in the tense of the participle is rendered clear by a parallel or a contrasted clause. The examples are III 653 ἦτοι ὅτ' ἰθύσειεν ἔρυκέ μιν ἔνδοθεν αἰδώς· | αἰδοῖ δ' ἐργομένην θρασὺς ἵμερος ὀτρύνεσκεν and IV 784, 1048. Sometimes such a force is suggested by the concatenation of the participle and a preceding word, as in the example just quoted and I 447, II 449, 498. More frequently the presence of a word of temporal meaning—whether connected with the participle or the main verb—causes its temporal force to spread throughout the whole clause. This is plainest in those cases in which a particle qualifying the main verb resumes a temporal clause, as τέως I 516 (the passage, however, is emended by Merkel), αὐτίκα II 562, 626, τότ' ἔπειτα III 898 (following the punctuation of Merkel's editio maior), ἔτι I 513, IV 926, ἔτι νῦν I 644. To these may be added the cases in which ἔτι qualifies the participle itself: I 195, II 433, 709 (bis), III 134, IV 38, 1381. Similar examples are: with ἤδη III 1384, with νέον (νεῖον) I 125, 1003, III 690, 1383, IV 54, with (οὔ)πω II 116, IV 678 (bis), with τότε II 721, πάρος III 182, τὸ πρίν I 497. A similar effect is sometimes produced by words that may be called temporal in a wider sense, as by αἶψα I 15, IV 681, δηναιόν III 589, λοίσθια IV 472, πρό (in προ . . . πημανθέντας) IV 558, τὰ πρῶτα I 1212. In some cases also the meaning of the participle itself, e. g. ἡβήσας, is such as to suggest the temporal meaning.

The treatment of μεσσηγύ(ς) calls for separate mention. In Homer it has, even in η 195, only local meaning, in Apollonius it undoubtedly has sometimes a temporal signification. The clearest example is IV 579 αὐτίκα δ' ἄφνω | ἴαχεν ἀνδρομέῃ ἐνοπῇ μεσσηγὺ θεόντων | αὐδῆεν γλαφυρῆς νηὸς δόρυ. Here the poet seems to have endeavored to turn the Attic construction of μεταξύ with the participle into Epic form. Similar examples with the present participle are III 307, 665 (but cf. p. 463), 723. The same use seems to be found with the aorist in II 337 and III 929, which is

perhaps no more surprising than the Attic use of ἅμα with the aorist participle. However, as other juxtapositions of μεσσηγύ and an aorist participle (II 269, III 1316) are clearly not temporal, it is perhaps better to explain μεσσηγύ in II 337 as local, and refer it in III 929 to the general situation. In a similar way the Attic construction of εὐθύς with the participle is represented in I 688 by πρόκα though a variant reading in L, καὶ περιτελλομένου, is also reported.

As examples of the temporal participle may be cited besides: I 160, 378, 413, 892, 906, II 385, 416, 513, 751, 915, 1098, III 68, 264, 405, 741, 859-60, 876, 974, 992, 1079, 1383, IV 90, 358, 1161, 1555, 1759. To these are to be added a number of temporal expressions cited under the head of the Genitive Absolute. The use of the participle as a substitute for a temporal clause developed early on account of the element of time in the tense of the participle, and examples are by no means infrequent in the Iliad. The chief difference between the use of Apollonius and that of Homer is in the particles that are employed to emphasize the temporal relation.

The Causal Participle.

A case in which the parallel constructions unmistakably show the causal relation is III 620 τὸν ξεῖνον δ' ἐδόκησεν ὑφεστάμεναι τὸν ἄεθλον | οὔτι μάλ' ὁρμαίνοντα δέρος κριοῖο κομίσσαι | οὐ δέ τι τοῖο ἔκητι μετα πτόλιν Αἰήταο | ἐλθέμεν, ὄφρα δὲ κτλ. Other instances in which the poet seems to have wished his readers to infer a causal relation are: I 314, 840, 1161, 1179, 1252, II 235, 419, 873, III 596, IV 51, 1401, 1565. More doubtful examples are: I 103, 1241, 1286, II 919, 1061, III 333.

Of particular interest are two passages in which ἅτε (IV 1439) and οἷα (IV 1722) are added to the participle to mark the causal relation in a way that is at variance with Homeric usage.

At this point may perhaps be mentioned the construction of the participle with particles expressing a comparison, which sometimes appear to approach a causal value. In Homer are found ὡς, ὥς τε, ὡς εἰ, ὡς εἴ τε; in Apollonius none of these occur. But there are found instead: ὡς . . . περ I 764 (formed probably by some such proportion as καίπερ: καὶ . . . περ = ὥσπερ: ὡς . . . περ); ἠύτε III 461, IV 1737 (ἠύτε κούρη approved of by Ziegler and read by Lehrs has not sufficient MS authority although in my opinion

either reading might be defended); *οἷόν τε* II 306, IV 997; *οἷά τε* I 991, III 618, IV 196, 318, 400. None of these words are combined in Homer with a participle. The supposed approach of such constructions—cf. Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses* § 874—towards the causal construction arises from the fact that in some instances either view of the situation would be logically appropriate, but the particle indicates clearly which concept the writer preferred. In a single passage Apollonius couples a participle with an instrumental dative. The example is II 325 (cf. T 336), and may be recorded here.

The Conditional Participle.

The clearest instances of this construction in Apollonius are those in which we have two possible contingencies expressed by contrasted participles. The examples are: IV 1104–5 *παρθενικὴν μὲν ἐοῦσαν ἑῷ ἀπο πατρὶ κομίσσαι | ἰθύνω· λέκτρον δὲ συν ἀνέρι πορσαίνουσαν | οὔ μιν ἐοῦ πόσιος νοσφίσσομαι*, which is repeated with some variation IV 1116–7; and III 614–5 *δέος δέ μιν ἴσχανε θυμόν, | μή πως ἠὲ παρ' αἶσαν ἐτώσια μειλίξαιτο | πατρὸς ἀτυζομένην ὀλοὸν χόλον, ἠὲ λιτῇσιν | ἐσπομένης ἀρίδηλα καὶ ἀμφαδὰ ἔργα πέλοιτο.* Of a different type is IV 402 *αὐτοὶ δὲ στυγερῷ κεν ὀλοίμεθα πάντες ὀλέθρῳ | μίξαντες δαΐ χεῖρας.* Here it is the optative with *κεν* that suggests the possibility of the resolution of the participle into a conditional clause. A similar suggestion is felt with greater or less force in I 470, II 147, 805, III 703, IV 389, 501. In IV 1101 and 1748 it is probably best to make the resolution as Lehrs does, but I see no reason for following him in the resolution of IV 113—cf. IV 182—nor should I resolve I 765-6 nor IV 428-9, which are the only other examples in which I can see the slightest possibility of suggesting such a construction.

There remains II 192 *οὐ δέ τις ἔτλη | μὴ καὶ λευκανίην δὲ φορεύμενος, ἀλλ' ἀπο τηλοῦ | ἑστηώς*, which if conditional (*οὐ δέ κεν ἔτλης* would rather have been expected) is the only example of *μή* with the participle in Apollonius (for the possibility of another interpretation compare p. 462). In no case is the conditional relation indicated by the addition of particles nor by a parallel clause with *εἰ* and the finite verb, and while the construction is much more frequent than in the Iliad, still, from the examples of the negatived construction collected by Gallaway, *On the Use of μή with the Participle in Classical Greek, Baltimore, 1897*, pp. 49 ff.,

it may easily be inferred that the poet has not allowed himself all the freedom of Attic usage, an inference that would be strengthened if a complete collection of the examples of the participle as the equivalent of a conditional clause were available.

Participle of Purpose.

The difference between the Epic and Attic use of the participle is clearly marked in this category. For in the early Epic the use of the future participle, especially in conjunction with ὡς, as a form of oratio obliqua is conspicuous by its absence, and the future participle is confined almost entirely to the use with verbs of motion. It is evident from Apollonius' work that he was conscious of this difference, and also evident that he limited somewhat too narrowly the Epic usage. For in the Argonautica the future participle is used *only* with verbs of motion. Parallels for the adjectival use of ἐσσόμενος are wanting, nor are there any for the use of the future participle with so-called ellipsis of the article, such as Σ 309 καί τε κτανέοντα κατέκτα,[1] Ψ 379 ἐπιβησομένοισιν ἐίκτην, λ 608 αἰεὶ βαλέοντι ἐοικώς, or Hes. S. 215 ἀπορρίψοντι ἐοικώς. Also without parallel is the use Ε 46 = Π 343 τὸν . . . νύξ' ἵππων ἐπιβησόμενον, for the form ἀλεξόμενον in IV 549, καί μιν ἔπεφνον | Μέντορες, ἀγραύλοισιν ἀλεξόμενον περι βουσίν, which Lehrs translates by *opitulaturum*, is clearly a present in IV 1486 ἀλεξόμενος κατέπεφνεν and in the only passage in which it occurs in Homer, ι 57 ἀλεξόμενοι μένομεν. This may be taken as an indication that Apollonius considered the form ἐπιβησόμενον in these passages as aoristic—a view which is supported by the context and against which there is nothing to be urged except the evidently future sense in Ψ 379. For Apollonius' use of sigmatic aorists with thematic vowel, cf. Rzach, p. 144.

The examples of the nominative with verbs of motion are as follows: with ἀντιάω IV 859; (μετα)βαίνω IV 1175, 1181; εἶμι IV 197, 740; (μετ)ελθεῖν II 149, III 482; (εἰσαφ)ικάνω III 351, IV 541; ἱκόμην I 12, III 539; μετακιάθω IV 531, κίον II 1173, κεδάννυμι II 136; ναυτίλλομαι III 62; στέλλομαι II 1198. But a single example of the

[1] The examples are too numerous to warrant Monro's remark, p. 58 n., that the use is "hardly to be defended". It may be noted, however, that the examples come only from the latest parts of the Iliad, the Odyssey and Hesiod.

accusative occurs III 1172, where the participle is in agreement with the subject of an infinitive, and it would seem not impossible that this restriction was intentional on the part of Apollonius, and rests on too narrow a conception of the Homeric usage. Of particular interest is IV 1113 *σῖγα δ' ἐὸν κήρυκα καλεσσαμένη προσέειπεν | ἦσιν ἐπιφροσύνῃσιν ἐποτρυνέουσα μιγῆναι | Αἰσονίδην κούρῃ*, which is in evident imitation of T 120 *αὐτὴ δ' ἀγγελέουσα Δία Κρυνίωνα προσηύδα*, the future participle being justified by the motion implied in each case in the context. Different is IV 248 *καὶ δὴ τὰ μέν, ὅσσα θυηλὴν | κούρη πορσανέουσα τιτύσκετο, μήτε τις ἴστωρ | εἴη quae sacrificium puella instructura paravit*, for which should be read *πορσαίνουσα*. The reading of G IV 817, 1535, *πρήσοντα, πρήσοντος*, which is adopted by Merkel and Lehrs, also affords impossible syntax. Lehrs' translation shows in the second example (the first can afford no indication) a present participle. Merkel at IV 817 ascribes this reading to the influence of Herodian; what Apollonius wrote he considers uncertain, perhaps *πρήσσοντα* the reading of L. In IV 1535 either a present or an aorist participle is possible so that the simplest emendation would be *πρήσαντος*, but in IV 817 a present participle is (cf. p. 467) required. May it not be best to cut the knot and read *πρήθοντα* even though the present stem occurs only in the compound *ἐνέπρηθον* Il. 9 589.

There remains the question as to whether the present participle is ever used by Apollonius in this construction instead of the future. Of this no example occurs in the Iliad, nor is the single example in Hesiod, Op. 85, very satisfactory. A number of passages in Apollonius have been interpreted in this way but unnecessarily, e. g. IV 1471 *ἔβη διζήμενος Ἀργώ, abierat quaesiturus Argo* (Lehrs); cf. II 697, IV 1150, and IV 483 *τό σφιν παρθενικὴ τέκμαρ μετιοῦσιν ἄειρεν*. The fire need not be a signal for them to return (*accessuris*) but rather a beacon for which to steer as they return. So also IV 455, *ὃ δ' ἐς λόχον ἦεν Ἰήσων | δέγμενος Ἄψυρτον*, the lying in wait for Absyrtus is conceived not as the purpose (*excepturus Absyrtum*) but as commencing with the going into ambush. Two more examples remain, I 209 *ἦμος ἔβη Πυθὼ δὲ θεοπροπίας ἐρεείνων ναυτιλίης*, which should be rendered "in quest of oracles" rather than "*oraculum consulturus*", and 703 *ὄρσο μοι, Ἰφινόη, τοῦδ' ἀνέρος ἀντιόωσα*, "*exi . . . rogatura*," in which such an explanation is inadmissible. The form *ἀντιόω* is, however, used by Homer not only as a present but also as a future

(cf. La Roche, *Einleitung* § 11, Monro § 63, Vogrinz p. 133), so that here and in III 879 I should assign the participle, against Rzach p. 153, to the future and add the example to those cited above.

Genitive Absolute.

This is the construction in which Apollonius varies most from the Homeric usage. The reason is that the difference between Homeric and later usage is largely a matter of quantity, and hence could hardly be expected to find reflection in Apollonius. Differences that are more easily observed, such as the exclusion of the future participle from this construction, are maintained and hence there can be no doubt that the solitary example IV 1535 is to be emended. The reading of the scholiast *φυσῶντος τοῦ ἀνέμου* shows that he was dealing with a present participle, though to read *πρήσαντος* would be palæographically the simplest correction.

No less than fifty-four examples are found in the Argonautica that must be interpreted as genitives absolute—a number which in proportion to the bulk of the work is about five times as great as the number of occurrences in the Homeric poems. The examples are as follows: Of the present participle, I 314, 452, 521, 588 (the scholiast gives a different but impossible interpretation), 651, 688, 757, 925, 1015, 1360, II 140, 147, 153, 195, 451, 496, 571, 753, 795, 805, 932, 963, III 864, 1385, IV 75, 241, 579, 835, 1157, 1214, 1462, 1535, 1580; of the perfect, II 905; and of the aorist, I 456, 470, 513, 607, 1063, 1152, 1159, II 468, 642, 729, III 850, 1358, 1398, IV 163, 501, 668, 926, 1401, 1406, 1629. *κεκλόμενος* II 642, IV 163, has been classed here although the occurrence of *κέκλομαι* II 693 and *κέκλεται* I 716 renders the classification doubtful.

The next question to arise is as to how those passages are to be interpreted in which there is more or less possibility of finding a word upon which the genitive may depend. In view of the number of certain examples cited above I am of the opinion that the absolute construction is to be accepted for Apollonius when the dependence is at all strained and that it is by no means certain that even such an example as II 1080 *οἵη δὲ κλαγγὴ δῆον πέλει ἐξ ὁμάδοιο | ἀνδρῶν κινυμένων*—although composed in imitation of such passages as K 523, λ 605, ξ 412 and κ 556, in which the genitive is undoubtedly dependent—was not felt by the poet to contain a genitive absolute. Instructive in this respect is II 107 *τοῦ δ' ἆσσον ἰόντος | δεξιτερῇ*

σκαιῆς ὑπερ ὀφρύος ἤλασε χειρί. To make the genitive depend on ὀφρύος is to my mind out of the question. The notable thing is the ease with which an absolute construction might have been avoided by writing τὸν δ' ἄσσον ἰόντα | κτλ. And so, while in Homeric poetry in a passage like II 594 ἐπεγνάμπτοντο δὲ κῶπαι | ἠύτε καμπύλα τόξα, βιαζομένων ἡρώων the genitive would be dependent, I should consider it in Apollonius a genitive absolute as Lehrs translates it, and the same applies to I 934, III 782, IV 211 and 555. In I 544 the interpretation turns upon the meaning of τεύχεα. Lehrs interprets it as *armamenta navis*, but as it is difficult to understand how the poet could say of this στράπτε δ' ὑπ' ἠελίῳ φλογὶ εἴκελα, we must refer τεύχεα to the armor which each hero had on the seat by him (cf. 530), and the νηὸς ἰούσης is genitive absolute. The scholiast also refers τεύχεα to armor. Less certain are III 709 and 805, while in I 1304 and II 572 (scholiast ὁ τοῦ κύματος ἀφρός) it seems best to accept the dependence of the genitive. In IV 1459 Lehrs rightly recognizes a genitive absolute and I should do the same also in I 260, II 1114 and IV 906.

In the last four passages the subject is omitted, but indisputable examples of this will be cited below from Apollonius. This interpretation of IV 1459 is strengthened by the parallel II 451, and that of IV 906, by I 513. These last two passages, however, are of especial interest. Both refer to the minstrel Orpheus, IV 906 ὄφρ' ἄμυδις κλονέοντος ἐπιβρομέωνται ἀκουαὶ | κρεγμῷ, I 513 τοὶ δ' ἄμοτον λήξαντος ἔτι προύχοντο κάρηνα, and it can hardly be a mere coincidence that the most satisfactory example of the construction in Homer, Σ 606 = δ 19 μολπῆς ἐξάρχοντος (sc. ἀοιδοῦ), also comes from the sphere of music. The similar position in the verse and the fact that λήξαντος and ἐξάρχοντος are exact opposites strengthen this belief. Its importance for the Homeric text is that it confirms the statement (Athen. V, p. 181°) that the reading before Aristarchus was ἐξάρχοντος whereas our MSS have ἐξάρχοντες with Aristarchus.

There remain a few passages in which there is the possibility of the genitive depending on the verb of the sentence. These cases are difficult to decide in the absence of any monograph to show the use of the cases in Apollonius and especially the syntactical influence possibly exerted upon him by the tragic poets. Thus in II 73 we find ἡ δ' ... ἀλύσκει | ἰεμένου φορέεσθαι ἔσω τοίχοιο κλύδωνος. Parallels for ἀλύσκειν τινός can be found in Soph. Ant. 488, El. 627, but the epic construction is the accusative. Similarly in IV 834,

κύματος . . . νῆα σαωσέμεναι might be compared with Soph. Ant. 1162 σώσας . . . ἐχθρῶν . . . χθόνα (cf. Phil. 919), but Homeric usage requires a preposition. The use of πείθομαι with the genitive is found in Eur. I. A. 726, is disputed at Thuc. 7, 73, 2, admitted for Herodotus and said to occur as a variant in K 57. It seems necessary to admit this construction in III 308, though whether it should be ascribed to the influence of Euripides, or taken as a confirmation of the age of the variant at K 57, must remain an open question. I should prefer to interpret III 1054 as a genitive absolute rather than as an ablatival genitive, though the absence of earlier examples of the verb ἀνασταχύω must make the interpretation doubtful.[1]

The addition of these examples raises the number of the occurrences of the genitive absolute to 71, comprising 47 presents, 2 perfects, 22 aorists. The proportion of present to aorist is practically the same as that found in the Homeric poems—a result that is surprising when contrasted with the use of the tenses of the participle after verbs of seeing.

The 'last step' in the development of the genitive absolute is the omission of the subject. The occurrence of this for Homer has been denied. The examples at best are rare, La Roche citing only Σ 606 = δ 19 and Λ 458 (cf. also Spieker A. J. P. VI, p. 317). The genuineness of the first example is disputed and the last could possibly be removed by reading σπάσσαντι, the permissible hiatus being the cause of the corruption. In marked contrast is the use of Apollonius. Cf. I 260, 513, II 153, 451, 642, 1114, III 709 (??), 782, 805 (??), IV 211, 579, 906, 1406, 1459.

Other departures from early Epic usage may be noted in the use of the relative as the subject in II 195, and in the fact that the genitive absolute is somewhat more freely employed in other than temporal relations. For the examples compare the preceding sections. Noteworthy also is the use of μεσηγύ, πρόκα, ἔτι to mark the temporal relation.

[1] Since writing the above I have succeeded in obtaining a copy of the dissertation *De Apollonii Rhodii casuum syntaxi comparato usu Homerico, Lipsiae, 1887*, by Linsenbarth, which brings evidence of the influence of the tragic poets on Apollonius. The author would apparently consider these passages genitives absolute, as on p. 6 only examples of ἀλύσκειν with the accusative are cited, and on p. 43 only III 1127 is given as an example of σαοῦν with the genitive. There is no mention of πείθομαι with the genitive nor of ἀνασταχύω.

At this point may be cited the examples in which a participle is employed in a case different from that of the pronoun with which it might agree, as these are in imitation of passages in which some would see the origin of the absolute construction. In three passages, III 371, 1009, IV 170, the ethical dative *οἱ* is followed by a genitive, and in another, II 393, we have a shift from the accusative subject of an infinitive to a dative depending on *χρειώ ἐστι*, as follows: *ἀλλὰ τί ἤ με πάλιν χρειὼ ἀλιτέσθαι | . . . ἐξενέποντι*; where Merkel, editio maior, and Lehrs follow G and the corrected reading of L *ἐξενέποντα*, the original reading of L being a compendium. Cf. *ρ* 555, *ψ* 206, the passages cited there by Ameis-Hentze, and Monro §243 d.

In I 396 is found an example of the so-called nominative absolute (cf. also IV 200). More interesting are the approaches to a dative absolute, as, for example, IV 977 *νυκτὶ δ' ἰούσῃ* as compared with *νυκτὸς ἰούσης*, but here I 1080 and II 942 point rather to a temporal dative. Other examples are II 679, 728, 973, 1003, 1231, III 166. For Homeric parallels cf. Monro § 246. Of the accusative absolute there is an example IV 417 *εἴ κέν πως κήρυκας ἀπερχομένους πεπίθοιμι | οἰόθεν οἷον ἐμοῖσι συναρθμῆσαι ἐπέεσσιν*. As the construction is hardly admissible, the passage needs emendation. The reading of G *ἀπερχομένη* and the scholiast's unfortunately free *φιλίαν πρὸς αὐτὸν συνθεμένη* suggest a feminine participle such as *πεμπομένη*. But as that would destroy the caesura it is perhaps best to read *κήρυκος ἀπερχομένου* with but slight deviation from the manuscripts.

Negative with the Participle.

Originally the participle, like other adjectives, was negatived by composition with a negative prefix while the particles *οὐ* and *μή*, or rather the predecessors of these particles, were employed only with finite verbs. The retiring of this first method of negation in favor of the second goes, as Delbrück has shown, *Vergleichende Syntax* II 531, hand in hand with the approach of the participle towards the nature of the finite verb. That this process is but beginning in the early Epic poetry I have endeavored to prove, and have found in this fact one of the strongest reasons for believing that the participle was not felt by early Epic poets as an equivalent of a subordinate clause.

I have also attempted to show that at a still earlier period the

particles οὐ and μή were brought into contact with the participle as the result of a process which we may term with Paul displacement of the syntactical distribution, so that as a corollary of this it must be admitted that the main verb of the sentence exerts an influence on the negative of the participle—an explanation which is sufficient (cf. Gildersleeve, A. J. P. XVIII 244) to account for all cases of μή with the participle in Epic poetry.

That this should be faithfully reflected in the work of Apollonius is hardly to be expected. What is merely external—the rarity of examples of μή with the participle—he has grasped and imitated. For the construction there can be cited at most but two passages in the Argonautica and of these examples one is not satisfactory. This is IV 1019 Ἴστω δ' ἱερὸν φάος Ἠελίοιο | . . . μὴ μὲν ἐγὼν ἐθέλουσα συν ἀνδράσιν ἀλλοδαποῖσιν | κεῖθεν ἀφωρμήθην. The negative belongs logically to ἐθέλουσα but formally to ἀφωρμήθην, otherwise we should have had the adhaerescent negative.[1]

The other passage is II 192 καὶ δ' ἐπι μυδαλέην ὀδμὴν χέον· οὐ δέ τις ἔτλη | μὴ καὶ λευκανίην δὲ φορεύμενος ἀλλ' ἀπο τηλοῦ | ἑστηώς. Lehrs renders μὴ καὶ . . . ἀλλ' by *nedum . . . adeo*, giving it the sense of μὴ ὅπως . . . ἀλλά, for which I know no parallel, and making the participle supplementary. One who is willing to introduce into Apollonius a case of μή with the participle as the equivalent of a negative protasis of a conditional sentence—a construction not found in Homer—may interpret οὐ δέ τις ἔτλη as an apodosis with κεν omitted (for other examples cf. Goodwin p. 24, where this passage is not included), although it seems to me that the poet would rather have written in that sense οὐ δέ κεν ἔτλης. In either event it is intended to match the one apparently real example of μή with the participle in Homer, namely δ 684.

Of the examples with οὐ a number might be explained away as due to displacement of the syntactical distribution (I 840, 1341, II 873, III 84, 388), others as adhaerescent (I 1217, 1219, IV 491, 636, 983, 1564), but the number of examples that remain (I 1191 (bis), II 990, 1026, III 839, IV 670) especially with the adversative (III 54, 520, 1221), the temporal (II 116, IV 676, 678), and the causal participles (II 235, III 620), are out of all proportion to the

[1] In T 262 Ἰστω . . . μὴ μὲν ἐγὼ κούρῃ Βρισηίδι χεῖρ' ἐπένεικα | οὔτ' εὐνῆς πρόφασιν κεχρημένος οὔτε τεν ἄλλου the participle seems added as an afterthought and the force of the oath has not carried the negative μή through.

Homeric usage and show how the syntax of Apollonius has been influenced by the post-Homeric development of the participial constructions.

The Supplementary Participle.

Verbs of Perception.

Subdividing according to the different senses and beginning with the sense of sight, we find in Apollonius the following instances of the supplementary participle after ὁράω and its compounds:

Present: I 241, 323, 552, 633, 814, II 431, 562, 1035, III 77, 490, 729, 827, IV 129, 185, 861, 973, 1193, 1245, 1478, 1719.

Aorist: II 1255, III 702, 1378.

Perfect: I 1056, II 1148, III 673, IV 1624.

After νοέω and εἰσνοέω, which, as in Homer (cf. La Roche at M 335), are used without any difference in meaning, are found the following examples of the Present: I 322, 1230, II 1261, IV 872, and the following aoristic forms: βαλοῦσαν IV 724, λιπόντες I 1283, -πλόμενος III 127, 1149, κιών IV 752. In meaning, however, κιών is certainly a present. Cf. especially Ap. I 391, κ 574, π 156 and Λ 284, Ξ 440, θ 286. -πλόμενος is an isolated form, the aoristic force of which (cf. νυκτὶ ἐπιπλομένῃ with νυκτὶ λούσῃ) may not be fully felt, while the example in I 1283 is not a case of actual perception. To these examples should most probably be added III 665: τὴν δέ τις ἄφνω | μυρομένην μεσσηγὺς ἐπιπρομολοῦσ' ἐνόησεν | δμωάων, though it is also possible to consider the participle as temporal and depending directly upon ἐπιπρομολοῦσα. After θηέομαι are found the following examples of the present, I 437, 438, 776; after δοκεύω is found the present in III 1055.

So far there is a close parallelism with the early Epic usage. But no examples occur with either ἀθρέω or λεύσσω, and on the other hand we find no Homeric parallel to IV 318 οἷά τε θῆρας | ὀσσόμενοι πόντου μεγακήτεος ἐξανιόντας, this verb not being used in Homer of actual perception, nor to the examples after δέρκομαι, IV 567, 864, 1047, which tend to show a loss of feeling for the original meaning of the word and the employment of it merely as synonymous with ὁράω. In the case of παπταίνω, however, this has not happened and the examples of the participle after the verb, I 342, II 35, 611, III 924, are not to be classed as supplementary, though the last example approximates to such a usage. Finally

I 1360 *οἱ δὲ χθονὸς εἰσανέχουσαν | ἀκτὴν ἐκ κόλποιο μάλ' εὐρεῖαν ἐσιδέσθαι | φρασσάμενοι, κώπῃσιν ἅμ' ἠελίῳ ἐπέκελσαν* may be interpreted as supplementary rather than adjectival. The closest Homeric parallels are Ψ 453 *φράσσατο δ' ἵππον ἀριπρεπέα προῦχοντα*, which La Roche correctly interprets as *ἔξοχον* in opposition to the *προτρέχοντα* of the Paraphrast and K 339 *τὸν δὲ φράσατο προσιόντα*, where La Roche makes the equation *φράσατο* = *ἐνόησεν*. There is, however, no reason for giving up the distinction between these verbs. Cf. La Roche at Ψ 450.

In Homer these verbs of seeing are used only of actual perception. This is generally the case in Apollonius also, but we have one instance of *νοέω* denoting intellectual perception, I 1283 *τῆμος τούς γ' ἐνόησαν ἀιδρείῃσι λιπόντες*—where the use of the nominative also is a construction that developed in post-Homeric times—and one example after *εἰσοράω*, III 77 *ἅζετο δ' ἀντομένην Ἥρην ἔθεν εἰσορόωσα*, which must be classed as intellectual perception since Hera has expressed her request only in words and evidently without assuming the posture of a suppliant. In the use of the tenses there is quite a noticeable departure from the Homeric usage. The examples of actual perception in Apollonius include 34 present, 6 aorist and 4 perfect participles. Two out of the 6 examples of the aorist are the isolated *-πλόμενος* forms but even including these the present participle furnishes in round numbers four-fifths of the instances of this construction as against three-fourths in Homer, while the aorist participle instead of being nearly twice as frequent as the perfect is only one and a half times as frequent. That is, Apollonius has made no attempt to imitate the chief Homeric peculiarity in this construction—the frequent use of the aorist participle. In this respect his poem stands about on the level of Attic poetry, which also employs the aorist participle to a limited extent. Of the four examples of the aorist apart from the two of *-πλόμενος*, two are forced on the poet—*ὑπερπτάμενον*, II 1255, by the metrical impossibility of *ὑπερπετόμενον*, *διαρραισθέντας*, III 702, by the lack of a corresponding perfect, for *διαρραιομένους* would express an entirely different idea—but the third, *ἀίξαντα* III 1378, is deliberately chosen as *ἀίσσοντα* would have fitted both metre and sense. The passive of this construction is found in the use of *φαίνομαι* with the participle: II 690, 1044, III 819, 956, IV 1601.

Under the verbs of finding we have the following examples: after *εὑρίσκω* II 781, IV 661, 850, 1122; after *τέτμε* I 908, III 249 (as

emended), 1275, 1276, IV 537; after *δήω* IV 1458. To these may be added IV 1484, with which P 134 and *π* 254 are to be compared. The tense employed is always the present except for one occurrence of the perfect, III 1275. The corresponding passive construction, which occurs I 491 *φράζεο δ', ὅππως χεῖρας ἐμὰς σόος ἐξαλέοιο, | χρειὼ θεσπίζων μεταμώνιον ἦ (=εἴ) κεν ἀλῴης*, is without parallel in Homer.

As in Homer the verbs of *hearing* are used both of actual and intellectual perception. The examples of actual perception are all in the genitive, viz., after *ἀκούω* I 278 (aorist), 1260 (present) and after *ἐπικλύω* I 1240 (present); the examples of intellectual perception are III 352 *ἀίων ἐμέθεν μέγα δυσμενέοντας | Σαυρομάτας* and 914 *ὅτ' ἤδη τήνδε κασιγνήτων ἐσάκουσεν | ἠερίην Ἑκάτης ἱερὸν μετα νηὸν ἰοῦσαν*, and being both in the accusative show that in this construction Apollonius has followed the Attic distinction of cases (cf. Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses* § 886), which is at variance with the Homeric usage.

Verbs of hearing or seeing may become verbs of knowing or learning by hearsay or by sight and still figuratively retain the construction of actual perception. The examples of this after *ἀκούω, ἀίω, εἰσοράω* and *νοέω* have already been noted. But this opens the way for the analogical extension of this construction to a variety of verbs denoting "to perceive," "to know," "to learn," "to think." Thus we find the participle after *ἐπαΐω* I 1022, II 195, after *οἶδα* I 135, II 66, III 175, IV 1317, after *γιγνώσκω* III 972, after *δαήσομαι* IV 235 (following Merkel's punctuation) and *προδαῆναι* I 106, after *δοάσσαι* III 954, and after *μανθάνω* IV 1204.

Of these verbs Homer employs in this construction only *ἀκούω, οἶδα* and *γιγνώσκω*, and in addition to these *πείθομαι* with which no participle is found in Apollonius. The construction is not only more frequent in Apollonius in proportion to the bulk of his work—15 examples occurring in the Argonautica to 12 in the Iliad and 21 in the Odyssey—but the use of the nominative (II 66, III 175, IV 235, 1204) is a marked variation from Homeric usage.

Also without parallel in Homer is the further extension of this use of the participle to verbs of "showing" IV 1415, and "reminding" III 1115. In I 1086 *ὀπὶ θεσπίζουσα | λῆξιν ὀρινομένων ἀνέμων* the construction is avoided in a way that may be compared with Homer's *ὀσσόμενον . . . ἀνέμων . . . κέλευθα.*

ΛΑΝΘΑΝΩ ΤΥΓΧΑΝΩ ΦΘΑΝΩ.

Noteworthy is the fact that the ordinary prose construction with τυγχάνω—of which but a single example ξ 334 = τ 291 is found in Homer—does not occur in Apollonius. Nor does he employ τυχών, which is not found in Homer, except in the sense of "hitting"—a sense in which Apollonius would have had little occasion to use it.

With λανθάνω and φθάνω the typical construction is identity of tense and from this type there is no real variation in Homer. This is also true of the examples with φθάνω in Apollonius I 1209, II 587, IV 307, and of the following examples with λανθάνω, II 539, 755, III 737, 779, IV 49. But in addition to these we have III 212 ὄφρα λάθοιεν | Κόλχων μυρίον ἔθνος ἐς Αἰήταο κιόντες, which shows a rather mechanical treatment of κιών according to its form rather than its meaning (contrast π 156 οὐδ' ἄρ' Ἀθήνην | λῆθεν ἀπὸ σταθμοῖο κιὼν κτλ.). Also in II 226 we find the aorist combined with the perfect participle—ἀλλά κε ῥεῖα | αὐτὸς ἐμὸν λελάθοιμι νόον δόρποιο μεμηλὼς | ἢ κείνας—a combination that is unavoidable, as either the perfect of λανθάνω or the aorist of μέλω would be un-Homeric.

The reverse construction occurs—always with coincidence of tense—in III 280 λαθών, 1143 ὑποφθάμενον, IV 911 προφθάμενος.

The construction of φθάνω with the infinitive is found I 1189, IV 1766, and although the occurrence of the construction in Classic Greek is considered more than doubtful by Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses* § 903, 8, still Apollonius has a single Homeric parallel (Π 861).

VERBS OF BEGINNING, CONTINUING, ENDING AND ENDURING.

Of the participle with these verbs Apollonius contains the following examples: ἐξάρχομαι I 362, μίμνω III 7, ἀνύω I 600, ἐρητύω II 251, IV 1052, κατερητύω I 493, κατερύκω IV 1006 (possibly adversative), ἔχω I 391, II 463 and 577, ἰσχάνω IV 108, λήγω II 84, μεθίημι IV 797, λωφάω IV 817 (but cf. p. 457), (IV 1416 is adjectival rather than supplementary), τλάω II 192-3 (but cf. pp. 455, 462), κάμνω IV 1326 = 1352. Periphrasis for ἀναπνέω (cf. Λ 801) is found II 476 οὐ δέ τις ἦεν ἀνάπνευσις μογέοντι. Similar is IV 117 ὅθι πρῶτον κεκμηότα γούναθ' ἕκαμψεν | νώτοισιν φορέων κτλ. (cf. K 201 and Ameis-Hentze at ν 187, Anhang). Here may be added: I 973 οὐ δέ νύ πω παίδεσσιν ἀγαλλόμενος[1] μεμόρητο (cf. I 646) and I 1171 χεῖρες γὰρ

[1] The scholiast reads ἀγάλλεσθαι.

ἀήθεσον ἠρεμέουσαι. Worthy of notice also are I 1353, III 274, IV 192, in which we seem to have a contamination of this construction and a case construction (cf. Ω 475-6).

The list of verbs used varies considerably from the Homeric usage, most noticeably in the avoidance of παύω for which are substituted (κατ)ερητύω, κατερύκω, λωφάω. The reason for this is undoubtedly the fact that παύω was also used in prose and that Apollonius was seeking for what he considered more elevated expressions. Notice, as a morphological parallel, the way in which the late Epic poets avoid πρός except when driven to it by the exigencies of the metre (cf. La Roche, Wiener Studien XXII, p. 49). Except for two present-perfects λελοχημένοι III 7 and ἑστηώς II 193 and one instance of κιών I 391, the participles, as was to be expected, are all present participles. Hence II 230 οὐ κέ τις οὐδὲ μίννυθα βροτῶν ἄνσχοιτο πελάσσας must be interpreted as circumstantial, "No mortal could approach and endure it even for a little while."

Verbs of Emotion.

The distinction between the circumstantial and supplementary participle is extremely slight in verbs of this class. When either the participle or the principal verb in a sentence denotes a state of the feelings an extra-linguistic inference of a causal connection is in many cases rendered particularly easy, and even the cases of the closest fusion of verb and participle amount to hardly more than this (cf. Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 882). Still the following examples may be cited here, and classified according to the case of the participle:

The *nominative* occurs with θαμβέω I 322, 550, II 923, III 923, IV 184, 1190, 1361, ἔταφον II 1040, ἄζομαι III 77, γηθέω I 436, ἰαίνομαι III 1019, ἐγγελάω III 64, ἐπεχήρατο IV 55, αἰδέομαι IV 1047, ἀνιάζεσκον III 1136, στυγέω II 1199, and ὀλοφύρομαι IV 1737 if Lehrs' reading ἠύτε κούρη be retained. To these should be added II 583 οἱ δ' ἐσιδόντες | ἤμυσαν λοξοῖσι καρήασιν, and IV 170 ἐν δέ οἱ ἦτορ | χαίρει δερκομένης καλὸν σέλας where the participle, although in the genitive, qualifies the logical subject of the sentence (cf. III 1009).

With the *genitive* we find only ἀθερίζω I 123, III 80, and the curious passage IV 690 ἀμηχανέουσα κιόντων "at a loss for their coming," i. e., "wondering why they had come". In II 642 ὃ δὲ φρένας ἔνδον ἰάνθη | κεκλομένων the participle is most probably a genitive absolute.

With the *dative* are found *λαίνομαι* II 163, *ἀγαίομαι* III 1015, *χολόομαι* III 124.

With the *accusative* is used *ἐλεαίρω* IV 736, 1306, 1421, *ὀδύρομαι* I 1066.

Besides these are found a number of phrases with *αἱρέω*, *ἔχω*, *λαμβάνω* that serve as periphrases for verbs of emotion. An example with the genitive of the participle—unless it be considered a genitive absolute—is IV 555 *αὐτόν που μεγαλωστὶ δεδουπότος Ἀψύρτοιο | Ζῆνα θεῶν βασιλῆα χόλος λάβεν.* The dative occurs in II 775 *ἄχος δ' ἕλεν Ἡρακλῆι | λειπομένῳ* (changed, however, to the genitive by van Herwerden; cf. Rzach, *Bursians Jahresbericht* 38, p. 16), but more frequently the accusative: IV 1243 *ἄχος δ' ἕλεν εἰσορόωντας*; so I 1054, II 19, 410, 577, 683, III 726, IV 582, 958.

Comparing these examples with the early Epic usage, the most noticeable difference is the absence of *χαίρω* (except in IV 170 which is raised far above the prose level by the periphrasis) and *τέρπομαι*, which is on a line with Apollonius' avoidance of *παύω* with the participle. In not using *ἥδομαι* the poet comes closer to the Homeric usage which affords but a single example of this construction. *ἀθερίζω* is also not employed by Homer with the participle—nor is it construed with the genitive—but Apollonius has given to it the construction of its synonyms. On the other hand is to be noted the construction of the participle with *αἰδέομαι*, the earliest example of which is Kallinos 1, 3.

The Adjectival Participle.

The clearest sign of the degradation of the participle to an adjective is the formation from it of comparatives or adverbs. Of this we have in Apollonius only one example *ἐσσυμένως*, which occurs I 789, 1329, II 540, 896, 1174, 1248, III 840, IV 881, 1407, 1531, 1593. Next may be mentioned some words of a quasi-participial nature—*κρείων* IV 1007, 1067 (possibly = *χρεϳάων*; cf. Brugmann, Grundr. II 404), *κρείουσα* IV 572, *μεδέουσα* IV 915 (note that it is construed like a noun with the genitive), *βαθυρρείοντα* II 661 (cf. 797), *εὐρὺ ῥέοντα* II 1264, *κελαδεινὰ ῥέοντας* III 532, *παμφανόωσαν* III 1279 (cf. I 788), *ἐυκτιμένης* I 1355, *ἐυφρονέουσα* III 997, *ἀέκοντι* II 769 (cf. IV 1504)—which are used as adjectives.

The remaining instances of the attributive participle may be classified into those in which the simple participle is used to qualify the noun, and those in which it is employed to form a complex

that is practically the equivalent of a compound adjective. Of the first class we find: Present, *αἰθόμενος*[1] I 518, 1134, II 158, III 848, IV 598, 923, 1416, 1719, *ἐπανθιώωντας* III 519, *εὐδιόωντι* II 371, *καταβλώσκοντι* IV 227, *κελάδων* I 501, IV 133, *κοιρανέοντος* IV 545, *κυμαίνοντι* IV 609, *λαμπετόωντα* III 1361, *λαμπομένῃσιν* III 1355, *μελαινομένην* III 749, *μυδόωσα* IV 1529, *νεύοντας* II 1067, *νηπιάχοντος* IV 866, *ὀρινομένων* I 1086, *πλαδόωσαν* II 664, *πλήθοντος* IV 1768, *προύχων* I 925, IV 1581, 1624, *πυθομένοισιν* IV 1403, *τηκομένῳ* IV 1678, *τηλεθάοντα* IV 1423, *τυφόμενος* IV 139, 621, *φλεγέθοντα* III 141, *χνοάοντας* II 43.

Perfect: *ἀρηρομένην* III 1335, *ἀρηρώς* I 1163, *III 1323*, *βεβαρηότα* IV 1524, *(ἐκ)γεγαώς* I 208, 233, 719, 975, III 244, 364, 1074, *ἑαδότα* II 35, *ἐοικότα* I 1141, III 594, *κεκμηώς* III 1340, IV 116, *κεκοτηότι* IV 1086, *μεμορμένον* III 1129, *πεπρωμένῃ* II 817, *τετληότες* II 544, *τετμηότι* IV 156, *τετρηχώς* I 1167, III 1392, *τετρυμένα* I 1174.

Aorist: *διακρινθέντες* I 856, *θανόντος* *I 1350*, *καμόντων* II 1276, *καταφθιμένοιο* III 1272, *οὐλόμενος* I 802, II 153, 1187, III 436, 677, IV 446, 1009, 1250, 1483.

Examples of the second class are: Present, I 34, 37, 49, 411, 546, 935, 1076, 1191 (bis), II 739, 744, 1072, III 67, 410, 496, 839, 927, IV 221, 323, 788, 976. Perfect, I 52, 76, 147, 200, 508, 576, 595, 787, 938, II 26, 278, 552, 818, 1226, III 832, 1290, 1294, IV 670, 675, 1463, 1559, 1583.

Of the participle employed as a substantive we have the following examples with the article: III 174 *ὁ δὲ σῖγα νόον βουλήν τ' ἀπερύκων*, III 406 *τὸν Ἑλλάδι κοιρανέοντα*. In II 156, III 204, 421, *ἀνήρ* (cf. Gildersleeve, *Syntax* §31) takes the place of the article. Examples without the article are more frequent: *περιναιετάοντες* I 229, 941, II 911, *ἀνεγρόμενοι* II 673, *ὑπέρβια μηχανόωντες* III 583, *ἄρμενα* IV 237, 887, *παρεδριόων* II 1041, *διάνδιχα ναιετάοντας* III 990, *παρεόντας* II 1026, *κῶας ἄγειν κριοῖο μεμαότας* II 1201, *πυγμαχέοντα* II 785, *ζωόντων* (neuter) IV 1507, *ὑποτρέσσαντος* IV 1505, *θανόντος* IV 477, *οἰχομένοισι* II 842, *φθιμένοισι* II 891, *ἰοῦσιν* III 917, *πευθομένοις* IV 263, *ἐπινισσομένοισιν* IV 281, *πλώουσιν* (?) IV 525, *ἀντομένοισιν* (?) IV 1553, *δαιομένοις* (neuter) II 703, *κατηφιόωντι* I 461, *μογέοντι* I 739, *ἐξενέποντι* I 764, *ἐπαΐσσοντι* (neuter) II 170, *περιγνάμψαντι* II 364.

[1] When several examples in different cases occur the participle is cited only in the nominative singular masculine. *Italicized* examples contain a parallel adjective.

Of the participle used as a predicate with various forms of εἰμί the following examples occur: of the aorist only ἄρμενον I 1290, of the perfect ἐκγεγαῶτες I 952, περι . . . ἐσκληῶτες II 53, ἐληλαμένον II 231, βεβολημένοι II 411, προπεφραδμένον III 1314, τετελεσμένος III 1406, δεδαημένοι IV 1276. In a number of other cases the copula is omitted and the participle itself takes the place of the finite verb: βεβολημένη I 262, ἐοικώς I 764, κυλινδόμενον IV 152, ἄρμενοι IV 1459.

The examples show no noteworthy departure from the Homeric syntax. The most interesting fact is the disappearance of many of the most familiar *epitheta ornantia*, but that is a matter that concerns Apollonius' vocabulary rather than his syntax.

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Μή FOR οὐ BEFORE LUCIAN.

The Greek negatives are ever a fair subject for discussion, and the pages following will take up once more the *Ἀλαβανδιακὸς σολοικισμός* as illustrated by the usage of ten authors from Polybius to Lucian. The *μή*'s that have trenched on the ground of *οὐ* in these ten have for most of them been collected in various places, whereby the labor of him who would trace the growth of this encroachment is facilitated. All these collections could not be obtained, so that I have in the main made my own collection, which has been checked wherever possible. The limited space precludes much discussion, but this is not necessary, inasmuch as the encroachments of *μή* on *οὐ* in Later Greek have been treated by Professor Gildersleeve in the first volume of the American Journal of Philology (pp. 45-57). No one has as yet set forth in order the development of the encroachments of *μή* on *οὐ* during the centuries preceding the full growth reached in Lucian and the other Atticists.

Stephanus Byzantius (s. v. *Ἀλάβανδα*) says, *Ἀλαβανδιακὸς σολοικισμὸς ὡς Φιλόξενος τὴν Ὀδύσσειαν ἐξηγούμενος, ὅταν ἡ μὴ ἀπαγόρευσις ἀντὶ τῆς οὐ κεῖται, ὡς τὸ μὴ δι' ἐμὴν ἰότητα Ποσειδάων ἐνοσίχθων.* And Schmid, Atticismus ii 60 Anm. 78, supposes that its prevalence was due to the Alabandian rhetoricians Hierocles and Menecles, whose influence was exerted in the first half of the century preceding the Christian era. Whether the credit for the name Alabandian as applied to this solecism is due to these two citizens of Alabanda, or not, Professor Gildersleeve has shown in the article already cited that there was always a common border-land between *οὐ* and *μή*, and that the latter trespasses over this border-land by the extension of usages at first legitimate. Brugmann, Griech. Gram.[1] p. 499, adopts Professor Gildersleeve's view. To refer the encroachments of *μή* on *οὐ* to the desire to avoid hiatus shows little appreciation of the problem, and does not account for the *μή*'s that are not used to avoid the yawn, nor for the authors who had no regard for proprieties.

The encroachments in each author will be catalogued under his name so as to indicate as much as possible the historical growth. To begin with Polybius.

Polybius.

For Polybius the figures of Birke are used, taken from his dissertation *De particularum μή et οὐ usu Polybiano Dionysiaco Diodoreo Straboniano*, Lipsiae, 1897. Birke's interpretation of an encroachment is faulty, as he often disregards the context.

1. μή can be legitimately employed after a verb of saying, the utterance striving to make good the statement. And the only two instances of μή thus used in Polybius would be explained, were his Greek classic. The two are after φημί, ii 49, 7; xiv 9, 9. λέγω is followed by a negative only in the ὅτι οὐ construction. The *verba cogitandi*, νομίζω (xi 3, 6) and οἴομαι (i 37, 7), with μή are to be explained, the former by a preceding ὥστε, the latter as depending on δεῖν. δοκεῖ ἔμοιγε, ix 36, 2 = νομίζω, A. J. P. i 49.

2. Two examples of the simple relative with μή are cited by Birke, x 32, 9 and xviii 31, 7, the former being explained by a preceding δεῖ. μή after ὅσος (i 51, 12; x 35, 3; xvi 12, 6; 34, 11) is not to be counted as an extension in Polybius. In general, μή is more and more used after ὅσος, οὐ avoided.

3. The most certain intrusion of μή into the sphere of οὐ is with the participle, most widely with the causal participle, which is an extension of the conditional. Four such participles are cited: iv 24, 6 (o. o.); xii 16, 9; xviii 7, 5; 30, 10. But purely causal are those with ἅτε: v 48, 10 (ἅτε μηδενὸς κωλύοντος); 67, 11; viii 19, 9. Once a concessive-adversative participle takes μή, iii 26, 4. In xviii 31, 5 we have an adjective followed by a participle with μή, ψιλῶν, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις μηδὲν ἐχόντων.

Philodemus.

Philodemus, whose *floruit* is set at about a century after that of Polybius, and after the supposed influence exerted by the Alabandian rhetoricians, shows the Alabandian solecism well developed.

1. Among the *verba dicendi* with μή, φημί, as might be expected, leads the way: π. ῥητορικῆς (cited by page of the Teubner text) i 91; 153; 188. Others are φάσκω, π. ῥητ. i 223; λέγω, ii 226, 240; ὀνειδίζω, *supplem.* ii 5; ἀποδείκνυμαι, ibid. ii 2, 32. General *oratio obliqua* (*oratio obl.* without any special introductory word)

with μή is found in π. μουσικῆς p. 17. The *verba cogitandi* are represented by νομίζω, π. ῥητ. i 22, 147; δοκῶ (= *videor*), ibid. *supp.* ii 18, 54.

2. Causal ὅτι μή is not employed, but ἐπειδὴ μή is found once, without *oratio obliqua*, π. ῥητ. ii 264.

3. The following three simple relatives with μή are extensions of μή into the domain of οὐ: π. ῥητ. i 79 (ὃ μή που συμβέβηκεν); 326 fr. 7; *supp.* ii 48.

4. The *oratio obliqua* participle with μή is found after φαίνομαι, π. μουσ. 6, οὐδ' ἐφαίνοντο μὴ οὖσαι. Examples of causal participles with μή are, π. ῥητ. i 302; *supp.* ii 31: of temporal, μὴ δυνηθέντι, ibid. i 342. ὡς μή with a participle deserves notice, ibid. ii 105 fr. 12, ὡς μὴ κατ' ἀρχ[ὰς] εὐθέως εὐδοκιμοῦντας.

Diodorus Siculus.

1. The few years from Philodemus to Diodorus find in the latter a large increase in the number of μή's with an *oratio obliqua infinitive*. The *verba dicendi* are the following: φημί, heading the list, i 24, 2; 43, 4; 84, 1; 89, 2; ii 30, 1 (μή interchanged with οὐ): λέγω, i 94, 4; ii 16, 3: ἀποφαίνομαι, iii 18, 5; xii 14, 2: εἶπον, xvii 114, 2: ἱστορῶ, ii 38, 6: μυθολογῶ, iv 64, 3. Of general *oratio obliqua* there are 49 examples in the first five books, iv 9, 3 (μή and οὐ interchange); 45, 3; xiii 94, 3, etc. The *verba cogitandi* are νομίζω, xi 8, 4; v 24, 1; xiii 32, 2: ἡγοῦμαι, i 78, 2: ὑπολαμβάνω, ii 26, 9; xvi 45, 4: διαλαμβάνω, ii 50, 6: δοκῶ, xv 34, 2; xi 82, 3: ἐλπίζω, xv 51, 4: διαλογίζομαι, xx 12, 5. πυνθάνομαι, a *verbum sentiendi*, not seldom takes μή, xii 33, 4; 49, 2; xix 43, 2, etc. ὅτι μή does not occur.

2. The simple relative with μή is found only in *oratio obliqua* after φημί, or λέγω: i 24, 5; 45, 3.

3. *Oratio obliqua* participles with μή are used after ὁρῶ, xi 17, 1; xv 93, 2; xviii 59, 4: θεωρῶ, xiii 78, 3; xix 64, 5: γιγνώσκω, xviii 64, 3: οἶδα, xix 9, 2: φαίνομαι, i 39, 8. Examples of the large number of causal participles with μή are: i 6, 3; 8, 5; 23, 4; 29, 6; 30, 8. Concessive-adversative are ii 16, 4; 18, 1; v 69, 5; xv 81, 4. Temporal are ii 10, 6; v 14, 1; xi 64, 4; 84, 3.

ὡς μή c. part. is found once (v 69, 3), but in connection with an infinitive after ἄτοπον, so that it does not count.

Dionysius Halicarnaseus.

Dionysius contemporary with Diodorus does not in point of number approach the latter, which is perhaps due to his stricter Atticism. But ὅτι μή (in o. o.) and ἐπειδὴ μή occur in the rhetorical works, which are cited for convenience' sake by *Rhet.* from the old Tauchnitz edition.

1. The following *verba dicendi* take μή with the *oratio obliqua* infinitive: φημί, *Antiq.* ii 60, 4; 69, 3; *Rhet.* v [149], 291: λέγω, *Ant.* iii 29, 1: ἀποκρίνομαι, *Ant.* iii 23, 1: ἀποφαίνομαι, *Rhet.* vi 194. General *oratio obliqua* with μή occurs in *Ant.* v 71, 3; vii 17, 1; ix 28, 4. The *verba cogitandi* are ἡγοῦμαι, *Ant.* ix 54, 3: οἴομαι, *Ant.* ii 43, 4; vi 35, 2: δοκῶ, *Ant.* viii 67, 1: δόξαν παρέχω, *Ant.* ix 23, 1: εἰκάζω, *Ant.* i, 10, 2: ἔοικα, *Ant.* ii 56, 6: λογίζομαι, *Ant.* v 70, 3. Dionysius has one *verbum sentiendi*, πυνθάνομαι, *Ant.* v 52, 2.

2. ὅτι μή in *oratio obliqua* is found once in the rhetorical works after φιλοσοφεῖ: ὅτι μηδέν ἐστι, φιλοσοφεῖ, v [154].

3. The rhetorical works also contain two causal sentences introduced by ἐπεὶ μή and ἐπειδὴ μή: ἴωμεν . . . οὐκ ἐπειδὴ μὴ προσήκει . . . ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ μὴ πάντων καιρός, v 225.

4. Relative sentences with μή are not restricted to *oratio obliqua*, as in Diodorus: *Ant.* ii 19, 5; 26, 6; v 24, 2; *Rhet.* v 61; [212]. One local sentence occurs in the Antiquities, i 40, 6, ἔνθα μὴ τυγχάνει, and one temporal sentence in the *De Lys. Iud.* v 252, ὅτε μὴ πᾶσιν ἐξῆν.

5. *Oratio obliqua* participles with μή are found after ὁρῶ, *Ant.* vi 40, 3: οἶδα, vii 53, 3: εὑρίσκω, *Rhet.* vi 226. Causal participles with μή are: *Ant.* i 52, 4; ii 59, 4; *Rhet.* v 88, [132]; temporal are: *Ant.* ii 42, 2; iii 67, 5; adversative-concessive are: *Ant.* ii 71, 1; xi 52; *Rhet.* vi 176. οἷα δὴ μή is found with participles: *Ant.* v 28, 2; 67, 5; and ὡς μή similarly: *Ant.* iii 3, 4; ix 22, 6; *Rhet.* v 342.

Strabo.

1. *Oratio obliqua* infinitive with μή: after *verba dicendi* φημί, i 29 B; 30 D; ii 77 A (often): λέγω, vii 301 D: εἶπον, i 48 A: ἐλέγχω, xiv 677 A: ὑπισχνοῦμαι, v 222 D: general *orat. obl.* i 23 C; 31 C; ii 76 B, and often. These are the *verba cogitandi*: νομίζω, i 22 B; 38 D: ὑπολαμβάνω, i 29 D: εἰκάζω, i 23 B; vi 274 C: δοκῶ, xi 491 D—rare in comparison with the preceding class.

2. *Oratio obliqua* ὡς μή (c. opt.) is found twice, xv 715 A (already *orat. ob.*), vi 265 B (after λόγος).

3. Μή occurs twice in causal sentences: after ἐπεί, ix 401 A (*orat. ob.*, if not corrupt); after ἐπειδή, vi 271 C.

4. Relative sentences with μή that show an intrusion of this negative into the realm of οὐ are few: i 13 C; vi 286 C; xvii 730 B. Local sentences with μή are two in number, vi 285 B; ii 73 D (ὅπου μή).

5. Participles with μή in *oratio obliqua* are used after ὁρῶ, xvi 785 B: οἶδα, i 28 D: κατανοῶ, xvi 741 A. Of the others with μή the most numerous are the causal: i 38 C; 44 D; iii 144 D, 170 A, etc. The temporal are i 45 C; 56 B; vi 274 B, etc. Concessive-adversative are ii 104 C; 121 A; xi 491 D, etc. ὡς μή c. part. is found at i 8 C; 28 C; 43 A.

New Testament.

The New Testament which is placed here after Strabo presents fewer instances of μή wrongly used than would be expected in the march of the development of μή's intrusion on οὐ, except that μή holds almost undisputed sway with the participle.

1. *Oratio obliqua* infinitive with μή. Striking is the entire absence of φημὶ μή. λέγω is found three times, Matt. xxii 23; Mark xii 18; Acts xxiii 8. Besides these we find also ἀντιλέγω, Luke xx 27; ἀποκρίνομαι, Luke xx 7; ἀπαρνεῖσθαι, Luke xxii 34. The *verba cogitandi* with μή are λογίζομαι, ii Cor. xi 5; καταλαμβάνω, Acts xxv 25.

2. One ὅτι μή causal is found in John iii 18, ἤδη κέκριται, ὅτι μὴ πεπίστευκεν. ἐπεὶ μή ποτε in Heb. ix 18 is explained as interrogative, Blass, Gram. d. neutest Griech. 75, 3.

3. There are four simple relatives with μή: Titus i 11; ii Pet. i 9; i John iv 3; Col. ii 18 (which does not really count, being after an imperative).

4. *Oratio obliqua* participles with μή are found only after θεωρῶ, Acts xxviii 6, and εὑρίσκω, ibid. xxiii 29. Numerous above all are causal participles with μή: Matt. xviii 25; xxii 25; Mark ii 4, etc. Examples of concessive-adversative participles with μή are John vii 15; Acts xiii 28; i Cor. ix 20. The following μή's are with temporal participles, Luke ii 45; John viii 10; Acts xii 19. Less defined are not a few: Luke vii 30; Acts v 7; Phil. i 28; i Pet.

iii 6. ὡς μή c. part. is represented by two examples: i Cor. iv 18; ii Cor. x 14. Three times we have an adjective and μή + participle: δίκαιος ὢν καὶ μὴ θέλων, Matt. i 19; Heb. vii 3; Jude 19.

PLUTARCH.

In Plutarch's Lives there is a great increase of μή for οὐ.

1. *Oratio obliqua* infinitives with μή: after *verba dicendi*, φημί, Thes. 13; Rom. 29; Num. 9: λέγω, Thes. 31; Rom. 9; Pop. 6: ἀποκρίνομαι, Cam. 13; Tim. 6; Agis 10: εἶπον, Alc. 7: αἰτιῶμαι, Thes. 29; Brut. 40: ἀντεῖπον, Cam. 29: ἱστορῶ, Caes. 63: καταμέμφομαι, Pomp. 76: ἀπόφημι, Alc. 23: γράφω, Ant. 22: ἀντιφωνῶ, Arat. 8: ἀκούω, Galb. 13. General *orat. obl.* with μή is common: Thes. 23; Rom. 28; Aem. P. 19; Flam. 21. πυνθάνομαι μή is also found, Alc. 7; Cat. Min. 72. Plutarch yields the following *verba sentiendi*: νομίζω, Alc. 37: ἡγοῦμαι, Cras. 2: ἐλπίζω, Luc. 9; Eum. 15: δοκῶ, Alc. 18; Cor. 33: οἴομαι, Rom. 27: καλλωπίζεσθαι, Marius 30: εἰκάζω, Brut. 51: ἔοικα, Thes. 14: τεκμαίρομαι, Phoc. 4: λογίζομαι, Cleom. 25.

2. ὅτι μή after verbs of emotion, corresponding to quod c. conj. in Latin: θυμοῦμαι, Dion 9: ἀγανακτῶ, Pop. 2: χαλεπαίνω, Otho 7. ὅτι μή after λέγω in Pomp. 36, ὅτι μή βάλλει, is due to θαυμαστόν.

3. Two causal ὅτι μή's were found, Demet. 52; Galba 17, and the same number of ἐπεὶ μή's, Thes. 28; Pyr. 10.

4. The following are instances of relative sentences with μή for οὐ: Lyc. 9; Sol. 29; Cor. 22; Tim. 36. Two local sentences are Peric. 28 (ὅπου); Luc. 39 (οὗ). ὅτε μή temporal-causal is found once, Ant. 5.

5. *Oratio obliqua* participles with μή are found after these verbs: φαίνομαι, Thes. 27: ὁρῶ, Sol. 8; Cor. 12: συνορῶ, Sol. 19: πυνθάνομαι, Alc. 35: καταλαμβάνω, Aem. P. 19: αἰσθάνομαι, Syl. 4: ἀνέχομαι, Syl. 6: ἐλέγχω, Ages. 22: εὑρίσκω, Ages. 24: οἶδα, Demos. 13: γιγνώσκω, Demet. 49. Examples of causal participles with μή are, Thes. 15; Rom. 16; Lyc. 8; Numa 16, and often: of concessive-adversative, Thes. 20; Sol. 7; Pop. 5; Alc. 10: of temporal, Pelop. 30: less defined, Them. 23; Lyc. 22; Alc. 16. The following particles are found, ὡς μή, Rom. 6; Lyc. 5; Them. 9, and often: ὥσπερ μή, Cor. 1; Galb. 7: ἅτε μή, Rom. 14; Lys. 11; Luc. 11; Nic. 23. Plutarch also uses an adjective with μή + participle, Alc. 14 (παλιμβόλους . . . καὶ μηδὲν . . . ἥκοντας); Pelop. 28; Brut. 15.

Dio Chrysostomus.

Dio Chrysostomus presents nearly the same condition of affairs in regard to μή as does Lucian.

1. *Oratio obliqua* infinitives with μή: after *verba dicendi*, φημί, iv 75 (page of Teubner text); vii 130; xi 180: λέγω, xi 178; xxi 301: ἀντιλέγω, vi 101: φάσκω, vii 135: ὁμολογῶ, xi 171: ἀποφαίνω, xxxi 367: καταμηνύω, lix 187: general *oratio obliqua*, vi 95; 98; 100, and often: after *verba cogitandi*, νομίζω, xxx 345: δοκῶ, κόμης ἐγκ. 310.

2. ὅτι μή as an *oratio obliqua* construction has spread much beyond Plutarch's few verbs. It is found after θαυμάζω, vi 102: θαυμαστόν, xxxi 382: ἄχθομαι (διότι μή), xxxviii 75: λογίζομαι, iv. 80: κρίνω, xvi 270: ἐνθυμοῦμαι, xxxi 357: ἐννοοῦμαι, xvi 271: ὁμολογῶ, xlv 121: ἐπίσταμαι, xxxi 357: οἶδα, ibid. 359: λέγω, lvii 182: εἰπεῖν, xxxi 352: ἐπιδείκνυμι, xxxiv 24: ὁρῶ, ibid. 34: διαφέρει, xxxi 348: δῆλον, ibid. 350: φανερόν, xxxviii 79: τοῦτο, xxxiii 71, cf. xvii 275. Some of the above μή's are explainable by the complex (condition, imperative, etc.) in which they occur.

3. Not only causal ὅτι μή but also διότι μή is used by Dio. ὅτι μή causal is found in xxxi 365 (after εἰ); 376; 379; xxxiv 23: διότι μή, cf. ἄχθομαι (l. c.). The number of μή's for οὐ's in the 31st oration is worthy of remark. Neither ἐπεί nor ἐπειδή with μή occurs.

4. The following places may be cited for simple relatives with μή: vi 101; 103; xxix 326; xxxi 344. Local adverbs with μή are ὅποι, xxxi 374: ὅπου, xxxi 385: ἔνθα, lxxx 288: temporal, ὁσάκις, xlix 145.

5. *Oratio obliqua* participles with μή are used after ὁρῶ, vi 102; xi 175: οἶδα, xxxi 358: ἀγνοῶ, xiii 245. For causal participles with μή may be cited vi 102; x 157; xi 209; xxvii 317; xxxii 416: for concessive-adversative, vii 115; xi 192; 202: for temporal, xxxi 350: less defined, xi 189; 198; xxxi 395. An example of ἅτε μή with part. is vii 132: of ὡς μή, xxx 332. For an adjective with μή + participle the following passages will suffice: iii 44; vii 134; lvi 225.

Arrian.

Arrian has few passages in which μή has been wrongly placed for οὐ. This may perhaps be explained by the relation borne by his works to those of Xenophon.

1. *Oratio obliqua* infinitive with μή: after *verba dicendi*, λέγω, Cyn. 24, 2; ἀποκρίνομαι, Anab. i 1, 2; δηλῶ, ibid. vii 18, 2: general *o. o.* Ind. 7, 3; Anab. v 28, 3: after *verba cogitandi*, δοκῶ, ibid. i 25, 5.

2. Causal ὅτι μή occurs five times, Cyn. 36, 2; Anab. v 8, 1; vi 6, 3; 16, 1; 21, 3. ἐπειδὴ μή is found in *orat. obl.* after φημί in Cyn. 36, 1.

3. Relatives with μή are represented by Anab. ii 6, 6, χῶρον, οὗ μήτε ἐγένετο. ἵναπερ μή is found at Anab. v 23, 6.

4. Once an *orat. obl.* participle is used with μή, after ὁρῶ, Anab. vii 2, 3. Concessive-adversative participles have μή in Anab. v 14, 3; vi 9, 5: others less defined are Cyn. 15, 1; 20, 2; Anab. iv 11, 9. These make the sum total of participles with μή that were collected as fair examples, and they form a surprisingly small number. Cyn. 4, 4 contains an adjective with μή + participle.

Justin Martyr.

Justin Martyr's misuses of μή have been collected and arranged by Professor Gildersleeve in the index to his edition of the Apologies.

1. *Oratio obliqua* infinitives with μή are: after *verba dicendi*, φημί, A 4, 18; 28, 16: λέγω, A 18, 22: ὑπισχνοῦμαι, A 5, 2: after *verba cogitandi*, νομίζω, B 10, 14.

2. *Oratio obliqua* ὅτι μή is found after ἐγκαλῶ, A 24, 9: ἐλέγχω, B 3, 16: ἐπίσταμαι, A 26, 35. πείθω takes ὡς μή at A 26, 21.

3. A simple relative with μή is found once, B 3, 5 (characteristic; see note of the editor).

4. For the *oratio obliqua* participle we have A 44, 30; 63, 45, both after ἐλέγχω. Causal participles with μή are A 5, 4; 29, 10; 36, 11: concessive-adversative, A 24, 2; 28, 9; 54, 31: less defined, A 53, 36. An example of ὡς μή c. part. is A 4, 19: of an adjective with μή + part., A 9, 4.

Summary.

The basis for the encroachments of μή on οὐ is to be found in the earliest Greek, and their growth is an extension of legitimate usages. The first certain extension of μή is in the direction of the causal and of the concessive-adversative participle. In the course of the next century μή has in Philodemus enlarged its sphere well into the *oratio obliqua* with the infinitive (in the line

of the stronger expression), into the realm of the causal sentence, and into that of the relative. The negatives with the participles have, however, remained almost as in Polybius. But in a few years the *oratio obliqua* infinitives with μή have become numerous in Diodorus; and likewise the number of participles with μή has enlarged. The *oratio obliqua* participle with μή appears for the first time. Μή with simple relatives is confined to *oratio obliqua;* but after Diodorus there is no longer a similar restriction. Dionysius Halicarnaseus has restricted the number of μή's for οὐ's, but two causal sentences with μή are found in the *Veterum Censura.* The *Ars Rhetorica* has an *oratio obliqua* ὅτι μή. Strabo does not differ much from the two preceding writers, except that he has two *orat. obl.* ὡς μή's. In New Testament Greek μή has become the usual negative with the participle. There is one causal ὅτι μή. *Oratio obliqua* infinitives with μή are much restricted. Plutarch has made a long stride. He uses ὅτι μή after verbs of emotion and the causal ὅτι μή. In Dio Chrysostomus the categories are full, there being an increase of ὅτι μή's. Arrian shows comparatively few encroachments of μή on οὐ in any line, and Justin Martyr, likewise, has no large number in comparison with his heathen contemporary Lucian.

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A TRAGIC FRAGMENT OF ION.

Plutarch, Comparison of Alcibiades and Coriolanus, Teubner Text, vol. I, p. 458, lines 21 ff., has this phrase: *ἀλλ' ὀργῇ χαριζόμενος, παρ' ἧς οὐδένα φησὶν ὁ Δίων ἀπολαβεῖν χάριν.* Removing the words *φησὶν ὁ Δίων*, and then writing the phrase in direct discourse, we have *ὀργῇ χαριζόμενος, παρ' ἧς οὐδεὶς χάριν | ἀπέλαβε*—a trimeter, faulty only in that the main caesura is at the end of the third foot. Likely the use of the words *ὀργῇ χαριζόμενος* suggested to Plutarch the rest of the verse, of which they were the chance beginning, and the participle did not stand in the original verse, but some other form of *χαρίζεσθαι*, which suggested the kindred word *χάριν*. In a quotation from Menander (Stobaeus, Florilegium XX, 6), based on this passage, the imperative is used, and here also the participle does not lend itself to gnomic expression, so that it is probable that a negative imperative was the original form of this proverb: *ὀργῇ χαρίζου μηδαμῶς, παρ' ἧς χάριν | οὐδεὶς ἀπέλαβε.* The trimeter is thus a perfect tragic verse, and but two changes have been made in the prose of Plutarch, *χαριζόμενος* having been transferred to the imperative and a negative added.

This negative *μηδαμῶς* is thus used, after the caesura in the third foot, by Aeschyl. Pro. 337, Soph. Ajax, 74, Eurip. Hipp. 611, Aristoph. Clouds, 1478, and frequently elsewhere.

The play on the words *χαρίζου* and *χάριν* is exactly the same as one found in Ion, Agamemnon, Frag. 2, Nauck, *κακῶν ἀπέστω θάνατος, ὡς ἴδῃ κακά*, where the turn is on *κακῶν, κακά*.

The prose fragments of Ion, found in Müller, F. H. G., II, pp. 44 ff., nearly all turn on some kindred word play, or contain some point of humor.

The change from *ὁ δ' Ἴων* to *ὁ Δίων* in Plutarch is a simple one, and has an exact parallel in Pollux II, 88, where the editio princeps (Aldine, 1502) has *παρὰ Δίωνι δὲ τῷ τραγικῷ ἐν τῷ ἐπιγραφομένῳ Συνεκδημητικῷ κ. τ. λ.* The phrase *τῷ τραγικῷ*, and the evident similarity of *Συνεκδημητικός* with Ion's *Ἐπιδημίαι* mentioned by Athenaeus XIII, 603 E, and also with Ion's *Πρεσβευτικός* (*λόγος*), referred to by the scholiast to Aristoph. Peace 835, leave no doubt that the true reading in Pollux is *παρὰ δ' Ἴωνι τῷ τραγικῷ*, and that *δὲ* before *τῷ τραγικῷ* is redactional. So in Plutarch *ὁ δ' Ἴων* has

been falsely read ὁ Δίων. The δέ here in Plutarch needs no other explanation than that it was the insertion of a careless scribe, or due to the desire to avoid hiatus. The sentence just quoted from Pollux shows a δέ falsely inserted after Ἴωνι. In Eurip. Medea 698, in the face of the meter, two manuscripts, Vaticanus B and Florentinus c, have πιστὸς δ' οὐκ ἔφυ. So in Pausanias, III 24, 11, the reading of the Aldine and of some of the older editors is τὸν δὲ Ὀδυσσέα πρὸς Ἀλκίνουν περὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου καὶ ἄλλα διηγούμενον καὶ ὅτι Θησέα δὲ ἰδεῖν ἐθελῆσαι κ.τ.λ., where the δὲ before ἰδεῖν seems to have no MS authority. Polybius II 24, 1 has also a mistaken insertion of δέ. It seems quite reasonable, then, to suppose that in the passage from Plutarch δέ was similarly inserted between ὁ and Ἴων and then ὁ δ' Ἴων became ὁ Δίων exactly as in Pollux, II, 88.

It was a characteristic of the comic poets to appropriate and modify the verses of tragedy. Ion was so used by Aristophanes, Frogs, 1425, ποθεῖ μέν, ἐχθαίρει δέ, βούλεται δ' ἔχειν, which passage according to the scholiast is founded on the following verse of Ion, σιγᾷ μέν, ἐχθαίρει δέ, βούλεταί γε μήν.

Menander's mode of adaptation of tragic passages is shown by comparing Aesch. Prometheus, 377,

οὔκουν, Προμηθεῦ, τοῦτο γιγνώσκεις ὅτι
ψυχῆς νοσούσης εἰσὶν ἰατροὶ λόγοι;

with Menander, Meineke, F. C. G., Vol. IV, p. 240,

λύπης ἰατρός ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις λόγος·
ψυχῆς γὰρ οὗτος μόνος ἔχει θελκτήρια.

Now, if my contention as to the source of the citation in Plutarch is correct, Stobaeus' quotation from Menander,

Ἐπίσχες ὀργιζόμενος. Ἀλλὰ βούλομαι.
οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὀργῆς χάριν ἀπείληφεν, πάτερ,

referred to above, would also seem to be founded on a verse from Ion, but Menander omits the play on χαρίζεσθαι and χάριν, which is the key to the verse in Ion.

My conclusion is that as the words in Plutarch so easily form a tragic trimeter, they must be a poetic and not a prose quotation, that an easy restoration is

ὀργῇ χαρίζου μηδαμῶς παρ' ἧς χάριν
οὐδεὶς ἀπέλαβε,

and that Ion was the author.

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THE METAPHOR IN AESCHYLUS.

Of the two classes, *σχήματα λέξεως* and *σχήματα διανοίας*, into which the ancients divided all figures, the metaphor belongs to the second. It permeates all literature from the earliest to the most recent productions. From Homer to Tennyson poets have been lavish in its use. Quintilian[1] calls it *translatio*, and says: Incipiamus igitur ab eo, qui cum frequentissimus est, tum longe pulcherrimus, translatione dico, quae *μεταφορὰ* Graece vocatur. Volkmann says,[2] Der häufigste und schönste, dabei allgemeinste Tropus, so dass sich die meisten übrigen Tropen im Grunde genommen als Unterarten desselben betrachten lassen, ist die Metapher. It has been demonstrated by Blümner[3] that the metaphor grows from age to age with the progress of man and the multiplicity of his inventions. Its possibilities are practically unlimited. New and beautiful metaphors are constantly being discovered. As the original color of all figures is apt to fade, so many metaphors have lost the freshness of the first poetic color and may now be regarded as simple colorless prose. It has been well said that "language is a dictionary of faded metaphors."

The Greek rhetoricians devoted considerable time and thought to the study of the metaphor. Cf. Spengel, Rhetores Graeci II, 254; III, 191, 208, 216, 228, 232, 245, 280; Aristotle, de Arte Poetica 1457 b. Tryphon (III, 191) has given us perhaps the best definition of the figure: *μεταφορά ἐστι λέξις μεταφερομένη ἀπὸ τοῦ κυρίου ἐπὶ τὸ μὴ κύριον ἐμφάσεως ἢ ὁμοιώσεως ἕνεκα.* He also divides the metaphor into four classes (*γίνεται δὲ ἡ μεταφορὰ τετραχῶς*) as follows: *ἀπὸ ἐμψύχων ἐπὶ ἔμψυχα· ἀπὸ ἀψύχων ἐπὶ ἄψυχα· ἀπὸ ἀψύχων ἐπὶ ἔμψυχα· ἀπὸ ἐμψύχων ἐπὶ ἄψυχα.* Several other rhetoricians make the same divisions. Gregorius Corinthius (III, 217 Spengel) adds a fifth—*ἀπὸ πράξεως ἐπὶ πρᾶξιν.* The effect of metaphor is stated by Aristotle, Ars Rhet. 1405 a, 8, *τὸ σαφὲς καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ ξενικὸν ἔχει μάλιστα*

[1] Quintilian, Inst. Orat. VIII, 6, 4.

[2] Volkmann, Rhetorik der Griechen u. Römer,[2] p. 417.

[3] Blümner, Ueber Gleichniss u. Metapher in d. Attischen Komödie, p. ix.

ἡ μεταφορά. Cf. also Demetrius (III, 280 Spengel), αὗται (αἱ μεταφοραὶ) γὰρ μάλιστα καὶ ἡδονὴν συμβάλλονται τοῖς λόγοις καὶ μέγεθος.

The dominant figures in Aeschylus belong to the σχήματα διανοίας rather than to the σχήματα λέξεως. The proportion is about two to one in favor of the former. In this respect his language is in marked contrast with that of Sophocles where the σχήματα λέξεως lead in the proportion of three to two. The metaphor is easily the leading figure in Aeschylus. He has more examples of metaphor than of all the other σχήματα διανοίας combined. All of his σχήματα λέξεως fall short of the number of his metaphors. However, in spite of his excessive use of the metaphor it is never dull nor monotonous. The range of his metaphors is as wide as life itself. Illustrations are furnished from all experiences of man and from all of his environment; from the winds, from the torrent, from the sea, from the farm, from the ruler of the state to the lonely woman working at her loom; from the flowers that bloom, to the beasts that roam the field.

The poet sometimes illustrates his point by introducing several metaphors in quick succession. A good example of this is found in the *Sept. c. Th.* 599–608, where in ten lines we find at least five metaphors:

ἐν παντὶ πράγει δ' ἔσθ' ὁμιλίας κακῆς
κάκιον οὐδέν, καρπὸς οὐ κομιστέος·
ἄτης ἄρουρα θάνατον ἐκκαρπίζεται.
ἢ γὰρ ξυνεισβὰς πλοῖον εὐσεβὴς ἀνὴρ
ναύταισι θερμοῖς ἐν πανουργίᾳ τινὶ
ὅλωλεν ἀνδρῶν σὺν θεοπτύστῳ γένει,
ἢ ξὺν πολίταις ἀνδράσιν δίκαιος ὢν
ἐχθροξένοις τε καὶ θεῶν ἀμνήμοσιν
ταὐτοῦ κυρήσας ἐνδίκως ἀγρεύματος,
πληγεὶς θεοῦ μάστιγι παγκοίνῳ 'δάμη.

The farm, the sea, the state, the chase, and again the farm. Each figure follows closely upon the other as the scene unfolds itself to the poet's vision. In such an aggregation of figures Aeschylus may be compared with Homer who gives us such a rapid succession of similes in Il. B 455–476.

The metaphors in Aeschylus may be divided into the following classes:[1] A. Man. B. Nature. The metaphors from man, his occupations and environment, easily lead in number, there being a total of 450. These may be divided as follows:

I. *The human body.* In this division the *Prom.* leads with the *Agam.* a close second. The best examples are the following: *Prom.* 64 ἀδαμαντίνου νῦν σφηνὸς αὐθάδη γνάθον. 368 ποταμοὶ πυρὸς δάπτοντες ἀγρίαις γνάθοις. *Agam.* 306 φλογὸς μέγαν πώγωνα. *Choeph.* 854 οὗτοι φρέν' ἂν κλέψειεν ὠμματωμένην. *Choeph.* 934 ὀφθαλμὸν οἴκων μὴ πανώλεθρον πεσεῖν.

II. *The conditions and acts of body and mind.* This division outnumbers the preceding almost three to one. Here again the *Prom.* leads with the *Agam.* and *Sept. c. Th.* not far behind. First among these must be placed the well-known ποντίων τε κυμάτων | ἀνήριθμον γέλασμα (*Prom.* 90). In the *Prom.* Aeschylus is especially fond of using νόσος and νόσημα metaphorically. Cf. *Prom.* 225 ἔνεστι . . . τοῦτο τῇ τυραννίδι | νόσημα, and his especially bold θαλασσίαν τε γῆς τινάκτειραν νόσον (*Prom.* 924), as if poor old mother earth were subject to chills. Another good example is *Prom.* 685 νόσημα γὰρ | αἴσχιστον εἶναί φημι συνθέτους λόγους. One of the best of his "pugnacious" metaphors is found in *Prom.* 881 κραδία δὲ φόβῳ φρένα λακτίζει. Among other bold metaphors of this class may be mentioned: *Sept. c. Th.* 155 αἰθὴρ ἐπιμαίνεται. Id. 247 στένει πόλισμα (cf. 901). *Suppl.* 770 φιλεῖ | ὠδῖνα τίκτειν νύξ. *Agam.* 276 ἀλλ' ἦ σ' ἐπίανέν τις ἄπτερος φάτις; Id. 640 πόλει μὲν ἕλκος ἐν τὸ δήμιον τυχεῖν. *Choeph.* 167 ὀρχεῖται δὲ καρδία φόβῳ. 197 τόνδ' ἀποπτύσαι πλόκον. *Eumen.* 280 βρίζει γὰρ αἷμα καὶ μαραίνεται χερός.

III. *External circumstances, clothing, etc.* There are comparatively few of these but they are generally very striking. One of the best is the much admired "'star-bespangled' night,"—ποικιλείμων νύξ (*Prom.* 24). When the chorus in the *Persae* fear for the safety of the Persian army Aeschylus wraps their heart with a *black tunic*—μελαγχίτων φρὴν ἀμύσσεται φόβῳ (*Pers.* 114). Another bold metaphor is found in *Pers.* 815 κοὐδέπω κακῶν κρηπὶς ὕπεστιν. Cf. also *Suppl.* 95 ἐλπίδων ἀφ' ὑψιπύργων, *Agam.* 839 ὁμιλίας κάτοπτρον, εἴδωλον σκιᾶς, *Choeph.* 811 <ἐκ> δνοφερᾶς καλύπτρας.

[1] In the classification of the metaphors of Aeschylus Bluemner has been followed as far as practicable.

IV. *Family and daily life.* These are not so numerous as one would expect in Aeschylus. The most of them are found in the *Prom.* and the *Agam.* He is especially fond of using μήτηρ in a metaphorical sense, as *Prom.* 90 παμμῆτόρ τε γῆ, Id. 301 τὴν σιδηρομήτορα | ἐλθεῖν ἐς αἶαν, Id. 461 μνήμην ἁπάντων, μουσομήτορ' ἐργάνην. Obedience to rule (πειθαρχία) is the *mother* of well-being (τῆς εὐπραξίας | μήτηρ), *Sept. c. Th.* 224–5. A very bold metaphor is found in *Pers.* 614 where the poet says the pure wine is from a wild mother (μητρὸς ἀγρίας ἄπο). He gives the traditional step-mother a hard rap when he says the rough Salmydessian coast is a *stepmother* of ships (μητρυιὰ νεῶν), *Prom.* 727. Cf. Hesiod *Works and Days* 825 ἄλλοτε μητρυιὴ πέλει ἡμέρη. When a city is captured plunderings are the *sisters* of *pursuits*—ἁρπαγαὶ δὲ διαδρομᾶν ὁμαίμονες, *Sept. c. Th.* 351. We may not consider it quite 'elegant' to speak of smoke as the "flickering *sister* of fire"—λιγνὺν μέλαιναν, αἰόλην πυρὸς κάσιν, *Sept. c. Th.* 494—but it is thoroughly Aeschylean. He also calls dust the *sister* of mud!—κάσις | πηλοῦ ξύνουρος διψία κόνις, *Agam.* 495. When sad cares touch the heart they are its *neighbors* (γείτονες δὲ καρδίας | μέριμναι, *Sept. c. Th.* 288). In the *Pers.* (577) fish are the *dumb children* of the sea, and (618) wreaths of flowers are the *children* of earth. The beacon fire that flashed to the palace roof of the Atreidae was the *grandson* of the fire from Mount Ida (φάος τόδ' οὐκ ἄπαπτον Ἰδαίου πυρός, *Agam.* 311). Wealth begets *children* and does not die *childless* (μέγαν . . . ὄλβον | τεκνοῦσθαι μηδ' ἄπαιδα θνήσκειν, *Agam.* 753-4). In the *Eumen.* 534 wanton insolence is the *child* of impiety (δυσσεβίας μὲν ὕβρις τέκος). When Agamemnon has been murdered by his wife the poet says the victim filled a *bowl* full of evils and *drained* it to the *dregs* (*Agam.* 1397-8).

V. *The occupations of man.*

1. *The liberal arts.* In this division the art of medicine occupies very nearly the whole field, with a total of 18 examples—9 in the *Agam.*, 6 in the *Prom.*, and 3 in the *Choeph.* The following are some of the best: *Prom.* 378 ὀργῆς νοσούσης εἰσὶν ἰατροὶ λόγοι. *Agam.* 17 ὕπνου τόδ' ἀντίμολπον ἐντέμνων ἄκος. *Agam.* 548 τὸ σιγᾶν φάρμακον βλάβης ἔχω. *Agam.* 848–50 ὅτῳ δὲ καὶ δεῖ φαρμάκων παιωνίων, | ἤτοι κέαντες ἢ τεμόντες εὐφρόνως | πειρασόμεσθα πῆμ' ἀποστρέψαι νόσου. *Agam.* 1622–3 ἐξοχώταται φρενῶν | ἰατρομάντεις. *Choeph.* 471 δώμασιν ἔμμοτον | τῶνδ' ἄκος.

The *Agam.* furnishes 3 examples from art: *κάρτ' ἀπομούσως ἦσθα γεγραμμένος* (801), *ἅτας τάσδε θριγκώσων φίλοις* (1283), *βολαῖς ὑγρώσσων σπόγγος ὥλεσεν γραφήν* (1329). Cf. also *Agam.* 1340, *Choeph.* 503, *Eum.* 50 *εἰδόν ποτ' ἤδη Φινέως γεγραμμένας | δεῖπνον φερούσας.*

2. *The useful arts.* This division is naturally a very numerous one. It easily leads the whole list of metaphors, with a total of about 170. The metaphors from husbandry are the most numerous, with those from the sea-faring man not far behind. Aeschylus seeks the type of natural prosperity in agriculture, and that of avarice in commerce. Trade and commerce come in for their full share of metaphors. The smith and the carpenter are treated alike. Even the servant, the cobbler, the weaver, and the executioner are not forgotten. The farm furnishes the poet with some of his most striking metaphors, among which may be mentioned the following: *Prom.* 322-3 *οὔκουν ... πρὸς κέντρα κῶλον ἐκτενεῖς.* *Prom.* 672 *ἐπηνάγκαζέ νιν | Διὸς χαλινὸς πρὸς βίαν πράσσειν τάδε.* *Sept. c. Th.* 593 *βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος.* Id. 601 *ἄτης ἄρουρα θάνατον ἐκκαρπίζεται.* *Agam.* 1624 *πρὸς κέντρα μὴ λάκτιζε.* Id. 1655 *τάδ' ἐξαμῆσαι πολλὰ δύστηνον θέρος.* *Choeph.* 25 *ὄνυχος ἄλοκι νεοτόμῳ.* Id. 795 *ζυγέντ' ἐν ἅρμασιν | πημάτων.* Id. 1044 *μήτ' ἐπιζευχθῇς στόμα | φήμῃ πονηρᾷ.* Aeschylus is especially fond of the metaphor of yoking oxen, using the noun or adjective 15 times and the verb 8 times. The sailor's vocabulary is made to do good service, as we may expect. His sea metaphors are about as numerous as his farm metaphors. He speaks of the gods as 'helmsmen' of Olympus—*οἰακονόμοι κρατοῦσ' Ὀλύμπου* (*Prom.* 149). The old familiar 'ship of state' is not forgotten—*Sept. c. Th.* 2–3 *ἐν πρύμνῃ πόλεως, | οἴακα νωμῶν.* The young warrior Parthenopaeus has a 'fair prow'—*βλάστημα καλλίπρῳρον* (*Sept. c. Th.* 533), as has also Iphigenia—*στόματός τε καλλιπρῴρου φυλακᾷ κατασχεῖν | φθόγγον* (*Agam.* 235 ff.). The poet teaches his hearers a moral lesson by a metaphor *Sept. c. Th.* 602 ff. *ξυνεισβὰς πλοῖον εὐσεβὴς ἀνὴρ | ναύταισι θερμοῖς ἐν πανουργίᾳ τινὶ | ἅλωλεν.* Cf. Horace, Carm. III, 2, 26 ff., and the English familiar expression "in the same boat." In the *Sept. c. Th.* 208 ff. Eteocles criticises the timid maidens, who cling to the altars in their fright, as follows:

> *τί οὖν; ὁ ναύτης ἆρα μὴ 's πρῷραν φυγὼν*
> *πρύμνηθεν ηὗρε μηχανὴν σωτηρίας,*
> *νεὼς καμούσης ποντίῳ πρὸς κύματι;*

The Agamemnon contains some of the poet's most striking and powerful metaphors. Cf. *Agam.* 1005 ff.,

καὶ πότμος εὐθυπορῶν
ἀνδρὸς ἔπαισεν ἄφαντον ἔρμα.
καὶ πρὸ μέν τι χρημάτων
κτησίων ὄκνος βαλὼν
σφενδόνας ἀπ' εὐμέτρου,
οὐκ ἔδυ πρόπας δόμος
πημονᾶς γέμων ἄγαν,
οὐδ' ἐπόντισε σκάφος.

Also Id. 1617 f.,

σὺ ταῦτα φωνεῖς νερτέρᾳ προσήμενος
κώπῃ, κρατούντων τῶν ἐπὶ ζυγῷ δορός;

Even the heart is looked upon as a ship in a storm—*Choeph.* 390 ff.,

πάροιθεν δὲ πρῴρας
δριμὺς ἄηται κραδίας
θυμὸς ἔγκοτον στύγος.

Commerce and trade are associated with the sea and naturally suggest many metaphors to the poet. In fact these are the most numerous in his writings after those of the farmer and the sailor. In the *Sept. c. Th.* 545 the messenger thinks Parthenopaeus will wage no 'petty peddling' fight—ἔοικεν οὐ καπηλεύσειν μάχην. In the battle of Salamis, so the Persian messenger reports, an 'evil genius' (δαίμων τις) tipped the balance the *wrong* way—τάλαντα βρίσας οὐκ ἰσορρόπῳ τύχῃ (*Pers.* 346). Man learns by experience, but in this Aeschylus sees the scale descend—Δίκα δὲ τοῖς μὲν παθοῦσιν μαθεῖν ἐπιρρέπει (*Agam.* 250). The image of the scale occurs no less than a dozen times. It is especially frequent where the poet treats of the fortunes of battle. Even Ares likes to drive a good bargain—ὁ χρυσαμοιβὸς δ' Ἄρης σωμάτων (*Agam.* 437). In bitter irony Helen is called an ἄγαλμα πλούτου (*Agam.* 741) to Troy. When Clytaemnestra has murdered her husband the children are 'sold' as slaves—πεπραμένοι γὰρ νῦν γέ πως ἀλώμεθα (*Choeph.* 132) says Electra in speaking of her condition. Similarly Orestes says διχῶς ἐπράθην ὢν ἐλευθέρου πατρός (*Choeph.* 915).

VI. *The pleasures of man.*—This division ranks second in the whole list of metaphors. It yields only to the useful arts in

numerical order, with a total of over a hundred. The palaestra and the chase furnish three-fourths of the examples; races and dice practically all of the remainder. In metaphors from the palaestra the *Agam.* leads with ten, the *Prom.* following closely with nine. The *Choeph.*, *Eumen.* and *Sept. c. Th.* run neck and neck, with the *Pers.* and *Suppl.* bringing up the rear. In the *Prom.* ἆθλον is very frequently used. An especially good Aeschylean metaphor is found in *Sept. c. Th.* 441—ἀπογυμνάζων στόμα. The metaphor—βαρὺς | ποδοῖν ἐνήλλου—in *Pers.* 516 may be compared with that in *Agam.* 1175—δαίμων ὑπερβαρὴς ἐμπίτνων, both being taken from wrestling. Another from the same source is Ἀσία ... αἰνῶς ἐπὶ γόνυ κέκλιται (*Pers.* 930), the cry of the chorus after the defeat of the Persians, which may well be compared with *Agam.* 63–4 πολλὰ παλαίσματα καὶ γυιοβαρῆ | γόνατος κονίαισιν ἐρειπομένου. When Zeus succeeded Cronus the latter was thrice thrown by his victor—τριακτῆρος οἴχεται τυχών, *Agam.* 172. In the midst of her misfortune and sorrow Electra asks οὐκ ἀτρίακτος ἄτα; (*Choeph.* 339). Many have 'wrestled' with misfortune but Aeschylus alone has thought of overcoming the old adversary by 'three throws.' When Orestes admits that he killed his mother the chorus of Furies claims one 'fall'—ἓν μὲν τόδ' ἤδη τῶν τριῶν παλαισμάτων, *Eumen.* 589. When Orestes is on the point of avenging the death of his father, by slaying Aegisthus and Clytaemnestra, the poet immediately thinks of a wrestling ring or pugilistic encounter where one is matched against two—τοιάνδε πάλην μόνος ὢν ἔφεδρος | δισσοῖς μέλλει θεῖος Ὀρέστης | ἄψειν, *Choeph.* 866 ff.

In metaphors from the chase the *Agam.* again leads. The *Prom.* follows with the *Eumen.* a close third. In the *Prom.* the poet seems especially fond of the verb ἐπιθωύσσω, on which the Scholiast (*Prom.* 73) remarks ἡ μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ τῶν κυνηγῶν. The hunter's net furnishes its full share of metaphors. In the *Pers.* 99 the goddess Ate beguiles men into her nets—παρασαίνει | βροτὸν εἰς ἄρκυας Ἄτα. When Troy is taken the poet thinks of this city as caught in a net—ἐπὶ Τροίας πύργοις ἔβαλες | στεγανὸν δίκτυον, ὡς μήτε ... ὑπερτελέσαι | μέγα δουλείας | γάγγαμον, *Agam.* 357 ff.; cf. also 1375–6. Cassandra's prophetic vision sees a net—a net of Hell, —τί τόδε φαίνεται; ἢ δίκτυόν τί γ' Ἅιδου; the net is Clytaemnestra —μάλ' ἄρκυς ἁ ξύνευνος, the victim Agamemnon (*Agam.* 1115 f.; cf. also *Choeph.* 998). In the *Eumen.* 147–8, when Orestes has

escaped from the Furies, it is the wild beast that has escaped the nets—*ἐξ ἀρκύων πέπτωκεν οἴχεταί θ' ὁ θήρ. ὕπνῳ κρατηθεῖσ' ἄγραν ὤλεσα.* Just before this Clytaemnestra tells the drowsy Furies they are pursuing their victim in a dream—*ὄναρ διώκεις θῆρα* (*Eumen.* 131). Of the more than three dozen metaphors from the chase in Aeschylus the above are fair samples.

Fully half the metaphors from the race-course are found in the *Agam.* One of the finest of all the poet's metaphors is found in *Agam.* 312–4. The beacon fires, first lighted on Mt. Ida to telegraph to Argos the fall of Troy, naturally suggest a torch-race. A lively and intensely interesting one it is.

> *τοιοίδε τοί μοι λαμπαδηφόρων νόμοι,*
> *ἄλλος παρ' ἄλλου διαδοχαῖς πληρούμενοι·*
> *νικᾷ δ' ὁ πρῶτος καὶ τελευταῖος δραμών.*

A few lines further on the voyage to Troy and return presents itself to the poet as a "double course" race in which the return course is yet to be run—*δεῖ . . . κάμψαι διαύλου θάτερον κῶλον πάλιν* (*Agam.* 344). Again in the *Agam.* 1245, when the chorus cannot quite understand the prophecy of Cassandra they say they are "off the track"—*ἐκ δρόμου πεσὼν τρέχω.* Cf. *Prom.* 883, *ἔξω δὲ δρόμου φέρομαι,* and *Choeph.* 1022, *ὥσπερ ξὺν ἵπποις ἡνιοστροφῶν δρόμου | ἐξωτέρω.* The same metaphor occurs also in *Choeph.* 514.

Man's gambling propensity is not forgotten by Aeschylus. The die furnishes several good metaphors. Even the gods are not exempt from this weakness, as we see from *Sept. c. Th.* 414 *ἔργον δ' ἐν κύβοις Ἄρης κρινεῖ.* In the same play (v. 1028) Antigone will 'risk a throw' (*ἀνὰ κίνδυνον βαλῶ*) in burying her brother. In the *Agam.* (v. 33) when the watchman sees the beacon fire that announces the capture of Troy, it is a 'lucky throw'—*τρὶς ἐξ βαλούσης τῆσδέ μοι φρυκτωρίας.* Another 'lucky throw' is found in *Choeph.* 696—*Ὀρέστης ἦν γὰρ εὐβόλως ἔχων.*

VII. *War and law metaphors.* Since Aeschylus was always proud of the fact that he was a 'Marathon man,' and seems to have belonged to a fighting family, we naturally expect many fine metaphors from war and the battlefield. Here, however, the poet is disappointing. We find barely two dozen metaphors from fighting and none of these very striking. In *Prom.* 371 the lava streams of Aetna are 'hot arrows'—*Τυφὼς ἐξαναζέσει χόλον | θερμοῖς*

. . . *βέλεσι*. In *Prom.* 649 Zeus smarts from the 'arrow' of love —*Ζεὺς γὰρ ἱμέρου βέλει . . . τέθαλπται*. In the *Suppl.* we find that the tongue can shoot—*γλῶσσα τοξεύσασα μὴ τὰ καίρια* (446), and the eye has its arrow—*ὄμματος θελκτήριον | τόξευμ(α)* (1004). Cf. also *Agam.* 240 *ἔβαλλ' ἕκαστον . . . ὄμματος βέλει*, and 742 *ὀμμάτων βέλος*. In *Agam.* 1194 Cassandra asks if her words have hit the mark—*ἥμαρτον, ἢ κυρῶ τι τοξότης τις ὡς*; in the *Choeph.* 694 the Curse *shoots* the family of Agamemnon with unerring arrows—*τόξοις . . . εὐσκόποις*. In the *Eumen.* 676, when the Furies have finished their arguments in the trial of Orestes, they have shot their last arrow—*ἡμῖν μὲν ἤδη πᾶν τετόξευται βέλος*.

The metaphors from the legal profession are not as numerous as those in the preceding class. Nearly all of them are in the *Sept. c. Th.* and the *Agam.* In the *Sept.* the poet is rather fond of the word *φερέγγυος* (cf. 396, 449, 470, 797). In the *Agam.* 41 Menelaus is Priam's adversary in a law suit—*Μενέλαος ἄναξ μέγας ἀντίδικος*, and in v. 451 both Menelaus and Agamemnon are viewed as such—*ἄλγος ἕρπει προδίκοις Ἀτρείδαις*.

B. *Metaphors from the realm of Nature.* Aeschylus is very fond of metaphors from this source. Nature stands next to man in suggesting metaphors to him. Many of his most powerful personifications also come from the realm of nature. This division contains nearly three hundred examples, which may be grouped as follows:

I. *The animal world.* One-third of the whole number of examples from nature falls into this group. The hare is the type of cowardice everywhere, so we may expect it as such in Aeschylus. The bird, especially the bird in its flight, is the symbol of swiftness. The bite and snarl of the dog, the kick of the horse, the bellow of the bull, all furnish the poet with excellent metaphors.

For the hare cf. *Prom.* 29 *ὑποπτήσσων χόλον*, and 960 *ὑποπτήσσειν τε τοὺς νέους θεούς*. The 'bird' metaphors are especially numerous. The winds have swift wings—*Prom.* 88 *ταχύπτεροι πνοαί*; so also ships—*Suppl.* 734 *νῆες . . . ὠκύπτεροι*. Snow has white wings—*Prom.* 993 *λευκοπτέρῳ δὲ νιφάδι*. Misery settles upon one as a bird of evil omen—*Prom.* 276 *πημονὴ προσιζάνει*, as does also a curse—*Sept. c. Th.* 695 *Ἀρὰ . . . προσιζάνει*. Trouble is never of the same 'plumage'—*Suppl.* 328 *πόνου δ' ἴδοις ἂν οὐδαμοῦ ταὐτὸν πτερόν*. The locks of brother and sister—Orestes and Electra—are of 'like feather' (*ὁμόπτερος*, *Choeph.* 174). The

children of Agamemnon are the brood of an eagle—*Choeph.* 247 *ἰδοῦ δὲ γένναν εὖνιν ἀετοῦ πατρός*, and a little later (v. 256) they are nestlings—*πατρὸς νεοσσοὺς τούσδ' ἀποφθείρας*, and (v. 501) *ἰδὼν νεοσσοὺς τούσδ' ἐφημένους τάφῳ.*

Next to the bird the horse and dog suggest the most metaphors to the poet. In the Eumenides the horse leaps into prominence by the poet's frequent use of the verb *καθιππάζομαι*—*Eumen.* 150 *δαίμονας καθιππάσω*, 731 *καθιππάζει με*, 779 and 809 *νόμους καθιππάσασθε.* In the *Prom.* 1085 the winds 'leap' like a young horse—*σκιρτᾷ δ' ἀνέμων | πνεύματα.* The maidens in *Sept. c. Th.* are 'fillies' in the eye of the poet—*πωλικῶν θ' | ἑδωλίων ὑπερκόπῳ δορί ποτ' ἐκλαπάξαι* (454-5). In Atossa's dream the two women, one in Persian the other in Dorian garb, become, in an extended metaphor, a pair of horses which Xerxes yokes and undertakes to drive. A runaway is the result, and Xerxes takes a fall—*Pers.* 189-197

παῖς δ' ἐμὸς μαθὼν
κατεῖχε κἀπράϋνεν, ἅρμασιν δ' ὕπο
ζεύγνυσιν αὐτὼ καὶ λέπαδν' ἐπ' αὐχένων
τίθησι. χἠ μὲν τῇδ' ἐπυργοῦτο στολῇ
ἐν ἡνίαισί τ' εἶχεν εὔαρκτον στόμα,
ἡ δ' ἐσφάδαζε, καὶ χεροῖν ἔντη δίφρου
διασπαράσσει, καὶ ξυναρπάζει βίᾳ
ἄνευ χαλινῶν καὶ ζυγὸν θραύει μέσον.
πίπτει δ' ἐμὸς παῖς.

In the *Agam.* (1066) Clytaemnestra thinks that Cassandra is not 'broken to the bit'—*χαλινὸν δ' οὐκ ἐπίσταται φέρειν.* The chorus immediately recommends the captive to handsel her yoke—*καίνισον ζυγόν.*

The dog furnishes the poet with some fine metaphors. The bark, bite, snarl, and wagging of his tail are all pressed into service. The verb *σαίνω* is especially common in a metaphorical sense; cf. *Sept. c. Th.* 383 *σαίνειν μόρον*, Id. 704 *ἂν σαίνοιμεν ὀλέθριον μόρον*, *Pers.* 97 *παρασαίνει βροτὸν ... Ἄτα*, and *Agam.* 798, *Choeph.* 194, 420. In *Agam.* 607 Clytaemnestra is the watch-dog of the royal palace—*δωμάτων κύνα*, and a little later (v. 896) she calls her husband the same—*λέγοιμ' ἂν ἄνδρα τόνδ' ἐγὼ σταθμῶν κύνα.* In *Agam.* 1228 Cassandra speaks of Clytaemnestra as *γλῶσσα μισητῆς κυνός.* The avenging Furies are hounds—*Choeph.* 924

φύλαξαι μητρὸς ἐγκότους κύνας, as also v. 1054. In the opening scene of the Persae the chorus cry aloud for their absent king as a dog moans for his master—νέον δ' ἄνδρα βαύζει (v. 13). Cf. also *Agam.* 449 τάδε σῖγά τις βαύζει, 1631 νηπίοις ὑλάγμασιν, and 1672.

The ox furnishes Aeschylus with a powerful metaphor in *Agam.* 36. The guard of the house knows a secret, which he cannot tell, for—*an ox is on his tongue*, βοῦς ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ μέγας | βέβηκεν. But here the poet has evidently borrowed from the language of the people, for the expression βοῦς ἐπὶ γλώσσῃ is designated by the scholiast as a παροιμία. It would be hard to find a more powerful figure in any writer than that in *Agam.* 1125-7 where Cassandra cries out

> ἀᾶ, ἰδοὺ ἰδού· ἄπεχε τᾶς βοὸς
> τὸν ταῦρον· ἐν πέπλου νιν
> μελάγκερως λαβοῦσα μηχανήματι
> τύπτει.

Ships in a storm are at the mercy, as it were, of a mad bull—αἱ δὲ κεροτυπούμεναι βίᾳ . . . ᾤχοντ' ἄφαντοι, Id. 655-7.

In the *Agam.* 1224 Aegisthus is a cowardly lion—ποινάς φημι βουλεύειν τινὰ | λέοντ' ἄναλκιν, while in 1258-9 he is a wolf, Clytaemnestra a lioness and Agamemnon a noble lion—

> αὕτη δίπους λέαινα συγκοιμωμένη
> λύκῳ λέοντος εὐγενοῦς ἀπουσίᾳ.

Aeschylus also makes good use of the serpent, although not as often as we might expect; cf. *Pers.* 82 λεύσσων φονίου δέργμα δράκοντος. An arrow is a winged serpent—λαβοῦσα πτηνὸν ἀργηστὴν ὄφιν, *Eumen.* 181. The spider is also found, *Agam.* 1492, 1516, and even the wryneck or snakebird, *Pers.* 989.

II. *The vegetable world.* This division does not contain as many metaphors as that of the animal world nor are they as striking. Aeschylus prefers more pugnacious nature as the source of his metaphors, rather than the quiet and peaceful life of the vegetable world. About seventy examples, however, have been found which may properly be classed under this head. The *Suppl.*, the *Agam.*, and the *Sept. c. Th.* have a strong lead in the number of such metaphors. The remaining plays run an even race, except the *Persae* which is slightly in the rear. Fully half the metaphors are from the seed, flower, and fruit. The remain-

ing examples are distributed among the other parts of the plant, such as root, sprout, stem, leaf, and bloom.

The metaphor of the seed (*σπέρμα*) as applied to the offspring of the human race is so common that it has become practically one of the "faded metaphors." That of the flower is of brighter color. The 'flower' of an army is common enough both in Greek and in English. Aeschylus is very fond of it. Other examples of the 'flower' metaphor are more striking. In *Prom.* 7 the gleam of fire is a 'flower'—*ἄνθος, παντέχνου πυρὸς σέλας.* The color of the human body is a 'flower' or 'bloom'—*Prom.* 23 *χροιᾶς ἀμείψεις ἄνθος.* In the *Agam.* 743 Helen is referred to as *δηξίθυμον ἔρωτος ἄνθος*, and in 954–5 the following words refer to Cassandra—*αὕτη δὲ πολλῶν χρημάτων ἐξαίρετον | ἄνθος.* In the *Agam.* 1144 the nightingale is 'in full bloom' (= filled) with sorrow—*ἀμφιθαλὴς κακοῖς.* In the *Choeph.* 394 all-powerful, all-abounding Zeus is *ἀμφιθαλὴς Ζεύς.* Bad company is a 'fruit' that is not to be plucked—*Sept. c. Th.* 600 *καρπὸς οὐ κομιστέος*, and in 618 of the same play the poet says *εἰ καρπός ἐστι θεσφάτοισι Λοξίου.* A curse is the 'fruit' of a rash tongue—*Eumen.* 830–1 *γλώσσης ματαίας μὴ 'κβάλῃς ἐπὶ χθόνα | καρπόν.* Old age is a withered leaf—*φυλλάδος ἤδη | κατακαρφομένης*, *Agam.* 79. The stem is twice employed with telling effect in the *Choeph.* 204 *σμικροῦ γένοιτ' ἂν σπέρματος μέγας πυθμήν*, and 260 *οὔτ' ἀρχικός σοι πᾶς ὅδ' αὐανθεὶς πυθμὴν | βωμοῖς ἀρήξει.* A child is a 'sprout'—*Sept. c. Th.* 533 *βλάστημα καλλίπρῳρον* (a strangely mixed metaphor), *Agam.* 1281 *μητροκτόνον φίτυμα*, *Eumen.* 661 *ἔσωσεν ἔρνος.* In the *Sept. c. Th.* 594 plans 'sprout'—*βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.* A fine Aeschylean metaphor is found in *Pers.* 821—*ὕβρις γὰρ ἐξανθοῦσ' ἐκάρπωσε στάχυν | ἄτης.* Cf. *Agam.* 756.

In the *Prom.* Aetna has roots—*ῥίζαισιν Αἰτναίαις ὕπο* (365), and so has the earth itself—*χθόνα δ' ἐκ πυθμένων | αὐταῖς ῥίζαις πνεῦμα κραδαίνοι* (1046). The poet can even speak of a murder as a flower bursting into full bloom—*πολύμνηστον ἐπηνθίσω αἷμ' ἄνιπτον*, *Agam.* 1459. So also calamity can be 'in blossom'—*πάθος ἀνθεῖ*, *Choeph.* 1009. The "irony of sorrow" can speak of being 'decked with many woes'—*πολλοῖς ἐπανθίσαντες | πόνοισι γενεάν*, *Sept. c. Th.* 951. In the *Suppl.* 72 the chorus is plucking 'flowers of sorrow'—*γοεδνὰ δ' ἀνθεμίζομαι* (schol. *τὸ ἄνθος τῶν γόων ἀποδρέπεσθαι*). The sea 'blossoms' with corpses—*ὁρῶμεν ἀνθοῦν πέλαγος Αἰγαῖον νεκροῖς*, *Agam.* 659.

III. *The elements.* Metaphors from the elements (wind, fire, winter, rain, etc.) are about as numerous as those from the vegetable world. In this division the *Agam.* is far in the lead, the *Sept. c. Th.* next, the *Prom.*, *Choeph.* and *Eumen.* close together, while the *Suppl.* falls far in the rear. The metaphors from the wind are by far the most numerous, as we should naturally expect. Heat, cold, and light also come in for a fair share.

One of the most powerful metaphors is found in the words of the god-possessed Cassandra, *Agam.* 1309 *φόνον δόμοι πνέουσιν αἱματοσταγῆ.* Cf. also *Choeph.* 32 *κότον πνέων*, 951 *πνέουσ' ἐν ἐχθροῖς κότον.* Fortune is a 'fair wind' that gives a man a 'fair sail'—*ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων εὐροῇ, πεποιθέναι | τὸν αὐτὸν αἰὲν ἄνεμον οὐριεῖν τύχης*, Pers. 601-2. The Furies are asked to pursue Orestes, but the language is highly figurative and fairly burns with hot metaphors—*Eumen.* 137–139,

> *σὺ δ' αἱματηρὸν πνεῦμ' ἐπουρίσασα τῷ,*
> *ἀτμῷ κατισχναίνουσα, νηδύος πυρί,*
> *ἕπου, μάραινε δευτέροις διώγμασιν.*

In *Sept. c. Th.* 52 we find three metaphors employed with *θυμός*—iron, fire, wind—*σιδηρόφρων γὰρ θυμὸς ἀνδρείᾳ φλέγων | ἔπνει.* Anxious cares are 'kindling fires'—*μέριμναι ζωπυροῦσι τάρβος*, Id. 289. The heart is 'set on fire' by a message from a beacon fire—*φλογὸς παραγγέλμασιν | νέοις πυρωθέντα καρδίαν*, *Agam.* 480–481. A bold Aeschylean metaphor is the following: *μητρός τε πληγὴν τίς κατασβέσει δίκη*; *Sept. c. Th.* 584. It is not too bold for Aeschylus to call a rash man 'hot'—*γελᾷ δὲ δαίμων ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ θερμῷ*, *Eumen.* 560. Cf. also *Sept. c. Th.* 603. The trumpet blast 'fires' the Greek fleet at Salamis—*σάλπιγξ δ' ἀντῇ πάντ' ἐκεῖν' ἐπέφλεγεν*, *Pers.* 395. Fear is a 'frost'—*κακόν με καρδίαν τι περιπίτνει κρύος*, *Sept. c. Th.* 834. Even bolder is the metaphor in *Agam.* 1512 *πάχνᾳ κουροβόρῳ παρέξει.* An attack upon Thebes is a violent 'snow-storm' or perhaps a 'blizzard'—*νιφάδος | ὅτ' ὀλοᾶς νιφομένας βρόμος ἐν πύλαις*, *Sept. c. Th.* 213. The winter and the stormy sea also do their part—*οἷός σε χειμὼν καὶ κακῶν τρικυμία | ἔπεισ' ἄφυκτος*, *Prom.* 1015. Clytaemnestra would address her returning lord as *κάλλιστον ἦμαρ εἰσιδεῖν ἐκ χείματος, | ὁδοιπόρῳ διψῶντι πηγαῖον ῥέος*, *Agam.* 900–901. The curse in the house of Agamemnon is a 'storm'—*ὅδε τοι μελάθροις τοῖς βασιλείοις | τρίτος*

αὖ χειμὼν | πνεύσας γονίας ἐτελέσθη, *Choeph.* 1065–67. After the 'storm' of battle the 'ship of state' has fair sailing and has not sprung a leak—*Sept. c. Th.* 795–6,

πόλις δ' ἐν εὐδίᾳ τε καὶ κλυδωνίου
πολλαῖσι πληγαῖς ἄντλον οὐκ ἐδέξατο.

The life-blood of Agamemnon is bloody 'dew'—βάλλει μ' ἐρεμνῇ ψακάδι φοινίας δρόσου, *Agam.* 1390. His death is a 'shower' of blood—δέδοικα δ' ὄμβρου κτύπον δομοσφαλῆ | τὸν αἱματηρόν· ψακὰς δὲ λήγει, *Agam.* 1533–4.

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THE RELATION OF THE RHYTHM OF POETRY TO THAT OF THE SPOKEN LANGUAGE WITH ESPECIAL REFERENCE TO ANCIENT GREEK.

It is a matter of common experience with students of Greek that have advanced far enough to read Homer to find that it is impossible for them to read a single line of Homer rhythmically, and that this ability can be gained only by dint of hard practice and by a thorough understanding of the structure of the heroic hexameter. The difficulty is very much increased when the student encounters the Comic trimeter, and it may be truthfully stated that many a fair Greek scholar never masters the trimeter. Now if the English or the German student will recall the experience of his boyhood, he will notice that there was no such chasm between prose and poetry. Though he had barely learned how to read he was able to render the ordinary rhythms of his mother-tongue correctly when attempting to read a poem. The most natural question, and the question that presents itself to everyone that has had the above experience, is this: "Whence this diversity? Why could I not read my Homer or my Sophocles correctly as well as my English or my German poem?"

The traditional answer to this question is contained in the assertion that Greek versification is a purely artificial product of the poet's brain, or, at any rate, that the fundamental principles of Greek rhythm are not based upon the rhythm of the spoken language. So, for example, Westphal, in his *Griechische Metrik* (1868), p. 2, after having on page 1 explained the term ictus, makes the following statement: "Die Setzung des rhythmischen Ictus auf die eine oder die andere Silbe ist wenigstens für die griechische Poesie *lediglich*[1] die That des Dichters in seiner Eigenschaft als Rhythmopoios, der in dieser Beziehung *gänzlich frei* über das sprachliche Material gebietet." And Christ, in the second edition (1879) of his *Metrik der*

[1] The italics in this and the following quotations are not in the originals.

Griechen und Römer, p. 3, makes use of the following language: "Das Natürlichste wäre daher gewesen, wenn der rhythmische Ictus sich mit den langen und zugleich accentuirten Sylben verbunden hätte; aber damit hätten sich die Dichter zu beengende Fesseln angelegt; *sie legten daher dem Versbau nur eines von jenen beiden Elementen, entweder die Quantität oder den Accent zu Grunde*, indem sie zugleich bei der langen aber unbetonten Sylbe die Tonstärke und bei der accentuirten aber kurzen Sylbe die Sylbendauer künstlich steigerten."

The foregoing quotations plainly indicate a belief in the possibility of a system of rhythms whose entire fabric rests upon purely artificial principles and such as are entirely distinct from those of the spoken language, and, as was pointed out above, this represents the traditional view with regard to Greek versification. The falsity of this view seemed so self-evident to the writer of this article, that as early as 1884, in a paper read before the Johns Hopkins University Philological Association, an abstract of which was published in the Johns Hopkins University Circulars, No. 32 (1884), pp. 125 f., it was quietly discarded by him, and instead the principle was postulated "that the versification of a language must be in accordance with the nature of the language." But old beliefs die hard, and even in 1892, at the close of a distinguished career in the field of Greek rhythmic and metric, Westphal had apparently not gotten over the position he held in 1868, for on p. 42 of his *Allgemeine Metrik* he speaks thus: "Zum Begriffe des Rhythmus gehört ein Zweifaches, einmal die Gleichheit, zweitens die Hervorhebung dieser einzelnen Zeitabschnitte als selbständiger Gruppen durch den Ictus . . . Beide Momente suchen sich nun an die in der Sprache vorhandenen Eigenthümlichkeiten anzuschliessen: die Ordnung in den aufeinander folgenden rhythmischen Zeitabschnitten an die in der Sprache bestehende Zeitdauer der einzelnen Sylben, der Ictus an den in der Sprache bestehenden Wortaccent. Aber keine Poesie lässt gleichzeitig der Sylbenquantität und dem Wortaccente dieselbe Berechtigung zu Theil werden. Die griechische Metrik unterwirft lediglich die prosodische Sylbenbeschaffenheit dem Rhythmus und vertheilt den Ictus unabhängig von dem Wortaccente nach einem *freien künstlerischen Principe*, während die altgermanische Poesie ohne Berücksichtigung der Sylbenquantität an dem Wortaccente als dem Träger des rhythmischen

Ictus festhält . . . Es lässt sich aber auch denken, dass eine Poesie die Sprache nach einem völlig freien Principe dem Rhythmus unterwirft, bloss auf die Zahl der Sylben Rücksicht nimmt und sich weder in der Zeitdauer der rhythmischen Abschnitte an die Sylbenquantität, noch im Ictus an den Wortaccent bindet, und somit würde zu dem quantitirenden und accentuirenden noch ein bloss sylbenzählendes Princip der Metrik hinzukommen."

It is perfectly clear, then, that in 1892 Westphal had not abandoned the position he held in 1868, and as some such theory as this is still widely prevalent, and even at the present day the majority of the youth of the land are trained by their text-books, or teachers, or both, to look upon Greek versification as based upon purely artificial rules, it did not seem amiss, in view of the fundamental importance of the principle involved, to take up the question once more and treat it at greater length.

Before proceeding with our discussion, it may be well to issue a word of caution. We will readily grant that it is possible to conceive of poetry for which the author might choose a means of artistic embellishment or a distinctive form other than that of artistic rhythm. Alliteration, rhyme, equality or symmetry of the length of the verses depending upon equality or symmetry of the number of syllables, equality or symmetry that may be only approximate, or some other device, might all of them, either singly or in combination, serve as an artificial or an artistic means of formally separating poetry from prose. But all such poetry would fall outside of the scope of the present discussion. Our contention is simply this—to state it a little more clearly than in the Circulars—that under normal conditions, when a poet employs an artistic form of rhythm as an artistic embellishment of his poetry, such rhythm is not a purely artificial and arbitrary product of the poet's brain, but is based upon the rhythm of the spoken language, or, to put it more concisely, *Under normal conditions the rhythm of poetry is based upon the rhythm of the spoken language.*

We may without fear of contradiction venture the statement that all serious art is meant by the artist to appeal to the aesthetic faculties of others than himself. It is true that there is a certain charm for the artist in the mere act of creating; he may also look forward with keen pleasure to the completion of his

work, and he may even display an affection for the finished product of his skill comparable to that with which a parent views his offspring; but his joy will be full only when his work has found appreciative hearers, readers, or admirers, and when its merits have been recognized and acknowledged by intelligent critics. If this is true of the sculptor, the painter, the musical composer, and other artists, it is certainly true of the poet. Take away the reader, the hearer, the admirer, and poetry would soon practically become extinct. Under normal conditions, then, poetry is meant to be heard or to be read. But by whom? The poet's mission is ordinarily not confined to any single individual or class, but he strives to reach everybody. Poetry is essentially of the people and for the people, and our great poets speak to their countrymen at large without reference to social distinctions or intellectual attainments. "He that hath ears to hear, let him hear," saith the poet as well as the preacher.

It is evident, then, that if poetry—rhythm and all—is not intended simply for the poet's own amusement but is primarily designed for others than the poet himself, the rhythm must be expressed in such a way as to be intelligible to the reader, just as the thought must be clothed in a language that will be understood by those to whom the thought is to be communicated, for without an intelligible medium of expression neither thought nor rhythm can be discerned. From the very nature of the case, then, just as the poet is forced to employ the mother-tongue of the reader or hearer as the vehicle of expressing his thoughts, so he is compelled to use the rhythm of the mother-tongue of the reader or hearer as the basis of his own rhythm; for language is the common carrier of both thought and rhythm. In other words, when the poet is writing iambic, trochaic, dactylic, or anapaestic rhythm, the rhythm that results when the reader reads such poetry according to his natural way of speaking, must be iambic, trochaic, dactylic, or anapaestic, as the case may be.

If the above be true, it follows that the adoption of a purely artificial basis of rhythm, or the adoption of foreign principles of rhythm, is altogether excluded. But for the sake of viewing the matter in all its aspects, let us suppose that an English poet did write an English poem which was based upon the principles of rhythm of Ancient Greek, if such a thing were possible, or, if it be preferred, let the laws of rhythm employed be those of the

French language; it matters not; the result would be the same in each case: no English-speaking person would comprehend the rhythm, if he followed the ordinary pronunciation of the English language, and if, by a previous knowledge of the poet's intention and by dint of extra effort, he should succeed in rendering the poem in such a way as to bring out the intended rhythm, the result would be gibberish and the reader would not be able to follow the sense and much less impart it to others. So the result of the experiment would be either a loss of the rhythm, and we should have the case of a poet consciously undertaking a very difficult, if not Herculean, task, all to no purpose, a thing which it is scarcely possible to conceive as happening in reality; or, if the rhythm were maintained, the sense would be lost, and the poet confronted with an alternative even more absurd than the other.

Having shown that the principle enunciated by us is true on *a priori* grounds, let us now look at some of the actual facts, as far as we are able to observe them. That the principle holds good for English, German, Norwegian, French, and Modern Greek, all those that are conversant with the facts will readily admit. Any English, German, Norwegian, French, or Greek man, woman, or child that knows his mother-tongue and can read with any degree of ease, whether he has any scientific knowledge of rhythm or not, nay, even without knowing that there is such a thing as rhythm, can and does without any effort bring out in his reading the ordinary rhythms of his native poetry, and the fewer the rhythmic licenses in which the poet has indulged, the more exactly will the rhythm of the reading correspond with the rhythm designed by the poet.

Though the writer of this article cannot speak from personal observation and experience about other languages than those mentioned above, yet there is sufficient variety in these to warrant the inference that the same state of affairs as has just been described prevails also in the case of all the other European languages in which a well-defined rhythm is the concomitant of poetry. If only the Teutonic group of languages were represented, one might be in doubt as to whether the principle would hold good in any of the Romance languages, or in Modern Greek; but when three so dissimilar languages as the German, the French, and the Modern Greek afford evidence of the truth

of the principle for which we are contending, the only safe inference is the one presented above, and we can confidently assume the validity of the principle for all the languages that fall under the scope of the present investigation.

Before taking up the question of the applicability of the principle to Ancient Greek, it may be well to state that the author, of course, recognizes the fact that the truth of the principle in the case of the more familiar modern languages must have been apparent to many persons even before the author's publication of his views, and that it must have appeared to others independently since. So, for example, as early as 1871, Brücke in his *Physiologische Grundlagen der neuhochdeutschen Verskunst*, p. 1, says: "Ich glaube nicht auf den Widerspruch des Lesers zu stossen, wenn ich von dem Grundsatze ausgehe, dass ein Vers um so correcter sei, je weniger man sich beim scandiren desselben in störender Weise von der prosaischen Aussprache zu entfernen braucht."

Lanier's whole *Science of English Verse* (1880) is based upon a recognition of this principle for English. Thus, on page 73 f. is found the statement: "We have found, first, that an ordinary English reader, in coming upon the line,

Rhythmical roundelays wavering downward,

would immediately recognize in it the rhythmic movement noted in the musical scheme . . . By what signs is this recognition made?"

"To this question there can be but one answer: The English habit of uttering words, *prose or verse* (the italics are not Lanier's), is to give each sound of each word a duration which is either equal or simply proportionate to the duration of each other sound; and, since these simple proportions enable the ear to make those exact co-ordinations of duration which result in the perception of primary rhythm, we may say that all English word-sounds are primarily rhythmical, and therefore that the signs of those sounds —that is, written or printed words—are in reality also signs of primary rhythm; so that we may say further, Written or printed English words constitute a sort of system of notation for primary rhythm."

"But this is not all. We found, secondly, that an ordinary English reader, in coming upon the line,

Rhythmical roundelays wavering downward,

would recognize not only the simple relations in time among the verse-sounds which suggest primary rhythm, but would also recognize a certain grouping of these sounds which was intended by the writer and which constitutes their secondary rhythm, to wit, the grouping of the eleven syllables into four bars, each bar equal in its time to each other bar, etc."

Compare also what the same writer says on page 117 of his work: "(1) Primary rhythm is the result of simple time-relations between individual verse-sounds. (2) The English habit of utterance in current speech is to deliver the sounds in some sort of primary rhythm. (3) The particular sort of primary rhythm thus given varies with different speakers, but only within such limits as allow *every speaker* (the italics are not Lanier's) to preserve without difficulty the larger time-relations of bar to bar in secondary rhythm. (4) In consequence of the habit mentioned, words have become so associated with their rhythms as to suggest them when written or printed and thus to become a system of notation for rhythm."

Even Westphal, when he is not brought face to face with the perplexing problem of accounting for the seeming difference between the pronunciation of Greek poetry and that of prose, recognizes the principle at least for German; for on page 116 of his *Allgemeine Metrik* (1892) he expresses himself in favor of Brücke's view as follows: "Oftmals genug kommt es vor, dass unsere besten Dichter auch eine Flexionssylbe im Verse zur rhythmischen Hebungssylbe machen. Nur muss man dabei mit E. Brücke von dem Grundsatze ausgehen, dass ein Vers um so correcter ist, je weniger man beim Scandiren der Verse in störender Weise von der Aussprache der Prosa sich zu entfernen braucht."[1]

But it is high time for us to direct our attention to Ancient Greek. The same *a priori* reasoning that led us to accept the principle in the case of other languages would lead us to accept it also in the case of Ancient Greek. It may be well to note, it is true, that music and the dance played a prominent part in Greek

[1] The above was written before the appearance of *Chapters on Greek Metric*, by Thomas Dwight Goodell, New York, 1901. It is a source of great satisfaction to the writer of this article to note that Goodell also (pp. 19 f.) unreservedly recognizes, for English, German, and Ancient Greek, the principle which this paper is seeking to establish.

poetry. But as the Greeks employed no system of notation for expressing the rhythm of the musical and orchestic accompaniment of their poetry other than that which was contained in the language itself, and as the music and dance, if any, were simple and were in general subordinated to the words, the conditions in Greek, so far as the relation of the rhythm of poetry to that of the spoken language is concerned, could not have been essentially different from those which prevailed in other languages.

Furthermore, the overwhelming mass of the testimony of the ancients themselves points in the direction of our theory. The limits of this paper preclude the presentation of all this testimony and it would be wearisome to quote even the familiar remarks of Aristotle and of Dionysius of Halicarnassus. Among other works that might be mentioned as presenting more or less of this testimony, may be cited *De vi atque indole rhythmorum quid veteres iudicaverint, Breslau, 1887* (=Breslauer phil. Abh. I, 3), by G. Amsel, who gives a formidable array of quotations and references on the subject. Without stopping, then, for a detailed discussion of these passages we shall content ourselves with calling attention, on the one hand, to Plato's views regarding the rhythm of poetry, and, on the other hand, to the important place assigned to rhythm in the artistic elaboration of Ancient Greek prose.[1]

The manner in which Plato, in the Republic, discusses rhythm, and the importance which he, from an educational point of view, attaches to the character of the rhythms employed, plainly show that rhythm was a feature of poetry that was universally recognized and whose effect was universally felt. It does not seem reasonable to suppose that this recognition was made possible only by the instruction received at school and that it was not primarily due to the conformity of the rhythm of poetry with the rhythm of the spoken language. On the other hand it is impossible to conceive that Plato, Isocrates, Demosthenes, and other Greek prose writers should have paid so much attention to rhythm, and that the works or teachings of the Greek rhetoricians should be fraught with such minute observations and explicit

[1] For the proper appreciation of the part played by rhythm in the elaboration of Greek prose, a study of Blass' *Attische Beredsamkeit* and of Norden's *Antike Kunstprosa* is indispensable.

instructions on this subject, if rhythm had not been intended for artistic effect. Now this effect would have been entirely lost if the rhythm had not been properly brought out in the delivery of the works referred to, or had not been observed when these works were read. But this would have been impossible unless the rhythm had been based upon the rhythm of the spoken language. For surely the orator could not possibly have pronounced his oration on a rhythmical basis entirely distinct from that of his ordinary pronunciation, and if, for the sake of argument, the possibility of such a feat might be granted, the audience could but ill have understood him, if it understood him at all; and, on the other hand, it is preposterous to suppose that the ordinary Athenian reader could have discarded his ordinary rhythmical utterance of prose and adopted therefor a purely artificial one for the sole purpose of enjoying, during his reading, the beauties of a purely artificial rhythm. Hence, as the artistic rhythm of prose was based upon the same principles as the rhythm of poetry,[1] it follows that the rhythm of poetry must have been based upon the rhythm of the spoken language.

But the same result may be reached in another way by simply confining our attention to one particular feature of the testimony of the ancients. It is well known that the employment in prose of a verse of any of the ordinary rhythms, as, for example, an iambic trimeter, or a dactylic hexameter, or a trochaic tetrameter, was regarded by the ancient rhetoricians as a blemish. This fact shows that such verses, if present in prose, must have been noticed by the average reader or hearer, even when the reader or hearer was unprepared for them, and this ability on the part of the reader or hearer would be inconceivable unless the rhythm in question had been a reflex of that of the spoken language. Now, since it is perfectly certain that an iambic, trochaic, or dactylic verse

[1] Compare Amsel, l. c., page 26: "Oratores autem quin suos numeros a poetis quasi mutuati sint, in dubitationem vocari nequit. . . . Sed cum rhythmorum in prosa oratione usurpatorum natura eadem sit atque metrorum, quibus carmina efficiuntur, consentaneum est indolem quoque eorum fere esse parem. Quare non solum universa brevium et longarum syllabarum, rhythmorum ascendentium et descendentium vis eadem fere est in orationibus atque in carminibus, sed etiam ubicumque de singulis pedibus rhetores iudicium faciunt, animis eorum obversantur versus ex his pedibus contexti."

in poetry differed in no respect from one that happened to be employed in prose, except that the latter was unexpected, and since the rhythm of the prose verse, as we have just seen, must have been a reflex of the rhythm of the spoken language, we are again forced to the conclusion that the rhythm of poetry was based upon the rhythm of the spoken language.

It now remains for us briefly to discuss some of the reasons that have prevented the proper recognition of the principle here advocated, and that have made it possible, especially in the case of Ancient Greek, for the traditional view to hold its own with such a degree of tenacity. The first of these reasons inheres in the very nature of the rhythm of poetry. For, after all, no matter how artistically and how skilfully used, poetical rhythm serves as an artificial restraint upon the language. Language does not naturally run in uniform rhythms; not all words are iambi, or trochees, or dactyls, or anapaests. To secure a uniform movement the poet has to resort to a process of selection and re-arrangement, and in the course of this process of selection and re-arrangement he at times does violence to the rhythm of the spoken language as he does to the grammar and to the diction. But as there is usually some excuse for the deviations in grammar and diction, and, indeed, a portion of the poet's art may consist in the skilful use of these very deviations, so there is usually some excuse for the deviations from the rhythm of the spoken language, and the rhythmical artist will show his superiority also in the way in which he admits these variations. Some of them may be survivals from earlier periods, which have become a part of the rhythmical paraphernalia of the poet's workshop. This is true notoriously of the employment of mute *e* in modern French poetry in a manner that is largely at variance with the usage of the spoken language. Other deviations may be so skilfully employed as to be noticeable only when the verse in which they occur is taken out of its context, whereas in continuous recitation or reading they escape observation. This becomes possible by the momentum, if we may call it so, of the rhythm. The type of the rhythm has been set up and the reader's mind, in accordance with the law of inertia, unconsciously continues in the same movement. This factor is one that is of the utmost importance, and it unquestionably played quite as prominent a rôle in Ancient Greek as it does in modern languages. The fol-

lowing lines of Tennyson's *Princess* may serve as an illustration:

> A great broad-shoulder'd genial Englishman,
> A lord of fat prize-oxen and of sheep,
> A raiser of huge melons and of pine,
> A patron of some thirty charities.

These lines, if read singly, and without a knowledge of the context, would certainly not be suspected of being heroic verse, and yet, when taken in conjunction with the preceding portion of the poem, they are naturally read as heroic verse and one would not at first sight notice that in prose they would be read otherwise.

Even those seemingly more serious variations that are brought about by placing the rhythmical accent upon an unaccented final syllable may be concealed by a little manipulation, which consists in a dissociation of the pitch and stress on the one hand and the rhythmical accent on the other hand, the stem-syllable retaining the pitch and stress elements of its normal accent and thus doing partial justice to the language, whilst the requirements of the verse are met by placing the rhythmical accent on the ending. Thus, if in the following two verses from Tennyson's *Idyls of the King*,

> Darkening the world. We have lost him: he is gone

and

> Wearing the white flower of a blameless life,

the words "darkening" and "wearing" are pronounced somewhat as the words "Thine are" in the fifth verse of Tennyson's *In Memoriam*,

> Thine are these orbs of light and shade,

the word "thine", because of the emphasis, receiving a higher pitch and greater stress than the word "are", and the word "are" receiving the rhythmical value demanded by the verse,[1] no perceptible violence will be done to the language and we escape the shock of the sudden transition from ascending rhythm in a number of successive verses to descending rhythm in a single verse followed by just as sudden a return to ascending rhythm in the very next line.

[1] For a different view of the matter, see J. W. Bright, Publications of the Modern Language Association, XIV (1899), pp. 364 ff.

But apart from all these deviations which are perfectly justifiable, there are others that are less so, and these are occasionally indulged in even by poets that are distinguished for their fine rhythmical feeling. So, for example, a verse like the following from Tennyson's *Princess*,

Blacken'd about us, bats wheel'd, and owls whoop'd,

does not fall naturally into the movement of heroic verse, and any large number of such verses would be fatal to fine rhythmical effect.

Now all these greater and lesser, justifiable and unjustifiable deviations have a tendency to obscure the true relationship subsisting between the rhythm of poetry and that of the spoken language, and it is, perhaps, not surprising, after all, that there are found those who would deny the existence of any relationship whatsoever between poetry and the spoken language in the matter of rhythm.

The second great reason that has served to keep our principle in the background arises from the physiological and mechanical difficulties that are encountered in the analysis of the sounds of the spoken language. Thus, whilst the average person will readily admit that every musical sound possesses at least four characteristics, viz., quality, quantity, stress, and pitch, and whilst he may be able fairly well to distinguish these four characteristics in the case of vocal music, few persons would, perhaps, feel perfectly safe in admitting the presence of these four factors in the sounds of the spoken language, and very few, indeed, are there whose ear is sufficiently well trained to enable them, in the case of spoken sounds, to distinguish even roughly between the four qualities, not to speak of measuring them. The truth is that the human ear, though capable of the most marvelous development in the matter of recognizing minute variations of quantity, stress, and pitch, is at best an imperfect instrument, and so rapid are the changes that take place in the quantity, stress, and pitch of the sounds of the spoken language that even those who think they have discerned certain relationships between spoken sounds hesitate to express very positive views on the subject for fear of being mistaken, and the average person, appalled by the difficulties, is satisfied to leave the problem unsolved. Neither does physics come to our rescue. For, wonderful as have been the

results obtained in the investigation of vocal sounds by the aid of ingenious physical apparatus, no instrument has as yet been devised that will simultaneously determine the absolute or relative values of the quantity, stress, and pitch of the sounds of a sentence of even moderate length.

But great as may be the obstacles occasioned by the physical limitations described in the previous section and by the artificial restrictions imposed on language by the very nature of rhythm, greater still are the barriers to a proper understanding of the subject under discussion that have been caused by the great difference between the Teutonic languages and Modern Greek on the one hand and Ancient Greek on the other so far as the interrelationship of the elements of pitch, quantity, and stress is concerned. Modern Greeks were the teachers of the western nations in the study of Ancient Greek. As these teachers were unable to read Ancient Greek verse without a great deal of practice, the belief arose that Ancient Greek poetry was constructed according to an artificial system of versification. Now the Teuton, while experiencing the same difficulty with respect to Ancient Greek as did his Modern Greek teacher, found no difficulty whatever in mastering Modern Greek rhythms, a Modern Greek word being pronounced just as an English word that has the same number of syllables and that is accented on the same syllable as that which bears the Greek written accent. It was quite natural, then, that the belief regarding the artificiality of Ancient Greek rhythm should have found a firm lodgment in the mind of the Teutonic scholar.

Furthermore, as Modern Greek rhythm is regulated principally by the written accent just as English or German rhythm is regulated by the so-called word-accent, and as the principal point in connection with the writing of Classic verse was to know the quantities of the syllables of the Classic languages, the versification of these languages was said to be *quantitative*, whilst that of the Teutonic languages and Modern Greek was said to be *accentual*. Now as the word *accent* is used in a variety of significations it became necessary, of course, to define the meaning of the word *accentual*. Inasmuch as the accentual principle was supposed to be radically different from the quantitative principle, *quantity* was excluded; everybody knew that the term did not apply to *timbre*; a slight knowledge of music was sufficient to show that *pitch* did

not determine rhythm; so the only thing left was to suppose that *accent* was tantamount to *stress*.[1] The inevitable result of this false notion has been the growth of a belief in the existence of two distinct kinds of rhythm, one based upon quantity, the other based upon stress,[2] and it is precisely this erroneous belief that has to a large extent been the cause of the

[1] This false view seems to have been perpetuated in the term *expiratory* as applied to the accent of Modern Greek (Brugmann, *Gr. Gram.*[3] §143) and of the Teutonic and other languages (Hirt, *Der Indogermanische Akzent*, pp. 10 and 47), though Hirt after accepting the current classification of word-accent as *musical* and *expiratory* is careful to add that probably both kinds of accent exist in every language, and he does not fail to call attention to the existence in the modern Germanic dialects of a well-developed so-called *musical* accent. The fact of the matter is that the current classification is misleading, and any definition of the word-accent of any particular language that fails to take into account the three factors of pitch, stress, and quantity, fails to give an adequate idea of the nature of such accent. Now whilst there is still a great deal to be learned in regard to the word-accent of English or German, not to mention Ancient Greek, yet the most palpable difference, as the writer sees it, between the word-accent of English or German and that of Ancient Greek is this: The German, or the English, word-accent contains in addition to the stress element a decided pitch element, and as the word-accent is also the regulator of the rhythm, the quantitative element must also be reckoned with, for without a symmetrical distribution of time-values rhythm is impossible. It will be seen, then, that in English and German there is a tendency to combine prominence of pitch, stress, and quantity on one syllable, whereas in Ancient Greek there is often a tendency to dissociate prominence of pitch from prominence of either or both of the other two factors. To Christ (l. c., p. 4) belongs the credit of having pointed out, as early as 1879, the essential difference between the accent of German and that of Ancient Greek.

[2] One of the latest adherents of this view is G. Schultz, who in *Hermes* XXXV (1900), p. 314, uses the following language: "Man pflegt den Unterschied im Versbau der antiken und der neueren Zeit so zu bestimmen, dass man jenen als quantitirend, diesen als accentuirend bezeichnet. Die Verse der Alten bauen sich auf der Länge und Kürze der Silben auf, *die unsrigen auf der verschiedenen Tonstärke* (the italics are mine). Dieser Unterschied ist, wie man meinen sollte, offenkundig und allgemein bekannt . . . *Es giebt in der antiken Poesie keinen Versaccent* (the italics are Schultz's). Dieser Satz beruht zunächst auf einer allgemeinen Erwägung. *Wo bleibt denn der Unterschied zwischen accentuirendem und quantitirendem Versbau, wenn auch dieser wiederum der Accente bedarf* (the italics are mine)?" It is hard to escape the conclusion that Schultz, in addition to limiting the German word-accent to stress and believing in a rhythm based on stress versus a rhythm based on quantity, is also confounding rhythmical accent and word-accent.

persistence of the idea as to a purely artificial basis of the rhythm of poetry and that has blinded the eyes of scholars in regard to the true nature of the rhythm of Ancient Greek.

Let us now rapidly survey the ground that we have covered. In the first place, the principle was advanced that under normal conditions the rhythm of poetry is based upon that of the spoken language. Secondly, it was shown that the principle is probable on *a priori* grounds, that it actually holds good for a number of languages, and that therefore there is a strong presumption in its favor in the case of all languages whose poetry is characterized by artistic rhythm. Thirdly, it was pointed out that the same *a priori* reasoning applies also in the case of Ancient Greek and that our position is sustained by the overwhelming mass of the testimony of the ancients. In the last place, some of the reasons were pointed out that have kept the principle in the background and that have made it possible, especially in the case of Ancient Greek, for the traditional view to hold its own with such a degree of tenacity.

It would seem high time, then, to abandon the view that Ancient Greek rhythm was based upon principles that were purely artificial and foreign to the genius of the language, and it ought to be distinctly understood that the reason why the average English or German student, in spite of a normally developed rhythmical feeling, cannot read his Homeric hexameter or iambic trimeter without special preparation and without a forewarning, is that he is in the habit of pronouncing his Greek according to the laws of English or German rhythm and not according to the laws of Ancient Greek rhythm.

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